Shredded 'documents' XV230
Thread Starter
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: W Sussex
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shredded 'documents' XV230
This from the Times online:
RAF Commander admits to shredding spy plane documents
Michael Smith
An RAF commander destroyed a number of official documents after the loss of a Nimrod spy plane and its 14-man crew over Afghanistan, it emerged last week.
The Nimrod XV230 caught fire and broke up shortly after refuelling in mid-air over Afghanistan in September 2006 killing all 14 on board.
All documents relating to the aircraft were immediately impounded but Sqn Ldr Guy Bazalgette, commander of the Nimrod detachment in the Gulf, managed to retrieve one file.
In a previously unreported admission, Bazalgette told the inquest last May into the deaths of the 14 crew that he retrieved the file because he needed it to run his detachment.
He then decided that some of the documents within the file, known as the “stopped press folder”, should be destroyed and had them shredded.
Asked what the file contained, he said: “Information might come in from the station flight safety officer or other experts at Kinloss. It could have been about various aspects”.
Bazalgette insisted none of the shredded documents were relevant to the loss of XV230 but admitted: “They should not have been shredded and it was my fault that they were.”
James Jones, a former RAF engineering officer, said: "The idea that the commander of the Nimrod detachment would destroy any documents in the wake of the XV230 deaths is incomprehensible.
"No documents should have been shredded until the inquiry team had examined them and decided whether or not they were relevant. It was not his decision to make."
An independent inquiry into the loss of the Nimrod sent out a number of letters to organisations and senior RAF officers last week warning them they were likely to be criticised in its report.
The so-called Salmon letters give those who are likely to be criticised by the inquiry the opportunity to respond to the criticism before the report’s publication.
Organisation’s that might be criticised include manufacturers BAE Systems. The inquest ruled that a “design flaw” built into the aircraft that led to its demise meant it had never been airworthy. BAE Systems declined to comment.
The MoD and the Nimrod inquiry team declined to say which senior RAF officers had received letters.
But the senior officers most directly involved were the officers in charge of the “integrated project team” which oversaw Nimrod operations and was responsible for its continued airworthiness.
The independent inquiry by senior lawyer Charles Haddon-Cave QC was set up in December 2007. It was due to report in mid-2009 but will now report in late October.
RAF Commander admits to shredding spy plane documents
Michael Smith
An RAF commander destroyed a number of official documents after the loss of a Nimrod spy plane and its 14-man crew over Afghanistan, it emerged last week.
The Nimrod XV230 caught fire and broke up shortly after refuelling in mid-air over Afghanistan in September 2006 killing all 14 on board.
All documents relating to the aircraft were immediately impounded but Sqn Ldr Guy Bazalgette, commander of the Nimrod detachment in the Gulf, managed to retrieve one file.
In a previously unreported admission, Bazalgette told the inquest last May into the deaths of the 14 crew that he retrieved the file because he needed it to run his detachment.
He then decided that some of the documents within the file, known as the “stopped press folder”, should be destroyed and had them shredded.
Asked what the file contained, he said: “Information might come in from the station flight safety officer or other experts at Kinloss. It could have been about various aspects”.
Bazalgette insisted none of the shredded documents were relevant to the loss of XV230 but admitted: “They should not have been shredded and it was my fault that they were.”
James Jones, a former RAF engineering officer, said: "The idea that the commander of the Nimrod detachment would destroy any documents in the wake of the XV230 deaths is incomprehensible.
"No documents should have been shredded until the inquiry team had examined them and decided whether or not they were relevant. It was not his decision to make."
An independent inquiry into the loss of the Nimrod sent out a number of letters to organisations and senior RAF officers last week warning them they were likely to be criticised in its report.
The so-called Salmon letters give those who are likely to be criticised by the inquiry the opportunity to respond to the criticism before the report’s publication.
Organisation’s that might be criticised include manufacturers BAE Systems. The inquest ruled that a “design flaw” built into the aircraft that led to its demise meant it had never been airworthy. BAE Systems declined to comment.
The MoD and the Nimrod inquiry team declined to say which senior RAF officers had received letters.
But the senior officers most directly involved were the officers in charge of the “integrated project team” which oversaw Nimrod operations and was responsible for its continued airworthiness.
