Hercules inquest.
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Hear Hear Colin
We are all volunteers in the service of the Military, hazadous flying in hostile enviroments is all part of the risk. The nature of ops is dangerous as is the essential support that C-130 crews give to the user units.
ESF and tactics discussions could go on for ever - perhaps we could just accept that the crew of XV179 were unlucky on that day in Iraq. Given the number of sorties flown in support of ops since Sarajevo, the loss of one aircraft and crew should have been expected.
Lets just let XV179 rest and concentrate on providing support to our crews currently deployed around the world.
Military flying is dangerous - fact.
We are all volunteers in the service of the Military, hazadous flying in hostile enviroments is all part of the risk. The nature of ops is dangerous as is the essential support that C-130 crews give to the user units.
ESF and tactics discussions could go on for ever - perhaps we could just accept that the crew of XV179 were unlucky on that day in Iraq. Given the number of sorties flown in support of ops since Sarajevo, the loss of one aircraft and crew should have been expected.
Lets just let XV179 rest and concentrate on providing support to our crews currently deployed around the world.
Military flying is dangerous - fact.
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The reporting of events in Iraq was not entirely a US to UK problem it was more a inter-unit problem and is something the MOD would have found it difficult to deal with. The following link shows an accident which happened after 179 to a US aircraft in Iraq when a NOTAM was not passed from one US unit to another. The article says that it wasn't issued, it was, it was just never passed to the unit that lost the ac as they worked for 'different people'.
http://kg.typepad.com/banter/2005/04...crash_pic.html
This is what we and 179 had to contend against. Therefore it would have been very difficult for little old us to have had any affect, the changes in the passing of information to ALL units was more as a result of the findings of this american crash rather than XV179.
This won't come up in the inquest either will it...
http://kg.typepad.com/banter/2005/04...crash_pic.html
This is what we and 179 had to contend against. Therefore it would have been very difficult for little old us to have had any affect, the changes in the passing of information to ALL units was more as a result of the findings of this american crash rather than XV179.
This won't come up in the inquest either will it...
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Yes its Dangerous
Trukkie,
As an ex-engineer who spent virtually all of his career on the FJ side - first line and projects, I have to agree with most of your last posting - military flying was, is and always will be dangerous at times. The operational imperatives will always have to come first almost regardless of risk, and it is obvious from all of the current public domain information just what risks are being run by the crews of the AT fleet and in RW operations such as Merlins and Chinooks on casevac missions. Where I totally disagree with you is your statement that because it is dangerous XV 179's (and other military) lessons should not be learnt and put right. Even the BOI agreed that they were not just unlucky!
I am not qualified to join the tactics debate, but I suggest that there is nothing remotely operational about losing an aircraft (or soldier) because MOD has, in the past, failed to provide equipment to the highest standards to meet their duty of care obligations, including ensuring that aircraft are airworthy and fit for purpose. Yes, things may be getting a lot better now, but it has taken the recognition and actioning of a whole pile of lessons, and money - a lot of it, to recover the situation, and it is still not clear whether everything that could and should have been done has been actioned.
The fact remains that MOD has spent (some might argue wasted) billions on new HQ, moving units, failed projects, etc etc, whilst having, it would appear, insufficient funds (not always caused by MOD of course) fully to meet their obligations to the front line - this is why the lessons from XV179 and later this year XV 230 cannot and should not be ignored - they need to be investigated, learnt and acted upon. As you rightly say military flying is often dangerous especially in operational theatres - that danger should not be exacerbated by the (in)actions of your own side, eg a failure to ensure that the airworthiness chain is intact (not my comment alone but the conclusion of AOC in C Air Command re the loss of XV 230) or, certainly in the past, a government failure to fund the necessary equipment to ensure fitness for purpose!
