resuming of inquest XV179
Well said Chug.
The indisputable fact that very few want to acknowledge, and many try to steer us away from, is that the tragedies discussed here (Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Tornado etc) have a common denominator - failure to apply the Military Airworthiness Regulations.
The only practical difference between them is the sentences in the same paragraphs which were not applied.
The Gp Capt mentioned above may have been a “blockage” to the Sqn Ldr, but he is a little cog in the airworthiness machine. Leadership and management set the tone. Those truly responsible, both serving and civilian, have known about these systemic failures for many years, yet turned their backs and walked away.
The indisputable fact that very few want to acknowledge, and many try to steer us away from, is that the tragedies discussed here (Chinook, Hercules, Nimrod, Tornado etc) have a common denominator - failure to apply the Military Airworthiness Regulations.
The only practical difference between them is the sentences in the same paragraphs which were not applied.
The Gp Capt mentioned above may have been a “blockage” to the Sqn Ldr, but he is a little cog in the airworthiness machine. Leadership and management set the tone. Those truly responsible, both serving and civilian, have known about these systemic failures for many years, yet turned their backs and walked away.
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One of the saddest aspects to this tragedy is that the insurgents did indeed know how to shoot down a large aircraft, but our own crews had not been informed about an extremely serious vulnerabilty analysis report that was issued twice in 2002 and 2003.
A report that highly recommended the fitting of foam stating the weakness of Hercules wing fuel tanks was not disseminated to those who desperately needed to know.
Hercules Crews.
The report WAS disseminated to senior figures in 2Gp, Strike Cmd and PJHQ.
I would like to know why the crews were not told and who made that decision.
A report that highly recommended the fitting of foam stating the weakness of Hercules wing fuel tanks was not disseminated to those who desperately needed to know.
Hercules Crews.
The report WAS disseminated to senior figures in 2Gp, Strike Cmd and PJHQ.
I would like to know why the crews were not told and who made that decision.
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Oct 2008 at 15:57.
The think the point being made is that, in this case and as always, many in the airworthiness chain did their jobs properly and assessed vulnerability and threats - and recommended ESF.
As a result, Lockheed Martin applied for and were awarded their patent (1969-70).
Evidence has emerged that many in MoD (UK) recognised this, and we issued our own specification (1982) and made voluminous amendments to Def Stan 00-970 (Design and Airworthiness Requirements). Download it, search for "foam" and see what I mean.
Whether or not users (RAF) actually knew of this is an important point, but the airworthiness system is designed to have fail safes and in more recent years formal requests were made to deal with these vulnerabilities and threats; which the "system" demands are kept under constant assessment.
The problem is the "system" makes a rather simplistic, albeit reasonable, assumption. That all concerned, having been deemed competent (although by whom is key!) and as a result issued with letters of delegation, do their job correctly. It doesn't help when those at the top make ruling after ruling that this inconvenient legal obligation can be completely ignored if it impacts time, cost, performance or promotion prospects. And that people without formal airworthiness delegation can overrule those who have. Fix this little lot, and you are half way there.
As a result, Lockheed Martin applied for and were awarded their patent (1969-70).
Evidence has emerged that many in MoD (UK) recognised this, and we issued our own specification (1982) and made voluminous amendments to Def Stan 00-970 (Design and Airworthiness Requirements). Download it, search for "foam" and see what I mean.
Whether or not users (RAF) actually knew of this is an important point, but the airworthiness system is designed to have fail safes and in more recent years formal requests were made to deal with these vulnerabilities and threats; which the "system" demands are kept under constant assessment.
The problem is the "system" makes a rather simplistic, albeit reasonable, assumption. That all concerned, having been deemed competent (although by whom is key!) and as a result issued with letters of delegation, do their job correctly. It doesn't help when those at the top make ruling after ruling that this inconvenient legal obligation can be completely ignored if it impacts time, cost, performance or promotion prospects. And that people without formal airworthiness delegation can overrule those who have. Fix this little lot, and you are half way there.
