Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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I understand that a Nimrod from 201 Squadron will be escorted by two Tornado F3s from RAF Leuchars in the flypast of 55 aircraft at 1pm will following the Trooping the Colour ceremony in Horseguards Parade, London.
So they are now flying un-airworthy a/c over the most densely populated area of the the country, or has this particular Nimrod had all it's fuel seals changed in the last three weeks!!!!! and all the risks are now ALARP ???
So they are now flying un-airworthy a/c over the most densely populated area of the the country, or has this particular Nimrod had all it's fuel seals changed in the last three weeks!!!!! and all the risks are now ALARP ???
You are, as ever, quite right, TD. The Torygraph had the story set up for tomorrow, complete with picture of said MR2 and F3s in the rehearsal flypast. For some unfathomable reason, they’ve decided not to run it.
Channel 4 News and Today programme have pleaded more interesting political stories as their reasons for not publicising this strange decision by the MoD.
I’m hoping the flypast will be live on BBC News (News 24 as used to be) on Saturday.
airsound
Channel 4 News and Today programme have pleaded more interesting political stories as their reasons for not publicising this strange decision by the MoD.
I’m hoping the flypast will be live on BBC News (News 24 as used to be) on Saturday.
airsound
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TD
Your emotive posts are not helping the situation
We do not have the luxury of the Shackelton sqn days - the Nimrod is part of the Kinloss Orbat (pool) and it's possible a 201 Sqn crew will be manning it for the flypast
Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely
It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?
I will now take this opportunity to apologise unreservedly to Pprune Mod and posters, and most importantly, the relatives and friends of my eleven fellow crew mates of XV230, who I flew with and trained over the years, for any offence or hurt I may have caused on this thread, regarding my previous posts
When you spend 32 years and 10,000 hours on type, you tend to get attached and supportive - I trust you will understand
God Bless and regards B15
Your emotive posts are not helping the situation
We do not have the luxury of the Shackelton sqn days - the Nimrod is part of the Kinloss Orbat (pool) and it's possible a 201 Sqn crew will be manning it for the flypast
Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely
It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?
I will now take this opportunity to apologise unreservedly to Pprune Mod and posters, and most importantly, the relatives and friends of my eleven fellow crew mates of XV230, who I flew with and trained over the years, for any offence or hurt I may have caused on this thread, regarding my previous posts
When you spend 32 years and 10,000 hours on type, you tend to get attached and supportive - I trust you will understand
God Bless and regards B15
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Buoy15
My point is this a/c is not ALARP and won't be for some time , had crew 3 XV230 known their a/c was not airworthy I am sure that would not have flown it that day. As Bob Ainsworth said the accident could have happenned to any of the nimrods as they were not airworthy.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7417498.stm
Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely
It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?
It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7417498.stm
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In the case of a hazard which has a catastrophic consequence, there is a prescribed level of probability which is judged to be commensurate with the assessed hazard.
A hazard resulting in the loss of the aircraft in the civilian world would be termed 'Catastrophic'. the required probability of such an event is 'extremely improbable', which is considered to be not more than one event per 1,000,000,000 flying hours.
Approximately what percentage of that one billion do your on-time departures and safe returns amount to? Would you consider it a statistically significant sample? I doubt if I would.
(And before someone berates me about using civilian airworthiness risk numbers, I note that the various MoD regs which someone kindly supplied a link for earlier note that the MoD target/policy is to achieve levels of safety 'not worse than' civil. Even if you were a couple or orders of magnitude worse by policy, that's still one event per ten million hours. Even if you flew the Nimrod fleet to its design life and beyond, you'd never get a statistically useful fraction of that exposure.)
I feel the need to respond to this because the "we haven't had an incident so we must be ok" attitude prevails in my part of the industry too, and it's just as wrong.
MF Scientist
Excellent. Spot on. And MoD's own Regulations specifically say this shall not be used to justify a safety argument. Unfortunately, it became the norm long ago and is the argument routinely trotted out by Ministers and MoD.
