MoD 40 Years Behind With Projects
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MoD 40 Years Behind With Projects
From Sky News:
See: MoD Has No Grip On Spiralling Costs Says A Report - Delays On Biggest Projects Are Huge | UK News | Sky News
And yes, you can bash the journos for using a picture of the MR2....
Defence chiefs have still not got a grip on spiralling delays and costs of its biggest equipment projects, a watchdog has warned.
Bosses have failed to learn from past mistakes, the National Audit Office said, as it was announced large-scale contracts have fallen 96 months behind schedule this year.
This leaves them 40 years late overall.
Costs rose £205 million and two more projects were no longer on course to meet all of their "key user requirements", the NAO's annual analysis of major MoD projects found.
NAO head Tim Burr said: "Performance remains variable and, until the MoD and the defence industry improve their decision-making processes and show sustained learning from previous projects, value for money will not be consistently delivered."
Tory MP Edward Leigh, who chairs the Commons public accounts committee, said the "same old failings" were potentially leaving British troops unprepared for frontline action.
The longest delay recorded this year was to the Terrier armoured combat engineer vehicle, which was pushed out by two-and-a-quarter years because test prototypes were delivered late and then failed reliability tests.
The NAO found that the MoD had "broadly kept costs under control" this year on all but two projects: the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile system and Mark 4 Nimrod aircraft.
Bosses have failed to learn from past mistakes, the National Audit Office said, as it was announced large-scale contracts have fallen 96 months behind schedule this year.
This leaves them 40 years late overall.
Costs rose £205 million and two more projects were no longer on course to meet all of their "key user requirements", the NAO's annual analysis of major MoD projects found.
NAO head Tim Burr said: "Performance remains variable and, until the MoD and the defence industry improve their decision-making processes and show sustained learning from previous projects, value for money will not be consistently delivered."
Tory MP Edward Leigh, who chairs the Commons public accounts committee, said the "same old failings" were potentially leaving British troops unprepared for frontline action.
The longest delay recorded this year was to the Terrier armoured combat engineer vehicle, which was pushed out by two-and-a-quarter years because test prototypes were delivered late and then failed reliability tests.
The NAO found that the MoD had "broadly kept costs under control" this year on all but two projects: the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile system and Mark 4 Nimrod aircraft.
And yes, you can bash the journos for using a picture of the MR2....
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In the words of Capt Mainwaring:
"Well done, Private DaveyBoy, I was just waiting to see how long it would take you to spot that one"
"Well done, Private DaveyBoy, I was just waiting to see how long it would take you to spot that one"
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Thanks for the link. I read it. Very frustrating, mainly because the audit team are clearly going through the motions and have very little clue about the subject matter. The report is, essentially, a stitch up, whereby MoD agrees the minimum level of criticism they can live with, take a minor hit and walk away.
Down in the detail, there lurks some extraordinary claims. Did you know that Nimrod MRA4 did NOT suffer from "lack of realism from the outset" or "failure to identify key dependencies"? That'll come as a surprise to the many who predicted precisely what would go wrong, back in the mid-90s. Probably means they've retired, so MoD thought they could get away with this nonsense.
Oh, and one of the reasons why costs have increased by "only" £200M+ is the favourable Sterling/Dollar exchange rate. Didn't know MoD were responsible for that. They should compare like with like.
Listened to Min(DE&S) on the radio this morning. I don't think he answered a single question directly (which is why he's a Minister), but to be fair he did make one good point. Many, many projects are delivered to Time, Cost and Performance; or better. So why not say "We're learning from these" as well as "We're learning from the failures"? Everyone knows why the projects failed, often in advance (!!), but few want to know why many are successful, because it's too embarrassing.
Down in the detail, there lurks some extraordinary claims. Did you know that Nimrod MRA4 did NOT suffer from "lack of realism from the outset" or "failure to identify key dependencies"? That'll come as a surprise to the many who predicted precisely what would go wrong, back in the mid-90s. Probably means they've retired, so MoD thought they could get away with this nonsense.
Oh, and one of the reasons why costs have increased by "only" £200M+ is the favourable Sterling/Dollar exchange rate. Didn't know MoD were responsible for that. They should compare like with like.
