Belgrano...
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Belgrano...
This might not at first glance seem aviation related, but it is, indirectly.
We at Dunsfold had taken 13 months to wire up and instrumentate Sea Harrier XZ450 ( the first one to fly, in the hands of CTP John Farley, August 20th 1978 ) for the Sea Eagle surface-skimming missile, a larger punching & more intelligent programmable thing otherwise similar to the Exocet.
That aircraft, for some reason which I cannot fathom, was used on an iron bomb raid on Goose Green, and was the first of our aircraft taken out by ground fire – unfortunately with the loss of the pilot, Nick Taylor.
It has been said to me by one of his relatives that his RWR was either not fitted or U/S; this is possible as it was a development aircraft, but at that stage even the fully operational FRS1’s only had countermeasures in the form of tin foil strips stowed above the airbrake, giving the pilot one go at self defence !
So XZ450 was technically ready to go with Sea Eagle, though untried.
The only good thing to come out of it was I was told the Argentinians found the missile control panel in the wreckage, and thought “ Christ, they’ve got Sea Eagle operational already ! ”
A little while later I set up the camera pod on XZ440 which recorded the first real Sea Eagle firing.
What has always made me wonder ( putting aside for a moment the ‘outside the exclusion zone factor’) is while the Belgrano had – I believe - 6” guns, fair enough I wouldn’t want to be at the wrong end of those, her 2 escorts were both carrying Exocet – so why weren’t they the prime targets ?
I know the story that a third torpedo possibly dinged off one of their hulls, failing to detonate, and the sub had chosen Mk8 virtually WW2 vintage torpedoes as the wire guided ‘fish’ were regarded unreliable – also the often unmentioned fact that the heavy loss of life on the Belgrano was due to her Captain, Hector Bonzo, choosing to cruise with all hatches & watertight doors open !
Note that when a British warship ( admittedly a bit smaller ) was sunk by bombs or Exocet, the casualties were usually around 20.
The Belgrano, which had relatively much more heavy armour, took around 380 men down with her…
So the point I’m working to is, why weren’t the Exocet carrying escorts regarded as the primary targets ( by Sub’ or Sea Harrier ) or indeed allowed to get away ?
No I am not a journo’ trawling, my meagre contibution is viewable on the Harrier website 'history' section - please feel free to PM me, though a lot of people here know me anyway…
Andy
We at Dunsfold had taken 13 months to wire up and instrumentate Sea Harrier XZ450 ( the first one to fly, in the hands of CTP John Farley, August 20th 1978 ) for the Sea Eagle surface-skimming missile, a larger punching & more intelligent programmable thing otherwise similar to the Exocet.
That aircraft, for some reason which I cannot fathom, was used on an iron bomb raid on Goose Green, and was the first of our aircraft taken out by ground fire – unfortunately with the loss of the pilot, Nick Taylor.
It has been said to me by one of his relatives that his RWR was either not fitted or U/S; this is possible as it was a development aircraft, but at that stage even the fully operational FRS1’s only had countermeasures in the form of tin foil strips stowed above the airbrake, giving the pilot one go at self defence !
So XZ450 was technically ready to go with Sea Eagle, though untried.
The only good thing to come out of it was I was told the Argentinians found the missile control panel in the wreckage, and thought “ Christ, they’ve got Sea Eagle operational already ! ”
A little while later I set up the camera pod on XZ440 which recorded the first real Sea Eagle firing.
What has always made me wonder ( putting aside for a moment the ‘outside the exclusion zone factor’) is while the Belgrano had – I believe - 6” guns, fair enough I wouldn’t want to be at the wrong end of those, her 2 escorts were both carrying Exocet – so why weren’t they the prime targets ?
I know the story that a third torpedo possibly dinged off one of their hulls, failing to detonate, and the sub had chosen Mk8 virtually WW2 vintage torpedoes as the wire guided ‘fish’ were regarded unreliable – also the often unmentioned fact that the heavy loss of life on the Belgrano was due to her Captain, Hector Bonzo, choosing to cruise with all hatches & watertight doors open !
Note that when a British warship ( admittedly a bit smaller ) was sunk by bombs or Exocet, the casualties were usually around 20.
The Belgrano, which had relatively much more heavy armour, took around 380 men down with her…
So the point I’m working to is, why weren’t the Exocet carrying escorts regarded as the primary targets ( by Sub’ or Sea Harrier ) or indeed allowed to get away ?
No I am not a journo’ trawling, my meagre contibution is viewable on the Harrier website 'history' section - please feel free to PM me, though a lot of people here know me anyway…
Andy
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My guess would be it was a shiny big black eye to the Argies. Sinking their 'Flag ship' would and did make bigger waves (scuse pun) than the smaller, more sensible tactical targets.