JB
As an ex-engineer who spent virtually all of his career on the FJ side - first line and projects, I have to agree with most of your last posting - military flying was, is and always will be dangerous at times. The operational imperatives will always have to come first almost regardless of risk, and it is obvious from all of the current public domain information just what risks are being run by the crews of the AT fleet and in RW operations such as Merlins and Chinooks on casevac missions. Where I totally disagree with you is your statement that because it is dangerous XV 179's (and other military) lessons should not be learnt and put right. Even the BOI agreed that they were not just unlucky!
I am not qualified to join the tactics debate, but I suggest that there is nothing remotely operational about losing an aircraft (or soldier) because MOD has, in the past, failed to provide equipment to the highest standards to meet their duty of care obligations, including ensuring that aircraft are airworthy and fit for purpose. Yes, things may be getting a lot better now, but it has taken the recognition and actioning of a whole pile of lessons, and money - a lot of it, to recover the situation, and it is still not clear whether everything that could and should have been done has been actioned.
The fact remains that MOD has spent (some might argue wasted) billions on new HQ, moving units, failed projects, etc etc, whilst having, it would appear, insufficient funds (not always caused by MOD of course) fully to meet their obligations to the front line - this is why the lessons from XV179 and later this year XV 230 cannot and should not be ignored - they need to be investigated, learnt and acted upon. As you rightly say military flying is often dangerous especially in operational theatres - that danger should not be exacerbated by the (in)actions of your own side, eg a failure to ensure that the airworthiness chain is intact (not my comment alone but the conclusion of AOC in C Air Command re the loss of XV 230) or, certainly in the past, a government failure to fund the necessary equipment to ensure fitness for purpose!
JB
Couple of late updates to the BBC News piece
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7354076.stm
Near the end of the piece , in the section 'Hercules Vulnerability', an important extra last sentence about the document:
And, at the end, the fact that the inquest resumes on Tuesday.
airsound
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7354076.stm
Near the end of the piece , in the section 'Hercules Vulnerability', an important extra last sentence about the document:
A document, dating from 1993, was presented to the inquest, in which the Defence Evaluation and Research Establishment at Farnborough drew attention to the vulnerability of Hercules aircraft to SAFire damage to fuel tanks. The document warned that the UK was seriously lagging behind the USA in explosion-protection matters.
airsound
The vulnerability of unprotected aircraft to fuel tank explosions was graphically illustrated by the DHL A300 at Baghdad.
Were MoD blind, stupid or both not to have at least reviewed the protection of RAF transport aircraft immediately afterwards?
It was some 2 years before the loss of XV179, after all.....
Were MoD blind, stupid or both not to have at least reviewed the protection of RAF transport aircraft immediately afterwards?
It was some 2 years before the loss of XV179, after all.....
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Truckie said: We are all volunteers in the service of the Military, hazadous flying in hostile enviroments is all part of the risk. The nature of ops is dangerous as is the essential support that C-130 crews give to the user units.
ESF and tactics discussions could go on for ever - perhaps we could just accept that the crew of XV179 were unlucky on that day in Iraq. Given the number of sorties flown in support of ops since Sarajevo, the loss of one aircraft and crew should have been expected.
Lets just let XV179 rest and concentrate on providing support to our crews currently deployed around the world.
Military flying is dangerous - fact.
ESF and tactics discussions could go on for ever - perhaps we could just accept that the crew of XV179 were unlucky on that day in Iraq. Given the number of sorties flown in support of ops since Sarajevo, the loss of one aircraft and crew should have been expected.
Lets just let XV179 rest and concentrate on providing support to our crews currently deployed around the world.
Military flying is dangerous - fact.