Listened to Min(DE&S) on the radio this morning. I don't think he answered a single question directly (which is why he's a Minister), but to be fair he did make one good point. Many, many projects are delivered to Time, Cost and Performance; or better. So why not say "We're learning from these" as well as "We're learning from the failures"? Everyone knows why the projects failed, often in advance (!!), but few want to know why many are successful, because it's too embarrassing.
Where does the 40 years late bit come from? 96 months is only 8 years - not that that isn't bad enough! Can you imagine what they would have said back in the 30s & 40s if the designers and engineers had come up with bits of kit that took decades to bring into Service?
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Melchett asked;
The 96 months is programme slip in-year, therefore the cumulative delay of all projects is 40 years, up from 32 years previously.
So why is there so much programme slip? My personal view is that the technical complexity of some projects is grossly underestimated. Whenever a new weapon system comes into service the nay sayers are immediately banging on about it being yesterdays technology which may be true, but it's going to take 10 to 15 years to get the current cutting edge technology turned into an in-service WS, so live with it.
Another reason, again my personal view, is that the original estimate to project completion is seriously underestimated in many cases. The Tornado GR1 took 12 years from concept to in-service so why was it thought that MRA4 (Nimrod 2000) could happen in 7 or so years with a completely new mission system and more software than Typhoon. Typhoon itself (EFA 2000?) took 18 years from formation of the Eurofighter consortium to 1st production ac. (Granted the political aspect probably added 5 years.) However if it took 12 years for Tornado, 13 years for Typhoon doesn't seem unreasonable nor a similar timescale for MRA4.
So the question is not why are all these projects so late, but why are the completion times so seriously underestimated? Answers on a postcard to CDM please.
Best wishes to all at Christmas, especially those away from home.
Where does the 40 years late bit come from? 96 months is only 8 years
So why is there so much programme slip? My personal view is that the technical complexity of some projects is grossly underestimated. Whenever a new weapon system comes into service the nay sayers are immediately banging on about it being yesterdays technology which may be true, but it's going to take 10 to 15 years to get the current cutting edge technology turned into an in-service WS, so live with it.
Another reason, again my personal view, is that the original estimate to project completion is seriously underestimated in many cases. The Tornado GR1 took 12 years from concept to in-service so why was it thought that MRA4 (Nimrod 2000) could happen in 7 or so years with a completely new mission system and more software than Typhoon. Typhoon itself (EFA 2000?) took 18 years from formation of the Eurofighter consortium to 1st production ac. (Granted the political aspect probably added 5 years.) However if it took 12 years for Tornado, 13 years for Typhoon doesn't seem unreasonable nor a similar timescale for MRA4.
So the question is not why are all these projects so late, but why are the completion times so seriously underestimated? Answers on a postcard to CDM please.
Best wishes to all at Christmas, especially those away from home.
So the question is not why are all these projects so late, but why are the completion times so seriously underestimated?
I prefer - Why do other, more complex programmes, with the same inherent risks, get it spot on? Or even, ahead of time, under “cost” and to a better spec than requested.
The answer lies in the inherent, or standing, risks which are often seen as unpalatable and quietly ignored. For example, no right minded project manager for an upgrade programme would make the assumption that the support authority will (a) have maintained the build standard or (b) in any way “support” the programme. I was taught very early that one ALWAYS assumes you (the PM) must carry out the job of Sponsor (DEC), Engineering Authority, Provisioning Authority, Requirements Manager, ILS Manager, Quality Assurance etc etc. (I deliberately omit the “User” as they are invariably helpful). If any of them actually does their job, it’s a bonus. In fact, the guidelines say the PM must be prepared to do these jobs himself, which infers he must already possess the necessary competence and experience before becoming a PM. Funnily enough, if you study failed projects, the problems will often lie in those areas.
Related to this, the good book says “risks” which have a 100% probability of occurring MUST be mitigated up front. Of course, to actually know such a risk exists, and how one mitigates it, requires relevant competence and experience. That means risk management MUST commence with DEC, not years later with the project office/IPT. Ask any DEC officer if they’ve ever initiated a risk register. It follows that IPTs are playing catch up from the day they assume control. The project can’t afford to wait a couple of years, or more, while inexperienced staffs retrospectively attain competencies others (in the minority) achieve in 5 or 6 previous grades.