People (not least MoD themselves) continue to confuse airworthiness, safety, fitness for purpose and serviceability. The admission by the MoD was that the Nimrod fleet (and by extension most other aircraft as the processes, procedures and regulations are the same) was/is not airworthy. Given the extraordinarily long list of actions necessary to satisfy the MoD's own requirements, I doubt very much if they are today, or will be in the near future. I acknowledge this resurrection, if it happens, will be of biblical proportions, but that is the concern of MoD and the staffs who, over the last 20 years, knowingly accepted greater and greater risk. Until....... Their position is indefensible, made worse by the onus being on MoD to demonstrate airworthiness; whereas with a single phone call anyone can demonstrate it is NOT airworthy.
This list is not just QQ's "30 recommendations" - they just touch the surface. The reports are damning enough, yet in a way benign and clearly diluted because the recommendations go nowhere near addressing the issues discussed in the main narrative. This was touched on earlier when it was reported that the early drafts of the reports had mysteriously disappeared - that particular audit trail would have been illuminating.
I feel the need to respond to this because the "we haven't had an incident so we must be ok" attitude prevails in my part of the industry too, and it's just as wrong.
Excellent. Spot on. And MoD's own Regulations specifically say this shall not be used to justify a safety argument. Unfortunately, it became the norm long ago and is the argument routinely trotted out by Ministers and MoD.
People (not least MoD themselves) continue to confuse airworthiness, safety, fitness for purpose and serviceability. The admission by the MoD was that the Nimrod fleet (and by extension most other aircraft as the processes, procedures and regulations are the same) was/is not airworthy. Given the extraordinarily long list of actions necessary to satisfy the MoD's own requirements, I doubt very much if they are today, or will be in the near future. I acknowledge this resurrection, if it happens, will be of biblical proportions, but that is the concern of MoD and the staffs who, over the last 20 years, knowingly accepted greater and greater risk. Until....... Their position is indefensible, made worse by the onus being on MoD to demonstrate airworthiness; whereas with a single phone call anyone can demonstrate it is NOT airworthy.
This list is not just QQ's "30 recommendations" - they just touch the surface. The reports are damning enough, yet in a way benign and clearly diluted because the recommendations go nowhere near addressing the issues discussed in the main narrative. This was touched on earlier when it was reported that the early drafts of the reports had mysteriously disappeared - that particular audit trail would have been illuminating.
People (not least MoD themselves) continue to confuse airworthiness, safety, fitness for purpose and serviceability.
That is like asking "What day is it?" and getting the response "June".
Quite deliberate, and a gross insult to the families and the Coroner.
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A hazard resulting in the loss of the aircraft in the civilian world would be termed 'Catastrophic'. the required probability of such an event is 'extremely improbable', which is considered to be not more than one event per 1,000,000,000 flying hours.
You may cause some confusion with your numbers. The civil targets you discuss are to be found in EASA CS25. The target rate for hull (catastrophic) losses is no greater than 1E-7 per flying hour. The number you quote is for an individual critical system causing loss of the aircraft. EASA AMC25 explains this and makes the assumption that there are around 100 such systems onboard an aircraft. Hence the two orders of magnitude difference.
If you read JSP553, you will find the Nimrod target to be 1E-6 per flying hour. For a miltary aircaft derived from a civil airliner and used in a passenger carrying role the target should be 1E-7 per flying hour, eg VC10, Tristar.
S_H
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Nimrod over London. So?