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colin,
i have only the quotes utilised in peoples responses to see what your thought is on this process. i also hope that you chose to delete your post out of respect rather than an inability to facing up to the heat such comments initiate.
this inquest is a necessary process and one none of us wish to fond ourselves in. the point of the inquest is to find out what happened. yes, people die in military ops, please do not for a second think any of us are too short sighted not to realise that, but they should not die due to an inability to put right shortcomings. i do not think that the squadron is getting a bad name and the fact that you feel that is something that saddens me.i cannot tell you that your feeling is wrong, as it is the way that you feel, but i'd find it very hard to see that anyone could think that the sqaudron were at fault.
why on earth would the inquest cause hurt and tarnish the names of those who died????? i really am at pains to understand this. those men are spoken of extremely highly and no one thinks anything bad of them. if they do i can't see how. the inquest hurts , as we have to listen and examine about the last moments of those men. we have to sit there, away from our families,and try and find some comfort in the process that is an absolute must. try seeing it from a grieving relatives perspective, sir. these men deserve an inquest, as do we, the families left behind.
i have only the quotes utilised in peoples responses to see what your thought is on this process. i also hope that you chose to delete your post out of respect rather than an inability to facing up to the heat such comments initiate.
this inquest is a necessary process and one none of us wish to fond ourselves in. the point of the inquest is to find out what happened. yes, people die in military ops, please do not for a second think any of us are too short sighted not to realise that, but they should not die due to an inability to put right shortcomings. i do not think that the squadron is getting a bad name and the fact that you feel that is something that saddens me.i cannot tell you that your feeling is wrong, as it is the way that you feel, but i'd find it very hard to see that anyone could think that the sqaudron were at fault.
why on earth would the inquest cause hurt and tarnish the names of those who died????? i really am at pains to understand this. those men are spoken of extremely highly and no one thinks anything bad of them. if they do i can't see how. the inquest hurts , as we have to listen and examine about the last moments of those men. we have to sit there, away from our families,and try and find some comfort in the process that is an absolute must. try seeing it from a grieving relatives perspective, sir. these men deserve an inquest, as do we, the families left behind.
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Suppliers of ESF
Im not to sure if this has been mentioned before , but the makers of ESF ( and im not to sure who that is and what they are called ) Surely they would of approached the RAF or MOD with this product .You wouldnt invent a product and then not try to sell it on ...??? ....Just a thought
Hammerwest; information is available these days at:
http://www.crestfoam.com/intro.html
but in the late 60's the MOD would have been aware of this technology being fitted as standard by the USAF to its own Hercules as that was the very agency that all dealings with Lockheed had to pass through. It is literally incredible to suggest that the RAF Air Staff were ignorant of ESF, on the contrary they would have been only too well aware of its cost which was in US$'s a very big problem in those days of exchange control and trade deficit.
NigeGilb, Chappie et al, your stalwart determination to not relent in ensuring that this long awaited inquest is able to properly discharge its duty to reveal the truth behind this tragic accident does you credit as always. The various official and unofficial efforts to subvert that process would be normally more at home in Moscow than Trowbridge, but we live in interesting times..... Suffice it to say that I have just been privileged to spend the last two days in the company of the splendid young men and women currently bearing the torch for a Squadron going 'Flat Out' at a top secret Wiltshire airbase. I suggest that having something more effective than coils of chain as a Defence Suite allows them to do their hazardous duty more effectively and safely. Those who gainsay what Nigel and co. have done and seek to do say more about themselves than anyone else in my view.
http://www.crestfoam.com/intro.html
but in the late 60's the MOD would have been aware of this technology being fitted as standard by the USAF to its own Hercules as that was the very agency that all dealings with Lockheed had to pass through. It is literally incredible to suggest that the RAF Air Staff were ignorant of ESF, on the contrary they would have been only too well aware of its cost which was in US$'s a very big problem in those days of exchange control and trade deficit.
NigeGilb, Chappie et al, your stalwart determination to not relent in ensuring that this long awaited inquest is able to properly discharge its duty to reveal the truth behind this tragic accident does you credit as always. The various official and unofficial efforts to subvert that process would be normally more at home in Moscow than Trowbridge, but we live in interesting times..... Suffice it to say that I have just been privileged to spend the last two days in the company of the splendid young men and women currently bearing the torch for a Squadron going 'Flat Out' at a top secret Wiltshire airbase. I suggest that having something more effective than coils of chain as a Defence Suite allows them to do their hazardous duty more effectively and safely. Those who gainsay what Nigel and co. have done and seek to do say more about themselves than anyone else in my view.