What is experience? I’ve never seen it defined by MoD. But I have seen a benchmark laid down for “inexperience” – coincidentally by the Nimrod 2 Star. To have managed projects in every phase of the acquisition cycle (CADMID), for each Service, and across every discipline in ones specialist field (e.g mechanical, avionic etc) is inexperienced; to be “experienced”, one must add a variety outside that field. How many in MoD meet those criteria? Answers, in large print, on the back of a stamp please. (0). Which, of course, means the Nimrod 2 Star didn’t display the necessary “management oversight” to ensure his projects were resourced in accordance with his own rulings. Not my words – I’m quoting a PAC audit report into another of his successes, Chinook Mk3.
Tucumseh, wise words indeed. My take of why we are crap at major defence projects is as follows:
1. Lack of consistant financial assurance through the life of a project. Arbitary 20% budget cuts do not permit a project to be delivered on time, or to be as required by the user. A lot of time is wasted re-negotiating schedule/cost profiles to deal with these cuts, causing further impact.
2. Reluctance to support a career stream for procurement experts. The "revolving door" in and out of DE&S and MoD is a godsend to industry. Just wait 18mths-2 years and pull the wool over the new guy/girl. We need to breed procurement aware military personnel and reward them with a genuine career structure to stop them b*******g off to Industry at the first opportunity...
3. Do something about PMs in general. The fault here is the archaic Civil Service pay structure; can you really expect to recruit and retain high-calibre PMs on a C1/B2 salary? We pay contractors iro £500-800 per day for PM work, and, most of the time, in my experience, the quality differential is palpable.
4. The (apparant) willingness of some people to push forward over-optimistic cost/schedule estimations in order to secure a funding line in the full knowledge that they will be long gone before it bites.
5. The dead hand of political interference and the complicity of major Defence Companies in the UK. Nimrod 4 is the poster child of bluster and exaggeration, followed by blunt pork barrel politics.
IMHO conducting business as DE&S is, like Geoff Howe said, going into bat only to find that the captain has broken your bat before you left the changing room.
1. Lack of consistant financial assurance through the life of a project. Arbitary 20% budget cuts do not permit a project to be delivered on time, or to be as required by the user. A lot of time is wasted re-negotiating schedule/cost profiles to deal with these cuts, causing further impact.
2. Reluctance to support a career stream for procurement experts. The "revolving door" in and out of DE&S and MoD is a godsend to industry. Just wait 18mths-2 years and pull the wool over the new guy/girl. We need to breed procurement aware military personnel and reward them with a genuine career structure to stop them b*******g off to Industry at the first opportunity...
3. Do something about PMs in general. The fault here is the archaic Civil Service pay structure; can you really expect to recruit and retain high-calibre PMs on a C1/B2 salary? We pay contractors iro £500-800 per day for PM work, and, most of the time, in my experience, the quality differential is palpable.
4. The (apparant) willingness of some people to push forward over-optimistic cost/schedule estimations in order to secure a funding line in the full knowledge that they will be long gone before it bites.
5. The dead hand of political interference and the complicity of major Defence Companies in the UK. Nimrod 4 is the poster child of bluster and exaggeration, followed by blunt pork barrel politics.
IMHO conducting business as DE&S is, like Geoff Howe said, going into bat only to find that the captain has broken your bat before you left the changing room.
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Tuc. and Evalu8ter have it spot on as usual, particularly the latters #4 and #5. I've heard it described as " the conspiracy of optimism". Recent attempts to put in measures to address this have been undermined by massive under-resourcing.
As to pork-barrel politics, I give you the AJT project, saviour(?) of Brough.
As to pork-barrel politics, I give you the AJT project, saviour(?) of Brough.
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Thanks to GeeRam elsewhere
If the MoD's 40 years behind, how come the RAF doesn't still look more like this?