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Tuc, I am holding my fire on the figures central to maintaining airworthiness of the Hercules until we know what happened after that report was issued. The Coroner has referred to a black hole so I will wait until MoD release the names of those in position at the time so that more information can be gleaned.
The point I am making is that as a former Herc crew operator, if I had been armed with the information contained in that report the pressure from below, the grass roots, to fit foam would have been considerable. Tactics could also have been changed by front line crews once they understood the huge weakness in their aircraft.
I hope the systemic failure of airworthiness implementation is now placed under forensic examination, in what remains of the inquest.
This is what should have happened.
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/standev/00-970e.php
Section 9.9 Reduction of Vulnerability to Battle Damage
The point I am making is that as a former Herc crew operator, if I had been armed with the information contained in that report the pressure from below, the grass roots, to fit foam would have been considerable. Tactics could also have been changed by front line crews once they understood the huge weakness in their aircraft.
I hope the systemic failure of airworthiness implementation is now placed under forensic examination, in what remains of the inquest.
This is what should have happened.
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/standev/00-970e.php
Section 9.9 Reduction of Vulnerability to Battle Damage
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Oct 2008 at 12:07.
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JTO, Section 5 of DefStans covers Transport Aircraft but it has not yet been published!
It also came up as an issue at the Nimrod Inquest.
The sections relating to combat aircraft are generic and are even more applicable to a large slow moving aircraft like the hercules flying at low level, which presents a much easier target than a fast jet.
If those reponsible for implementing airworthiness regs wanted to seek an alternative to DefStans they could have gone with the American (mil) equivalent, which ranks number 8 in the preferred list.(DefStans being number 6).
I think you will find that USAF has been fitting foam as standard to Talon aircraft since 1965.
Please tell me where in Def Stans it states that a vulnerability analysis report can be ignored? Especially one backed by a subject matter expert from DSTL?
Finally, standards have to be applied, in the absence of section 5 which ones are the MoD using?
Edited to add, I too, would like to see a copy of the aircraft specification, particularly to see if it was up to date at the time.
It also came up as an issue at the Nimrod Inquest.
The sections relating to combat aircraft are generic and are even more applicable to a large slow moving aircraft like the hercules flying at low level, which presents a much easier target than a fast jet.
If those reponsible for implementing airworthiness regs wanted to seek an alternative to DefStans they could have gone with the American (mil) equivalent, which ranks number 8 in the preferred list.(DefStans being number 6).
I think you will find that USAF has been fitting foam as standard to Talon aircraft since 1965.
Please tell me where in Def Stans it states that a vulnerability analysis report can be ignored? Especially one backed by a subject matter expert from DSTL?
Finally, standards have to be applied, in the absence of section 5 which ones are the MoD using?
Edited to add, I too, would like to see a copy of the aircraft specification, particularly to see if it was up to date at the time.
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Oct 2008 at 19:20.
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JTO, good points, of course DefStans are described as guidelines because those responsible for implementing airworthiness regulations have the option to choose which ones are most applicable.
"Guidelines" do not mean they are there to be ignored.
The specific info in 9.9 that is highly relevant is the requirement to provide fuel tank protection in the event that a vulnerability is established. As Tuc says, all the info you would need is specified in DefStans. Not that you would need it. A simple phone call to Marshalls would have done the job. As they have direct linkage to LM in the States who could call up the latest specification of foam going into their US Hercs.
I look forward to hearing which standards were followed with regard to RAF C130 craft and what rationale was given for the decision not to fit reticulated foam.
It is, as I am sure you are aware, a requirement to record the rationale behind a decision NOT to fit foam in this (safety) case. Which makes the "black hole" even more difficult to understand.
Safety decisions HAVE to be available for audit and scrutiny.
Otherwise there is a clear breach of airworthiness regulations.
More from DefStans.....
