C17 Gear Up Landing Bagram
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Not trying to defend anyone, with no knowledge of the incident nor indeed the type but:
I wonder how far they were into their crew duty day and what their rest pattern was like leading up to the event.......
I wonder how far they were into their crew duty day and what their rest pattern was like leading up to the event.......
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A fast approach at night in hostile territory OK blame the crew but there is more to this than is being said........does anyone know the speed limitations for the gear??
Champagne anyone...?
Read the report. Well rested crew inadvertently switched off the GPWS, didn't do the pre-landing checks and then the captain took control on short finals to recover a biffed approach by the co. They had the speed brakes out to try and kill the speed but landed 3000ft down the runway at 157kts against a Vat of 119 kts. Captain had a total of 1879 hrs with 826 on type. Handling copilot had a total of 402 hrs. Ever. With 149 on the C17. And he'd done 20.7 of those in the previous 7 days 
VFR night, one helo and one C130 leaving or arriving (very quiet for OAIX) so not a particularly arduous ATC environment.
Reading the report suggests a few "cheese holes" lining up and the captain not taking corrective action early enough to recover a poor approach by the co.
NVGs, "hostile territory", are possibly factors but this just looks like a fundamental failure of flight deck procedures, airmanship and CRM.
No, I really don't think there is.
VFR night, one helo and one C130 leaving or arriving (very quiet for OAIX) so not a particularly arduous ATC environment.
Reading the report suggests a few "cheese holes" lining up and the captain not taking corrective action early enough to recover a poor approach by the co.
NVGs, "hostile territory", are possibly factors but this just looks like a fundamental failure of flight deck procedures, airmanship and CRM.
OK blame the crew but there is more to this than is being said
By far the the greatest proportion of responsibility for this accident appears to rest with the crew. However, there does seem to be a degree of mitigation in the TAWS/GPWS issue.
Orders and procedures for the operation of equipment like EGPWS and Predictive Windshear Alerting always focus on the mandatory nature of the subsequent escape manoeuvre, which will call for something like "Aggressively apply maximum thrust, level the wings and rotate to XX degrees pitch attitude...". Training will reinforce that these actions MUST be carried out promptly. However, operations in the real world, particularly in a military environment, can present situations where such actions are not appropriate. Because manufacturers and regulators sometimes do not fully understand the nature of these operations, crews often have to resort to techniques and procedures developed at unit or even individual crew level to cope with these situations.
Switching of the TAWS on receipt of spurious terrain warnings is clearly widespread practice for crews going into Bagram. With a large dose of hindsight, the method employed was unsound due to the ergonomics and chances of switching-off the GPWS instead. Perhaps higher echelons of AMC should take some responsibility for not dealing with problem of nuisance terrain warnings at Bagram? An approved, checklisted and trained procedure for de-selecting TAWS may have been appropriate. More significantly, if Rwy 03 at Bagram has well-known terrain database issues there has to be some blame apportioned to a system that did not correct the problem, particularly since AMC have been using it for 7 years. The continued existence of database anomalies has clearly resulted in crews receiving in nuisance warnings, raising their workload and causing them to make switch selections that the manufacturer did not intend to be made at that stage of flight.
This crew's culpability can only be marginally reduced, but I feel that it is worth pointing-out that the TAWS de-selection was a operational work-around that could/should have been better addressed by higher echelons.
Orders and procedures for the operation of equipment like EGPWS and Predictive Windshear Alerting always focus on the mandatory nature of the subsequent escape manoeuvre, which will call for something like "Aggressively apply maximum thrust, level the wings and rotate to XX degrees pitch attitude...". Training will reinforce that these actions MUST be carried out promptly. However, operations in the real world, particularly in a military environment, can present situations where such actions are not appropriate. Because manufacturers and regulators sometimes do not fully understand the nature of these operations, crews often have to resort to techniques and procedures developed at unit or even individual crew level to cope with these situations.
Switching of the TAWS on receipt of spurious terrain warnings is clearly widespread practice for crews going into Bagram. With a large dose of hindsight, the method employed was unsound due to the ergonomics and chances of switching-off the GPWS instead. Perhaps higher echelons of AMC should take some responsibility for not dealing with problem of nuisance terrain warnings at Bagram? An approved, checklisted and trained procedure for de-selecting TAWS may have been appropriate. More significantly, if Rwy 03 at Bagram has well-known terrain database issues there has to be some blame apportioned to a system that did not correct the problem, particularly since AMC have been using it for 7 years. The continued existence of database anomalies has clearly resulted in crews receiving in nuisance warnings, raising their workload and causing them to make switch selections that the manufacturer did not intend to be made at that stage of flight.
This crew's culpability can only be marginally reduced, but I feel that it is worth pointing-out that the TAWS de-selection was a operational work-around that could/should have been better addressed by higher echelons.
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In my day young man, we had people called runway controllers who sat in a caravan at the end of the runway and let you know all was not well, a well aimed red across the bows wakes most mortals! 