The independent inquiry by senior lawyer Charles Haddon-Cave QC was set up in December 2007. It was due to report in mid-2009 but will now report in late October.
Last edited by Biggles225; 31st May 2009 at 09:24. Reason: Tidying up the script
Whilst it is not unreasonable to prune the contents of a 'Stop Press' folder during routine detachments, so that it doesn't fill up with out-of-date cr@p, after a major aircraft accident all detachment files and paperwork should most certainly have been preserved intact.
Such a stupid, basic error - and one which will undoubtedly make people suspect that this was an attempt to destroy incriminating evidence. Whereas it was probably no such thing and was more likely to have been just routine housekeeping. However, as a result of these actions, no-one can now be certain.
Such a stupid, basic error - and one which will undoubtedly make people suspect that this was an attempt to destroy incriminating evidence. Whereas it was probably no such thing and was more likely to have been just routine housekeeping. However, as a result of these actions, no-one can now be certain.
Whereas it was probably no such thing and was more likely to have been just routine housekeeping.
Beagle, you may be right, but there are other cases where reports to Boards of Inquiry, ultimately intended for Coroners, have been deliberately withheld and/or destroyed.
Such an act, deliberate or otherwise, prevents both from fulfilling their role - to identify causes and prevent reoccurrence.
On the other hand, Ainsworth is recently on record as being quite content with such destruction (aka perverting the course of justice) so I assume the good Sqn Ldr is safe.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
James Jones, a former RAF engineering officer, said: "The idea that the commander of the Nimrod detachment would destroy any documents in the wake of the XV230 deaths is incomprehensible.
Most of the (many) ops detachments I went on were run out of a portacabin/tent/broom cupboard. I'm sure there has been many an inadvertant admin cock up over the years.
I am reminded of the clip in "Reach for The Sky", when Bader lobs the files in the bin. Or Wellington's famous letter requesting parliment's priorities.
It's war. No money; no staff; no equipment and too many jobs. A minor cock up, which is unlikely to have had any consequences for any aspect of the XV230 accident, before or after the event.
And well done BG for holding up your hand. That puts you above, bankers, politicians and attention-seeking "former engineering officers" straight away".
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to Guy Bazalgettes evidence he:
(1) Imbounded all files/documentation after the crash. So he knew it was important to do that.
(2) After being told that he should continue running the detachment, he asked for the "stopped press folder" to be released.
(3) He then shredded documents in the folder, some of them being from the station flight safety officer, Sdn Ldr John Nelson.
All this happened, not in weeks, but a couple of days. I believe the BOI team, which included John Nelson, arrived in theatre around 5th Sept. There is no mention of this incident in the body of the BOI report.
Did Guy Bazalgette get promoted in 2008?
DV
(1) Imbounded all files/documentation after the crash. So he knew it was important to do that.
(2) After being told that he should continue running the detachment, he asked for the "stopped press folder" to be released.
(3) He then shredded documents in the folder, some of them being from the station flight safety officer, Sdn Ldr John Nelson.
All this happened, not in weeks, but a couple of days. I believe the BOI team, which included John Nelson, arrived in theatre around 5th Sept. There is no mention of this incident in the body of the BOI report.
Did Guy Bazalgette get promoted in 2008?
DV
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
let's not lose sight of the most important aspect of this article. Namely Haddon-Cave is issuing Salmon letters to high up elements intimately involved in this tragedy. The Salmon letters allow people facing serious accusations to respond. This inquiry was originally intended for release to Parliament before the summer recess. There is little doubt that the inquiry has broadened and deepened. Fingers crossed that Haddon-Cave now has the overview on all that has gone wrong by way of airworthiness implementation in the RAF.
Let's hope that his report will act as a force for the good when it eventually sees the light of day. TD and the other main players should be congratulated for their hard work in bringing various failings to the attention of HC. It would appear they have pierced the MoD insulating tape surrounding the inquiry in the initial stages.
Ainsworth and his colleagues have strived to deny systemic failings, quick to stove pipe fatal incidents/accidents, I have always believed that it would take someone of HC's stature to spell out systemic failings at the heart of safety management in MoD/RAF. I don't think Ainsworth will be able to deny it much longer.
