2 days worth of Missiles
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We noticed that the number of SNAF AAR Badger would enable a 1:2 match with the missile Aircraft. This would enable them to reach down into the Norwegian Sea.
OTOH the AF had dedicated ECM ac and an AAR ratio of about 1:6. Our tentative conclusion was that the Badger jammer would be used as a stand-off jammer in Soviet controlled airspace and that their mission would be fuel limited rather than chaff load limited. The provision of AAR to the jammer/chaffer would work as a significant force multiplier. We reckoned the jammer/chaffer could fly a 16 hr mission without running out of chaff.
As for engaging low flying penetrators, even the exercises had the opfor releasing ARM at the limit of the ADGE cover near the outer caps. Without AWACs we would have relied on the F4 or F3 conduct its own detection and interception.
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Razor, in my honest opinion, we would have got dicked!!! OK, a blaze of glory may have come into it, however, dicked would have been the outcome.
Throw a thousand amateurs towards a hundred professionals, some of those amateurs would have got through.
The frightening things is, that the Soviets were not 'totally' amateur.
Ah well, pass the coleslaw.
Throw a thousand amateurs towards a hundred professionals, some of those amateurs would have got through.
The frightening things is, that the Soviets were not 'totally' amateur.
Ah well, pass the coleslaw.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Well as an FC with several hundred hours as an MC including during many exercises and Tacevals during the 80s and early 90s, I can tell you that, except during the odd period when AAR was plentiful and Int (and the exercise scenario) told me the threat was imminent, manning the outer CAPs was not really an option.
The odd pair to act as mini-AWACS and a heads-ups for the middle CAPs, but no more. Just not enough assets for more than a token effort.....
(the EW was 360 and the very odd other asset, never an further out than the middle CAPs - which we were not allowed to engage. I never, ever, saw enough to cause more than a spurious response from the T85/HSA PD system)
)
The odd pair to act as mini-AWACS and a heads-ups for the middle CAPs, but no more. Just not enough assets for more than a token effort.....
(the EW was 360 and the very odd other asset, never an further out than the middle CAPs - which we were not allowed to engage. I never, ever, saw enough to cause more than a spurious response from the T85/HSA PD system)
)
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ORAC, true regarding funding. I was told that the RNoAF 'agreed' to provide SAW to get its funding slice as well but then failed so to do.
All airfields that got the 3-gen HAS farms allso got Hawk. (As well as the ones that had the HAS planned, but was cancelled in the late 80s)
Paralell to the NATO funding deal, USAF demanded a missile system at the bases with earmarked US units in wartime.
Avoid imitations
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The mind game being that eastern troops would witness western quality of life and wonder why they were fighting at all.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Well as an FC with several hundred hours as an MC including during many exercises and Tacevals during the 80s and early 90s, I can tell you that, except during the odd period when AAR was plentiful and Int (and the exercise scenario) told me the threat was imminent, manning the outer CAPs was not really an option.
With an AS6 ARM launch at 240 miles you could not achieve anything from middle CAP except get a poke in the eye.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Well a yes and a no.
If the quantity of torpedoes procured for the 3 full Nimrod sqns was maintained then it follows that stocks per aircraft have now increased by 50%.
But weapons are procured against an SD98 requirement. To hold more weapons than the SD98 requires has an increase in the cost of ownership - servicing, storage, spares, salaries etc. The only way the stock per aircraft could be increased would be an amendment to the SD98 which of course requires staff work.
But the number of aircraft or weapons systems has been reduced as the threat has reduced or the weapons system effectiveness has been increased.
The original premise was weapons/target matching.
So, do you think we have more weapons per aircraft, less more-effective weapons, or the same?
If the quantity of torpedoes procured for the 3 full Nimrod sqns was maintained then it follows that stocks per aircraft have now increased by 50%.
But weapons are procured against an SD98 requirement. To hold more weapons than the SD98 requires has an increase in the cost of ownership - servicing, storage, spares, salaries etc. The only way the stock per aircraft could be increased would be an amendment to the SD98 which of course requires staff work.
But the number of aircraft or weapons systems has been reduced as the threat has reduced or the weapons system effectiveness has been increased.
The original premise was weapons/target matching.
So, do you think we have more weapons per aircraft, less more-effective weapons, or the same?
Cunning Artificer
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When challenged I said officers always bought their own uniform
... and no, I haven't grown horns or an extra leg (so far).
