UK Armed Forces are superb, but why is procurement so bad?
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Time for Change
The answer is simple - IPTs do not work. They are far too removed from the front line to understand what what is actually required and staffed by incompetant, jobsworth civil serpants.
What we need is to employ people who are actually good at their job. Unfortunately, in order to do that, we have to pay industry rates, otherwise all that we get is some monkey who does just enough to earn half of the peanuts that he is paid. Until we cast off the MOD chains that bind us we will continue to procure products that are over budget, late into service and not fit for purpose.
At the end of the day we could spend a little more on employing the right people and save millions on the cost of projects - if only our lords and masters had the balls.
What we need is to employ people who are actually good at their job. Unfortunately, in order to do that, we have to pay industry rates, otherwise all that we get is some monkey who does just enough to earn half of the peanuts that he is paid. Until we cast off the MOD chains that bind us we will continue to procure products that are over budget, late into service and not fit for purpose.
At the end of the day we could spend a little more on employing the right people and save millions on the cost of projects - if only our lords and masters had the balls.
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From what I have seen, it is a case of pretence. Pretending to seek Best Practice, pretending to seek value for money. There are as many half wits in the Civil Service as the military - no point in trying to blame it all on the CS - so there is half a pretence that there are capable people willing to seek Best Practice and value for money. As Tuc highlights, those that do try and aren't just in it for the next promotion, get black-balled.
And by value for money I don't mean cheapest. Too often I've seen contracts (support and equipment) go to the cheapest bidder, and that being stated as the intention despite the safety implications. So, company x who actually uses his intellect in assessing the requirement to ensure that the capability can be delivered, even if the ITT has been very vague, loses out to the cheapskate who puts in the cheapest initial bid but will undoubtedly have to go back for more.
I don't know why IPTs bother asking for any technical response or get people to make presentations - think of the time and money that could be saved in the contracting phase if the players were gathered in a room and started bidding, lowest bid wins.
sw
ps for a good example, see PN's #342 on "Nimrod Information / Panorama Mon 4th June (Merged)"
And by value for money I don't mean cheapest. Too often I've seen contracts (support and equipment) go to the cheapest bidder, and that being stated as the intention despite the safety implications. So, company x who actually uses his intellect in assessing the requirement to ensure that the capability can be delivered, even if the ITT has been very vague, loses out to the cheapskate who puts in the cheapest initial bid but will undoubtedly have to go back for more.
I don't know why IPTs bother asking for any technical response or get people to make presentations - think of the time and money that could be saved in the contracting phase if the players were gathered in a room and started bidding, lowest bid wins.
sw
ps for a good example, see PN's #342 on "Nimrod Information / Panorama Mon 4th June (Merged)"
Last edited by Safeware; 6th Jun 2007 at 22:13.
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It’s been mentioned before but in short the CS are more interested in process than product. Far too many members of an IPT will have no idea about the product and hence will often demand performance that is unnecessary because they do understand its use. Any blue suit involvement might, if your lucky, have recent experience on type, but they tend not to be empowered to make decisions, and will be overruled by finance. And of course any engineering officers leave after 2 yrs because to stay any longer will destroy their career. If they dont make any decisions, so much the better, they wont be wrong.
A bit of poke there, but lets face it unless a project is funded properly it will always be late and cost more. And we all know that funds are never increased always reduced. It costs more in the end, but hey that’s next years budget and the leader will have moved on by then.
Five years on an IPT with no one paying any attention.
A bit of poke there, but lets face it unless a project is funded properly it will always be late and cost more. And we all know that funds are never increased always reduced. It costs more in the end, but hey that’s next years budget and the leader will have moved on by then.
Five years on an IPT with no one paying any attention.
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Originally Posted by Big Bear
The answer is simple - IPTs do not work. They are far too removed from the front line to understand what what is actually required and staffed by incompetant, jobsworth civil serpants.