Let's hope that his report will act as a force for the good when it eventually sees the light of day. TD and the other main players should be congratulated for their hard work in bringing various failings to the attention of HC. It would appear they have pierced the MoD insulating tape surrounding the inquiry in the initial stages.
Ainsworth and his colleagues have strived to deny systemic failings, quick to stove pipe fatal incidents/accidents, I have always believed that it would take someone of HC's stature to spell out systemic failings at the heart of safety management in MoD/RAF. I don't think Ainsworth will be able to deny it much longer.
Last edited by nigegilb; 31st May 2009 at 13:34.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: N/A
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Please bear in mind that Crew 3's signature sheet at the start of the Stop Press folder (which shows which items they had read) survived, as did the folder's index (which contains details of the entries and shows which had been taken out during routine housekeeping). I would not be surprised if every single entry of that 'shredded evidence' could be reconstructed by consulting the index and asking the originators for a copy.
I'm not saying that the original pieces of paper shouldn't have been preserved for completeness of the investigation -- they should have and Wg Cdr Bazalgette has admitted the same and accepted responsibility. I also accept that we will thus never be able to comprehensively prove to conspiracy theorists that what was in the folder was indeed the full text of the signals that were sent, etc. I hope, however, that reasonable people will be able to accept the word of all those involved that there was no foul play involved in this innocent administrative error.
I'm not saying that the original pieces of paper shouldn't have been preserved for completeness of the investigation -- they should have and Wg Cdr Bazalgette has admitted the same and accepted responsibility. I also accept that we will thus never be able to comprehensively prove to conspiracy theorists that what was in the folder was indeed the full text of the signals that were sent, etc. I hope, however, that reasonable people will be able to accept the word of all those involved that there was no foul play involved in this innocent administrative error.
Anybody else find this poor form to name relatively ‘junior’ officers and criticize them in the open press?
There have been some well constructed arguments on pprune regarding the systematic erosion of military airworthiness standards over the last decade or so and no doubt the Hadden-Cave report will express a rather strong view. However, I am uncomfortable that relatively junior personnel are being named and shamed in this manner, as these personnel have little or no influence in the scheme of things. Indeed, they are more likely to be ‘victims’ of the current system rather than the chief protagonists – although they do make convenient scapegoats.
The XV179 inquiry cross-examined personnel down to cpl level, whilst the MoD provided no legal advice or council to them. Such a measure would have been deemed unthinkable only 5 years ago. For those of you who have not been exposed to such scrutiny and take a view (perhaps justifiably) that such matters should be pushed out into the light, it is worth a reminder that UK military personnel are still subject to military law. QRs currently prohibit any action that could be seen as criticizing more senior personnel. The chain-of-command still has primacy and regulations such as QR999 are powerful ‘catch-alls’ designed to protect the chain-of-command and provide a ‘legal’ framework for the unique things the military are asked to do. In a number of areas military law directly contradicts civilian law.
For those still serving ask yourself this – what has primacy, civil or military law? Then ask yourself another question – what happens when you give evidence under oath that may run against military law? Finally ask yourself this - what safeguards are in place to assure protection of any witness that gives evidence against senior personnel in their current, previous or potential chain-of-command?
For most of us the ‘look yourself in the mirror’ law rises above anything on the military or civil statute, but the recent inquests have been rather telling. Indeed, one could be forgiven in thinking that the true divide between junior and senior personnel is the gift of memory. Junior personnel seemingly have the gift of recall, whilst a number in senior positions have little or no recollection of anything.
Military personnel have been groomed for centuries that their actions are ‘covered’ by the chain of command. Even when we write letters or policy documents it is traditional to write on behalf of those in command (eg for AOC 2 Gp), safe in the knowledge that the buck would stop with them. Civilian inquests see no such cover – if you wrote it will be you they investigate. You could try pointing out that you wrote what you did as a result of orders from your chain of command, but of course you have the gift of memory – they may not recall anything.
The military needs to decide where they sit on such matters and change the regulations to match the season of openness. Otherwise I fear that I will be serving in a military paralysed into doing nothing, for fear of being cast to the press or the courts at a latter date. Sadly ‘inaction’ is equally likely to lead to loss of life, but has the benefit of leaving little incriminating evidence.