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5 SECTION 9 LEAFLET 22 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1.4 Vulnerability, in an analysis, is quantified as the probability that the aeroplane will be degraded to one of the defined kill levels (para 5 below), after being subjected to the Defined or Specified threats.
3 PROTECTION MEASURES The following is a list of measures which should be considered. For any particular project some will be more important than others and some may be omitted. The order of priority will be determined by the Vulnerability Analysis. (Remember it has been reported that the analysis report concerning Hercules dated 2002/2003 stated wing fuel tanks as the biggest weakness).
3.1 FUEL SYSTEMS
(i) Design of components to tolerate battle damage.
(ii) Continuance of supply.
(iii) Protection against leakage, explosion, and fire.
(iv) Low volatility fuels.
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5 SECTION 9 (Page 210 online)
probabilities of fuel tank fires and explosions is conditional on such parameters as the fuel vapour concentration in the ullage, fuel temperature, fuel tank geometry, fuel tank pressure, and the materials used in the construction of the fuel tanks. ........... The prevention of aircraft fuel tank explosions may be achieved by either the installation of explosion suppression foam; or by the introduction of an inert gas such as nitrogen which limits the oxygen concentration in a fuel-air mixture by dilution (See Chapter 713).
"Guidelines" do not mean they are there to be ignored.
The specific info in 9.9 that is highly relevant is the requirement to provide fuel tank protection in the event that a vulnerability is established. As Tuc says, all the info you would need is specified in DefStans. Not that you would need it. A simple phone call to Marshalls would have done the job. As they have direct linkage to LM in the States who could call up the latest specification of foam going into their US Hercs.
I look forward to hearing which standards were followed with regard to RAF C130 craft and what rationale was given for the decision not to fit reticulated foam.
It is, as I am sure you are aware, a requirement to record the rationale behind a decision NOT to fit foam in this (safety) case. Which makes the "black hole" even more difficult to understand.
Safety decisions HAVE to be available for audit and scrutiny.
Otherwise there is a clear breach of airworthiness regulations.
More from DefStans.....
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5 SECTION 9 LEAFLET 22 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1.4 Vulnerability, in an analysis, is quantified as the probability that the aeroplane will be degraded to one of the defined kill levels (para 5 below), after being subjected to the Defined or Specified threats.
3 PROTECTION MEASURES The following is a list of measures which should be considered. For any particular project some will be more important than others and some may be omitted. The order of priority will be determined by the Vulnerability Analysis. (Remember it has been reported that the analysis report concerning Hercules dated 2002/2003 stated wing fuel tanks as the biggest weakness).
3.1 FUEL SYSTEMS
(i) Design of components to tolerate battle damage.
(ii) Continuance of supply.
(iii) Protection against leakage, explosion, and fire.
(iv) Low volatility fuels.
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5 SECTION 9 (Page 210 online)
probabilities of fuel tank fires and explosions is conditional on such parameters as the fuel vapour concentration in the ullage, fuel temperature, fuel tank geometry, fuel tank pressure, and the materials used in the construction of the fuel tanks. ........... The prevention of aircraft fuel tank explosions may be achieved by either the installation of explosion suppression foam; or by the introduction of an inert gas such as nitrogen which limits the oxygen concentration in a fuel-air mixture by dilution (See Chapter 713).
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Oct 2008 at 19:23.
Nige,
You are a diamond and I consider your thoughts are well-thought out and lucid and indeed powerful. Clearly,the only reason that the PTB (MOD) fail to acknowledge their systemic failures over soooo many years is because IF they did ack they were WRONG, and thus admit they failed to protect our crews from a known and tangible threat, it would open the floodgates to culpable negligence claims by the crews relatives.
This whole issue of this and the Chinook and the other ac disasters is not about the truth, it is about, so far as the MOD is concerned, damage-limitation (30 month tours for those in authority-guarantee the let's scarper now, leave the oh-so-messy problems behind me and leave the **** to be cleared up by the next would-be encumbent). Ultimately, it IS about saving F*CKI*G money in potential claims in the High Court.
