RAAF Future Air Combat Capability Review

[griffinblack]

Just because you don't see it on the 5 o'clock news doesn't mean our jets don't see action!

Yes it does, because we have no Fast Jets deployed, therefore they see no ‘action’.

The Iraq deployment got very Little publicity, didn't make it any less real though.

Mate, the same goes for every deployment - to the ships that spend half there life in the MEO, to our overstretched troops and our P3 and C130 guys/gals.

You can only live on the glory of one deployment for so long.

Besides, I thought the SH was supposed to replace the F111 and supplement the classics. In this case it would be the F111 crews (pilots only, or back seat as well?) who will require transition. Therefore, the idea that a down and dirty 3 hour conversion will be all that is required is misleading. That is not to say some of the crews won’t be classic qualified in which case there would be efficiencies.

[grasssnake]

I thought the SH was supposed to replace the F111 and supplement the classics.

There in lies the rub. Are you really going to crew a more capable Air to air platform with F-111 guys ? Interesting times ahead.

Really though, if the govt doesn't have the balls to cancel Sea Sprite then the SH deal should have no problem. At least there is some semblance of logic behind it.

[grasssnake]

The only combination is F-111 nav and classic driver. I guess the 111 drivers will go solo on classics. Sorry guys

[WannaBeBiggles]

Griffin,

The hawks systems are set to duplicate the F18's, all FJ's start their FJ training on the Hawks, so ALL of them have some knowledge of the systems.

Last time I checked there were no back seat drivers on the F111, unless they've started ductaping a spare nav'y to the fuselage

Therefore, the idea that a down and dirty 3 hour conversion will be all that is required is misleading

I couldn't agree with you more mate.... thats why I said 3-4 DAYS

[Backwards PLT]

The only combination is F-111 nav and classic driver. I guess the 111 drivers will go solo on classics. Sorry guys

Just wondering what your thinking behind this is. Logically it would be more sensible to have a F-111 driver with classic pilot in the boot! That would be popular! In reality the way ahead would be a mix of F-111 and classic pilots with a mix of F-111 and ab initio* backseaters.

* was going to put abo, but that might mean something else in Oz. Also, are they Navs, WSOs or something else in the RAAF?

[griffinblack]

WBB,

Yes, I know what the Hawk is set up to do. No, you said 2-3 days not 3-4 days. How many sorties do you think you fly in a day? How many flight hours per sortie? Let us be generous and say five hours.

So what you are saying is that because some F111 guy has flown Hawks 5 years ago, he can get away with a 3-4 day (using your revised timings) conversion? I’ll put a six pack on that.

This is not to say I think our 1 and 6 Sqn guys/gals won’t be up to the task. They will handle the SH with aplomb in all roles. But they will have to undergo a full transition, just as if they where transitioning onto the classic. This I suppose would take 4-6 months – I will be happy to stand corrected on those timings.

Furthermore, I stand corrected about the ‘back seat’.

[WannaBeBiggles]

griffin,

not trying to get in to a slinging match here.

I got the 2-3 day figure from an ex F18 driver (now Hawk QFI). Yes the F111 crew will need more time than that, however my point is they have already been exposed to a similar (systems) platform in their training, hence an easier transition.
Flying a jet is easy, learning the systems is a whole other story.

[Naked_recommiting]

The majority of the 'new' SH drivers will come from F-111 circles, requiring a significant conversion (in the order of months, like 6).

It is true the hawk provides a similar cockpit layout etc etc to the hornet, but flight charateristics and the tactical training offered on hornet conversion would certainly be something a F-111 pilot wouldn't have been exposed to.

The lack of F/A-18 (classic) pilots wanting to convert to SH comes down to:
- SH is not that different to flying to the classic (hence the very short converstion)
- SH offers a number of new toys (however the classic upgrades continue to offer this as well, noting not a sweetly intergrated)
- Not wanting to jeopardise a JSF slot

[Magic Mushroom]

I have no doubt that the deployment of Aussie fast jet support would have been a hot topic across many desks at Canberra over the past 12 months.

But I fear the following issues would prevent such a deployment:
- The lead up to the election, and the subsequent incoming Labor 'government'
- The Hornet upgrade program (availability and crews)
- Low F-111 survivability and high operational costs (even in relatively beneign threats)
- The surplus of fast air available in Australia's current area's of operation

Nr,

Okay, so that's the last 12 months explained. What about the 36 months prior to that since your Hornets did their guest appearance in Iraq? Or the 18 prior to that since OEF started? Or even the 10 years of Northern and Southern Iraqi NFZs? I don't wish to be facetious, and I know you have some national ops in ET and PNG, but in the immortal words of Capt Blackadder: 'Where are you, you b**tards?!!'