The coroner didn't "confirm the nimrod is not airworthy", he commented in his verdict as he can using rule 43 (I believe). He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
TD. I understand your frustration
The coroner didn't "confirm the nimrod is not airworthy", he commented in his verdict as he can using rule 43 (I believe). He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
TD. I understand your frustration
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Mad Scientist
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
This survival record, which defies the designers and scientists, bears testament to the Ground and Aircrews who service and fly this remarkable ac
You only have to talk to the RN and Army to get an appreciation of what Nimrod provides for them, over land and sea
Unlike this government - this ac is fit for purpose and safe to fly
Profound apologies to all families - I was in the personal crew mode at the time of that post
Love Many, Trust a Few, Always paddle you own canoe
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
This survival record, which defies the designers and scientists, bears testament to the Ground and Aircrews who service and fly this remarkable ac
You only have to talk to the RN and Army to get an appreciation of what Nimrod provides for them, over land and sea
Unlike this government - this ac is fit for purpose and safe to fly
Profound apologies to all families - I was in the personal crew mode at the time of that post
Love Many, Trust a Few, Always paddle you own canoe
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Mad Scientist
You may cause some confusion with your numbers. The civil targets you discuss are to be found in EASA CS25. The target rate for hull (catastrophic) losses is no greater than 1E-7 per flying hour. The number you quote is for an individual critical system causing loss of the aircraft. EASA AMC25 explains this and makes the assumption that there are around 100 such systems onboard an aircraft. Hence the two orders of magnitude difference.
If you read JSP553, you will find the Nimrod target to be 1E-6 per flying hour. For a miltary aircaft derived from a civil airliner and used in a passenger carrying role the target should be 1E-7 per flying hour, eg VC10, Tristar.
S_H
You may cause some confusion with your numbers. The civil targets you discuss are to be found in EASA CS25. The target rate for hull (catastrophic) losses is no greater than 1E-7 per flying hour. The number you quote is for an individual critical system causing loss of the aircraft. EASA AMC25 explains this and makes the assumption that there are around 100 such systems onboard an aircraft. Hence the two orders of magnitude difference.
If you read JSP553, you will find the Nimrod target to be 1E-6 per flying hour. For a miltary aircaft derived from a civil airliner and used in a passenger carrying role the target should be 1E-7 per flying hour, eg VC10, Tristar.
S_H
Since we're talking about a specific catastrophic event, rather than any of the one hundred, the key is the 10e-9 rate, not the overall airframe design 10e-7.
Interesting that Nimrod uses one order of magnitude less. I assume it's the design rate i.e. equivalent to the EASA/FAR rate?
Incidentally the civil 'all-causes' expected rate is also 10e-6 (and is borne out by recent statistics) but that includes all the non-design causes, which I'd guess in military operations, even in peace, would be expected to run at a higher rate.
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Mad Scientist
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
You emphatically should not have lost half the fleet by now.
Taking a service fleet of, say, 50 aircraft (I believe it was originally 46 MR1 + 3 R1 ?) with an average flight time on the current fleet of 20,000hrs as you say, and ignoring the aircraft no longer operating (which would drag the average down a bit) you've accumulated a total of 50*20,000 = 1 million FH on the feet. Not too shabby.
Now, from the statement that the original Nimrod design catastrophic loss rate was 1 per million FH (provided by S_H) that means that on average would one have expected to lose one aircraft due to a design fault in that time. Assuming a similar rate between 'operational'/'all-causes' losses and 'design' losses as in the civil world (i.e. a factor of ten) I would also therefore have expected to lose 9 other aircraft due to 'other causes' (weather/human error/etc). Given that the one million FH total is on the generous side, perhaps 6 'all causes' accidents would be expected.
You quote 1 'design fault error' and 3 'other causes' losses. Which is statistically about right for a fleet of that size and age.
The problem is that once you know of a specific design fault you did NOT account for in your original safety assessments you have to go back and re-account for it - even if your historical loss rate is ok, what it may now tell you is that your predicted loss rate is optimistic. Which means, if you can't simply absorb the new prediction and stay 'on target' then you have to do something.
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Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.
But today was not about what the BBC are posting and saying the MOD was wrong, from our point of view it was a show of the Nimrod to the people of the UK that it is still here to do buisness and the flypast for us was more a tribute to the guys lost than anything else.