RAF leaders, one-and-all, you should be ashamed of yourselves--I hope you sleep well-- and when you shave in the morning, take a moment to look at yourselves in the mirror and just think about what you have done (or rather not done) and think how your wife would feel if you had died because your bosses had failed, and knowingly failed, to give you the protection you deserved. You are all, to a man, shallow, self-protectionist and spineless. I hope you enjoy your pensions.
You are a diamond and I consider your thoughts are well-thought out and lucid and indeed powerful. Clearly,the only reason that the PTB (MOD) fail to acknowledge their systemic failures over soooo many years is because IF they did ack they were WRONG, and thus admit they failed to protect our crews from a known and tangible threat, it would open the floodgates to culpable negligence claims by the crews relatives.
This whole issue of this and the Chinook and the other ac disasters is not about the truth, it is about, so far as the MOD is concerned, damage-limitation (30 month tours for those in authority-guarantee the let's scarper now, leave the oh-so-messy problems behind me and leave the **** to be cleared up by the next would-be encumbent). Ultimately, it IS about saving F*CKI*G money in potential claims in the High Court.
RAF leaders, one-and-all, you should be ashamed of yourselves--I hope you sleep well-- and when you shave in the morning, take a moment to look at yourselves in the mirror and just think about what you have done (or rather not done) and think how your wife would feel if you had died because your bosses had failed, and knowingly failed, to give you the protection you deserved. You are all, to a man, shallow, self-protectionist and spineless. I hope you enjoy your pensions.
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Cirrus, thankfully the truth is that the insurgents do not know what works best. Quite simply they do not have access to the information we do, nor the level of weaponry that they may desire. We also work hard to understand what weapon systems and information they do have so we can adapt.
I’ll leave what (we think) the enemy knows to others whose job it is, but assuming they have internet access anyone can download the list of defined threats from MoD websites and then work out from various Board of Inquiry reports and Coroners verdicts what our general implementation policy is……. (On the low side of zero).
CirrusF
Spot on. I’d add knighthoods and, in particular, CBs if you’re being specific about those who ignored warnings about airworthiness. Perhaps “ignored” is the wrong word. They read the warnings, acknowledged they were true and said “That’s ok”. One said “That’s political dynamite, don’t get involved”. (1991, immediately before it was advised to the C130 directorate). But he wasn’t the poor sod with the delegation being told to paper over the cracks by deliberately lying.
I remember the pronouncement of one 19 year old supply manager (!!!). “Equipment reliability improves with age. (C130) is old, therefore we’ve chopped the money for (maintaining airworthiness)”. You hope, in vain, that her bosses (Wg Cdr, Gp Capt…..) will see the light, but in the meantime I recall getting round that particular problem by “borrowing” spares from a British Caledonian contract at the same company. Thanks BCal, I did replace them, eventually. Honest. Meanwhile, she’s arranging a 20 year spares buy for an aircraft that left service the previous year and her AVM backs her up.
CirrusF
Methinks the reason for the official secrecy is more to do with protecting careers/OBEs of the chaps in charge of budgets etc than protecting the lives of the blokes at the sharp-end.
Spot on. I’d add knighthoods and, in particular, CBs if you’re being specific about those who ignored warnings about airworthiness. Perhaps “ignored” is the wrong word. They read the warnings, acknowledged they were true and said “That’s ok”. One said “That’s political dynamite, don’t get involved”. (1991, immediately before it was advised to the C130 directorate). But he wasn’t the poor sod with the delegation being told to paper over the cracks by deliberately lying.