I genuinely find it quite incredible that, given the lack of use your fast air is put to, you can conceivably talk about a Raptor purchase. Drag your FA-18s away from their endless Willytown PIs, give them a CAS work up and come and join the party!!!

Switzerland has the biggest airforce fleet (per capita) in the world, and they have never even been invaded. But it's still a big stick wave at any would be invaders.

Wbg,

But the Swiss don't have members of their own armed forces getting killed in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We just spent a few billion on Wedgtail (Boeing), so having a fighter/strike platform that has systems ready to integrate with it makes a LOT of sense.

That'll be the Wedgetail that isn't working yet then! However, your arguments are irrelevant. Wedgetail is deigned to be interoperable on a whole range of C2 protocols with a variety of Western aircraft. Just as NATO, France and ourselves introduced our E-3s in the 80s and 90s and immediately started integrating them with European naval, land and air assets via JTIDS, L11 and L14, Wedgetail could work tomorrow with Typhoon or Rafale just as well as it could with FA-18F.

The Super Hornet probably makes sense for you guys as F-35 is a long way away. But let's be realistic with the claims we make!!

Like the Wallabies, it's about time the RAAF started walking the walk as well as talking the talk!

Regards,
MM

[Naked_recommiting]

MM,

You're quite right - however some of the inital points I made could well be considered >12 months (ie surplus of fast air in any of our theatres). You'd have to find a Government and Defence force happy to back (to the public) these high value assets being deployed to pick a fight or at least join a very one sided one, when the assets are not in fact needed (I acknowledge that there may well be intergration issues at times).

You'd be hard pressed to find aircrew that didn't want to go on overseas operations, perhaps the answer lies a little deeper in the strategic defence of Australia (something about a large air/sea gap). Strangely enough, I imagine that is what most of the F/A-18 exercises conducted focus on. (Although I am sure that CAS currencies aren't to shabby either).

As far as the Raptor purchase goes - do you think we will always enjoy the air advantage we have now? Have you seen Raptor results?

[Magic Mushroom]

Nr,

You'd have to find a Government and Defence force happy to back (to the public) these high value assets being deployed to pick a fight or at least join a very one sided one, when the assets are not in fact needed (I acknowledge that there may well be intergration issues at times).

Err, do you honestly feel it's a one sided battle or that the assets aren't needed?! Our Harriers are being run ragged in Afghanistan and the GR4s also working hard in Iraq. As for integration issues, one of the reasons your Hornets struggled to integrate in Iraq was their lack of recent op experience.

You'd be hard pressed to find aircrew that didn't want to go on overseas operations...

Granted, and I don't doubt the quality or motivation of your personnel. However, the quality of the RAAF (and it's procurement focus) IS being eroded by a lack of exposure to ops imho. Ops can be painful, but they bring benefits too in some respects.

As far as the Raptor purchase goes - do you think we will always enjoy the air advantage we have now? Have you seen Raptor results?

Absolutely not, and it is a danger in the UK that people are becoming too focused upon current ops at the expense of wider capabilities. That has to be balanced and it's an ongoing battle. But it is disappointing that your fast air has not been commited.

As for Raptor, I've operated with them at Nellis and they are very impressive. My point was that, when you seem reticent to offer your current 'high value assets' to ops, I am amazed that an F-22 purchase is even being talked about.

Regards,
MM

[wessex19]

Magic mushroom quote ;
"Like the Wallabies, it's about time the RAAF started walking the walk as well as talking the talk!"

The only guys on the world stage that are good at walking are English batsmen!!!

[MTOW]

Time for an injection of heresey.

Anyone who remembers the Falklands will recall what a real bother a very simple (and cheap) light twin turboprop named Pucara turned out to be for the invading forces. How useful would something like a Pucara be to the RAF in Afghanistan today, where there is no enemy air element?

Should the RAAF (or ADF) not seriously consider a second tier ground attack platform as well as the 'Gucci" top shelf kit? I know the subject of this thread is the fighter replacement, but it's not just the F35 that has a telephone book sized price tag, necessitating small numbers and an understandable reluctance to commit them to situations where they might be lost. I understand that the unit cost of the (yet to be deployed and don't hold your breath waiting) Tiger is astronomical, (I've heard the unbelievable figure of $45 million a copy quoted [for a ***ing helicopter!!!]).

