Nimrod Grounded
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One Degree Alignment
DV - In the dim and distant past when FRS fuel couplings were used on most aircraft manufactured in Britain, the MOD published an Air Publication on fuel couplings that covered the FRS coupling. I believe that approved data was added to Nimrod aircraft APs when everyone realised the coupling AP was gone!
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Woodbine, I am not sure what you mean by;
The information that I have indicates that FRS information was added to the a/c AP's under RTI/NIMROD/224A in Dec 07 because "There is currently no technical information regarding FRS fuel pipe couplings within the a/c Topic 1 publications". Even then there was no mention of the 1 degree alignment requirement. This was not added until a further amendment in Nov 08.
Is this what you are talking about?
DV
I believe that the approved data was added to Nimrod aircraft AP's when everyone realised that the coupling AP was gone
Is this what you are talking about?
DV
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Here is the latest report on Nimrod from QinetiQ dated 17th Feb 2009
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/95A1F...rveyReport.pdf
A letter sent to all the families on the 6th March 2009 from Bob Ainsworth saying there were no airworthiness issues in this report and yet QinetiQ counted 26 !!!!. However the IPT mitigated 11 and the other 15 will be done at there next maintainence.(For some that is two years).
You can read the story that was printed in todays Sunday Independent
Defence minister glossed over Nimrod safety fears - Home News, UK - The Independent
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/95A1F...rveyReport.pdf
A letter sent to all the families on the 6th March 2009 from Bob Ainsworth saying there were no airworthiness issues in this report and yet QinetiQ counted 26 !!!!. However the IPT mitigated 11 and the other 15 will be done at there next maintainence.(For some that is two years).
You can read the story that was printed in todays Sunday Independent
Defence minister glossed over Nimrod safety fears - Home News, UK - The Independent
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Woodbine.
No, I have not found the "obsolete coupling-specific AP". I only have the documents mentioned in my post #123, plus a copy of the 1968 Declaration of Design and Performance.
DV
No, I have not found the "obsolete coupling-specific AP". I only have the documents mentioned in my post #123, plus a copy of the 1968 Declaration of Design and Performance.
DV
Hey! Change the thread title. Flew the Mighty Hunter again, yesterday. Loverly...
How much AAR did you do?
Beags the Nimrod is designed as a LRMPA aircraft which it can do nicely without AAR as we used too before the Falklands war. I am sure there are many others who see the whole thing as BS does......If and I say If there were major problems with the aircraft they would not be flying at all. When are all you people going to let the crews get on with thier jobs they are the people who will make a decision on wether to fly or not not you.
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Fergineer.
You are quite correct, the Nimrod was designed as a LRMPA not needing AAR. To achieve that design requirement, the a/c needed to carry 84K of fuel, fly for over 9 hours, carry out double engine restarts whilst on task and have adequate equipment cooling using an SCP. Today, this LRMPA a/c has a restriction placed on fuel loads, can fly for about 7.5 hours, can not use the cross-feed for engine restarts in flight and has the SCP isolated. Not quite the same picture.
You also state;
Sorry not true, you can only make that right decision if you have all the facts and it is clear from postings made on the thread that aircrews do not have all the facts. What did you know about fuel seals, alignment and the 37 life expired hot air pipes before the a/c was "grounded". Some of these problems were known about, by non-aircrew for over 3 years (i.e before XV230 accident). Furthermore, I would like to remind you that safety/airworthiness affects not only the lives of crews who fly the a/c, but the general public over whom the a/c flies.
In my opinion the Nimrod is currently being kept in the air as a "flying political statement of defiance" against the findings of the inquest and common sense. It has nothing to do with meeting a LRMPA task.
DV
You are quite correct, the Nimrod was designed as a LRMPA not needing AAR. To achieve that design requirement, the a/c needed to carry 84K of fuel, fly for over 9 hours, carry out double engine restarts whilst on task and have adequate equipment cooling using an SCP. Today, this LRMPA a/c has a restriction placed on fuel loads, can fly for about 7.5 hours, can not use the cross-feed for engine restarts in flight and has the SCP isolated. Not quite the same picture.
You also state;
When are all you people going to let the crews get on with their jobs they are the people who will make the decision on wether to fly or not not you
In my opinion the Nimrod is currently being kept in the air as a "flying political statement of defiance" against the findings of the inquest and common sense. It has nothing to do with meeting a LRMPA task.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 10th May 2009 at 16:02.