The answer is simple - Squadrons do not work. They are far too removed from real life to understand the implications of their actions and manned by blinkered military personnel with no concept of 'wider defence'.
For you to sit from one side, or on any side rather than think of the whole team, displays one of the reasons for Projects being so messed up - lack of Customer engagement - both ways.Lots of clear reasons provided above for why it went wrong and lots of righteous pointy fingers. So many times we forget the good things that are done, day in/out by the whole of defence (from Sqdn to Industry), none of which is possible by just one team/squadron working in isolation of the other.
Answers to many of the reasons are in the NAO report on Major Projects - hence the DACP.
If I had to chose one reason, from the multitude of reasons, I would say that defence these days costs far more per 'unit' than it ever did, given our year on year financial 'wedges' is it any wonder that we often don't deliver what was required in the first place?
MrAEO - that is priceless - blame the customer (the squadrons) for not understanding how you have to do your job................hahahahahahahahaha
I think I know what Mr AEO is referring to. Forgive me if this upsets anyone, but it’s an honest appraisal.
I think RN and RAF squadrons do a superb job. (Are you upset yet?). My experience with AAC is less direct.
The most common question I am asked by front line is “How do we influence what is bought for us to use?” The official answer – and it works, up to a point – is that there is a seamless link all the way from the lowest rank to the signature on the contract. To the Squadron, the important thing is Constraints Working Groups (or whatever they’re called this week). Having highlighted your problems, filtered by senior Sqn personnel, the CWG decides whether they are a true operational constraint, or can be classified a limitation (which can be worked round). They are then prioritised as Critical, Major etc. The machinery takes over, but in simple terms DEC / Requirement Managers are, in theory, supposed to make EP bids to clear these constraints. In practice, if it’s not a Critical, you haven’t a hope in hell, unless solutions can be combined and bring added value. Research and development works in much the same way – for example, scientists on “technology watch” bid through Requirement Managers.
My criticism is that the systems I describe are not understood by those who are meant to manage them. How many at a Squadron know of what I decribe? The CWGs typically meet once a year, if at all these days. (Apathy tends to set in when nothing seems to happen). There is no follow up to ensure DEC do what they should, or feedback from DEC to say “Look guys, we tried, but the BCs knocked us back”. The main problem here is that DEC and their Requirement Managers MUST have a full understanding of all the technical and acquisition issues (as they are making a case to, invariably, acquire technology). Very few do. (I’ve known ONE!). Also, and this goes against the grain, the CWGs MUST have, as a senior member, an acquisition specialist – usually a civvy. They are occasionally invited to attend, but largely ignored.
Note – I haven’t mentioned IPTs yet, yet we’re years into the “acquisition cycle”. The RqM may be embedded with the IPT, but he doesn’t work for the IPTL. As has been mentioned before, he takes at least a year to suss out his role, and is then on rundown. Frankly, most are a waste of space. As a backstop, the PM can make these bids on the Users’ behalf. Again, this requires a combination of experience, deep technical knowledge and a reasonable understanding of how you work. A rarity these days.
Here’s the bit you won’t like, and where Mr AEO is right. The people who can help both the Squadrons and the RqM are, almost universally, treated like **** underfoot. I went to a NAS at Culdrose once to assess a “critical” flight safety issue, and was literally thrown out on my ear. Shoved out the front door. I made a best guess at what they needed, had a prototype built and trialled at Boscombe. Thumbs up. Arranged for a Commodore to fly with it at Culdrose, naively thinking the penny would drop with the aircrew. No chance. ****** civvy was the chorus, even though the brass ( a pilot with more hours than the NAS combined) declared the solution the dogs *******. Sorry guys, you missed 10 minutes of your lunchbreak because the Commodore had the courtesy to speak to the CO before the flight. But it’s ok, take it out on the ***** civvy. Never mind that it cleared one of your Critical constraints. Hope you felt a lot safer.
We’re a team people. And it all boils down to people.
I think RN and RAF squadrons do a superb job. (Are you upset yet?). My experience with AAC is less direct.