As to lack of ammunition, once, as we watched our three QRA charges taxi down to the runway, it occurred to us that there were no Standing Orders for what to do next. The reason of course, was that was no need of any. In a couple of minutes or so we were expected to vanish in a cloud of radio-active gas along with most of Lincolnshire.
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Leaving aside the technicalities, the flip side was that I, and many others, were treated to two tours in RAFG c/o HM Gov't.....for which my liver, stomach and other bits of my anatomy ( plus bank balance) were and still are eternally grateful. The prospect of the Russians arriving after about 1530hrs on Friday up to 0600hrs on Monday was never high on my list of concerns...strangely.
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A snippet from Cabinet Papers released under the 30 Year Rule.
Quote
Britain's ability to defend itself against an attack from the Soviet Union was so diminished in the late 1970s that the Prime Minister exclaimed: "Heaven help us if there is a war!"
James Callaghan's handwritten note came after he had reviewed top-secret briefings which showed that the country's surface-to-air missiles were equipped with merely a single reload, early warning aircraft were "obsolete" and RAF fighter squadrons hopelessly outnumbered by Soviet bombers.
The bleak assessment of national defence preparations emerged after Callaghan had questioned intelligence reports, according to Downing Street papers released to the National Archives today. He described the situation as a scandal, and called for those responsible to be sacked.
The Prime Minister's probing at the height of the Cold War ignited a fierce debate in Whitehall about the British resources allocated to NATO rather than domestic defence. The controversy, never made public, originated in October 1977 after the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was presented with a detailed top secret report on "Soviet capability to attack targets in the UK base".
The Prime Minister was not satisfied, however. "I take it someone has worked out whether we can defend ourselves?" Callaghan inquired. His Secretary for Overseas Affairs, Bryan Cartledge, wrote to the Ministry of Defence: "The Prime Minister has indicated that this assessment gives only one side of the picture. He assumes that a similar assessment has been made of our capacity to defend targets in the UK base; and we would be glad of an opportunity to see such an assessment."
The Cabinet Secretary had to admit there was no "mirror image of the JIC assessment in relation to our own capability because our policy is to base the defence of the UK firmly in the collective effort of the North Atlantic alliance".
Fred Mulley, the Defence Minister best remembered for dozing off beside the Queen during an official review of the RAF, was scrambled to prepare an explanatory paper. His report admitted that the picture painted by the Chiefs of Staff was "a sobering one".
"The most immediate Soviet conventional threat is from heavy and medium bombers and long-range tactical," the MoD report revealed. "Against a threat of more than 200 Soviet bombers we have a frontline strength of less than 100 fighters together with very limited area coverage of surface-to-air missiles.
"Although the [Phantom] fighters could acquit themselves well, they have sufficient missiles for only 2 to 3 days' operations." A shortage of Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles, which protected 15 key RAF and US airfields, meant they had only "a single reload". As for surveillance, there was a "single squadron of obsolete [Shackleton] airborne early warning aircraft".
The Warsaw Pact nuclear threat involved 150 land-based missiles targeted at the UK and 160 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Dismayed, Callaghan said: "I wish to talk to Mr Mulley about this."
The conversation at No 10 in February 1978 was grim. "The Prime Minister said the conclusion he drew from the paper was that one or two people should be sacked (he did not include Mr Mulley)," a note-taker recorded. "He would like to know the cost of remedying the situation and how far it could be met within the existing budget."
Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, tried to recover the initiative by announcing he was to buy "66 secondhand [Bloodhound] missiles with spare parts from Sweden for £6m and [maybe] another 50 from Singapore".
The Foreign Secretary, David Owen, suggested adjusting "the Tornado programme so as to produce 50 more Air Defence Variants for use in the UK air defence region . and 50 less for long-range strike on the central front".
Sir John Hunt, the Cabinet Secretary, was alarmed. "Any move on our part to put distinctly more emphasis on the UK at the expense of our contribution to the central front would almost certainly be opposed by NATO as a whole and by the US in particular," he warned Callaghan.
Unquote
Quote
Britain's ability to defend itself against an attack from the Soviet Union was so diminished in the late 1970s that the Prime Minister exclaimed: "Heaven help us if there is a war!"
James Callaghan's handwritten note came after he had reviewed top-secret briefings which showed that the country's surface-to-air missiles were equipped with merely a single reload, early warning aircraft were "obsolete" and RAF fighter squadrons hopelessly outnumbered by Soviet bombers.