1 Sqn Wittering – HS Harrier
2 Sqn Laarbruch – McD Phantom
3 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
4 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
5 Sqn Binbrook – BAC Lightning
6 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
7 Sqn St.Mawgan – BAC Canberra
8 Sqn Lossiemouth – Avro Shackteton
9 Sqn Akrotiri – HS Vulcan
10 Sqn Brize Norton – BAC VC.10
11 Sqn Binbrook – BAC Lightning
12 Sqn Honington – HS Buccaneer
13 Sqn Luqa – BAC Canberra
14 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
15 Sqn Laarbruch – HS Buccaneer
16 Sqn Laarbruch – HS Buccaneer
17 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
18 Sqn Gutersloh – Westland Wessex
19 Sqn Gutersloh – BAC Lightning
20 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
21 Sqn Andover – DH Devon
22 Sqn Thorney Island – Westland Whirlwind
23 Sqn Leuchars – BAC Lightning
24 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
26 Sqn Wyton – DH Devon
27 Sqn Scampton – HS Vulcan
28 Sqn Kai Tak – Westland Wessex
29 Sqn Wattisham – BAC Lightning
30 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
31 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
32 Sqn Northolt – HS Andover, HS125, Westland Whirlwind
33 Sqn Odiham – Westland Puma
35 Sqn Akrotiri – HS Vulcan
36 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
39 Sqn Wyton – BAC Canberra
41 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
42 Sqn St.Mawgan – HS Nimrod
43 Sqn Leuchars – McD Phantom
44 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
45 Sqn Wittering – HS Hunter
46 Sqn Thorney Island – HS Andover
47 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
48 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
50 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
51 Sqn Wyton – BAC Canberra, HS Nimrod
53 Sqn Brize Norton – Short Belfast
54 Sqn Coltishall – BAC Jaguar
55 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
56 Sqn Akrotiri – BAC Lightning
57 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
58 Sqn Wittering – HS Hunter
60 Sqn Wildenrath – Hunting Pembroke, HS Andover
70 Sqn Akrotiri – Lockheed Hercules, HS Argosy
72 Sqn Odiham – Westland Wessex
84 Sqn Akrotiri – Westland Whirlwind
85 Sqn West Raynham – BAC Canberra
92 Sqn Gutersloh – BAC Lightning
98 Sqn Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
99 Sqn Brize Norton – Bristol Britannia
100 Sqn West Raynham – BAC Canberra
101 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
103 Sqn Tenagh – Westland Wessex
111 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
115 Sqn Cottesmore – HS Argosy
120 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
201 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
202 Sqn Leconfield – Westland Whirlwind
203 Sqn Luqa – HS Nimrod
206 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
207 Sqn Northolt – DH Devon, Hunting Pembroke
208 Sqn Honington – HS Buccaneer
214 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
216 Sqn Lyneham – DH Comet
230 Sqn Odiham – Westland Puma
360 Sqn Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
511 Sqn Brize Norton – Bristol Britannia
617 Sqn Scampton – HS Vulcan
226 OCU Coltishall – BAC Lightning [soon to be Jaguar]
228 OCU Coningsby – McD Phantom
229 OCU(TWU) Brawdy – HS Hunter
230 OCU Scampton – HS Vulcan
231 OCU Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
232 OCU Marham – HP Victor
233 OCU Wittering – HS Harrier
236 OCU St.Mawgan – HS Nimrod
237 OCU Honington – HS Buccaneer
240 OCU Odiham – Westland Wessex, Westland Puma
241 OCU Brize Norton – Belfast, Britannia, Comet and VC.10 as required
242 OCU Thorney Island – HS Andover, Lockheed Hercules
1 FTS Linton-On-Ouze – BAC Jet Provost
2 FTS Church Fenton – DHC Chipmunk, Bulldog
3 FTS Leeming – BAC Jet Provost
4 FTS Valley – HS Gnat, HS Hunter
5 FTS Oakington – Vickers Varsity, Jetstream
6 FTS Finningley – HS Dominie, Varsity, BAC Jet Provost
CFS Little Rissington, Kemble and Ternhill
5 MU Kemble
19 MU St.Athan
23 MU Sydenham
27 MU Shawbury
32 MU St.Athan
60 MU Leconfield
71 MU Bicester
103 MU Akrotiri
431 MU Bruggen
Answers on a £20 note, please.