The most common question I am asked by front line is “How do we influence what is bought for us to use?” The official answer – and it works, up to a point – is that there is a seamless link all the way from the lowest rank to the signature on the contract. To the Squadron, the important thing is Constraints Working Groups (or whatever they’re called this week). Having highlighted your problems, filtered by senior Sqn personnel, the CWG decides whether they are a true operational constraint, or can be classified a limitation (which can be worked round). They are then prioritised as Critical, Major etc. The machinery takes over, but in simple terms DEC / Requirement Managers are, in theory, supposed to make EP bids to clear these constraints. In practice, if it’s not a Critical, you haven’t a hope in hell, unless solutions can be combined and bring added value. Research and development works in much the same way – for example, scientists on “technology watch” bid through Requirement Managers.
My criticism is that the systems I describe are not understood by those who are meant to manage them. How many at a Squadron know of what I decribe? The CWGs typically meet once a year, if at all these days. (Apathy tends to set in when nothing seems to happen). There is no follow up to ensure DEC do what they should, or feedback from DEC to say “Look guys, we tried, but the BCs knocked us back”. The main problem here is that DEC and their Requirement Managers MUST have a full understanding of all the technical and acquisition issues (as they are making a case to, invariably, acquire technology). Very few do. (I’ve known ONE!). Also, and this goes against the grain, the CWGs MUST have, as a senior member, an acquisition specialist – usually a civvy. They are occasionally invited to attend, but largely ignored.
Note – I haven’t mentioned IPTs yet, yet we’re years into the “acquisition cycle”. The RqM may be embedded with the IPT, but he doesn’t work for the IPTL. As has been mentioned before, he takes at least a year to suss out his role, and is then on rundown. Frankly, most are a waste of space. As a backstop, the PM can make these bids on the Users’ behalf. Again, this requires a combination of experience, deep technical knowledge and a reasonable understanding of how you work. A rarity these days.
Here’s the bit you won’t like, and where Mr AEO is right. The people who can help both the Squadrons and the RqM are, almost universally, treated like **** underfoot. I went to a NAS at Culdrose once to assess a “critical” flight safety issue, and was literally thrown out on my ear. Shoved out the front door. I made a best guess at what they needed, had a prototype built and trialled at Boscombe. Thumbs up. Arranged for a Commodore to fly with it at Culdrose, naively thinking the penny would drop with the aircrew. No chance. ****** civvy was the chorus, even though the brass ( a pilot with more hours than the NAS combined) declared the solution the dogs *******. Sorry guys, you missed 10 minutes of your lunchbreak because the Commodore had the courtesy to speak to the CO before the flight. But it’s ok, take it out on the ***** civvy. Never mind that it cleared one of your Critical constraints. Hope you felt a lot safer.
We’re a team people. And it all boils down to people.
Further to the above....
How many of you involved in this process know when properly formulated bids are due in for this year? Hint - if you don't, and want capability, you're working overtime this week-end, or another year has been lost. Me? 18 holes.
How many of you involved in this process know when properly formulated bids are due in for this year? Hint - if you don't, and want capability, you're working overtime this week-end, or another year has been lost. Me? 18 holes.
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One of the biggest problems by far that I've seen is non-experts running projects that they don't know how to manage, for a short-term period. There's certainly no framework or templates for project development and any expertise tends to be purely dependent on the individual's experience - which can be narrow.
For a 2ish year window a contractor could be fed all sorts of bull$hit from someone who is unwilling to admit they're out of their depth (not the done thing, old boy), while the individual concerned knows they just have to keep going for 2 years before they're sprung. Next bloke in is an expert at, say, radar, so that becomes en vogue, only he's not that good at other bits and they suffer. Two years later someone new: they don't like the software interface, so that gets all the attention. It's chaotic and blindingly obvious why commerical companies don't do it!
