Chinook HC3s - Why has it all gone so quiet?
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Chinook HC3s - Why has it all gone so quiet?
At one stage, it seemed as though the Chinook Fix-to-Field programme at last had some impetus behind it. That an unnamed Southampton-based company had unsuccessfully competed with DARA Fleetlands to win the contract to embody Thales Top Deck avionics on the eight HC3s. That we might expect Main Gate in the early part of 2007.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=109805
But it's all gone terribly quiet again, and the eight HC3s (or perhaps just seven of them, with the eighth in Wilmington, Delaware) remain mouldering in the sheds at Boscombe, unflown since 2005.
So what's going on?
Has someone grown big enough gonads to take the decision that the risk involved in simply putting these aircraft into service (taking Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation on the chin) is a risk worth taking?
Or has someone decided that validating the aircraft to a previous standard is good enough?
Or has someone found some way of validating the Software to today's standards?
Or is the fix-to-field programme going ahead - just very quietly?
Or is someone sitting back and procrastinating?
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=109805
But it's all gone terribly quiet again, and the eight HC3s (or perhaps just seven of them, with the eighth in Wilmington, Delaware) remain mouldering in the sheds at Boscombe, unflown since 2005.
So what's going on?
Has someone grown big enough gonads to take the decision that the risk involved in simply putting these aircraft into service (taking Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation on the chin) is a risk worth taking?
Or has someone decided that validating the aircraft to a previous standard is good enough?
Or has someone found some way of validating the Software to today's standards?
Or is the fix-to-field programme going ahead - just very quietly?
Or is someone sitting back and procrastinating?
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HC3 Why so quiet?
Having had Reds and Greens on chinooks and then moving to the DPA ...where I was sighted on QuinetiQs concerns...the technical reservations were only marginally credible.
The revised Def Stan 56, that I saw in draft at that time-2004, would have allowed for the receiving IPT Ldr to sign off these aircraft so that they could enter service at 'prudent' risk.
Dont know what's happened since then...but as a CEng I would have been happy to accept them and there is a de-facto body of evidence (from other Boeing customers) to support the required safety case.
Bottom line..no idea for the delay
The revised Def Stan 56, that I saw in draft at that time-2004, would have allowed for the receiving IPT Ldr to sign off these aircraft so that they could enter service at 'prudent' risk.
Dont know what's happened since then...but as a CEng I would have been happy to accept them and there is a de-facto body of evidence (from other Boeing customers) to support the required safety case.
Bottom line..no idea for the delay
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Dr Strangecab,
Without deep insight into what was going on in the minds of those involved, things aren't so easy to brush off.
Although on a different aircraft, I too have held reds and greens. I too am a CEng. I have also been involved in the RTS process. Having reds and greens on type does not give you all the knowledge that you need to assess whether or not a fleet of aircraft is safe to bring into service. Nor does being a CEng. Having reds and greens only gives you some experience, being a CEng only the opportunity to exercise your duties with responsibility.
Yes, it is the responsibility of the Duty Holder as to whether they accept the risk. Obviously they felt that the case was not made. What 'other Boeing customers' think may be of little relevance if Boeing themselves cannot demonstrate that their product is safe.
sw
Without deep insight into what was going on in the minds of those involved, things aren't so easy to brush off.
Although on a different aircraft, I too have held reds and greens. I too am a CEng. I have also been involved in the RTS process. Having reds and greens on type does not give you all the knowledge that you need to assess whether or not a fleet of aircraft is safe to bring into service. Nor does being a CEng. Having reds and greens only gives you some experience, being a CEng only the opportunity to exercise your duties with responsibility.
Yes, it is the responsibility of the Duty Holder as to whether they accept the risk. Obviously they felt that the case was not made. What 'other Boeing customers' think may be of little relevance if Boeing themselves cannot demonstrate that their product is safe.
sw
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HC3 Why so quiet?