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Just announced on BBC News that the inquest will have to be adjourned until October to allow time for all of the necessary witnesses to testify. Why on earth did someone not realise what the families have been through already and allocate sufficient time for the hearing? This is truly dreadful news.
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Re: Hercules Adjornment
As it is Shakespeare's birthday today heres a quote fom Hamlet.
Horatio:
Have after. To what issue will this come?
Marcellus:
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.
Horatio:
Heaven will direct it.
http://www.bartleby.com/59/6/somethingisr.html
A wee bit criptic but you get my drift
As it is Shakespeare's birthday today heres a quote fom Hamlet.
Horatio:
Have after. To what issue will this come?
Marcellus:
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.
Horatio:
Heaven will direct it.
http://www.bartleby.com/59/6/somethingisr.html
A wee bit criptic but you get my drift
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BBC News has had 10 minutes about this - no mention of the adjournment though, just Chris Seale's evidence. On the surface of it, and without getting involved with the personality aspects, his chain of correspondence does make for pretty damning testimony.
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.
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Agreed Buggalugs.
I can't see how the extra time would help the MoD, other than allow it time to muster political muscle. But thats being a little fanciful. Isn't it? 
BBC thingy said: The coroner told the inquest the adjournment was "a source of regret to us all" but said the decision had unanimous approval from counsel and interested parties.
Thread Drift
I'd echo Chugger's sentiments but possibly in not such an old crachety way (he's waiting for his new zimmer you know and the cabin fever has set in... 
).
).
Agreed Buggalugs.
I have the honour to be Sir,
Your Obediant Servant etc.,
Chug
(My Seconds will be attending upon you in due course.)
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Oh. I see. Its like that now is it? And don't you start. I'm getting flak from ruddy Stewards here now too (.. some of us serve more literally than others, ho ho). Funnily enough, this was on the radiogram earlier, and I thought.. I wonder if Chuggers got his winter fuel allowance?
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LYNEHAM INQUEST: Aviator silenced
By Gazette Reporter
Comment
An RAF aviator was silenced for speaking out about safety fears on Hercules planes three years before ten men died when one crashed in Iraq, he told an inquest today.
Squadron Leader Christopher Seal, a former flight commander with 47 Squadron, said he wrote a "lessons identified" memo - referred to despairingly as "lessons ignored" - after returning from serving in Afghanistan in 2002.
Among his concerns was that ESF (explosion-suppressant foam) should be fitted to the Hercules wing--located fuel tanks.
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On January 30, 2005, an RAF Hercules was hit in a tank by small arms fire near Baghdad. The tank exploded, blowing off a wing, killing the 10 men on board.
It was only after this that ESF began to be fitted on RAF Hercules aircraft.
Mr Seal was presented today with documents from the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) dating back to 1993 about UK research into ESF, which US Hercules planes have had since the Vietnam War.
One DERA document, from 1994, said the UK was "lagging behind the US" on the issue.
Mr Seal said he never knew about this research.
"I'm gob-smacked, astonished," he told the inquest into the death of the ten men in Trowbridge, Wilts, on seeing the document.
He said he only found out about ESF after a US pilot told him his aircraft had it.
Mr Seal sent his 'lessons identified' document on November 12, 2002, with a letter described today as "sadly prophetic".
In it he wrote: "I appreciate that a number of points are politically sensitive or already being worked but it does no harm to have lessons identified written down that may be of use for higher-level staff work or, ultimately, a ready-made history lesson for those who follow in our footsteps."
Mr Seal said, however, that by the time he sent this, he had already "got into trouble" for voicing his concerns about other Hercules safety issues, among them infra-red counter measures and night flying tactics.
While in Afghanistan earlier in 2002, he emailed safety concerns to his superiors in theatre and in Britain.
Although well-received in theatre, he said he felt those higher up the chain of command were ignoring the matters.