Apply this theory to all our projects from new aircraft to JPA and you can see why we're a bit stuffed. I'm not saying contractors don't take the p!ss too, but the difference is they're organised and are fielding their career experts. The RAF is not and its priority seems to be to provide officers with a varied career path.
Add to that the still somewhat under-developed communications channels in the military - the squadron leader says so - and shop floor users are rarely consulted about what they need. Five years down the line the user has something imposed on them that they don't really want because someone higher ranking, who generally doesn't do the actual job anymore, has been relied upon to 'staff' the project, safe in the knowledge that there is little chance of comeback.
For a 2ish year window a contractor could be fed all sorts of bull$hit from someone who is unwilling to admit they're out of their depth (not the done thing, old boy), while the individual concerned knows they just have to keep going for 2 years before they're sprung. Next bloke in is an expert at, say, radar, so that becomes en vogue, only he's not that good at other bits and they suffer. Two years later someone new: they don't like the software interface, so that gets all the attention. It's chaotic and blindingly obvious why commerical companies don't do it!
Apply this theory to all our projects from new aircraft to JPA and you can see why we're a bit stuffed. I'm not saying contractors don't take the p!ss too, but the difference is they're organised and are fielding their career experts. The RAF is not and its priority seems to be to provide officers with a varied career path.
Add to that the still somewhat under-developed communications channels in the military - the squadron leader says so - and shop floor users are rarely consulted about what they need. Five years down the line the user has something imposed on them that they don't really want because someone higher ranking, who generally doesn't do the actual job anymore, has been relied upon to 'staff' the project, safe in the knowledge that there is little chance of comeback.
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Biggest reason in my experience is that there's never enough money.
The IPT has a rather small sum allocated, and every section of the IPT is desperately trying to get their hands on enough of it to achieve what their customers want - and I'm generalising here that the customers are the guys and gals sitting at the pointy end.
There are of course others in the chain like groundcrew who need notes and training, support services who may need test equipment etc, but really the whole project is about getting the right kit to the aircrew as defined by the people at group - the true 'owners' of the airframe.
Sadly, some of the things the aircrew want are too damn expensive, or simply not flavour of the month, no matter how much those things would improve the operational effectiveness of the asset.
Sometimes the theatre changes too fast for projects to keep pace, and money tied up in a contract for a system now not needed has to be spent anyway.
Sometimes the Americans move the goalposts, and the gucci new kit is now useless. But the contractor still needs paying for the things they've supplied and the time expended. Profit on MOD contracts is pretty poor, typically 4% or so, and to squeeze the suppliers even futher will simply put them out of business or see them withdraw their offers of contract in future.
Personally I think we'd be spending money wisely to hire a bloody good lawyer who'd chase every contractor that did try to screw us over. I'm sure the money recovered would more than match their wages.
The IPT has a rather small sum allocated, and every section of the IPT is desperately trying to get their hands on enough of it to achieve what their customers want - and I'm generalising here that the customers are the guys and gals sitting at the pointy end.
There are of course others in the chain like groundcrew who need notes and training, support services who may need test equipment etc, but really the whole project is about getting the right kit to the aircrew as defined by the people at group - the true 'owners' of the airframe.
Sadly, some of the things the aircrew want are too damn expensive, or simply not flavour of the month, no matter how much those things would improve the operational effectiveness of the asset.
Sometimes the theatre changes too fast for projects to keep pace, and money tied up in a contract for a system now not needed has to be spent anyway.
Sometimes the Americans move the goalposts, and the gucci new kit is now useless. But the contractor still needs paying for the things they've supplied and the time expended. Profit on MOD contracts is pretty poor, typically 4% or so, and to squeeze the suppliers even futher will simply put them out of business or see them withdraw their offers of contract in future.
Personally I think we'd be spending money wisely to hire a bloody good lawyer who'd chase every contractor that did try to screw us over. I'm sure the money recovered would more than match their wages.
