Typhoon in Las Vegas
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Rudekid, I see where you are coming from
. It may be a clumsy statement or a quote out of context.
Could it be taken to mean that "Air power starts and ends with control of the air with the other missions in between contributing to the land/sea battle, never losing sight of the need to maintain control of the air"?
Certainly ACM Sir Richard Johns in his forward to Air Power Doctrine makes no such claim. He said, in 1999, 'the generation of Air Power must take into account both 'jointery' and multinational operations . . . '
The first core capability is said to be information exploitation. Control of the air is second. Strategic effect is third ahead of indirect and direct air operations, combat support is fifth with force protection as sixth. Finally we have sustainability.
Air power starts and ends with control of the air
Could it be taken to mean that "Air power starts and ends with control of the air with the other missions in between contributing to the land/sea battle, never losing sight of the need to maintain control of the air"?
Certainly ACM Sir Richard Johns in his forward to Air Power Doctrine makes no such claim. He said, in 1999, 'the generation of Air Power must take into account both 'jointery' and multinational operations . . . '
The first core capability is said to be information exploitation. Control of the air is second. Strategic effect is third ahead of indirect and direct air operations, combat support is fifth with force protection as sixth. Finally we have sustainability.
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Deliverance
I agree with the theory of what you're saying, I just don't see any likely application in a real modern-day conflict. I didn't know BVR had been authorised for TELIC but, realistically, the environment and the "sufficient ID" caveat combine to make it a meaningless statement.
Of course it would be nice to be like the US and buy bucket loads of weapons systems to fit every conceivable scenario; also, the importance of "keeping up with the Joneskis" in terms of defence capability can't be totally ignored. However, comparing the operational overstretch of the the rest of the RAF (particularly AT and SH fleets) with the possibility (even probability) of a requirement for Typhoon with a BVRAAM makes me question the sense of spending the money on Meteor.
Here endeth the rant.
N Joe
I agree with the theory of what you're saying, I just don't see any likely application in a real modern-day conflict. I didn't know BVR had been authorised for TELIC but, realistically, the environment and the "sufficient ID" caveat combine to make it a meaningless statement.
Of course it would be nice to be like the US and buy bucket loads of weapons systems to fit every conceivable scenario; also, the importance of "keeping up with the Joneskis" in terms of defence capability can't be totally ignored. However, comparing the operational overstretch of the the rest of the RAF (particularly AT and SH fleets) with the possibility (even probability) of a requirement for Typhoon with a BVRAAM makes me question the sense of spending the money on Meteor.
Here endeth the rant.
N Joe
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N Joe,
Your knowledge of Air Ops and the ROE surrounding the weapons and weapons systems involved are limited to say the least.
BVR engagements are 'plausible' to say the very least in many scenarios I can picture (and have been involved in) due to the vast array of ID mechanisms that now exist, in our military (not just RAF) and those we may find ourselves alongside.
Your knowledge of Air Ops and the ROE surrounding the weapons and weapons systems involved are limited to say the least.
BVR engagements are 'plausible' to say the very least in many scenarios I can picture (and have been involved in) due to the vast array of ID mechanisms that now exist, in our military (not just RAF) and those we may find ourselves alongside.
N Joe - the majority of US/NATO air-air victories over the past 15 years have been with BVR weapons systems; IIRC, all NATO kills over Kosovo in '99 were with AMRAAM. Afghanistan and Iraq didn't see air-air fighting, for obvious reasons. However, it would be foolish in the extreme for any air force to give up its BVR capability, since one could argue that the two current conflicts are the exception rather than the rule.
I can't buy the idea that Typhoon pilots should be forced to go up against adversaries equipped with R-77 armed Su-27s - which is not an impossibility. Although the details are sketchy, it would appear that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war saw the majority of air-air kills being scored with BVR weapons (albeit the R-27). BVR weapons have proliferated since the end of the Cold War, and to base assumptions on the requirement upon the fact that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan have seen air-air combat since 2001 would be foolish in the extreme.
I can't buy the idea that Typhoon pilots should be forced to go up against adversaries equipped with R-77 armed Su-27s - which is not an impossibility. Although the details are sketchy, it would appear that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war saw the majority of air-air kills being scored with BVR weapons (albeit the R-27). BVR weapons have proliferated since the end of the Cold War, and to base assumptions on the requirement upon the fact that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan have seen air-air combat since 2001 would be foolish in the extreme.