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"and the sub had chosen Mk8 virtually WW2 vintage torpedoes as the wire guided ‘fish’ were regarded unreliable "
no the wire guided fish were lightweight fish designed for lighweight (compared to ww2 cruisers) targets
a Heavy weight ww2 fish was chosen for a heavy weight ww2 target
no the wire guided fish were lightweight fish designed for lighweight (compared to ww2 cruisers) targets
a Heavy weight ww2 fish was chosen for a heavy weight ww2 target
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You may well be right,
but I was told that during a week's sailing course ( I was already an experienced yachtie but managed to screw it out of BAe on leaving ) by a very experienced 'Jimmy' and it has been related in several books since.
Then again, there's a lot still to be learned by the unwashed masses like me ( I had a tiny involvement in the Falklands as in producing trial fit detail photographs of various gear in a hurry for designers ) - and Nigel West's book 'The Secret War For The Falklands' is a bit of an eye-opener, with tales of planned airstrikes on the Arg' Navy in port...
I can't help thinking even a couple of 'medium / light' modern torpedos would spoil anyone's day - and back to the main question, why not the Exocet carrying escorts - as I've heard repeatedly - or were they not so equipped ?
but I was told that during a week's sailing course ( I was already an experienced yachtie but managed to screw it out of BAe on leaving ) by a very experienced 'Jimmy' and it has been related in several books since.
Then again, there's a lot still to be learned by the unwashed masses like me ( I had a tiny involvement in the Falklands as in producing trial fit detail photographs of various gear in a hurry for designers ) - and Nigel West's book 'The Secret War For The Falklands' is a bit of an eye-opener, with tales of planned airstrikes on the Arg' Navy in port...
I can't help thinking even a couple of 'medium / light' modern torpedos would spoil anyone's day - and back to the main question, why not the Exocet carrying escorts - as I've heard repeatedly - or were they not so equipped ?
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IIRC, each of the two Argentinian Navy battle groups, led by the Belgrano and their aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo respectively, had one of our hunter-killer submarines tagging along. The one with the Veinticinco de Mayo couldn't get a clear shot (due to fog?) otherwise it would have been sunk first as it was the greatest threat. And so it was the Belgrano that was attacked.
Sinking a big ship like the Belgrano made a huge impact (no pun intended) both politically and militarily. When the Belgrano went down, the Argentinian leadership realised they had no answer to our submarines and that we could also sink their real pride and joy the Veinticinco de Mayo, which together with the rest of their Navy promptly retreated to Argentinian territorial waters and stayed there for the rest of the conflict.
Sinking a big ship like the Belgrano made a huge impact (no pun intended) both politically and militarily. When the Belgrano went down, the Argentinian leadership realised they had no answer to our submarines and that we could also sink their real pride and joy the Veinticinco de Mayo, which together with the rest of their Navy promptly retreated to Argentinian territorial waters and stayed there for the rest of the conflict.
Suspicion breeds confidence
no the wire guided fish were lightweight fish
also the often unmentioned fact that the heavy loss of life on the Belgrano was due to her Captain, Hector Bonzo, choosing to cruise with all hatches & watertight doors open !
The heavy loss of life was due to the torpedo which struck outside the armour plating blowing away the compartments above which were the crowded messes and general relaxation area, some 275 men.
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Presumably a modern British sub or 2 armed with spearfish is more than capable of keeping the Argie navy pinned into its own waters??
Arguably, in the current climate, our best response to similar hostilities now would be to do the same thing, albeit with a suitable warning of intent, something along the lines of 'we don't have the time or resources to fight on your terms, these are ours - we will sink everything that crosses the line. You have been warned and if you don't like it, take your whinging to the UN and don't threaten military action'.
Don't know if we have the capability to do this, but like to think we do.
Arguably, in the current climate, our best response to similar hostilities now would be to do the same thing, albeit with a suitable warning of intent, something along the lines of 'we don't have the time or resources to fight on your terms, these are ours - we will sink everything that crosses the line. You have been warned and if you don't like it, take your whinging to the UN and don't threaten military action'.
Don't know if we have the capability to do this, but like to think we do.
Sinking a big ship like the Belgrano made a huge impact (no pun intended) both politically and militarily. When the Belgrano went down, the Argentinian leadership realised they had no answer to our submarines and that we could also sink their real pride and joy the Veinticinco de Mayo, which together with the rest of their Navy promptly retreated to Argentinian territorial waters and stayed there for the rest of the conflict.
Isla De Los Estados was a tanker on a resupply run IIRC. The main bulk of the Argie fleet remained in port - namely the 42's, the carrier and the higher quality escorts.
ISTR that Hippolito Bouchard (one of the escorts) was struck by a torpedo as well, but it didnt detonate.