Dear Safeware, all you say is indeed true...but I was there as the scrutineer, and although I can't read minds I can read documents.
In my present post I am about to accept/sign off a new Mk of aircraft...so I know what is involved. ....no brush-off intended to anyone...but prudent and informed risk taking is the order of the day. Regds
In my present post I am about to accept/sign off a new Mk of aircraft...so I know what is involved. ....no brush-off intended to anyone...but prudent and informed risk taking is the order of the day. Regds
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Dr Stangecab,
Indeed! Those that are particularly risk averse are just as bad as those who are gung-ho.
Best wishes with the new aircraft.
sw
prudent and informed risk taking is the order of the day
Best wishes with the new aircraft.
sw
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Having had Reds and Greens on chinooks
the technical reservations were only marginally credible.
The revised Def Stan 56, that I saw in draft at that time-2004, would have allowed for the receiving IPT Ldr to sign off these aircraft so that they could enter service at 'prudent' risk.
but as a CEng I would have been happy to accept them
By the way the revised Def Stan that you refer to was published quite some time ago, look it up ! There are a few changes to what you probably saw, but it's essentially the same.
Safety_Helmut
This is not correct - the HC3 architecture is unique and hence no such body of evidence can and does exist.
Dr Strangecab, this should have been immediately obvious to an intimately involved scrutineer. It is fundamental to the situation that now prevails.
Last edited by BossEyed; 12th Dec 2006 at 19:13.
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HC3 Why so quiet?
Helmut, flippant? ....as you call it...
BossEyes...there was nothing unique (to the MOD) about the source code running the HC3's system.
Shall we stop wibbling now and perhaps do you know what has happened since '04?
BossEyes...there was nothing unique (to the MOD) about the source code running the HC3's system.
Shall we stop wibbling now and perhaps do you know what has happened since '04?
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Dr Strangecab,
Nothing unique maybe, but if you pick bits from here, bits from there because you are doing COTS you make it very difficult to pull together a safety case that says 'this design standard, composed of these items, when integrated together, has a safety case that demonstrates an acceptable level of safety in this operating environment'.
When the MOD sets its own rules, it has to be prepared to live by them.
And as the saying goes, an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
sw
Nothing unique maybe, but if you pick bits from here, bits from there because you are doing COTS you make it very difficult to pull together a safety case that says 'this design standard, composed of these items, when integrated together, has a safety case that demonstrates an acceptable level of safety in this operating environment'.
When the MOD sets its own rules, it has to be prepared to live by them.
And as the saying goes, an absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
sw
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HC3....
Its midnight here and the details escape me now but.....you said..
"you pick bits from here, bits from there"
Errrrrrr we do actually, by principle of modular qualification and there is a agreed standard for it........
....need sleep zzz
"you pick bits from here, bits from there"
Errrrrrr we do actually, by principle of modular qualification and there is a agreed standard for it........
....need sleep zzz
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HC3.....
SAFEWARE- exactly, the problem was with the contracting and not the resulting technical solution that was supplied.
HELMUT- why prey do I believe that the new Def Stan 56 would have allowed us to accept the ac despite QuinetiQs reservations....because I specifically asked the drafter of the document; albeit no criticism whatsoever of the IPT should be inferred.
HELMUT- why prey do I believe that the new Def Stan 56 would have allowed us to accept the ac despite QuinetiQs reservations....because I specifically asked the drafter of the document; albeit no criticism whatsoever of the IPT should be inferred.
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Very simplistically, the HC.3s are/were meant to be SF orientated (?) so if the requirement was for ordinary supply helicopters (which everyone seems to be crying out for) would it be easier to qualify them, and then buy a "proper" SF Chinook version and transfer any special equipment over ?
As the Def Stan (Part 2) states, most emphatically, “THIS GUIDANCE IS NOT MANDATORY”. How safety management is implemented on a given project is left up to the IPT.