As has been suggested already, shouldn't serious consideration be given to an A10/Su27 type for 'down and dirty' operations (as well as something a lot cheaper than the Tiger in the rotary wing field like the Super Huey)?

They might not be able to be deployed in a major clash with an advesary equipped with a lot of top shelf kit themsleves, but if the Falklands and the Pucara are anyting to go by, a large number of such 'low tech' (and afordable) units, especially if used in conjunction with the 'top shelf' units, could prove to be quite a handful for any enemy - and in the meantime, provide a very cost effective force that could be used in the limited conflicts the West finds itself involved in in places like Afghanistan.

Australia doesn't have bottomless pockets when it comes to Defence. Maybe it's time someone in Canberra acknowledged this and shopped accordingly.

[Magic Mushroom]

Magic mushroom quote ;
"Like the Wallabies, it's about time the RAAF started walking the walk as well as talking the talk!"

The only guys on the world stage that are good at walking are English batsmen!!!

That'll be a bite then!!!!!!

MTOW

Anyone who remembers the Falklands will recall what a real bother a very simple (and cheap) light twin turboprop named Pucara turned out to be for the invading forces.

I'd argue the Pucara caused us very few problems during the Falklands.

Although it was a concern and a Pucara was responsible for the only Argentine air-air kill of the war (a RM Scout), they achieved very little against the ground forces. Of the approx 24 deployed to the Falklands by the Argies, 13 were lost and 11 captured. Several were shot down in air-air or surface-air engagements and the majority of the others were destroyed on the ground in air strikes or SF action. The poor weather was also a factor in their limited success as they were often unable to locate targets in the clag.

It is fair to say however that more intelligently operated Pucaras would have been more of an issue, and there is possibly a role for a small number of turboprop CAS assets in the PC-21, AT-6 or Super Tucano class on modern ops. However, those have specific limitations (such as transit speed and sensors) and they are of little use in a conventional campaign. They could therefore be described as a false economy.

You may wish to read this thread for more gouge on the issue.

However, you're correct in pointing out that Canberra doesn't have bottomless pockets. By opting so early for the F-35, and having now made a tenuous order for FA-18Fs, it appears that your procurement lacks coherency and is writing cheques your new government may not be willing to cash.

Regards,
MM

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Originally Posted by Magic Mushroom

As for integration issues, one of the reasons your Hornets struggled to integrate in Iraq was their lack of recent op experience.

I think you've been eating too much of your namesake mate. I was there, and the reason we "struggled to integrate" in 03 was because our NiteHawk pod was absolute sh!t and our ROEs were somewhat more restrictive than yours.

Plus, we took only partly upgraded Hornets with APG-73, CIT and ARC-210 with us - we didn't have any of the SA goodies that have since come with Hug 2.2.

I agree we have a lack of Ops experience, but as Nr said, we've got other things going on. I understand the previous govt was considering an FJ deployment to the Stan sometime this year to take over from the Dutch, but this has been quashed by the new govt.

Originally Posted by Magic Mushroom

am amazed that an F-22 purchase is even being talked about.

The only people talking about F-22s are the Kopp and Goon squad, plus anyone else with a political axe to grind. Although, as a pilot, I'd love to get my hands on one, it is still too focussed a capability for our requirements.

It's all politics mate, so delete your references to the "RAAF" not willing to come out an fight, and insert "Govt".

[Magic Mushroom]

I think you've been eating too much of your namesake mate. I was there, and the reason we "struggled to integrate" in 03 was because our NiteHawk pod was absolute sh!t and our ROEs were somewhat more restrictive than yours.

I was there also and your equipment was certainly a factor. However, remember that our own Tornado GR4s and Harrier GR7s still had TIALD at the time which was also a big limitation. I would respectfully suggest however that the reason much of your A-G kit was holding you back was because of a lack of ops focus in preceding years. TELIC 1 was a very big ask for you guys to come in cold. Most of our assets had had the experience of Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan over the preceding years to learn from and develop TTPs and urgent operational requirement mods.

Since 03, things have evolved even more quickly.

The only people talking about F-22s are the Kopp and Goon squad, plus anyone else with a political axe to grind. Although, as a pilot, I'd love to get my hands on one, it is still too focussed a capability for our requirements.