ISTR that Hippolito Bouchard (one of the escorts) was struck by a torpedo as well, but it didnt detonate.
Suspicion breeds confidence
The formation was loosely zig-zagging at 13 kts. They were clearly expecting a surface attack from the north, not an SSN from the south, so as a tactical formation it was very poor. I'm surprised Conqs didn't take out the two Sumner class escorts, which were actually the bigger threat and equally good targets for Shars to finish off.
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Hugh Bicheno in his book 'Razor's Edge' (map on page 109) points out that if the Belgrano had been moored at Stanley it could have had a significant, if not crucial, effect on the outcome of the war, as a result of its 6" guns.
It seems the Argentinians considered this option but whether it was in the British calculations is not clear.
It seems the Argentinians considered this option but whether it was in the British calculations is not clear.
The 42's didn't remain in port and the Hercules even had a go at a Sea Harrier. They didn't leave the shallower Argentine waters, but that is not to say that they wouldn't have done so if a target presented itself. No navy in it's right mind would launch two 42's against the Royal Navy fleet, that is just common sense.
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Type 42s
They had a go.. as part of a pincer. The carrier with the 42s from the North and the Belgrano from the South. The carrier couldn't get enough wind over the deck to launch.. and then it was too late. All ran to port after the SSN struck.
To quote the last 1SL. Not many navies in the world would go to sea in the face of an SSN threat - particularly now. I'm sure if you compared the ability of Conqueror and Astute to locate and track a target the differences would be mind blowing.
To quote the last 1SL. Not many navies in the world would go to sea in the face of an SSN threat - particularly now. I'm sure if you compared the ability of Conqueror and Astute to locate and track a target the differences would be mind blowing.
Suspicion breeds confidence
To answer some of the points in the previous posts;
1. Basing Belgrano at Stanley. First of all you have to get her there without being sunk especially as we had an SSN on station by April 18. Placing Canopus there in 1914 to deter the German was sound tactical sense then because they didn't have Sea Harriers to lob 1,000lb bombs at you 20 times a day. I discount this theory for these two reasons alone and I guess the Argentines did also. If it could be done in WW2 it certainly could in 1982.
2. Hercules: She was not fully worked up when she left Portsmouth in January 1982 IIRC. In terms of proficiency of her weapons systems and ops team she would not have passed FOST. She was also much nosier than our T42s which is why she kept being found so often. The ADAWS system on the Argentine T42 was "simpler" than ours and the miss distances of her Sea Dart system would have caused much arse scratching in RN circles. She did detect Flt Lt Mortimer's Shar but did not lock him up and certainly did not let a bird loose. She also ran aground playing hide and and seek in coastal waters with our SSNs.
1. Basing Belgrano at Stanley. First of all you have to get her there without being sunk especially as we had an SSN on station by April 18. Placing Canopus there in 1914 to deter the German was sound tactical sense then because they didn't have Sea Harriers to lob 1,000lb bombs at you 20 times a day. I discount this theory for these two reasons alone and I guess the Argentines did also. If it could be done in WW2 it certainly could in 1982.
2. Hercules: She was not fully worked up when she left Portsmouth in January 1982 IIRC. In terms of proficiency of her weapons systems and ops team she would not have passed FOST. She was also much nosier than our T42s which is why she kept being found so often. The ADAWS system on the Argentine T42 was "simpler" than ours and the miss distances of her Sea Dart system would have caused much arse scratching in RN circles. She did detect Flt Lt Mortimer's Shar but did not lock him up and certainly did not let a bird loose. She also ran aground playing hide and and seek in coastal waters with our SSNs.
Last edited by Navaleye; 28th Mar 2008 at 13:27.
Would the SHARs have been likely the hit the Belgrano with dumb iron bombs from above the Roland MEZ? A quicker developmnt of GR3 LGB capability might have been required.
And I'd rather not think too deeply about RN circles and arse-scratching practices.
And I'd rather not think too deeply about RN circles and arse-scratching practices.
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There is a story that the third torpedo ended up embeded in the hull of one of the escorsts.This has subsequently been dissmissed as a good dit. Belgrano was the HVT, that is why she was sunk. Shars are not much good with out a deck to fly from and her battle group was a threat to our carriers. Her demise caused the Argentine Navy to run for home. So quickly, according to legend. that the boat that was watching "25 May" could not engage as the carrier turned tail 30 mins before the boat could shoot.
The MK8 was selected because Concs had never been able to succesfully fire a Tigerfish.
If you want to know more read "Sink the Belgrano" by Mike Rossiter
The MK8 was selected because Concs had never been able to succesfully fire a Tigerfish.
If you want to know more read "Sink the Belgrano" by Mike Rossiter