And can i say 201 done a mighty fine low pass on return , still a lovely sight coming over low then the roar as engines spool up
I understand the families concerns and do sympathise, everything on the news now is all doom and gloom about the Nimrod but surely for one day can we not have any media coverage that is negative. This was a salute to all the troops lost in the conflicts rather than the Queens birthday. Tonight im sure at the CXX birthday bash a few toasts will be raised.
But today was not about what the BBC are posting and saying the MOD was wrong, from our point of view it was a show of the Nimrod to the people of the UK that it is still here to do buisness and the flypast for us was more a tribute to the guys lost than anything else.
And can i say 201 done a mighty fine low pass on return , still a lovely sight coming over low then the roar as engines spool up
I understand the families concerns and do sympathise, everything on the news now is all doom and gloom about the Nimrod but surely for one day can we not have any media coverage that is negative. This was a salute to all the troops lost in the conflicts rather than the Queens birthday. Tonight im sure at the CXX birthday bash a few toasts will be raised.
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buoy15 & The Old Fat One
Sorry Guys but do you really think there is nothing wrong with the Nimrod ??
Bob Ainsworth said it was flying around for years with a design flaw, the Coroner said it was un airworthy and Haddon-Cave has the following remit.
In light of the board of inquiry report:
· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.
You can stick your fingers in your ears and go la la la la as much as you like but the question mark over the safety of the Nimrod isn't going away.
PS;
From the Nimrod-review.org website
23rd May 2008
CONCLUSION OF THE INQUEST INTO THE DEATHS OF THE FOURTEEN SERVICEMEN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF XV230 IN AFGHANISTAN ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2006
•
The Inquest into the loss of those on board the Nimrod XV230 before HM Deputy Assistant Coroner for Oxfordshire, Mr Andrew Walker, has now concluded after 3 weeks.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has taken a close interest in the hearing and the evidence presented. He has had counsel present throughout the proceedings, Mr Peter Ferrer. Much of the evidence has also been observed by Counsel to the Review, Mr Luke Parsons QC and Miss Caroline Pounds.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC and his team with be carefully studying the transcript of the hearing and the documents and statements in evidence, together with the narrative verdict of the Coroner.
•
It is likely that Mr Haddon-Cave QC will want to see, and further question, a number of the key witnesses who gave evidence at the Inquest.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has noted the Coroner’s Rule 43 recommendation that the Nimrod fleet be grounded, pending demonstration that airworthiness risks have been reduced to ALARP. Mr Haddon-Cave QC will be closely examining all the currently available evidence, including that relied upon by the Coroner.
•
As he has previously indicated, Mr Haddon-Cave QC will issue an interim report if he decides any matter requires urgent action.
Sorry Guys but do you really think there is nothing wrong with the Nimrod ??
Bob Ainsworth said it was flying around for years with a design flaw, the Coroner said it was un airworthy and Haddon-Cave has the following remit.
In light of the board of inquiry report:
· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;
· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;
· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;
· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.
You can stick your fingers in your ears and go la la la la as much as you like but the question mark over the safety of the Nimrod isn't going away.
PS;
From the Nimrod-review.org website
23rd May 2008
CONCLUSION OF THE INQUEST INTO THE DEATHS OF THE FOURTEEN SERVICEMEN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF XV230 IN AFGHANISTAN ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2006
•
The Inquest into the loss of those on board the Nimrod XV230 before HM Deputy Assistant Coroner for Oxfordshire, Mr Andrew Walker, has now concluded after 3 weeks.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has taken a close interest in the hearing and the evidence presented. He has had counsel present throughout the proceedings, Mr Peter Ferrer. Much of the evidence has also been observed by Counsel to the Review, Mr Luke Parsons QC and Miss Caroline Pounds.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC and his team with be carefully studying the transcript of the hearing and the documents and statements in evidence, together with the narrative verdict of the Coroner.