1 Sqn Wittering – HS Harrier
2 Sqn Laarbruch – McD Phantom
3 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
4 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
5 Sqn Binbrook – BAC Lightning
6 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
7 Sqn St.Mawgan – BAC Canberra
8 Sqn Lossiemouth – Avro Shackteton
9 Sqn Akrotiri – HS Vulcan
10 Sqn Brize Norton – BAC VC.10
11 Sqn Binbrook – BAC Lightning
12 Sqn Honington – HS Buccaneer
13 Sqn Luqa – BAC Canberra
14 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
15 Sqn Laarbruch – HS Buccaneer
16 Sqn Laarbruch – HS Buccaneer
17 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
18 Sqn Gutersloh – Westland Wessex
19 Sqn Gutersloh – BAC Lightning
20 Sqn Wildenrath – HS Harrier
21 Sqn Andover – DH Devon
22 Sqn Thorney Island – Westland Whirlwind
23 Sqn Leuchars – BAC Lightning
24 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
26 Sqn Wyton – DH Devon
27 Sqn Scampton – HS Vulcan
28 Sqn Kai Tak – Westland Wessex
29 Sqn Wattisham – BAC Lightning
30 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
31 Sqn Bruggen – McD Phantom
32 Sqn Northolt – HS Andover, HS125, Westland Whirlwind
33 Sqn Odiham – Westland Puma
35 Sqn Akrotiri – HS Vulcan
36 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
39 Sqn Wyton – BAC Canberra
41 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
42 Sqn St.Mawgan – HS Nimrod
43 Sqn Leuchars – McD Phantom
44 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
45 Sqn Wittering – HS Hunter
46 Sqn Thorney Island – HS Andover
47 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
48 Sqn Lyneham – Lockheed Hercules
50 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
51 Sqn Wyton – BAC Canberra, HS Nimrod
53 Sqn Brize Norton – Short Belfast
54 Sqn Coltishall – BAC Jaguar
55 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
56 Sqn Akrotiri – BAC Lightning
57 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
58 Sqn Wittering – HS Hunter
60 Sqn Wildenrath – Hunting Pembroke, HS Andover
70 Sqn Akrotiri – Lockheed Hercules, HS Argosy
72 Sqn Odiham – Westland Wessex
84 Sqn Akrotiri – Westland Whirlwind
85 Sqn West Raynham – BAC Canberra
92 Sqn Gutersloh – BAC Lightning
98 Sqn Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
99 Sqn Brize Norton – Bristol Britannia
100 Sqn West Raynham – BAC Canberra
101 Sqn Waddington – HS Vulcan
103 Sqn Tenagh – Westland Wessex
111 Sqn Coningsby – McD Phantom
115 Sqn Cottesmore – HS Argosy
120 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
201 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
202 Sqn Leconfield – Westland Whirlwind
203 Sqn Luqa – HS Nimrod
206 Sqn Kinloss – HS Nimrod
207 Sqn Northolt – DH Devon, Hunting Pembroke
208 Sqn Honington – HS Buccaneer
214 Sqn Marham – HP Victor
216 Sqn Lyneham – DH Comet
230 Sqn Odiham – Westland Puma
360 Sqn Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
511 Sqn Brize Norton – Bristol Britannia
617 Sqn Scampton – HS Vulcan
226 OCU Coltishall – BAC Lightning [soon to be Jaguar]
228 OCU Coningsby – McD Phantom
229 OCU(TWU) Brawdy – HS Hunter
230 OCU Scampton – HS Vulcan
231 OCU Cottesmore – BAC Canberra
232 OCU Marham – HP Victor
233 OCU Wittering – HS Harrier
236 OCU St.Mawgan – HS Nimrod
237 OCU Honington – HS Buccaneer
240 OCU Odiham – Westland Wessex, Westland Puma
241 OCU Brize Norton – Belfast, Britannia, Comet and VC.10 as required
242 OCU Thorney Island – HS Andover, Lockheed Hercules
1 FTS Linton-On-Ouze – BAC Jet Provost
2 FTS Church Fenton – DHC Chipmunk, Bulldog
3 FTS Leeming – BAC Jet Provost
4 FTS Valley – HS Gnat, HS Hunter
5 FTS Oakington – Vickers Varsity, Jetstream
6 FTS Finningley – HS Dominie, Varsity, BAC Jet Provost
CFS Little Rissington, Kemble and Ternhill
5 MU Kemble
19 MU St.Athan
23 MU Sydenham
27 MU Shawbury
32 MU St.Athan
60 MU Leconfield
71 MU Bicester
103 MU Akrotiri
431 MU Bruggen
Answers on a £20 note, please.
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Tuc & Evalu8ter,
Agreed, mostly. Evalu8ter, combine points #1 and 4 and be nearer the truth. It's where the higher paid help don't like the answer at the end of the assessment phase and tell you what the cost is going to be; A lot of time is wasted re-negotiating schedule/cost profiles to deal with the 'right answer'.
Exscrib, I infer from the lack of a that you are serious. Think project-years, like man-hours but much bigger.