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Archimedes, Deliverance et al,
Sorry, I think I got out of bed the wrong side the other day!
Valid points all, however we already have/had a BVR capability with the F3 AMRAAM so why put all the effort into a BVRAAM with the Typhoon?
Maybe I have missed something, but whilst other military components are accepting capability gaps, surely we could have expended more energy earlier into Typhoons air-to-ground abilities? Especially as we already had an albeit more limited capability in the F3.
It seems that (rightly) current RAF No1 priority is getting Typhoon established with some form of AG capability so it can deploy and take some weight off the shoulders of some of the other fleets. This would also be politically expedient , given our current 'utterly useless' status!
However, the current scenario was easily forseeable (and foreseen) upto ten years ago, so why not realign the programme at that time to focus on something we really need? As far as I know, which has been spouted by every AOC I've heard on the subject, Typhoon has always been slated to get an AA role, with the AG role a distant (and apparently less favoured) cousin. it seems to me that this is and was shockingly naive.
We need to maintain a BVRAAM capability for lots of reasons, I accept, but it's a question of effective prioritisation. We needed to bite the bullet ten years ago, not knee jerk now.
We are where we are, is a phrase I hear more and more. Sadly, if we'd looked where we were going, we may well have avoided the mess!
I do object to the massive focus on Typhoon that has been the day to day thrust of RAF propaganda for the last five years. Hopefully, in ten years time the RAF will be less FJ-centric.
I'm sure Typhoon will be fantastic when it arrives in theatre, I just wish it hadn't been over hyped or three years late!
Still, would love a back seat if anyone's offering....
Sorry, I think I got out of bed the wrong side the other day!
Valid points all, however we already have/had a BVR capability with the F3 AMRAAM so why put all the effort into a BVRAAM with the Typhoon?
Maybe I have missed something, but whilst other military components are accepting capability gaps, surely we could have expended more energy earlier into Typhoons air-to-ground abilities? Especially as we already had an albeit more limited capability in the F3.
It seems that (rightly) current RAF No1 priority is getting Typhoon established with some form of AG capability so it can deploy and take some weight off the shoulders of some of the other fleets. This would also be politically expedient , given our current 'utterly useless' status!
However, the current scenario was easily forseeable (and foreseen) upto ten years ago, so why not realign the programme at that time to focus on something we really need? As far as I know, which has been spouted by every AOC I've heard on the subject, Typhoon has always been slated to get an AA role, with the AG role a distant (and apparently less favoured) cousin. it seems to me that this is and was shockingly naive.
We need to maintain a BVRAAM capability for lots of reasons, I accept, but it's a question of effective prioritisation. We needed to bite the bullet ten years ago, not knee jerk now.
We are where we are, is a phrase I hear more and more. Sadly, if we'd looked where we were going, we may well have avoided the mess!
I do object to the massive focus on Typhoon that has been the day to day thrust of RAF propaganda for the last five years. Hopefully, in ten years time the RAF will be less FJ-centric.
I'm sure Typhoon will be fantastic when it arrives in theatre, I just wish it hadn't been over hyped or three years late!
Still, would love a back seat if anyone's offering....
Last edited by rudekid; 13th Mar 2007 at 23:13. Reason: typo
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RK, another view may be that with the knowledge their airships had during the early years of EFA as it then was is that there existed a serious AA dogfighting gap. Unexpected levels of continuous operations for the last 17 years, plus cost saving by cutting some CAS fleets has produced the current AG shortfalls. Unfortunately with a complex aircraft, in terms of control laws etc I imagine the plan was always to get an aircraft that is aerodynamically mature and predictable before bringing it into close proximity to the ground as a CAS platform. Once these processes are written into a contract which three other nations have had to sign up to you can imagine how difficult it will be to change the programme. In short the seeds for this situation were sown in the last decades of the last century. (reminds me of HG Wells!)
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Deliverance
I don't think you need worry about that!