Quite useful and fairly cheap (2 beers were usually enough to say thank you!) 
Quite useful and fairly cheap (2 beers were usually enough to say thank you!)
The TAWS/GPWS issue is a red herring.
For 3 pilots all to forget to lower the gear and complete the pre-landing checks in benign weather at a low activity aerodrome is inexcusable. The lack of ATC call didn't help, but the ATCOs weren't on the flight deck!
25 years ago I held on 241OCU before starting my VC10 course. This included plenty of flight deck rides sitting in the corner on a tin ration box and cushion. I learned a heck of a lot from watching others. One day we were flying a procedural approach into Prestwick with take-off flap selected. Then the captain called for "Flap - approach, please". I attracted the attention of the senior QFI (dear old 'JR') on the jump seat and was about to ask "Is this some 10 Sqn SOP?", but he put his fingers to his lips. A few seconds later, the gear warning horn went off - and the crew reacted in total shock. After hurriedly lowering the landing gear and completing the pre-landing checks, we flew a go-around at which point the QFI announced "Grade One Diversion to Newcastle!". The Captain simply handed over control and announced "I need a cigarette!".
The debrief was, I later heard, quiet and damning. "Captain, explain to me why all 4 of you missed the 'gear down, landing checks' cue? Why was it that only the holding officer and I noticed?"
Anyone sitting on a jump seat (assuming they're qualified) must keep their wits about them!
For 3 pilots all to forget to lower the gear and complete the pre-landing checks in benign weather at a low activity aerodrome is inexcusable. The lack of ATC call didn't help, but the ATCOs weren't on the flight deck!
25 years ago I held on 241OCU before starting my VC10 course. This included plenty of flight deck rides sitting in the corner on a tin ration box and cushion. I learned a heck of a lot from watching others. One day we were flying a procedural approach into Prestwick with take-off flap selected. Then the captain called for "Flap - approach, please". I attracted the attention of the senior QFI (dear old 'JR') on the jump seat and was about to ask "Is this some 10 Sqn SOP?", but he put his fingers to his lips. A few seconds later, the gear warning horn went off - and the crew reacted in total shock. After hurriedly lowering the landing gear and completing the pre-landing checks, we flew a go-around at which point the QFI announced "Grade One Diversion to Newcastle!". The Captain simply handed over control and announced "I need a cigarette!".
The debrief was, I later heard, quiet and damning. "Captain, explain to me why all 4 of you missed the 'gear down, landing checks' cue? Why was it that only the holding officer and I noticed?"
Anyone sitting on a jump seat (assuming they're qualified) must keep their wits about them!
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Is it just me, or is the report a difficult read because of death by TLA ?
Interestering that the whole thing is signed off by a Col - they obviously don't feel the need for every airship and his dog to get involved........
Interestering that the whole thing is signed off by a Col - they obviously don't feel the need for every airship and his dog to get involved........
The TAWS is not a red herring, that's why it featured in the report. If the captain had not inadvertently switched-off the GPWS whilst trying to kill spurious alerts from the TAWS then the aircraft would have issued a "TOO LOW GEAR!" warning. That doesn't excuse any of this crew's poor CRM or airmanship, but a warning system is only fitted because someone envisaged a situation occurring where it might be required. Unfortunately, this crew got themselves into a situation where they needed that warning system but events had conspired to deny it to them. I have never heard of anyone advocating less-than-assiduous adherence to procedures and checklists on the basis that a warning system will save them, but that doesn't alter the fact that, in this case, part of the chain of events was the mistaken de-selection of the GPWS.
I suggest that the GPWS was far more likely to prevented this 'mis-hap' than a routine "Check Wheels" call from ATC. This crew managed to max themselves out to the point that they forgot the gear and the checks, so it seems equally possible that their response to ATC would also have been conditioned by expectation, rather than by examination of what was actually in front of them. However, if the aircraft had begun to shout "TOO LOW GEAR!, TOO LOW GEAR!...." they may well have been brought back to reality.
BEagle, your VC10 crew managed to trigger their aural-warning system but at least the ergonomics of their system didn't present them with the chance to inadvertently switch it off whilst trying to silence some other distracting warning.
I suggest that the GPWS was far more likely to prevented this 'mis-hap' than a routine "Check Wheels" call from ATC. This crew managed to max themselves out to the point that they forgot the gear and the checks, so it seems equally possible that their response to ATC would also have been conditioned by expectation, rather than by examination of what was actually in front of them. However, if the aircraft had begun to shout "TOO LOW GEAR!, TOO LOW GEAR!...." they may well have been brought back to reality.
BEagle, your VC10 crew managed to trigger their aural-warning system but at least the ergonomics of their system didn't present them with the chance to inadvertently switch it off whilst trying to silence some other distracting warning.
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How to nearly land a 747 gear up at LAX. Can be all too simple.
Pelican's Perch #80: Gear-Up Landing In A 747?
Pelican's Perch #80: Gear-Up Landing In A 747?