Concur re the F-22.

It's all politics mate, so delete your references to the "RAAF" not willing to come out an fight, and insert "Govt".

If I have implied the RAAF don't wish to get stuck in I apologise. I've tried to reinforce throughout the above that I don't doubt the quality of your guys per se. I understand also the political aspect but do find it slightly contradictory that the last Aussie Govt sanctioned an FA-18F buy but seemed very reticent to deploy your FA-18As.

Regards,
MM

[TheShadow]

Joint Strike Fighter:
the latest hotspot in the
US defence meltdown

BY PIERRE M SPREY AND
WINSLOW T WHEELER

Politicians in the US are papering over serious problems in the country’s armed forces. Equating exposure of flaws with failure to “support the troops,” Congress, the presidential candidates and think-tank pundits repeatedly dub the US armed forces “the best in the world”. Behind this vapid rhetoric, a meltdown
- decades in the making – is occurring.

The collapse is occurring in all the armed forces, but it is most obvious in the US Air Force (USAF). There, despite a much needed change in leadership, nothing is being done to reverse the deplorable situation the air force has put
itself into. The USAF’s annual budget is now in excess of USD150 billion: well above what it averaged
during the Cold War. Despite the plentiful dollars, the USAF’s inventory of tactical aircraft is smaller today than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War. At the same time, the shrunken inventory is older, on average, than it
has been ever before. Since George W Bush came to office in 2001, the air force has received a major budget
“plus up,” supposedly to address its problems. In January 2001 a projection of its budgets showed USD850 billion for 2001 to 2009.

It actually received USD1,059 billion – not counting the additional billions (more than USD80 billion) it also received to fund its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the “plus up” of more than USD200 billion, the air force actually made its inventory troubles worse: from 2001 to today, tactical aircraft numbers shrank by about 100 aircraft and
their average age increased from 15 years to 20, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Not to worry, the air force and its politicians assert, the solution is in hand; it is called the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. It will do all three tactical missions: air-to-ground bombing, air-to-air combat and specialised close air
support for ground troops – and there will be tailored variants for the air force, navy and marines. Most importantly, it will be “affordable” and, thus, the US can buy it in such large numbers that it will resolve all those shrinking and ageing problems.

Baloney. When the first official cost and quantity estimate for the F-35 showed up on Capitol Hill in 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) predicted 2,866 units for USD226 billion. That is a not inconsiderable USD79 million for each aircraft. The latest official estimate is for a smaller number of aircraft (2,456) to cost more (USD299 billion). That represents a 54 per cent increase in the per-unit cost to USD122 million, and the deliveries will be two years late.
The Government Accountability Office reported in March that the US can expect the costs to increase some more – perhaps by as much as USD38 billion – with deliveries likely to be delayed again, perhaps by another year.
That is just the start of the rest of the bad news.

The price increases and schedule delays cited above are for currently known problems. Unfortunately, the F-35 has barely begun its flight-test programme, which means more problems are likely to be discovered – perhaps even more
serious than the serious engine, flight control, electrical and avionics glitches found thus far.

Take the F-22 experience; it was in a similarly early stage of flight testing in 1998. Its programme unit cost was then USD184 million per aircraft but it climbed to a breathtaking USD355 million by 2008. Considering that the
F-35 is even more complex (19 million lines of computer code compared to 4 million, and three separate service versions compared to one), the horrifying prospect of the F-35ʼs unit cost doubling is not outlandish. The last tri-service, tri-mission “fighter” the US built, the F-111, tripled in cost before being cut back to barely half the number originally contemplated.

The DoD currently plans to spend more than USD10 billion to produce fewer than 100 F-35s per year at peak production. USAF leaders would like to increase the production rate and add in a few more F-22s. That plan is irresponsibly unaffordable (which contributed to the recent departure of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff). The unaffordability will become even more obvious when the unavoidable F-35 cost
increases emerge. The inevitable reaction, just as in past programmes, will be a slashing of annual production, the opposite of the increase the air force needs to address its inventory problems.

The DoD fix is simple: test the F-35 less and buy more copies before the testing is completed. Two test aircraft and hundreds of flight-test hours have been eliminated from the programme, and there is now a plan to produce
more than 500 copies before the emasculated testing is finished. This approach will not fix the programme but it will help paper over the problems and make the F-35 more cancellation-proof in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.