On his return to the UK he emailed all his superiors right up to the head of Strike Command - a measure he described as "a cry for help in the dark".
He was subsequently reprimanded for going above his station and "censored" thereafter, he said.
He expressed frustration today at the "convoluted" nature of obtaining crucial safety modifications, which involved long-winded chains of command.
"There is a difference between lessons identified and lessons learned - these were known throughout my tenure as lessons ignored," he told the court.
Mr Seal said that because RAF Hercules had for so many years been so reliable, many having been shot in the fuel tanks without exploding, RAF crews had developed a "false sense of security."
He said he believed the time the aircraft would need to be out of action and money were the main factors why ESF was not fitted to Hercules.
He later found out that the cost of fitting ESF was just £600,000 per aircraft and that each would be sidelined for just four or five weeks.
Bernard Collaery, for Kellie Merritt, the widow of Flt Lt Paul Pardoel, said his client wished to "commend" Mr Seal and "hoped others would be as assertive about the needs of their men."
Mr Seal replied: "All I can say is it does not do your career any good."
The victims based at RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire were: RAF 47 Squadron's Flt Lt David Stead, the pilot, 35; Flt Lt Andrew Smith, 25, the co-pilot; Master Engineer Gary Nicholson, 42; Flt Sgt Mark Gibson, 34, Australian airman Paul Pardoel, 35, a navigator; and from Lyneham's Engineering Wing, Chief Technician Richard Brown, 40, an avionics specialist; Sergeant Robert O'Connor, 38, an engineering technician; and Corporal David Williams, 37, a survival equipment fitter, a passenger.
Acting L/Cpl Steven Jones, 25, of Fareham, Hampshire, a Royal Signals soldier, was also part of the crew.
Sqn Ldr Patrick Marshall, 39, from Strike Command Headquarters, RAF High Wycombe, was another passenger on the Hercules.
mfl Page 2 Mr Seal, following his retirement from the RAF in 2005, wrote to the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee in May 2006 to express concerns that, even at that stage, ESF and other safety modifications were not being acted on quick enough.
Since that time steps have been taken to implement some of the high-lighted improvements, he said, explaining that word had reached him via "the jungle drums".
Mr Seal agreed with Richard Stead, father of the stricken craft's pilot, that the RAF's Hercules fleet was, prior to recent improvements, "not fit for purpose".
Mr Stead said he wished to echo Mr Collaery's comments about him, adding: "I'm sure you will be able to sleep well at night."
Earlier today, Wiltshire Coroner David Masters announced that he would be adjourning the inquest after this Friday until September 30.
The hearing, which started on March 30, was scheduled to end this week but it has not been possible to get through all the witnesses. Three weeks have been set aside in October to complete the inquest.
By Gazette Reporter
Comment
An RAF aviator was silenced for speaking out about safety fears on Hercules planes three years before ten men died when one crashed in Iraq, he told an inquest today.
Squadron Leader Christopher Seal, a former flight commander with 47 Squadron, said he wrote a "lessons identified" memo - referred to despairingly as "lessons ignored" - after returning from serving in Afghanistan in 2002.
Among his concerns was that ESF (explosion-suppressant foam) should be fitted to the Hercules wing--located fuel tanks.
advertisement
On January 30, 2005, an RAF Hercules was hit in a tank by small arms fire near Baghdad. The tank exploded, blowing off a wing, killing the 10 men on board.
It was only after this that ESF began to be fitted on RAF Hercules aircraft.
Mr Seal was presented today with documents from the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) dating back to 1993 about UK research into ESF, which US Hercules planes have had since the Vietnam War.
One DERA document, from 1994, said the UK was "lagging behind the US" on the issue.
Mr Seal said he never knew about this research.
"I'm gob-smacked, astonished," he told the inquest into the death of the ten men in Trowbridge, Wilts, on seeing the document.
He said he only found out about ESF after a US pilot told him his aircraft had it.
Mr Seal sent his 'lessons identified' document on November 12, 2002, with a letter described today as "sadly prophetic".