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The most common question I am asked by front line is “How do we influence what is bought for us to use?” The official answer – and it works, up to a point – is that there is a seamless link all the way from the lowest rank to the signature on the contract. . . . the CWG decides
How many at a Squadron know of what I decribe? The CWGs typically meet once a year,
The people who can help both the Squadrons and the RqM are, almost universally, treated like **** underfoot.
naively thinking the penny would drop with the aircrew. No chance. ****** civvy was the chorus,
But it’s ok, take it out on the ***** civvy.
How many at a Squadron know of what I decribe? The CWGs typically meet once a year,
The people who can help both the Squadrons and the RqM are, almost universally, treated like **** underfoot.
naively thinking the penny would drop with the aircrew. No chance. ****** civvy was the chorus,
But it’s ok, take it out on the ***** civvy.
******* civvy, also true. We don't know you and we are a close knit team. A civvy, or an Ops Support, or a SIntO etc all need to win credibility. The less you know at the begining the longer it takes. Almost by definition a civvy is present for too short a time to win credibility.
Once we had some IR Counter Measures experts give us a presentation. We were highly trained but simple 5-GCE aircrew. They were boffins. There was no meeting of minds.
Guys on sqns tend to have a long term outlook measured in hours not even days.
It is difficult and the solution is clearly elusive.
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Tucumseh - I agree with your post in full.
crabs@
Re: My post and your response. I had tried to make it clear that my statement was a strawman, a simple jibe in response to the one originally posted by Bear. My point being, constantly pointing the finger from either end, be it from the sharp end or blunt, is counter productive. We'd all get a lot more done if we worked together and stopped bitching. Sorry if you misunderstood, it was likely to be my poor england.
Back to specifics. The MOD have a project, they conduct several months/years sorting out the best value for money solution that meets the requirement etc and they are geared up (finally!) with Industry to meet an ISD - how disruptive do you think it is when certain Ministers do not agree with the MOD's decision and make up their own conclusion. This puts the project teams back years! Continual meddling like this, to feed personal popularity ratings of high level individuals and score 'News Headline' points, has buggered up several projects that I can think of. Several fairly recently!
The term, 'emperors new clothes' springs to mind.
crabs@
Re: My post and your response. I had tried to make it clear that my statement was a strawman, a simple jibe in response to the one originally posted by Bear. My point being, constantly pointing the finger from either end, be it from the sharp end or blunt, is counter productive. We'd all get a lot more done if we worked together and stopped bitching. Sorry if you misunderstood, it was likely to be my poor england.
Back to specifics. The MOD have a project, they conduct several months/years sorting out the best value for money solution that meets the requirement etc and they are geared up (finally!) with Industry to meet an ISD - how disruptive do you think it is when certain Ministers do not agree with the MOD's decision and make up their own conclusion. This puts the project teams back years! Continual meddling like this, to feed personal popularity ratings of high level individuals and score 'News Headline' points, has buggered up several projects that I can think of. Several fairly recently!
The term, 'emperors new clothes' springs to mind.
MrAEO - you are clearly to intelligent and too well educated which is why you guys can't communicate with aircrew properly To a pilot a strawman is a scarecrow in a field and constructing logical arguments to prove your point involves saying er......f*** off you red nosed b8st*rd!
To a pilot a strawman is a scarecrow in a field and constructing logical arguments to prove your point involves saying er......f*** off you red nosed b8st*rd!
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Well just how difficult a question is this?
Having permitted/encouraged our one big supplier to eat almost all the competition the tried and tested notion of competitive tendering is but a distant memory.
Within that sole supplier this has lead to a situation where the most important issue is the continuation of the project, not if it meets the requirements. Almost all projects become politicised because of the very high staffing levels and are then virtually impossible to cancel. Might I also suggest that some of the uniformed guys may be complicit in this game, because they have an eye towards the day they will leave and have to go looking for work with that one big supplier.
Then in order to try and contain costs fleet sizes get whittled down to silly levels and procurement of spares is nonexistent, thus ensuring a further reduction in effective fleet size. Somehow the Nimrod MR4 comes to mind here.