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QQ General Condition Survey Report
From the QQ report Executive Summary:
'On the basis of the information available from this assessment to date, it is concluded that there are no residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern arising from this assessment to warrant recommending grounding of the Nimrod Fleet'
Seems the MOD's decision to keep the aircraft flying is based on evidence from the independent assessor and not a so called 'statement of defiance'.
'On the basis of the information available from this assessment to date, it is concluded that there are no residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern arising from this assessment to warrant recommending grounding of the Nimrod Fleet'
Seems the MOD's decision to keep the aircraft flying is based on evidence from the independent assessor and not a so called 'statement of defiance'.
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As Betty states - and I hate agreeing with her - the Nimrods are not 'grounded', they are in the process of having maintenance carried out - or flying! In the same way that an ac that has a bald tyre isn't 'grounded' - it is just getting the tyre fixed. Admittedly, this is taking a tadge longer.
Duncs
Duncs
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Duncs you say,
Trouble is, this is a tyre that has been bald for over 3 years. You and I know that this is not a simple maintenance/modification program to replace hot air pipes and fuel seals, if it were then a/c would continue to fly until they could be phased in. This is far more serious, and someone up the ladder has said "no more, the risk is too great"
DV
In the same way that an a/c has a bald tyre isn't "grounded"- it is just having it fixed
DV
From the QQ report Executive Summary:
'On the basis of the information available from this assessment to date, it is concluded that there are no residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern arising from this assessment to warrant recommending grounding of the Nimrod Fleet'
'On the basis of the information available from this assessment to date, it is concluded that there are no residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern arising from this assessment to warrant recommending grounding of the Nimrod Fleet'
A few observations.
“On the basis of information available” is the usual cop-out when (anyone) considers insufficient info is available; due to, for example, failure to retain an audit trail.
“No residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern…..” is not the same as saying the aircraft is airworthy. What they are actually saying, is that this inspection and corrective action process VERY BELATEDLY satisfies one component of airworthiness; that they (QQ) have only been asked to look at this one component, and the hundreds of others are not in their contracted remit. What they do not say, and it remains unclear if the wider MoD understands this, is that this extraordinary action would probably have been unnecessary if MoD had adhered to their own mandated regs and had the design and its safety under continuous review. (Remember, the MoD started pulling funding for this in 1991).
Of equal concern is MoD’s long standing policy of happily quoting QQ (DRA/DERA etc) when the report is positive, justifying their actions by saying “Look, our independent assessor says it’s ok”, but completely ignoring them when the news is bad – the prime example being Chinook Mk2 in the days immediately before the Mull of Kintyre crash.
In the latter case, MoD were criticised for referring to both “DRA” and “Boscombe Down” in the same paragraph, inferring they were different entities; when they were actually talking about the same people. Otherwise known as pulling the wool over the eyes of successive inquiries.
A few years ago I witnessed a rather unwholesome aspect of this “independent” system. People I trusted (aircrew on a tour at Boscombe) reported a “no-go” system as wholly unsafe. An “essential”, meaning it had to be fixed and made safe before a positive MAR recommendation could be made. My boss (a non-engineer with no understanding whatsoever of said system or its use) simply went above the RWTS aircrew and demanded the recommendation be downgraded to “desirable” – not even “highly desirable”. His demands were met, and the aircrew told to shut up. They did, officially (refusing to answer correspondence asking if they disagreed with the official line), but privately begged for the aircraft to be made safe. I suspect the Mull case has similarities.
A subsequent Board of Inquiry recommended precisely the same as the original RWTS report, on the same system.
My conclusion is that QQ are not truly independent. The day they had to start charging for their services was the day commercial imperatives overtook airworthiness – both in DRA/DERA and MoD. When “privatised”, and until recently, MoD still owned a major share. That this no longer the case, but today they are in real trouble, with staff facing a pay freeze and job cuts, and this imperative still exists. In short, keep the customer happy. And, lest it be forgotten, MoD is most happy when not spending money on silly little things like airworthiness.
Clearly I’m not having a go at the many dedicated engineers who do the real work. But I suspect the final reports are heavily diluted. Oh for the days before half a dozen levels of management had to justify themselves and have their say, when you got a straight no-nonsense statement from the coal face. I’d like to think what I describe above was an isolated incident (but one too many for the deceased and their relatives), but I fear not.