The bleak assessment of national defence preparations emerged after Callaghan had questioned intelligence reports, according to Downing Street papers released to the National Archives today. He described the situation as a scandal, and called for those responsible to be sacked.
The Prime Minister's probing at the height of the Cold War ignited a fierce debate in Whitehall about the British resources allocated to NATO rather than domestic defence. The controversy, never made public, originated in October 1977 after the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was presented with a detailed top secret report on "Soviet capability to attack targets in the UK base".
The Prime Minister was not satisfied, however. "I take it someone has worked out whether we can defend ourselves?" Callaghan inquired. His Secretary for Overseas Affairs, Bryan Cartledge, wrote to the Ministry of Defence: "The Prime Minister has indicated that this assessment gives only one side of the picture. He assumes that a similar assessment has been made of our capacity to defend targets in the UK base; and we would be glad of an opportunity to see such an assessment."
The Cabinet Secretary had to admit there was no "mirror image of the JIC assessment in relation to our own capability because our policy is to base the defence of the UK firmly in the collective effort of the North Atlantic alliance".
Fred Mulley, the Defence Minister best remembered for dozing off beside the Queen during an official review of the RAF, was scrambled to prepare an explanatory paper. His report admitted that the picture painted by the Chiefs of Staff was "a sobering one".
"The most immediate Soviet conventional threat is from heavy and medium bombers and long-range tactical," the MoD report revealed. "Against a threat of more than 200 Soviet bombers we have a frontline strength of less than 100 fighters together with very limited area coverage of surface-to-air missiles.
"Although the [Phantom] fighters could acquit themselves well, they have sufficient missiles for only 2 to 3 days' operations." A shortage of Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles, which protected 15 key RAF and US airfields, meant they had only "a single reload". As for surveillance, there was a "single squadron of obsolete [Shackleton] airborne early warning aircraft".
The Warsaw Pact nuclear threat involved 150 land-based missiles targeted at the UK and 160 bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Dismayed, Callaghan said: "I wish to talk to Mr Mulley about this."
The conversation at No 10 in February 1978 was grim. "The Prime Minister said the conclusion he drew from the paper was that one or two people should be sacked (he did not include Mr Mulley)," a note-taker recorded. "He would like to know the cost of remedying the situation and how far it could be met within the existing budget."
Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, tried to recover the initiative by announcing he was to buy "66 secondhand [Bloodhound] missiles with spare parts from Sweden for £6m and [maybe] another 50 from Singapore".
The Foreign Secretary, David Owen, suggested adjusting "the Tornado programme so as to produce 50 more Air Defence Variants for use in the UK air defence region . and 50 less for long-range strike on the central front".
Sir John Hunt, the Cabinet Secretary, was alarmed. "Any move on our part to put distinctly more emphasis on the UK at the expense of our contribution to the central front would almost certainly be opposed by NATO as a whole and by the US in particular," he warned Callaghan.
Unquote
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What memories this brings back! In the early 70s, on my first/second tours, I vividly recall the policy known colloquially as 'Cut the Tail', designed to cut the support 'tail' and redirect resources to the front line - specifically to put more aircraft 'up front'. This had a number of effects - in 74/75 the closing of a number of smaller 'support' stations (Bicester and Little Rissington, for example) severe pressures on staffing levels and resources(I remember some horrific establishment reviews), reductions in mess staffing and facilities, changes to uniforms, reducing stores levels and the range of items available (with some really stupid 'you couldn't make it up' consequences in some places!) - everywhere you looked there was a 'squeeze' on, morale certainly started to shrivel up and inter-branch/service squabbling got much worse. Then there were the 'Irishmen's Pay Rises' in which we ended up much worse off than before the pay rise. Some airmen with families ended up entitled to state benefits and very publicly queuing outside the local benefits office - in uniform! The Daily Mirror loved it! What we were really seeing, I felt at the time, was the final real shrinkage of the Service after WW2.
By the late 70s, however, the message dribbling down from 'on high' was that we might have overdone the 'hair shirt' a bit and this latest release of information seems to confirm that.
What this now makes me realise, however, is that the REAL game in the early 70s was probably not so much 'Cutting the Tail' as cutting the overall Defence Budget - money was being saved (or rather, not spent) on support but there was only a limited reinvestment in the front line.
By the late 70s, however, the message dribbling down from 'on high' was that we might have overdone the 'hair shirt' a bit and this latest release of information seems to confirm that.