Agree that Air Power should be the Holy Grail in whatever guise. But then wouldn't we equip MRA4 with some AG capability? Big bomb bay, long time on station, capable avionics and comms, just lacking some cash and will power? Doesn't seem to be a ridiculous idea to me...
And no, I'm not a Nimrod mate!
Do you wonder whether there is a legacy of platform type to specific role that has maybe clouded our judgement on some of these issues?
I agree with your premise of thinking long term, however I would argue that this is too late in the day. The strategic direction ten years ago should have been dragging Typhoon towards delivering AG capability as a primary concern. Maybe this wasn't possible- anyone care to comment?
I don't think we should be losing any capabilities in the long term, but the current state of affairs was predicted by many and not acted upon.
I suspect that key actors like BAe Systems would have a lot of influence over this and their self interest would be evident.
We (as a service) face a lot of political challenges over the next 18 months and I suspect our survival is at stake in the longer term. The current malaise may have been avoided if we'd taken some bold decisions ten years ago, instead of pursuing the holy grail of a new generation AA fighter. We do need this-just not now.
Luckily with my 20-20 hindsight pill, I would avoid the same mistakes...
With you in charge it seems the air force would be AT & SH centric.
Agree that Air Power should be the Holy Grail in whatever guise. But then wouldn't we equip MRA4 with some AG capability? Big bomb bay, long time on station, capable avionics and comms, just lacking some cash and will power? Doesn't seem to be a ridiculous idea to me...
And no, I'm not a Nimrod mate!
Do you wonder whether there is a legacy of platform type to specific role that has maybe clouded our judgement on some of these issues?
I agree with your premise of thinking long term, however I would argue that this is too late in the day. The strategic direction ten years ago should have been dragging Typhoon towards delivering AG capability as a primary concern. Maybe this wasn't possible- anyone care to comment?
I don't think we should be losing any capabilities in the long term, but the current state of affairs was predicted by many and not acted upon.
I suspect that key actors like BAe Systems would have a lot of influence over this and their self interest would be evident.
We (as a service) face a lot of political challenges over the next 18 months and I suspect our survival is at stake in the longer term. The current malaise may have been avoided if we'd taken some bold decisions ten years ago, instead of pursuing the holy grail of a new generation AA fighter. We do need this-just not now.
Luckily with my 20-20 hindsight pill, I would avoid the same mistakes...
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Kitbag
Damn it- you managed to pose some pertinent points whilst I was one-finger typing. Slow down!
I see your points, but wouldn't the fact that Typhoon was always slated as having a AG capability have mandated the requirements from the outset? The EAP (is that correct?) first flew in 1986, so I would hope that 21 years later it is aerodynamically proven. Mind you, given our proven inability to procure what we need, I'm less sure.
If (as I believe) we're currently expending all our energies in turning Typhoon into an AG platform, we're already skewing an immature programme in a slightly different strategic direction. I don't see how this decision couldn't have been taken some time ago?
You're right, the project contracts must be an absolute nightmare, but impossible? i hope not.
As always, standing by for correction!
Damn it- you managed to pose some pertinent points whilst I was one-finger typing. Slow down!
I see your points, but wouldn't the fact that Typhoon was always slated as having a AG capability have mandated the requirements from the outset? The EAP (is that correct?) first flew in 1986, so I would hope that 21 years later it is aerodynamically proven. Mind you, given our proven inability to procure what we need, I'm less sure.
If (as I believe) we're currently expending all our energies in turning Typhoon into an AG platform, we're already skewing an immature programme in a slightly different strategic direction. I don't see how this decision couldn't have been taken some time ago?
You're right, the project contracts must be an absolute nightmare, but impossible? i hope not.
As always, standing by for correction!
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Remember, just 4 years ago, we didn't have an A/G problem.
We had sufficient assets for Deny Flight. The Jag force was still a force. The Navy had an integral A/G capability with a-A too and so on.
It is the last 4 years where we have both stripped our A/G capability and engaged in an extensive A/G role. Just proves the point that forecasting even months ahead is frought with difficulties.
We had sufficient assets for Deny Flight. The Jag force was still a force. The Navy had an integral A/G capability with a-A too and so on.
It is the last 4 years where we have both stripped our A/G capability and engaged in an extensive A/G role. Just proves the point that forecasting even months ahead is frought with difficulties.