The very high costs have lead to the necessity for multinational projects which offer further opportunities for folly. The suppliers are obliged to specify system architectures, which must accommodate the correct proportion of national work share.
Companies will go to great lengths to achieve work share, with it would seem the cooperation of their national governments. Hence the sweet deal that has given BAE the biggest piece of the action on Typhoon by appearing to order a large fleet for the RAF but latterly diverting a third to Saudi. (Anybody who thinks this wasn't intended up front just hasn't been paying attention. BAE announced it internally and it seems to be have been known within the RAF that Leeming would never actually gets its Typhoons) -Its unlikely that UK would have got the radar part of the work share for Typhoon if the initial RAF order had been as small as its now seen to be, and sad to say it seems as if the great days of British airborne radars came and went about 60 years ago.
The self induced added complexity of a work share influenced architecture has the added effect of generating endless Chinese walls that the various suppliers can hide behind, rather than fix problems.
Within that sole supplier this has lead to a situation where the most important issue is the continuation of the project, not if it meets the requirements. Almost all projects become politicised because of the very high staffing levels and are then virtually impossible to cancel. Might I also suggest that some of the uniformed guys may be complicit in this game, because they have an eye towards the day they will leave and have to go looking for work with that one big supplier.
Then in order to try and contain costs fleet sizes get whittled down to silly levels and procurement of spares is nonexistent, thus ensuring a further reduction in effective fleet size. Somehow the Nimrod MR4 comes to mind here.
The very high costs have lead to the necessity for multinational projects which offer further opportunities for folly. The suppliers are obliged to specify system architectures, which must accommodate the correct proportion of national work share.
Companies will go to great lengths to achieve work share, with it would seem the cooperation of their national governments. Hence the sweet deal that has given BAE the biggest piece of the action on Typhoon by appearing to order a large fleet for the RAF but latterly diverting a third to Saudi. (Anybody who thinks this wasn't intended up front just hasn't been paying attention. BAE announced it internally and it seems to be have been known within the RAF that Leeming would never actually gets its Typhoons) -Its unlikely that UK would have got the radar part of the work share for Typhoon if the initial RAF order had been as small as its now seen to be, and sad to say it seems as if the great days of British airborne radars came and went about 60 years ago.
The self induced added complexity of a work share influenced architecture has the added effect of generating endless Chinese walls that the various suppliers can hide behind, rather than fix problems.
Jetex
I agree with all you say except the radar bit. Like Merlin (Blue Kestrel), Typhoon radar (ECR90) development contracts were let in the early/mid 80s. Both are, in architectural and “road mapping” terms, merely continuations of Blue Vixen, Blue Fox and Sea Spray. All great radars – BV still is; and nearly 15 years after it went out of service, there are many who would sell their soul for BF. SS continues to be developed.
Ferranti (and they will always be Ferranti to some, despite the various changes over the years) have always made great radars. And an honourable mention to MEL and Thorn EMI, both unfortunately now part of T*****.
As always, there is a downside…. Nimrod AEW, Jetstream Mk3 – but God alone knows how those companies got the contracts! Just because they have “radar” in the name doesn’t mean they actually deliver working radars.
I agree with all you say except the radar bit. Like Merlin (Blue Kestrel), Typhoon radar (ECR90) development contracts were let in the early/mid 80s. Both are, in architectural and “road mapping” terms, merely continuations of Blue Vixen, Blue Fox and Sea Spray. All great radars – BV still is; and nearly 15 years after it went out of service, there are many who would sell their soul for BF. SS continues to be developed.
Ferranti (and they will always be Ferranti to some, despite the various changes over the years) have always made great radars. And an honourable mention to MEL and Thorn EMI, both unfortunately now part of T*****.
As always, there is a downside…. Nimrod AEW, Jetstream Mk3 – but God alone knows how those companies got the contracts! Just because they have “radar” in the name doesn’t mean they actually deliver working radars.