It follows that, as usual, the MoD describes very well WHAT safety is, but doesn’t offer any practical advice on HOW to do it. Even if the IPT were afforded the resources to appoint a Safety Manager (or Risk Manager for that matter), it is unlikely he’d actually get anywhere just by reading this Def Stan. For example, what to do when a senior officer gleefully points out it is not mandatory and uses this as his excuse for knowingly leaving the aircraft unsafe. (For those who haven’t experienced this, you ignore him, make the aircraft safe and take your punishment. Or you do what you’re told, get your promotion and brick it for the rest of your career waiting for a call).
It concentrates on delivering safety but, notably, does not cross refer to the Def Stan which outlines the procedures for maintaining safety through life. It has long been practice to ignore the latter but I wonder if this indicates it is now policy?
Getting back to the main topic, Mk3. Oh, just read the above.
(Edit) Perhaps worth pointing out the analogy to the Boscombe advice issue, where accepting this is not mandatory. However, only a complete idiot would ignore it. We have already heard that Boscombe advice was ignored on Mk3. This then only leaves the question, what idiots were responsible and did they routinely condone safety advice being ignored? (Yes).
It follows that, as usual, the MoD describes very well WHAT safety is, but doesn’t offer any practical advice on HOW to do it. Even if the IPT were afforded the resources to appoint a Safety Manager (or Risk Manager for that matter), it is unlikely he’d actually get anywhere just by reading this Def Stan. For example, what to do when a senior officer gleefully points out it is not mandatory and uses this as his excuse for knowingly leaving the aircraft unsafe. (For those who haven’t experienced this, you ignore him, make the aircraft safe and take your punishment. Or you do what you’re told, get your promotion and brick it for the rest of your career waiting for a call).
It concentrates on delivering safety but, notably, does not cross refer to the Def Stan which outlines the procedures for maintaining safety through life. It has long been practice to ignore the latter but I wonder if this indicates it is now policy?
Getting back to the main topic, Mk3. Oh, just read the above.
(Edit) Perhaps worth pointing out the analogy to the Boscombe advice issue, where accepting this is not mandatory. However, only a complete idiot would ignore it. We have already heard that Boscombe advice was ignored on Mk3. This then only leaves the question, what idiots were responsible and did they routinely condone safety advice being ignored? (Yes).
Last edited by tucumseh; 13th Dec 2006 at 07:55.
Thread Starter
While there is clearly some body of opinion that seems to endorse the current position
"that the HC.Mk 3 should not be released to service because the software cannot be adequately verified"
at the same time, many of those closely involved with the programme (engineers, TPs, etc) believe that Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation should be noted, but that this aircraft should still enter service, because the degree of risk is such that it can be prudently accepted.
Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?
Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?
Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?
"that the HC.Mk 3 should not be released to service because the software cannot be adequately verified"
at the same time, many of those closely involved with the programme (engineers, TPs, etc) believe that Boscombe's 'unacceptable' recommendation should be noted, but that this aircraft should still enter service, because the degree of risk is such that it can be prudently accepted.
Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?
Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?
Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?
J
“Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?”
The Def Stans aren’t mandatory, so with all due respect J, the question is academic. You have to ask what standards the Directorate (not IPT) applied to the contract, were they adhered to, was QA/QC robust, were the risks identified, mitigation plans put in place etc etc. (If you’re of a mind, ask who the Risk, Quality, Safety, Standardisation and Configuration Control Managers were. What??!!). And, in the context of your question, did the risks that were identified and ignored, materialise.
However, you also have to realise there are two distinct “acceptance” phases – off contract and into Service. Clearly, if the two are not considered as part of an integrated process, you get a situation where a contract is paid off, but the Service (and often other PMs) refuses to accept it because of outstanding airworthiness issues. This is quite common and was deemed acceptable by the MoD(PE) hierarchy at the time. Still is, depending on who the PM is. It is NOT deemed acceptable by PMs or Users who understand the question, or Boscombe. You may find that the real issues on Mk3 are (a) nervousness caused by Mull, where Boscombe’s warnings and recommendations were ignored, and (b) the answer to the question why far more complex programmes were delivered concurrently and with effortless competence by the same Directorate.
“Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?”
Can’t speak for Typhoon, but “yes” on Mk2. Also, of course, the SEM system almost guarantees that many in-service aircraft would not pass the Boscombe test and, like Mk2, do not have a seamless airworthiness audit trail back to the TI and PI a/c.
“Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?”
This IS considered and understood in DPA, but in my experience the issue is deemed a political one and outside the boundary of responsibility of those in DPA/DPO who deliver and maintain airworthiness. The issue also arises in other domains (infantry, ships etc). It is the “How much value do you place on a man’s life” question – and that is quite definitely political. It is for DPA/DLO/Users to present the evidence to the decision making machine. Where the issue is obvious you would expect it to have already been addressed by DEC in their original risk register, which they pass on to DPA. Trouble is, I’ve never known a DEC to satisfy this basic mandatory requirement, so DPA are playing catch up on risk from Day 1, and if the mitigation costs money (which of course they haven’t been given because DEC haven’t identified and hence costed the risk in the first place) then something else has to give.
Hope this helps. It’s a short answer. You raise some good points.
“Is it the case that the aircraft would have been accepted under prior Defstans?”
The Def Stans aren’t mandatory, so with all due respect J, the question is academic. You have to ask what standards the Directorate (not IPT) applied to the contract, were they adhered to, was QA/QC robust, were the risks identified, mitigation plans put in place etc etc. (If you’re of a mind, ask who the Risk, Quality, Safety, Standardisation and Configuration Control Managers were. What??!!). And, in the context of your question, did the risks that were identified and ignored, materialise.
However, you also have to realise there are two distinct “acceptance” phases – off contract and into Service. Clearly, if the two are not considered as part of an integrated process, you get a situation where a contract is paid off, but the Service (and often other PMs) refuses to accept it because of outstanding airworthiness issues. This is quite common and was deemed acceptable by the MoD(PE) hierarchy at the time. Still is, depending on who the PM is. It is NOT deemed acceptable by PMs or Users who understand the question, or Boscombe. You may find that the real issues on Mk3 are (a) nervousness caused by Mull, where Boscombe’s warnings and recommendations were ignored, and (b) the answer to the question why far more complex programmes were delivered concurrently and with effortless competence by the same Directorate.
“Is it not the case that other aircraft deemed 'unacceptable' by Boscombe have still gained an MAR and entered service - from Chinook HC2 to Typhoon?”
Can’t speak for Typhoon, but “yes” on Mk2. Also, of course, the SEM system almost guarantees that many in-service aircraft would not pass the Boscombe test and, like Mk2, do not have a seamless airworthiness audit trail back to the TI and PI a/c.
“Does the chance of a risk to aircrew safety (there is no indication that there is any such risk, it just can't be proven not to exist) outweigh the absolute certainty that UK service personnel will die as a direct result of the shortfall in helicopter lift?”
This IS considered and understood in DPA, but in my experience the issue is deemed a political one and outside the boundary of responsibility of those in DPA/DPO who deliver and maintain airworthiness. The issue also arises in other domains (infantry, ships etc). It is the “How much value do you place on a man’s life” question – and that is quite definitely political. It is for DPA/DLO/Users to present the evidence to the decision making machine. Where the issue is obvious you would expect it to have already been addressed by DEC in their original risk register, which they pass on to DPA. Trouble is, I’ve never known a DEC to satisfy this basic mandatory requirement, so DPA are playing catch up on risk from Day 1, and if the mitigation costs money (which of course they haven’t been given because DEC haven’t identified and hence costed the risk in the first place) then something else has to give.
Hope this helps. It’s a short answer. You raise some good points.