I choose to work in an area that is constantly under intense scrutiny and where further investigations and inquests are all-too-likely to occur. I am acutely aware that in anything I do the buck stops with me and not my 1 star (although my 1 star is a top bloke). I work with the most highly skilled and dedicated bunch of guys that I have ever come across, but I fear for the longevity of what we do. I am saddened to see a number of military personnel and civil servants avoid involvement in my area because of the potential of a highly invasive investigation.
There have been some well constructed arguments on pprune regarding the systematic erosion of military airworthiness standards over the last decade or so and no doubt the Hadden-Cave report will express a rather strong view. However, I am uncomfortable that relatively junior personnel are being named and shamed in this manner, as these personnel have little or no influence in the scheme of things. Indeed, they are more likely to be ‘victims’ of the current system rather than the chief protagonists – although they do make convenient scapegoats.
The XV179 inquiry cross-examined personnel down to cpl level, whilst the MoD provided no legal advice or council to them. Such a measure would have been deemed unthinkable only 5 years ago. For those of you who have not been exposed to such scrutiny and take a view (perhaps justifiably) that such matters should be pushed out into the light, it is worth a reminder that UK military personnel are still subject to military law. QRs currently prohibit any action that could be seen as criticizing more senior personnel. The chain-of-command still has primacy and regulations such as QR999 are powerful ‘catch-alls’ designed to protect the chain-of-command and provide a ‘legal’ framework for the unique things the military are asked to do. In a number of areas military law directly contradicts civilian law.
For those still serving ask yourself this – what has primacy, civil or military law? Then ask yourself another question – what happens when you give evidence under oath that may run against military law? Finally ask yourself this - what safeguards are in place to assure protection of any witness that gives evidence against senior personnel in their current, previous or potential chain-of-command?
For most of us the ‘look yourself in the mirror’ law rises above anything on the military or civil statute, but the recent inquests have been rather telling. Indeed, one could be forgiven in thinking that the true divide between junior and senior personnel is the gift of memory. Junior personnel seemingly have the gift of recall, whilst a number in senior positions have little or no recollection of anything.
Military personnel have been groomed for centuries that their actions are ‘covered’ by the chain of command. Even when we write letters or policy documents it is traditional to write on behalf of those in command (eg for AOC 2 Gp), safe in the knowledge that the buck would stop with them. Civilian inquests see no such cover – if you wrote it will be you they investigate. You could try pointing out that you wrote what you did as a result of orders from your chain of command, but of course you have the gift of memory – they may not recall anything.
The military needs to decide where they sit on such matters and change the regulations to match the season of openness. Otherwise I fear that I will be serving in a military paralysed into doing nothing, for fear of being cast to the press or the courts at a latter date. Sadly ‘inaction’ is equally likely to lead to loss of life, but has the benefit of leaving little incriminating evidence.
I choose to work in an area that is constantly under intense scrutiny and where further investigations and inquests are all-too-likely to occur. I am acutely aware that in anything I do the buck stops with me and not my 1 star (although my 1 star is a top bloke). I work with the most highly skilled and dedicated bunch of guys that I have ever come across, but I fear for the longevity of what we do. I am saddened to see a number of military personnel and civil servants avoid involvement in my area because of the potential of a highly invasive investigation.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JTO, good post. I am glad if some people are shying away from the responsibility you so clearly lay out. They shouldn't be in the job in the first place. We need people like you, with broad shoulders to take the tough job on. It was obvious by the deeply unimpressive witness performances of some senior ranking officers at the Herc Inquest that they should never have been in those positions of responsibility. The collective memory losses of some witnesses can only be described as plain lying under oath. The most impressive performances and by far the most honest were from FORMER members of the RAF or serving Sqn Ldrs. Watching the chain of command cover up and feign memory loss made me feel sick. The families could see through the wretched attempts at averting responsibility.
No, you have my utmost respect for what you are doing. We need more middle ranking officers of your stature to carry the torch.
Read Tuc's posts, he sets out clearly the protection routinely afforded to the rank of AVM and above. It would appear that in the case of Nimrod and Hercules a decision was taken to limit the damage to Gp Cpt level. Unfair on the individuals concerned. I hope the Salmon letters are hitting the right targets.
However, I did hear of some very senior military and civil types being retired/moved on a few months after the Nimrod Inquest.