In it he wrote: "I appreciate that a number of points are politically sensitive or already being worked but it does no harm to have lessons identified written down that may be of use for higher-level staff work or, ultimately, a ready-made history lesson for those who follow in our footsteps."
Mr Seal said, however, that by the time he sent this, he had already "got into trouble" for voicing his concerns about other Hercules safety issues, among them infra-red counter measures and night flying tactics.
While in Afghanistan earlier in 2002, he emailed safety concerns to his superiors in theatre and in Britain.
Although well-received in theatre, he said he felt those higher up the chain of command were ignoring the matters.
On his return to the UK he emailed all his superiors right up to the head of Strike Command - a measure he described as "a cry for help in the dark".
He was subsequently reprimanded for going above his station and "censored" thereafter, he said.
He expressed frustration today at the "convoluted" nature of obtaining crucial safety modifications, which involved long-winded chains of command.
"There is a difference between lessons identified and lessons learned - these were known throughout my tenure as lessons ignored," he told the court.
Mr Seal said that because RAF Hercules had for so many years been so reliable, many having been shot in the fuel tanks without exploding, RAF crews had developed a "false sense of security."
He said he believed the time the aircraft would need to be out of action and money were the main factors why ESF was not fitted to Hercules.
He later found out that the cost of fitting ESF was just £600,000 per aircraft and that each would be sidelined for just four or five weeks.
Bernard Collaery, for Kellie Merritt, the widow of Flt Lt Paul Pardoel, said his client wished to "commend" Mr Seal and "hoped others would be as assertive about the needs of their men."
Mr Seal replied: "All I can say is it does not do your career any good."
The victims based at RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire were: RAF 47 Squadron's Flt Lt David Stead, the pilot, 35; Flt Lt Andrew Smith, 25, the co-pilot; Master Engineer Gary Nicholson, 42; Flt Sgt Mark Gibson, 34, Australian airman Paul Pardoel, 35, a navigator; and from Lyneham's Engineering Wing, Chief Technician Richard Brown, 40, an avionics specialist; Sergeant Robert O'Connor, 38, an engineering technician; and Corporal David Williams, 37, a survival equipment fitter, a passenger.
Acting L/Cpl Steven Jones, 25, of Fareham, Hampshire, a Royal Signals soldier, was also part of the crew.
Sqn Ldr Patrick Marshall, 39, from Strike Command Headquarters, RAF High Wycombe, was another passenger on the Hercules.
mfl Page 2 Mr Seal, following his retirement from the RAF in 2005, wrote to the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee in May 2006 to express concerns that, even at that stage, ESF and other safety modifications were not being acted on quick enough.
Since that time steps have been taken to implement some of the high-lighted improvements, he said, explaining that word had reached him via "the jungle drums".
Mr Seal agreed with Richard Stead, father of the stricken craft's pilot, that the RAF's Hercules fleet was, prior to recent improvements, "not fit for purpose".
Mr Stead said he wished to echo Mr Collaery's comments about him, adding: "I'm sure you will be able to sleep well at night."
Earlier today, Wiltshire Coroner David Masters announced that he would be adjourning the inquest after this Friday until September 30.
The hearing, which started on March 30, was scheduled to end this week but it has not been possible to get through all the witnesses. Three weeks have been set aside in October to complete the inquest.
For those interested in how far back MoD's very detailed knowledge of ESF dates, and its purpose, please follow this link....
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/dtd/data/5627.pdf
Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive)
D.T.D. 5627 Aerospace Material Specification
"Fibrous Polyamide Material for use as an Explosion Suppressant and as a baffle material in Aircraft Fuel Tanks".
Dated April 1982
Any advances on 1982?
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/dtd/data/5627.pdf
Ministry of Defence (Procurement Executive)
D.T.D. 5627 Aerospace Material Specification
"Fibrous Polyamide Material for use as an Explosion Suppressant and as a baffle material in Aircraft Fuel Tanks".
Dated April 1982
Any advances on 1982?