•
It is likely that Mr Haddon-Cave QC will want to see, and further question, a number of the key witnesses who gave evidence at the Inquest.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has noted the Coroner’s Rule 43 recommendation that the Nimrod fleet be grounded, pending demonstration that airworthiness risks have been reduced to ALARP. Mr Haddon-Cave QC will be closely examining all the currently available evidence, including that relied upon by the Coroner.
•
As he has previously indicated, Mr Haddon-Cave QC will issue an interim report if he decides any matter requires urgent action.
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On a personal note, as ex-Nimrod MR1 and MR2 aircrew, and bearing in mind the times I went flying with less than 100% faith in the aircraft
EG: Bahamas Mama - I was on a similar flight, I attended several 'we think X is the problem, it's safe to fly' briefings from (amongst others) probably THE most respected eng in the fleet - guess what? The same fault recurred at about 36000 ft over the Hebrides while my ar*e was glued temporarily to the seat.. He was talking complete bollocks, as this and subsequent events proved.
...I would not be surprised if the Nimrod weren't actually safe right now, the BOI and the coroner weren't that far apart in their reasoning for the loss of 230, and I think it highly likely that current measures have indeed made a repeat of 230 virtually impossible. BUT...
The coroner actually highlighted a systematic failure in the safety chain - the RAF itself had ignored its own regulations for airworthiness, and THAT was why 230 went in. The factors that led to 230 being lost should have been spotted decades ago... had the RAF actually done what it was supposed to have done then the problem would have been identified and a work round or fix implemented WITHOUT 230 going in.
So what else is out there, what other problem might arise from the gaps in effective safety management over the past 4 decades? Nimrod AAR had been going on for 25 years before the flaw in the operation surfaced - maybe next week one of the airframes reaches the 25000th cycling of the bomb doors and the wings fall off? The 'it's safe' merchants are short sighted, you are all arguing that 'we have fixed all known problems' whilst the REAL problem, as identified by the coroner, is that the lack of effective safety management means that we have no idea at all what problems are actually out there.
Keep it tidy:
- 230 was 's' on take off too, didn't help much, did it?
Since I first flew Nimrod in 1978, I doubt there have been more than 30 operational aircraft on the go, the number has dwindled somewhat over the years ...I'd say 30 aircraft for 'the fleet' was a generous exaggeration most years. Out of these 4 have crashed. Call me picky, but a 15% crash rate seems quite high (If you calculate it based on the number of actual aircraft eng coord declare each day the percentage gets rather more worrying. I think we've also been very lucky - I've certainly logged a few sorties I was surprised to survive over the years, I bet everyone here with Nimrod hours will say the same.
Jesus, this is even worse - 4 lost aircraft in what, let's be generous, 600,000 hours? Good job BA don't lose them that often, isn't it? I bet there are B737's out there with almost the same number of hours on as the kipper fleet!
Don't be...no, I don't want to wear the asterisk key out - the fact is that the RAF can operate anything they want in our airspace, the RAF have a get out of jail free card. It must be admitted that the chances of the Nimrod bursting into flames during the flypast and plummeting into Buck house, immolating the Royal family and causing a consititutional crisis whereby some distant cousin called 'Colin Haverthwaite' ends up as King Colin I is a little unlikely.
Look, for the hard of thinking out there - there are actually definitions of airworthiness and the like, it isn't a matter of opinion, it's a matter of meeting the standards laid down in the relevant docs. If you meet the standards in the docs then your aircraft is airworthy, if you don't, then it de facto is not airworthy. The problem is that the RAF has been saving money by not meeting the standards, figuring nothing will happen and nobody would ever know. Now it's been caught out, and to actually meet the standards laid down in its own docs will take years and lots of dosh...this happens when you put things off for 30 or so years, the costs sort of mount up. The RAF has neither (docs, dosh), so it's decided to ignore its own docs and insist everything is okay after all. This will work right up until the next big accident.