No, you have my utmost respect for what you are doing. We need more middle ranking officers of your stature to carry the torch.
Read Tuc's posts, he sets out clearly the protection routinely afforded to the rank of AVM and above. It would appear that in the case of Nimrod and Hercules a decision was taken to limit the damage to Gp Cpt level. Unfair on the individuals concerned. I hope the Salmon letters are hitting the right targets.
However, I did hear of some very senior military and civil types being retired/moved on a few months after the Nimrod Inquest.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: St Annes
Age: 68
Posts: 638
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This story has done the rounds before.
Unless you are/have been aircrew in the RAF you will be unaware of the Stop Press, and its role in the day to day operational life of the squadron. The 'Stop press' is pretty well what you'd expect it to be, a file that contains information from all sorts of people that people think anyone going for a flight might need to be aware of - most (if not all) routine signals will also have a distribution list, so anything affecting Nimrod would quite likely be copied to the detachment on ops, whilst one would hope there'd be a degree of commonsense applied this does mean that a signal detailing special precautions with the sandwich toaster in sub zero temperatures would probably end up onfile in Afghanistan. (I appreciate this is an extreme example, not intended to be funny - I'm just trying to illustrate how all sorts of stuff irrelevant to the det might well be filed).
The signals will normally have an address list as long as your arm, there is no point destroying a signal to cover your tracks as copies of it will exist at all the addressees as well as the signal originator.
The good Sqn Ldr (as was) quite rightly retrieved the Stop Press, as the info in it was necessary for future ops, aircrew needed the info. He should, sensibly, have stuck what he edited out of it into a box for safe keeping - simply to protect his own back from those who see conspiracy where none exists - for example in this case. However, what was removed will have it's originator, date/time group, and SIC recorded in signal logs, the stop press enclosure record, and so forth, consequently the signals removed can be obtained by going back to the originator, or anyone else on the address list, any of whom can be expected to have a copy on file.
If you want to erase a signal from record you have to remove it from file at the originator and from the filing systems of all the addressees - it is naive to think that anyone would try to erase an important signal by simply shredding it, which would serve to destroy a single copy out of many, whilst highlighting that this might be of interest.
And one has to wonder what people imagine the "stop press" might have held, that somebody would try to 'hush it up' ... please stop looking for conspiracies where they do not exist. Nimrod was an accident waiting to happen, but I don't think anyone was aware of that - the RAF is guilty of incompetence, not malice. It is also guilty of trying to keep it all under the carpet, of course, which our modern internet age will not longer allow, thankfully.
I did quite a lot of AAR, now and again I'd volunteer for min crew slots etc involving AAR as I thought it was more interesting than most of the "flogging in circles while the tac team play a video game" that seemed to define much of my flying time. To be honest I wasn't that impressed by the lash up nature of it in the early days, even less when it all went under the floor but with (apparently) little extra thought involved beyond making it tidier... but I never once thought it was a serious safety problem, and I never heard anyone suggesting it was. We were ALL ignorant of the facts, I don't think anyone had a clue it was especially dangerous. That doesn't, of course, let the RAF off the hook for not bothering to find out.
Jimmy Jones should get back in his box, if he's such a bloody expert why didn't he sort all this out before I even arrived on the kipper fleet? My rear view vision is 20:20 too, but I'm not about to slag anyone off for failing to confront Hitler when he annexed the Sudentland....
(Edited a cupple of bad splellings out, and added some much needed full stops.)
Where'd you find 'Mermaid' in the dictionary?
Under 'C'
Unless you are/have been aircrew in the RAF you will be unaware of the Stop Press, and its role in the day to day operational life of the squadron. The 'Stop press' is pretty well what you'd expect it to be, a file that contains information from all sorts of people that people think anyone going for a flight might need to be aware of - most (if not all) routine signals will also have a distribution list, so anything affecting Nimrod would quite likely be copied to the detachment on ops, whilst one would hope there'd be a degree of commonsense applied this does mean that a signal detailing special precautions with the sandwich toaster in sub zero temperatures would probably end up onfile in Afghanistan. (I appreciate this is an extreme example, not intended to be funny - I'm just trying to illustrate how all sorts of stuff irrelevant to the det might well be filed).
