Help Required: Researching E3C Crash
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Regaining Track
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Help Required: Researching E3C Crash
Hi Guys,
I am doing some research into the E3C Crash at Elmendorf AFB on the 22nd Sep 1995.
I am particularly after any CVR data, Accident Investigation Reports (including the USAF's own if it is available in the public domain) etc
In addition if anyone knows a good place to go to get any comparative data on engine performance (or lack of) under birdstrike that would be much appreciated. I am thinking engine design vs vulnerability to FOD etc....
Either post here or PM as required.
Any help, discussion etc much appreciated,
SonicStomp
I am doing some research into the E3C Crash at Elmendorf AFB on the 22nd Sep 1995.
I am particularly after any CVR data, Accident Investigation Reports (including the USAF's own if it is available in the public domain) etc
In addition if anyone knows a good place to go to get any comparative data on engine performance (or lack of) under birdstrike that would be much appreciated. I am thinking engine design vs vulnerability to FOD etc....
Either post here or PM as required.
Any help, discussion etc much appreciated,
SonicStomp
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Somewhere in England!
Age: 67
Posts: 129
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Regaining Track
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Brickhistory -
My intentions are legitimate and noble I assure you - I am looking to put together a presentation on the accident and any possible lessons identified (airfield bird management, crew actions upon encountering 2 eng failure after t/o etc) from the accident. The presentation and hopefully subsequent discussion will take place behind closed doors with currently serving UK AWACS crews. (of which I am one.... damn there goes my cover!)
Hope this allays any fears you have...
My intentions are legitimate and noble I assure you - I am looking to put together a presentation on the accident and any possible lessons identified (airfield bird management, crew actions upon encountering 2 eng failure after t/o etc) from the accident. The presentation and hopefully subsequent discussion will take place behind closed doors with currently serving UK AWACS crews. (of which I am one.... damn there goes my cover!)
Hope this allays any fears you have...
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Lincs
Posts: 695
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sonic,
I spoke to Scuba over the weekend and he has the original USAF accident report, together with all the FSO details at Tinker.
The report, I recall, said that following a massive bird strike on T/O (Canada geese I think), three of the engines stalled and the aircraft crashed almost immediately, killing all on board. It was as a result of this, that the Captain of the NATO E-3A aborted the T/O (after V1)and managed to stop just in time: Very Lucky!!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Awacscrash.jpg
TSM
I spoke to Scuba over the weekend and he has the original USAF accident report, together with all the FSO details at Tinker.
The report, I recall, said that following a massive bird strike on T/O (Canada geese I think), three of the engines stalled and the aircraft crashed almost immediately, killing all on board. It was as a result of this, that the Captain of the NATO E-3A aborted the T/O (after V1)and managed to stop just in time: Very Lucky!!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Awacscrash.jpg
TSM
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Lincoln
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just in time?
TSM, define 'just in time'.
The NAEW E-3A ran off the end of the runway, tore off its undercarriage on the sea wall, and broke its back across the runway centre lights pier.
You should have been a supplier!
The NAEW E-3A ran off the end of the runway, tore off its undercarriage on the sea wall, and broke its back across the runway centre lights pier.
You should have been a supplier!
Milarity
Very amusing for a Sunday evening! Swonging Minkey, that has to be the biggest understatement of all time...
Just a flesh wound...
define 'just in time'
You should have been a supplier!
Just a flesh wound...
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Regaining Track
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for the posts guys!
I also find it an interesting spin-off that the Elmendorf accident may have led in some way to the Preveza one - what was the time interval between the events?
I also find it an interesting spin-off that the Elmendorf accident may have led in some way to the Preveza one - what was the time interval between the events?
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Lincoln
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aktion accident - 14 Jul 96.
The pilot elected to discontinue the take-off in the absence of a confirmed malfunction based on his belief that observed birds would trigger a catastrophic failure of 2 engines, and that it would be better to stay on the ground.
The pilot elected to discontinue the take-off in the absence of a confirmed malfunction based on his belief that observed birds would trigger a catastrophic failure of 2 engines, and that it would be better to stay on the ground.
Join Date: Oct 2000
Location: Nomadic
Posts: 1,343
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You weren't there.
And a concorde pilot elected to continue T/O with a fire warning - BUT if he HAD elected to reject the T/O, it would have been a hull loss - but maybe - just maybe some survivors. Dammned if you do and dammned if you do not..!
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Lincoln
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I wasn't there.
LJR,
Quite right, I was not.
My comments are taken from the accident report almost verbatim. The captain admitted that the Elmendorf crash was foremost in his mind when he elected to shut the throttles after V2. There were no adverse indications on the flight deck as there had been no damage from the minor bird-strike.
The captain reacted to a perceived threat in the way he thought most appropriate.
I apologise if it sounded like I was passing judgement.
The board acknowledged the link between the two accidents as playing a major part in the captain's decision making process.
Mils.
Quite right, I was not.
My comments are taken from the accident report almost verbatim. The captain admitted that the Elmendorf crash was foremost in his mind when he elected to shut the throttles after V2. There were no adverse indications on the flight deck as there had been no damage from the minor bird-strike.
The captain reacted to a perceived threat in the way he thought most appropriate.
I apologise if it sounded like I was passing judgement.
The board acknowledged the link between the two accidents as playing a major part in the captain's decision making process.
Mils.
). If you navigate through the second page on bird-scaring at Elmendorf to