Keep it tidy: This is not a reflection on the engineers, Flems etc... the problem is above station level, nobody is now, or ever has been, pointing fingers at the line or the aircrews. The corner cutting has occurred at much higher level.
Edit to add:
Still looking good on the flypast guys - well done.
EG: Bahamas Mama - I was on a similar flight, I attended several 'we think X is the problem, it's safe to fly' briefings from (amongst others) probably THE most respected eng in the fleet - guess what? The same fault recurred at about 36000 ft over the Hebrides while my ar*e was glued temporarily to the seat.. He was talking complete bollocks, as this and subsequent events proved.
...I would not be surprised if the Nimrod weren't actually safe right now, the BOI and the coroner weren't that far apart in their reasoning for the loss of 230, and I think it highly likely that current measures have indeed made a repeat of 230 virtually impossible. BUT...
The coroner actually highlighted a systematic failure in the safety chain - the RAF itself had ignored its own regulations for airworthiness, and THAT was why 230 went in. The factors that led to 230 being lost should have been spotted decades ago... had the RAF actually done what it was supposed to have done then the problem would have been identified and a work round or fix implemented WITHOUT 230 going in.
So what else is out there, what other problem might arise from the gaps in effective safety management over the past 4 decades? Nimrod AAR had been going on for 25 years before the flaw in the operation surfaced - maybe next week one of the airframes reaches the 25000th cycling of the bomb doors and the wings fall off? The 'it's safe' merchants are short sighted, you are all arguing that 'we have fixed all known problems' whilst the REAL problem, as identified by the coroner, is that the lack of effective safety management means that we have no idea at all what problems are actually out there.
Keep it tidy:
Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.
- 230 was 's' on take off too, didn't help much, did it?
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
Since I first flew Nimrod in 1978, I doubt there have been more than 30 operational aircraft on the go, the number has dwindled somewhat over the years ...I'd say 30 aircraft for 'the fleet' was a generous exaggeration most years. Out of these 4 have crashed. Call me picky, but a 15% crash rate seems quite high (If you calculate it based on the number of actual aircraft eng coord declare each day the percentage gets rather more worrying. I think we've also been very lucky - I've certainly logged a few sorties I was surprised to survive over the years, I bet everyone here with Nimrod hours will say the same.
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
Look, for the hard of thinking out there - there are actually definitions of airworthiness and the like, it isn't a matter of opinion, it's a matter of meeting the standards laid down in the relevant docs. If you meet the standards in the docs then your aircraft is airworthy, if you don't, then it de facto is not airworthy. The problem is that the RAF has been saving money by not meeting the standards, figuring nothing will happen and nobody would ever know. Now it's been caught out, and to actually meet the standards laid down in its own docs will take years and lots of dosh...this happens when you put things off for 30 or so years, the costs sort of mount up. The RAF has neither (docs, dosh), so it's decided to ignore its own docs and insist everything is okay after all. This will work right up until the next big accident.
Keep it tidy: This is not a reflection on the engineers, Flems etc... the problem is above station level, nobody is now, or ever has been, pointing fingers at the line or the aircrews. The corner cutting has occurred at much higher level.
Edit to add:
Still looking good on the flypast guys - well done.
Last edited by davejb; 14th Jun 2008 at 20:22.
Andgo and TOFO
T
Again, I’m afraid.
In the BoI report, ACM Sir Clive Loader stated the MoD’s airworthiness regulations had not been implemented properly and, recognising that the regulations are not aircraft-specific, recommended that the wider impact of this failure be addressed. In making this statement, he was (knowingly or otherwise) re-iterating long standing and oft-made advice to very senior MoD staffs and Ministers. For example, 18-24 months previously, before XV230 crashed, Min(AF) (Adam Ingram) was told the same thing, twice, in writing. He denied it, in writing. In 2000 the DPA 3 Star was told the same, in writing. He didn’t respond. His boss and numerous 2 Stars before that – they ignored it but did place in writing their ruling that refusing an instruction to ignore the airworthiness regulations was a disciplinary offence. (The direct results of their in-action can be read in the BoI reports). And so on, back to (in my personal experience) 1990.