The signals will normally have an address list as long as your arm, there is no point destroying a signal to cover your tracks as copies of it will exist at all the addressees as well as the signal originator.
The good Sqn Ldr (as was) quite rightly retrieved the Stop Press, as the info in it was necessary for future ops, aircrew needed the info. He should, sensibly, have stuck what he edited out of it into a box for safe keeping - simply to protect his own back from those who see conspiracy where none exists - for example in this case. However, what was removed will have it's originator, date/time group, and SIC recorded in signal logs, the stop press enclosure record, and so forth, consequently the signals removed can be obtained by going back to the originator, or anyone else on the address list, any of whom can be expected to have a copy on file.
If you want to erase a signal from record you have to remove it from file at the originator and from the filing systems of all the addressees - it is naive to think that anyone would try to erase an important signal by simply shredding it, which would serve to destroy a single copy out of many, whilst highlighting that this might be of interest.
And one has to wonder what people imagine the "stop press" might have held, that somebody would try to 'hush it up' ... please stop looking for conspiracies where they do not exist. Nimrod was an accident waiting to happen, but I don't think anyone was aware of that - the RAF is guilty of incompetence, not malice. It is also guilty of trying to keep it all under the carpet, of course, which our modern internet age will not longer allow, thankfully.
I did quite a lot of AAR, now and again I'd volunteer for min crew slots etc involving AAR as I thought it was more interesting than most of the "flogging in circles while the tac team play a video game" that seemed to define much of my flying time. To be honest I wasn't that impressed by the lash up nature of it in the early days, even less when it all went under the floor but with (apparently) little extra thought involved beyond making it tidier... but I never once thought it was a serious safety problem, and I never heard anyone suggesting it was. We were ALL ignorant of the facts, I don't think anyone had a clue it was especially dangerous. That doesn't, of course, let the RAF off the hook for not bothering to find out.
Jimmy Jones should get back in his box, if he's such a bloody expert why didn't he sort all this out before I even arrived on the kipper fleet? My rear view vision is 20:20 too, but I'm not about to slag anyone off for failing to confront Hitler when he annexed the Sudentland....
(Edited a cupple of bad splellings out, and added some much needed full stops.)
Where'd you find 'Mermaid' in the dictionary?
Under 'C'
Davejb
All that you say is very true.
However, take this example.
There exists a document (report) explaining the history behind an accident; an embarrassing report, as it clearly shows the problem was known about years beforehand. Worse, it was mitigated, but the corrective action over-ruled and the aircraft made unsafe again. It is submitted through ones line management, but stopped before it gets to the intended recipient (the BoI chairman). Knowing this would happen, a dozen other people are on the distribution.
The BoI report says “not known” a number of times, because the report which would have informed them has been withheld. Therefore, they cannot make informed recommendations to prevent reoccurrence.
When challenged, the MoD (Minister for the Armed Forces) denies the existence of the report as it is no longer in the files of the IPT, despite hard and soft copies being available in a dozen other IPTs and offices. In short, he ruled that if the original does not exist, then the document doesn’t exist. (Ludicrous I know, but he put this in writing).
On this accident, and others, I have sat before two 2 Stars and offered them copies of such documents. Both had the gall to look me in the eye and say “There is no evidence these documents exist”, while they were still in my hand under their noses. In placing their rulings in writing, I have even seen them Reference a document and deny its existence, in the same letter. It would be laughable, if so many people hadn’t died.
Like I said, perverting the course of justice, and failure of Duty of Care amounting to Gross Negligence. And guess who Minister asked if the document existed. Judge and jury in his own case.
A real example.
If you want to erase a signal from record you have to remove it from file at the originator and from the filing systems of all the addressees - it is naive to think that anyone would try to erase an important signal by simply shredding it, which would serve to destroy a single copy out of many, whilst highlighting that this might be of interest.
However, take this example.
There exists a document (report) explaining the history behind an accident; an embarrassing report, as it clearly shows the problem was known about years beforehand. Worse, it was mitigated, but the corrective action over-ruled and the aircraft made unsafe again. It is submitted through ones line management, but stopped before it gets to the intended recipient (the BoI chairman). Knowing this would happen, a dozen other people are on the distribution.