What this now makes me realise, however, is that the REAL game in the early 70s was probably not so much 'Cutting the Tail' as cutting the overall Defence Budget - money was being saved (or rather, not spent) on support but there was only a limited reinvestment in the front line.
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The Pact was not in much better condition and certainly not as "united" as propaganda would have had us believe. I know a former East German soldier who told me he and his comrades were forced to attend "fraternal evenings" with units of the 3rd Guards Shock Army at the height of the Cold War.
Before leaving for the Soviet barracks, the German officers called their troops together and told them never to forget that the Russians were their enemies and had overrun their country. They were ordered to eat everything they were offered and to drink the Russians' vodka, but not to fraternise.
A few months later, the East German soldier struck up a conversation with a Soviet soldier, who told him they received exactly the same lecture - substituting the Rodina for the Fatherland - from their officers before visiting Volksarmee barracks!
Before leaving for the Soviet barracks, the German officers called their troops together and told them never to forget that the Russians were their enemies and had overrun their country. They were ordered to eat everything they were offered and to drink the Russians' vodka, but not to fraternise.
A few months later, the East German soldier struck up a conversation with a Soviet soldier, who told him they received exactly the same lecture - substituting the Rodina for the Fatherland - from their officers before visiting Volksarmee barracks!
Suspicion breeds confidence
I went out with a girl from the former East Germany. It transpires that her father was Colonel in the East German airforce. She said that all their regularly practised wargames against the west all started on a Friday afternoon for obvious reasons.
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An interesting book to read is called "War Plan UK". It is a few years old.I found it at my local library. It has detailed maps of the underground station in London that "don't exist"and others and the approx. mt of hits on various UK targets with a target list.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Yes it is a good read, written by Duncan Campbell if I remember. There are about 30 permanently closed underground stations on the network, many of which have been used for govt purposes. I've been down a few of them, recently the old station and tunnels at Chancery Lane were opened and are now up for sale. Bull and Bush on the Northern Line is very interesting.
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And the Russians said they would rather the Poles were in front of them rather than behind.
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....and the Czechs were the same.
In '90 and '91, I worked in the Czech and Slovak Republics quite a lot, doing interesting things like privatising their electricity supply and banking industries. At Ostrava, the civil airport was (is?) shared with the Czech Airforce, and there were Mig 19's and 21's parked up. The air and ground crews were both delighted at the end of "confrontation" and deeply unhappy at their future prospects, but very hospitable and chatty.
Learning I was ex-RAF, they were very friendly and I was shown around the aircraft and facilities. The general impression one got was one of very low quality of everything that makes for efficient and effective aircraft operations, both airborne and ground based.
However, the major surprise was their admission that they never practiced "air defence" as we knew it in W.Europe. Their operations plans (and I saw charts and maps to confirm this) all centered around clearing a path for Soviet armour to blast through, behind the left-over carnage of Czech, Polish and E.German forces. They knew they were the expendable portion of a very disunited eastern bloc.
They said they had plenty of ammunition, though........
In '90 and '91, I worked in the Czech and Slovak Republics quite a lot, doing interesting things like privatising their electricity supply and banking industries. At Ostrava, the civil airport was (is?) shared with the Czech Airforce, and there were Mig 19's and 21's parked up. The air and ground crews were both delighted at the end of "confrontation" and deeply unhappy at their future prospects, but very hospitable and chatty.
Learning I was ex-RAF, they were very friendly and I was shown around the aircraft and facilities. The general impression one got was one of very low quality of everything that makes for efficient and effective aircraft operations, both airborne and ground based.
However, the major surprise was their admission that they never practiced "air defence" as we knew it in W.Europe. Their operations plans (and I saw charts and maps to confirm this) all centered around clearing a path for Soviet armour to blast through, behind the left-over carnage of Czech, Polish and E.German forces. They knew they were the expendable portion of a very disunited eastern bloc.
They said they had plenty of ammunition, though........
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Look at the UK and our major air battles, we hoped, would take place over the North Sea and Norwegian Seas with engagements commencing long before the enemy crossed our border.
In the Warsaw Pact case they could hardly mount outer caps over West Germany or Switzerland. The reality of this was brought home when one of our sim officers served at the SOC in Hungary. Air policing would be effected by a single SA6 unit in the centre of the country; there was absolutely no capability for a ground alert being able to intercept an intruder before its target was reached.
They said that they would be unable to protect the E3 in orbit and the only recourse was for the E3 to fall back