Agreed, mostly. Evalu8ter, combine points #1 and 4 and be nearer the truth. It's where the higher paid help don't like the answer at the end of the assessment phase and tell you what the cost is going to be; A lot of time is wasted re-negotiating schedule/cost profiles to deal with the 'right answer'.
Exscrib, I infer from the lack of a
that you are serious. Think project-years, like man-hours but much bigger.
Thread Starter
exscribbler, yes, that's the RAF I joined.....
You've missed a few - University Air Squadrons, RAFC Cranwell, CAW Manby etc etc. Also 1968 is a tad early for the Bulldog, Harrier and Jetstream.
You've missed a few - University Air Squadrons, RAFC Cranwell, CAW Manby etc etc. Also 1968 is a tad early for the Bulldog, Harrier and Jetstream.
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Tuc
I sat on the other side of the fence and volounteered to act as MILSM for PE as was. All was well providing I gave the right answer, otherwise I recieved a damn good ignoring. With the PM trying to foist a pile of poo into the aircraft and me scoring it as zero, I was told that my job was to make sure the guys were trained properly and to keep my nose out of equipment selection. The preferred answer would have cost us a fortune as the BIT locked in the fault and required replacement of the LRU. That would have been a joy for a wiring fault. Fortunately, in that case, a large chunk of my budget was propping up the procurememt as a "spend to save" due to improved reliability and I threatened to take my toys away, otherwise it was done deal for the cheapest option.
I would not have gone back for a 2nd bite at volounteering to aid PE it was too much grief.
Evalu8tor
Now I am on the other side of the fence I can see the impact of your comments more clearly than a few years ago.
Your 1 - Phased programmes prevent you from manning up for the next stage or making long lead commitments. Both result in delays and costs. As invariably happens, the funding is delayed while negotiations are going on as the opportunity is taken to re-shape the programme. MoD picks up marching army costs or the programme stalls and MoD picks up ramp up costs.
Your 2 - Probably true but again delays and intepretations while the new guy learns the ropes results in cost and time delays.
Your 3 - Again having sat on both sides of the fence, the MoD PM often does not understand the implications of decisions that he makes, not through unwillingness but a lack of training and experience.
Your 4 - Tell me about it. Once funded a programme will put a detailed integrated schedule together and find itself late before it starts. After that you are fire fighting and plundering the risk bucket.
Your 5 - Probably but that goes on above me. I would have added a 6th UK specific standards, these drive large costs into the programme and unless you ignore them (a la C17) big bucks are needed to re-qualify every piece of kit.
regards
retard
I sat on the other side of the fence and volounteered to act as MILSM for PE as was. All was well providing I gave the right answer, otherwise I recieved a damn good ignoring. With the PM trying to foist a pile of poo into the aircraft and me scoring it as zero, I was told that my job was to make sure the guys were trained properly and to keep my nose out of equipment selection. The preferred answer would have cost us a fortune as the BIT locked in the fault and required replacement of the LRU. That would have been a joy for a wiring fault. Fortunately, in that case, a large chunk of my budget was propping up the procurememt as a "spend to save" due to improved reliability and I threatened to take my toys away, otherwise it was done deal for the cheapest option.
I would not have gone back for a 2nd bite at volounteering to aid PE it was too much grief.
Evalu8tor
Now I am on the other side of the fence I can see the impact of your comments more clearly than a few years ago.
Your 1 - Phased programmes prevent you from manning up for the next stage or making long lead commitments. Both result in delays and costs. As invariably happens, the funding is delayed while negotiations are going on as the opportunity is taken to re-shape the programme. MoD picks up marching army costs or the programme stalls and MoD picks up ramp up costs.
Your 2 - Probably true but again delays and intepretations while the new guy learns the ropes results in cost and time delays.
Your 3 - Again having sat on both sides of the fence, the MoD PM often does not understand the implications of decisions that he makes, not through unwillingness but a lack of training and experience.
Your 4 - Tell me about it. Once funded a programme will put a detailed integrated schedule together and find itself late before it starts. After that you are fire fighting and plundering the risk bucket.
Your 5 - Probably but that goes on above me. I would have added a 6th UK specific standards, these drive large costs into the programme and unless you ignore them (a la C17) big bucks are needed to re-qualify every piece of kit.
regards
retard
Engineer (R),
I'd agree with your point about UK standards. There are many in the community who are starting to question the validity of the "gold plating" we do regarding certification. They point to Aussies/Canadians et al who will use US kit with read-across of certification, and save themselves £Ms and months by not paying a QinetiQ equivalent to unpick each piece of equipment.