The BoI report says “not known” a number of times, because the report which would have informed them has been withheld. Therefore, they cannot make informed recommendations to prevent reoccurrence.
When challenged, the MoD (Minister for the Armed Forces) denies the existence of the report as it is no longer in the files of the IPT, despite hard and soft copies being available in a dozen other IPTs and offices. In short, he ruled that if the original does not exist, then the document doesn’t exist. (Ludicrous I know, but he put this in writing).
On this accident, and others, I have sat before two 2 Stars and offered them copies of such documents. Both had the gall to look me in the eye and say “There is no evidence these documents exist”, while they were still in my hand under their noses. In placing their rulings in writing, I have even seen them Reference a document and deny its existence, in the same letter. It would be laughable, if so many people hadn’t died.
Like I said, perverting the course of justice, and failure of Duty of Care amounting to Gross Negligence. And guess who Minister asked if the document existed. Judge and jury in his own case.
A real example.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I asked under the FOI for a List of the Documents not the content just the list.This is the reply I had.
Dear Mr Knight,
I am writing in response to your query of 3 April 2009 submitted to the MOD website, in which you asked for a transcript of the voice recordings between Kandahar airfield and Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006 and a list of the documents shredded from the stop press folder on 6 September 2006. Your correspondence has been considered to be a request for information in accordance with the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000.
I have enclosed the relevant extract from the transcript between Kandahar military air traffic control and Nimrod XV230, from the point at which the aircraft concluded air-to-air refuelling until the time it crashed.
You also asked for a list of the documents shredded from the stop press folder on 6 September 2006. I can confirm that the MOD does hold the information you have requested.
However, it is considered that some of the information relevant to this part of your request falls within scope of exemption at Section 26 (Defence) of the FOI Act. Section 26 covers information which, if disclosed, would prejudice defence or the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant armed forces. It is a qualified exemption and, as such, requires a public interest test to decide whether, in all circumstances of the case, the public interest factors in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. I estimate that we will be able to provide a substantive response to this part of your request by 4 June 2009.
So I think to myself if these shredded documents were of no importance how come they"would prejudice defence or the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant armed forces".
A bit more than weather forecasts then eh ?
Dear Mr Knight,
I am writing in response to your query of 3 April 2009 submitted to the MOD website, in which you asked for a transcript of the voice recordings between Kandahar airfield and Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006 and a list of the documents shredded from the stop press folder on 6 September 2006. Your correspondence has been considered to be a request for information in accordance with the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000.
I have enclosed the relevant extract from the transcript between Kandahar military air traffic control and Nimrod XV230, from the point at which the aircraft concluded air-to-air refuelling until the time it crashed.
You also asked for a list of the documents shredded from the stop press folder on 6 September 2006. I can confirm that the MOD does hold the information you have requested.
However, it is considered that some of the information relevant to this part of your request falls within scope of exemption at Section 26 (Defence) of the FOI Act. Section 26 covers information which, if disclosed, would prejudice defence or the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant armed forces. It is a qualified exemption and, as such, requires a public interest test to decide whether, in all circumstances of the case, the public interest factors in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. I estimate that we will be able to provide a substantive response to this part of your request by 4 June 2009.
So I think to myself if these shredded documents were of no importance how come they"would prejudice defence or the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant armed forces".
A bit more than weather forecasts then eh ?
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: 4 Civvy Street. Nowhere-near-a-base. The Shires.
Posts: 559
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
stop press??? How many copies???
Given that the Nimdet was operating out of 2 primary bases at the time, both under Baz' command and subject to the same orders, why didn't anybody in the investigative chain ask to see the (same) stop press book we we using at the other one???
This is hardly rocket science now is it?
Also I fail to see how this new evidence could have come to light in the last week (original post) when Baz' shredding misdemeanours were made public at the inquest, some time ago.
CS
This is hardly rocket science now is it?
Also I fail to see how this new evidence could have come to light in the last week (original post) when Baz' shredding misdemeanours were made public at the inquest, some time ago.
CS
Champagne anyone...?
So I think to myself if these shredded documents were of no importance how come they"would prejudice defence or the capability, effectiveness or security of relevant armed forces".
A bit more than weather forecasts then eh ?
A bit more than weather forecasts then eh ?