I remember the pronouncement of one 19 year old supply manager (!!!). “Equipment reliability improves with age. (C130) is old, therefore we’ve chopped the money for (maintaining airworthiness)”. You hope, in vain, that her bosses (Wg Cdr, Gp Capt…..) will see the light, but in the meantime I recall getting round that particular problem by “borrowing” spares from a British Caledonian contract at the same company. Thanks BCal, I did replace them, eventually. Honest. Meanwhile, she’s arranging a 20 year spares buy for an aircraft that left service the previous year and her AVM backs her up.
tucumseh:
As ever your tag line says it all tuc. The extraordinary combination of incompetence, incestuousness, malevolence and mendaciousness that characterise daily life in that Tower of Babel makes one marvel at what the Armed Forces accomplish despite this millstone around their neck. Is the MOD planning for its own 50th birthday? If so may I counsel against celebrating it in a brewery, for the resulting financial ramifications would still be being attended to at its centenary (God forbid!). Whatever else this monstrous carbuncle has mangled, there is no doubt that it has done for UK Military Airworthiness and would not know where to start in making amends. That has to be done elsewhere by professionals that can be trusted to do the job, well away from 19 year old Supply Managers and their AVMs!
Meanwhile, she’s arranging a 20 year spares buy for an aircraft that left service the previous year and her AVM backs her up.
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Congratulations on the extraordinary work so far on ESF.
But my copy of the BOI says that contributory factors were:-
a) **** Tactics
b) **** Fuel Tank protection
c) **** Intelligence
'Flying at low level in daylight made the aircraft vulnerable...'
Before the inquest adjorned, we had expert witnesses contradicting each other
BBC NEWS | UK | Hercules crew tactics questioned
Will PPRuNe debate the other two points of contributory factors?
Will the inquest?
But my copy of the BOI says that contributory factors were:-
a) **** Tactics
b) **** Fuel Tank protection
c) **** Intelligence
'Flying at low level in daylight made the aircraft vulnerable...'
Before the inquest adjorned, we had expert witnesses contradicting each other
BBC NEWS | UK | Hercules crew tactics questioned
Will PPRuNe debate the other two points of contributory factors?
Will the inquest?
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'Flying at low level in daylight made the aircraft vulnerable...'
Therefore all aircraft are at risk from small arms fire on landing and take-off.
Perhaps all aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan should only land and take off in the dark then?
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The Inquest was shown footage of a wing test yesterday.One wing had foam the other did not, the difference when being hit by a bullet is startling.
BBC NEWS | UK | Inquest into warplane safety
BBC NEWS | UK | Inquest into warplane safety
The report doesn’t place a date on the footage. If it’s UK trials, then there would be no reason for it to be later than about 1980, unless it was to trial an improved ESF. I’d hazard a guess the footage is older than that.
Regardless, the simple fact is that our regulations demand vulnerability assessment against a list of defined threats. Those threats include inert and incendiary bullets, missile fragments etc. In practice, as the aircraft is of foreign origin, the first stop on the assessment is LM’s base design and how it was validated. It includes ESF and we know from their patent they conducted trials. If their standards were good enough to buy the basic airframe, why was their method of protection disregarded?
Reading between the lines there was some MoD in-fighting going on. The Hercules office and/or OR rejected ESF, yet someone was concerned because they made a successful case to spend money developing a MoD(PE) specification, dated April 1982. Why do this when there were perfectly good US equivalents? The only answer is someone wanted to emphasise the risk.
My guess is the original Concept of Use, against which Design Reviews were conducted, swiftly became invalid. This is why the regulations demand a process of continuous assessment as (in today’s language) the current use(s) must be reflected in the Safety Case. I find Aircrew are excellent at reacting to such change by, for example, developing new tactics and training. Experienced project engineers (define experienced!!) immediately spot the impact and, if asked, would point to the mandated requirement to maintain the build standard and this continuous safety assessment. The processes and procedures for dealing with this are laid down in precise detail.