Now, as an aircrew mate, I expect the Queen to provide me with a "fit for purpose" piece of kit. I'm certainly not advocating abandoning our Clearance strategy completely, but, balanced against the operational need and shrinking resources some pragmatism is required. The problem in the post Nimrod/Herk/Chinook world is that this would require some high-paid hands to stand up and take resposibility. Having QQ assurance gives them a crutch to lean on in that worst case scenario.
Also, never underestimate the lobbying power of QQ; they were very sore over the whole C17 business. Can you imagine if we did the same for JSF,or for any new build (I wish...) Herks or Chinooks??
I'd agree with your point about UK standards. There are many in the community who are starting to question the validity of the "gold plating" we do regarding certification. They point to Aussies/Canadians et al who will use US kit with read-across of certification, and save themselves £Ms and months by not paying a QinetiQ equivalent to unpick each piece of equipment.
Now, as an aircrew mate, I expect the Queen to provide me with a "fit for purpose" piece of kit. I'm certainly not advocating abandoning our Clearance strategy completely, but, balanced against the operational need and shrinking resources some pragmatism is required. The problem in the post Nimrod/Herk/Chinook world is that this would require some high-paid hands to stand up and take resposibility. Having QQ assurance gives them a crutch to lean on in that worst case scenario.
Also, never underestimate the lobbying power of QQ; they were very sore over the whole C17 business. Can you imagine if we did the same for JSF,or for any new build (I wish...) Herks or Chinooks??
Eng
Agreed. Your experience (in every sense) serves to highlight what I was saying. Increasingly, PMs haven't the slightest idea what an ILSM, and the rest of the disciplines I mentioned, are meant to do. Yet 30 years ago I couldn't be promoted into the lowest PM grade in PE without having filled ALL of these posts, and more; with the exception of DEC. That is why the rules/guidelines (still) say the PM must be able to do the jobs. To amend them makes it too obvious the posts are being dumbed down. The best MILSM / Reqts Mgr I ever came across (after the posts were militarised) was, surprise surprise, a WOII who'd been an Engineering Authority. (Wasn't you, as it?). The worst was a Colonel, who spent his tour jacking up sailing trips on the Solent (until they found out he was encouraging contractors to fund them). If you asked him to do his job, he simply lodged a complaint with the IPTL.
Agreed. Your experience (in every sense) serves to highlight what I was saying. Increasingly, PMs haven't the slightest idea what an ILSM, and the rest of the disciplines I mentioned, are meant to do. Yet 30 years ago I couldn't be promoted into the lowest PM grade in PE without having filled ALL of these posts, and more; with the exception of DEC. That is why the rules/guidelines (still) say the PM must be able to do the jobs. To amend them makes it too obvious the posts are being dumbed down. The best MILSM / Reqts Mgr I ever came across (after the posts were militarised) was, surprise surprise, a WOII who'd been an Engineering Authority. (Wasn't you, as it?). The worst was a Colonel, who spent his tour jacking up sailing trips on the Solent (until they found out he was encouraging contractors to fund them). If you asked him to do his job, he simply lodged a complaint with the IPTL.
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Perhaps I should have put a bit more depth into my post. I have no specific beef with QQ apart from the occasional forays into science projects. And before anyone shoots me, I worked there also and saw it happen at first hand. I believe that they do a good policing role and are generally brought into programmes too late to cause the desired effect without it costing a mint because the requirements are preset when they get hands on.
My specific issue is with environmental qualfications being different; even if you take COTS/MOTS kit you end up with additional redesign and tests to meet UK specific requirements. This can significantly drive costs because the testing is often destructive, such as higher lightning levels. Whilst this in itself is no bad thing because of improved safety margins, across a whole aircraft I would expect COTS costs to rise by up to £0.25m per system test plus the cost of scrapping an aircrafts worth of equipment. Structural testing would be on top of that. There are other examples of deltas but the cumalative effect is crippling. Now that I am on the industry side, some might think that is a good think. However, our higher non-recurring costs to meet UK standards when the rest of the world is content with US or similar makes us uncompetitve. It would be better from an export view to test less and invest in the shiny toys or reduce cost and increase the order book.