It gets even worse. Even without new problems, the F-35 is a “dog.” If one accepts every performance promise the DoD currently makes for the aircraft, the F-35 will be:

● Overweight and underpowered: at 49,500 lb
(22,450kg) air-to-air take-off weight with an
engine rated at 42,000 lb of thrust, it will be
a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight
ratio for a new fighter.

● At that weight and with just 460 sq ft (43 m2)
of wing area for the air force and Marine Corps
variants, it will have a ʻwing-loadingʼ of 108 lb
per square foot. Fighters need large wings relative
to their weight to enable them to manoeuvre
and survive. The F-35 is actually less manoeuvrable
than the appallingly vulnerable F-105
“Lead Sled” that got wiped out over North Vietnam
in the Indochina War.

● With a payload of only two 2,000 lb bombs
in its bomb bay – far less than US Vietnam-era
fighters – the F-35 is hardly a first-class bomber
either. With more bombs carried under its wings,
the F-35 instantly becomes ʻnon-stealthyʼ and
the DoD does not plan to seriously test it in this
configuration for years.

● As a ʻclose air supportʼ attack aircraft to help
US troops engaged in combat, the F-35 is a nonstarter.
It is too fast to see the tactical targets it is
shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand
ground fire; and it lacks the payload and
especially the endurance to loiter usefully over
US forces for sustained periods as they manoeuvre
on the ground. Specialised for this role, the
air force’s existing A-10s are far superior.

However, what, the advocates will protest, of the F-35ʼs two most prized features: its “stealth” and its advanced avionics? What the USAF will not tell you is that “stealthy” aircraft are quite detectable by radar; it is simply a question of the type of radar and its angle relative to the aircraft. Ask the pilots of the two “stealthy” F-117s that the Serbs successfully attacked with radar missiles in the 1999 Kosovo air war. As for the highly complex electronics to attack targets in the air, the F-35, like the F-22 before it, has mortgaged its success on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. The F-35’s air-to-ground electronics promise little more than slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.

The immediate questions for the F-35 are: how much more will it cost and how many additional problems will compromise its already mediocre performance? We will only know when a complete and rigorous test schedule –
not currently planned – is finished. The F-35 is a bad deal that shows every sign of turning into a disaster as big as the F-111 fiasco of the 1960s.

In January the US will inaugurate a new president. If he is serious about US defences – and courageous enough to ignore the corporate lobbies and their minions in Congress and the think-tanks – he will ask some very tough questions.
These will start with why an increased budget buys a shrinking, ageing force. After that the new president will have to take steps – unavoidably painful ones – to reverse the course the country is now on.

The man who best deserves to be inaugurated next January will actually start asking those questions now. ■

Pierre M Sprey, together with John
Boyd and Everest Riccioni, conceived and
shaped the F-16; Sprey also led the technical
side of the US Air Force’s A-10 design
concept team

Winslow T Wheeler is the Director of the
Straus Military Reform Program of the Center
for Defense Information in Washington

[antipodean alligator]

Modern Lawn Dart

Interesting....I would have thought that Sprey would be supportive of the Joint Strike Lemon, given that it is supposed to be a new generation F-16...... Cheap???? Jack of all trades.......???

[Wiley]

Anyone old enough to recall the F111 debacle (looooong delays, immense cost overruns, cancellation of the naval version, huge reductions in final numbers, impossibility of getting an aircraft designed to be all things to all men [or to be more accurate, all services] to be a top performer in any one field - particularly air to air - because of the large number of compromises required to make it more or less work in every role) will recognise the futility of attempting to build a single multi-role aircraft, particularly if the main reason for the single design is cost savings. (Happy multi-role sucess stories like the F4 sometimes occur, but almost by accident, and not when the designers set out from the drawing board for it to be multi-role and cheap.)

But (dare I say it?) - a new generation of beancounters has tried to do it again, and with similar results. One could almost be forgiven for imagining they don't recall the F111.

The only thing that's not surprising about this whole sorry mess is that the Australians have again thrown huge - and terribly scarce - amounts of defence funding into what looks like becoming another lemon. Please don't get all Pavolian on me and start defending the venerable Pig. Yes, it's done a sterling job in the RAAF, but at what (unit/ongoing) cost, particularly since we've been the only operator worldwide?

And this Pig(let) has about a third the capability of the original Pig, at least in what should be THE primary consideration for the RAAF, unrefuelled range and payload capability.

[L J R]

aaaaaaaaaaaaahhhh!