A number of things militate against this. First and foremost, a succession of senior staffs ruled the regs can be ignored. As this contradicts the mandated edicts of both SofS and PUS, the likes of D/Stan find it difficult to get anyone to continually assess standards, as it is a poisoned chalice. Whose instructions do you work to? SofS/PUS, or those of your immediate bosses? As I noted above, there is an excellent Def Stan about maintaining airworthiness. But, try implementing it! Many facilities designed to ensure compliance simply don’t exist anymore. Next, it costs money. To get the money, one must first appreciate the requirement and make a reasoned case. MoD stopped doing this, as a matter of policy, in the late 80s/early 90s. (It differed between Services). Since then, the fiscal policy has been “Don’t bother asking, you’re getting chopped xx% from last year, and here’s the extra tasks you must carry out”. In my personal experience, instead of declaring planning blight or restricted OC, the Stars sliced away at some rather important pre-requisites to safety and airworthiness. No fault investigations. No tech pub / drawing amendments (“waste of money”). Destroy spares, it costs too much to store them; and then immediately waste money replacing them. Safety related tasks only. Then, the real killer (in every sense). “No safety tasks to be conducted”. That was 1991. As I’ve said before, the airworthiness system simply doesn’t recover from that degree of incompetence and deliberate neglect. The effect was not immediate, but cumulative. For example, nowadays we don’t bat an eyelid at 70% of a fleet not being available. The official upper limit used to be 14%. The perpetrators were seen to “save” money. That it was at the expense of OC and safety was of no concern to them.
Regardless, the simple fact is that our regulations demand vulnerability assessment against a list of defined threats. Those threats include inert and incendiary bullets, missile fragments etc. In practice, as the aircraft is of foreign origin, the first stop on the assessment is LM’s base design and how it was validated. It includes ESF and we know from their patent they conducted trials. If their standards were good enough to buy the basic airframe, why was their method of protection disregarded?
Reading between the lines there was some MoD in-fighting going on. The Hercules office and/or OR rejected ESF, yet someone was concerned because they made a successful case to spend money developing a MoD(PE) specification, dated April 1982. Why do this when there were perfectly good US equivalents? The only answer is someone wanted to emphasise the risk.
My guess is the original Concept of Use, against which Design Reviews were conducted, swiftly became invalid. This is why the regulations demand a process of continuous assessment as (in today’s language) the current use(s) must be reflected in the Safety Case. I find Aircrew are excellent at reacting to such change by, for example, developing new tactics and training. Experienced project engineers (define experienced!!) immediately spot the impact and, if asked, would point to the mandated requirement to maintain the build standard and this continuous safety assessment. The processes and procedures for dealing with this are laid down in precise detail.
A number of things militate against this. First and foremost, a succession of senior staffs ruled the regs can be ignored. As this contradicts the mandated edicts of both SofS and PUS, the likes of D/Stan find it difficult to get anyone to continually assess standards, as it is a poisoned chalice. Whose instructions do you work to? SofS/PUS, or those of your immediate bosses? As I noted above, there is an excellent Def Stan about maintaining airworthiness. But, try implementing it! Many facilities designed to ensure compliance simply don’t exist anymore. Next, it costs money. To get the money, one must first appreciate the requirement and make a reasoned case. MoD stopped doing this, as a matter of policy, in the late 80s/early 90s. (It differed between Services). Since then, the fiscal policy has been “Don’t bother asking, you’re getting chopped xx% from last year, and here’s the extra tasks you must carry out”. In my personal experience, instead of declaring planning blight or restricted OC, the Stars sliced away at some rather important pre-requisites to safety and airworthiness. No fault investigations. No tech pub / drawing amendments (“waste of money”). Destroy spares, it costs too much to store them; and then immediately waste money replacing them. Safety related tasks only. Then, the real killer (in every sense). “No safety tasks to be conducted”. That was 1991. As I’ve said before, the airworthiness system simply doesn’t recover from that degree of incompetence and deliberate neglect. The effect was not immediate, but cumulative. For example, nowadays we don’t bat an eyelid at 70% of a fleet not being available. The official upper limit used to be 14%. The perpetrators were seen to “save” money. That it was at the expense of OC and safety was of no concern to them.