In December 2007 Des Browne agreed with ACM Loader. (I concede he probably didn’t know he was contradicting a long line of his junior staffs, in the process making them look even more foolish. If he did know, I applaud him).
Last month, the Coroner heard numerous witnesses, who detailed specific failures (but by no means all of them). This added detail to the simple statement by ACM Loader, thus establishing more firmly (i.e. confirming) Browne’s admission that the regulations had not been implemented.
Given the above, I find any assertion that the aircraft is airworthy bizarre. Is there any evidence that the acknowledged failures to implement the regulations have been corrected? KeepitTidy made an illuminating and honest comment;
Am I correct that there is a certain nervousness now that it has become known that maintainers have NOT been working to up to date or maintained standards – denied to them because the airworthiness regulations have not been implemented? Or have not been able to complete repairs because they lack proper tools and test equipment? Basics.
T
he coroner didn't "confirm the nimrod is not airworthy", he commented in his verdict as he can using rule 43 (I believe). He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.
Again, I’m afraid.
In the BoI report, ACM Sir Clive Loader stated the MoD’s airworthiness regulations had not been implemented properly and, recognising that the regulations are not aircraft-specific, recommended that the wider impact of this failure be addressed. In making this statement, he was (knowingly or otherwise) re-iterating long standing and oft-made advice to very senior MoD staffs and Ministers. For example, 18-24 months previously, before XV230 crashed, Min(AF) (Adam Ingram) was told the same thing, twice, in writing. He denied it, in writing. In 2000 the DPA 3 Star was told the same, in writing. He didn’t respond. His boss and numerous 2 Stars before that – they ignored it but did place in writing their ruling that refusing an instruction to ignore the airworthiness regulations was a disciplinary offence. (The direct results of their in-action can be read in the BoI reports). And so on, back to (in my personal experience) 1990.
In December 2007 Des Browne agreed with ACM Loader. (I concede he probably didn’t know he was contradicting a long line of his junior staffs, in the process making them look even more foolish. If he did know, I applaud him).
Last month, the Coroner heard numerous witnesses, who detailed specific failures (but by no means all of them). This added detail to the simple statement by ACM Loader, thus establishing more firmly (i.e. confirming) Browne’s admission that the regulations had not been implemented.
Given the above, I find any assertion that the aircraft is airworthy bizarre. Is there any evidence that the acknowledged failures to implement the regulations have been corrected? KeepitTidy made an illuminating and honest comment;
Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.
A certain nervousness
Tuc you are indeed correct about a certain nervousness - as you will know there are many across the trades and amongst the crews who feel it and its hardly surprising is it
what standards we have to work to.
IMHO the maintainers are working to the inspections laid down, they would not be looking for design faults. I am sure that they are following the requirements most carefully as they have always done; when the aircraft is signed off it means that they are complying with the regulations in place. If test equipment was required for a check, I cannot conceive that an engineer would sign for compliance if the test gear was not available. It would probably require a red line entry by an eng. officer to clear it. It's a long time since I certified military aircraft as serviceable to fly but I do not think that the principles have changed that much.
IMHO the maintainers are working to the inspections laid down, they would not be looking for design faults. I am sure that they are following the requirements most carefully as they have always done; when the aircraft is signed off it means that they are complying with the regulations in place. If test equipment was required for a check, I cannot conceive that an engineer would sign for compliance if the test gear was not available. It would probably require a red line entry by an eng. officer to clear it. It's a long time since I certified military aircraft as serviceable to fly but I do not think that the principles have changed that much.