I would hazard that the documents were indeed of "no importance" in relation to the BOI and probably contained information regarding equipment and procedures that are classified. I suspect stop press notes concerning the effectiveness of the SuperDuper MegaSpyCam Mk4 efficiency on alternate Thursdays would have very little to do with misaligned fuel couplings and general shoddy airworthiness.
You are barking up the wrong tree with this Stop Press folder rubbish. Perhaps there was some sort of failure in BOI procedure but having been flying in the RAF now for some 20 years I can guarantee you that there was nothing in that folder that had anything directly to do with the tragic loss of 230. I would suggest that if there had been something in there along those lines then one of the 60+ aircrew that had to sign as having read the thing (including the crew of XV230) might have said something.
This is an utter red herring. There are clearly many questions to be answered and, perhaps, heads to roll over the loss of XV230 with all her crew but seriously, don't waste your time over this folder.
Cunning Artificer
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: The spiritual home of DeHavilland
Age: 76
Posts: 3,127
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Never airworthy? Design deficiencies are easily discovered with hindsight.
Viewed in the same light, SFAR88 means that around half of the world's civil airliner fleet have "never been airworthy". Nevertheless, all these thousands of aircraft were type certified as airworthy after prolonged testing and in-depth regulatory oversight. Despite all the perceived shortcomings that are the subject of SFAR88, just one airliner is known to have suffered a fuel tank explosion in mid-air and three more on the ground.
The Nimrod is a military aircraft with operational features that make it more hazardous to operate than a civilian machine. Lets keep a sense of proportion. Whatever was in the shredded documents, the investigation has drawn a valid and proper conclusion and the airworthiness deficiency is being addressed: as is the case with the many hundreds of airworthiness matters that are the subject of Airworthiness Directives as a routine daily process for those of us who work in the airworthiness and reliability field.
While it is a stupid error to destroy any documents relating to an aircraft after an accident or incident, the chap seems to have been correct in his assessent of the value of the destroyed documents and no actual harm has been done.
Viewed in the same light, SFAR88 means that around half of the world's civil airliner fleet have "never been airworthy". Nevertheless, all these thousands of aircraft were type certified as airworthy after prolonged testing and in-depth regulatory oversight. Despite all the perceived shortcomings that are the subject of SFAR88, just one airliner is known to have suffered a fuel tank explosion in mid-air and three more on the ground.
The Nimrod is a military aircraft with operational features that make it more hazardous to operate than a civilian machine. Lets keep a sense of proportion. Whatever was in the shredded documents, the investigation has drawn a valid and proper conclusion and the airworthiness deficiency is being addressed: as is the case with the many hundreds of airworthiness matters that are the subject of Airworthiness Directives as a routine daily process for those of us who work in the airworthiness and reliability field.
While it is a stupid error to destroy any documents relating to an aircraft after an accident or incident, the chap seems to have been correct in his assessent of the value of the destroyed documents and no actual harm has been done.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I am not commenting on what happened or didn't happen but what might be best practice in the future.
1. An incident or accident occurs in which all relevant documents are impounded.
2. Some impounded documents are required for current operations (or whatever).
3. The document should be released from impounding, under signature and with a witness present.
4. The impound document should be copied either in whole or in part.
5. The entire impound document should be returned to the impound documents.
6. The copies may be used as required. If amendments or changes to the copies are then necessary, these changes should also be made to the BOI.
1. An incident or accident occurs in which all relevant documents are impounded.
2. Some impounded documents are required for current operations (or whatever).
3. The document should be released from impounding, under signature and with a witness present.
4. The impound document should be copied either in whole or in part.
5. The entire impound document should be returned to the impound documents.
6. The copies may be used as required. If amendments or changes to the copies are then necessary, these changes should also be made to the BOI.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Even the lowest SAC know that ALL documents are impounded immediately after an incident, and whether they are relative or not will be decided by the BOI, FULL STOP, that’s it, no ifs buts or maybes.
As for a genuine admin error, well lots of people have been disciplined for a lot less, not promoted.
There is no excuse for this, at all.
As for a genuine admin error, well lots of people have been disciplined for a lot less, not promoted.
There is no excuse for this, at all.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
You are barking up the wrong tree with this Stop Press folder rubbish. Perhaps there was some sort of failure in BOI procedure