Tuc
No that was not me but I had an EA background before doing Abbey Wood and felt that I was better equipped than the PE PMs of the day. Unfortunatly, I found many of them lacked a basic understanding of cost drivers, did not know how to risk manage (apparently a couple of days on a Predict course was the risk pre-requisite tick) and lacked empathy with the customer. I firmly believe that the rustication programme of the 90s was a disaster as the lines of communication snapped. The only plus side that I did see at Wyton was we had our own DEC rep embedded and that was worth its weight in gold.
regards
retard
Perhaps I should have put a bit more depth into my post. I have no specific beef with QQ apart from the occasional forays into science projects. And before anyone shoots me, I worked there also and saw it happen at first hand. I believe that they do a good policing role and are generally brought into programmes too late to cause the desired effect without it costing a mint because the requirements are preset when they get hands on.
My specific issue is with environmental qualfications being different; even if you take COTS/MOTS kit you end up with additional redesign and tests to meet UK specific requirements. This can significantly drive costs because the testing is often destructive, such as higher lightning levels. Whilst this in itself is no bad thing because of improved safety margins, across a whole aircraft I would expect COTS costs to rise by up to £0.25m per system test plus the cost of scrapping an aircrafts worth of equipment. Structural testing would be on top of that. There are other examples of deltas but the cumalative effect is crippling. Now that I am on the industry side, some might think that is a good think. However, our higher non-recurring costs to meet UK standards when the rest of the world is content with US or similar makes us uncompetitve. It would be better from an export view to test less and invest in the shiny toys or reduce cost and increase the order book.
Tuc
No that was not me but I had an EA background before doing Abbey Wood and felt that I was better equipped than the PE PMs of the day. Unfortunatly, I found many of them lacked a basic understanding of cost drivers, did not know how to risk manage (apparently a couple of days on a Predict course was the risk pre-requisite tick) and lacked empathy with the customer. I firmly believe that the rustication programme of the 90s was a disaster as the lines of communication snapped. The only plus side that I did see at Wyton was we had our own DEC rep embedded and that was worth its weight in gold.
regards
retard
THe problem from a MOD CS perspective is that staff who wish to develop their careers and thus get to the top, are actively encouraged to move posts and TLBs at least once every 2 years, so its hard to get retention when people know that their career depends on moving regularly.
As for the pay perspective for PMs - we pay a starting salary of 35K PA to a C1 CS - and this is a grade that many non faststream CS aspire to retire to! There are plenty of secretaries in the city that get paid (or at least were paid) more than this! While there are some fringe benefits to being a CS, these are rapidly diminishing - so you have to accept that once people are in need of earning a decent wage, they will move out to the private sector where they can easily double their salary. We need to look seriously at retention incentives for CS to ensure that they stay in post, and earn enough to provide the corporate memory to support posted forces personnel. Otherwise we risk reinventing the wheel once every 2 years!
As for the pay perspective for PMs - we pay a starting salary of 35K PA to a C1 CS - and this is a grade that many non faststream CS aspire to retire to! There are plenty of secretaries in the city that get paid (or at least were paid) more than this! While there are some fringe benefits to being a CS, these are rapidly diminishing - so you have to accept that once people are in need of earning a decent wage, they will move out to the private sector where they can easily double their salary. We need to look seriously at retention incentives for CS to ensure that they stay in post, and earn enough to provide the corporate memory to support posted forces personnel. Otherwise we risk reinventing the wheel once every 2 years!
Jimlad, exactly my point. Career CS who are nearing retirement as C1/B2 are fine as the majority have paid off relatively small mortgages and have good pension provision. What about the new guys/girls in the CS? £35K buys you f**k all in Bristol, and the "fast track" are in danger of becoming 6-month wonders as they move so quickly. Exposure to many disciplines can be a broadening experience, but somewhere along the line you have to develop some depth in order to have any credibility as a CS PM in a military programme.
So, I wonder why so many "young 'uns" look at £4-500 per day contractors and think "I'll have some of that....". We need to recruit, train, foster and retain a high calibre cadre of PMs. Unfortunately, that means paying the market rate. A bit like the military and lawyers really.....
So, I wonder why so many "young 'uns" look at £4-500 per day contractors and think "I'll have some of that....". We need to recruit, train, foster and retain a high calibre cadre of PMs. Unfortunately, that means paying the market rate. A bit like the military and lawyers really.....