Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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A laughable performance from Ainsworth. I have been in contact with the Coroner's office this afternoon to confirm what Hickman actually said. I am also in the process of contacting BAe and QQ to confirm that they agree with Ainsworth that Nimrod is airworthy IAW MoD regs and ALARP.
Ainsworth said he predicted the Inquest verdict the day before. That verdict confirmed that Nimrod was not airworthy and would remain not airworthy until the QQ recs were implemented by the end of the year. If Ainsworth predicted this verdict how on earth can he say that these recs no longer need to be implemented. His statement is a total contradiction and fools nobody. He refuses to deal with airworthiness issues and talks instead about safety. I believe he may have shot himself in the foot. His statement will be challenged by our own experts, meanwhile we will see what QQ and BAe have to say on the subject. There is no immunity from corporate manslaughter legislation for either.
"We do not need to implement all the recommendations of the Qinetiq Fuel Safety report for the aircraft to be ALARP. The recommendations relate to process and procedural issues which do not impact on the immediate risk of flying the aircraft. But their implementation will ensure that the aircraft remains ALARP throughout the remainder of its life."
The MoD claimed last night that Group Captain Hickman had been “misrepresented”. They said he told the inquest the target was to get the “majority” of the measures completed by the end of the year – not all of them.
Ainsworth said he predicted the Inquest verdict the day before. That verdict confirmed that Nimrod was not airworthy and would remain not airworthy until the QQ recs were implemented by the end of the year. If Ainsworth predicted this verdict how on earth can he say that these recs no longer need to be implemented. His statement is a total contradiction and fools nobody. He refuses to deal with airworthiness issues and talks instead about safety. I believe he may have shot himself in the foot. His statement will be challenged by our own experts, meanwhile we will see what QQ and BAe have to say on the subject. There is no immunity from corporate manslaughter legislation for either.
"We do not need to implement all the recommendations of the Qinetiq Fuel Safety report for the aircraft to be ALARP. The recommendations relate to process and procedural issues which do not impact on the immediate risk of flying the aircraft. But their implementation will ensure that the aircraft remains ALARP throughout the remainder of its life."
The MoD claimed last night that Group Captain Hickman had been “misrepresented”. They said he told the inquest the target was to get the “majority” of the measures completed by the end of the year – not all of them.
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DF
As I understand it, the older corporate manslaughter legislation needed proof that the top man/men/women had been party to the decision - does not Def Sec and his lap dogs' apparent incompetence support such an argument?
Although, I can see that these people were not directly involved in the airworthiness decision chain, as far as I am aware. Nonetheless, it would be safe to assume that the Def Sec knew of the value of the Nimrod to the UK Forces as well as its operation in a new high-threat theatre/role (since 2002). Therefore, any reasonable person acting as Def Sec would want to ensure the ac's continued safe operation in theatre and its overall airworthiness by asking the MoD to conduct a updated threat analysis/hazard log - not just regarding fuel leaks. Furthermore, this concern should have been applied to all our aircraft in theatre.
Was any such order issued to the IPTLs? I doubt it.
Whether this means the Def Sec is liable for manslaughter pre 2007 is a question only the legal people can really answer, I suspect. However, the new legislation certainly makes his position a load more vulnerable should we lose another aircraft, God Forbid!
flipster
As I understand it, the older corporate manslaughter legislation needed proof that the top man/men/women had been party to the decision - does not Def Sec and his lap dogs' apparent incompetence support such an argument?
Although, I can see that these people were not directly involved in the airworthiness decision chain, as far as I am aware. Nonetheless, it would be safe to assume that the Def Sec knew of the value of the Nimrod to the UK Forces as well as its operation in a new high-threat theatre/role (since 2002). Therefore, any reasonable person acting as Def Sec would want to ensure the ac's continued safe operation in theatre and its overall airworthiness by asking the MoD to conduct a updated threat analysis/hazard log - not just regarding fuel leaks. Furthermore, this concern should have been applied to all our aircraft in theatre.
Was any such order issued to the IPTLs? I doubt it.
Whether this means the Def Sec is liable for manslaughter pre 2007 is a question only the legal people can really answer, I suspect. However, the new legislation certainly makes his position a load more vulnerable should we lose another aircraft, God Forbid!
flipster
Last edited by flipster; 3rd Jul 2008 at 00:54.
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b. Do we have a 'we're at war, poke off' get-out clause?
c. Does this new Act apply to 'legacy' aircraft built before 2007?
The issue is such that we all received a specific top down briefing. As far as I can gather, if a problem is highlighted but the on scene commander choses to ignore it then he/she could be culpable. If a higher commander made the decision so the level of poo whole rise.
There is however an exemption in the operational theatre and, more significantly, in training for operations. That last little bit provides wriggle room and a steady source of income for the legal eagles.
Clearly a problem that occurs say on the air show circuit is not operational training. An exercise with the Army prior to one or the other working up to deploying on operations would be exempt. However what if there was an accident after the exercise serial had terminated and the crew was doing routine training circuits at an airfield? Would routine training not immediately working up to deployment be liable but similar training immediately before deployment be exempt?
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wader
Thanks for that interesting insight. I would be keen to see the exact wording of the 'exemption' you talk about - anyone know where it can viewed? In any case, it may be arguable that any risk or threat that has been identified prior to the commencment of ops is not, per se, exempt and must be mitigated against.
In my view, we have so few assets (people and platforms) these days that it is almost culpably negligent not do provide our Forces with the best available defences - becasue to lose only a very small number of our assets impinges quickly and significantly on our operational output - that's before you consider the legal, or even the moral arguments!
Flight Safety and Airworthiness are even more important in war than in peace?
Thanks for that interesting insight. I would be keen to see the exact wording of the 'exemption' you talk about - anyone know where it can viewed? In any case, it may be arguable that any risk or threat that has been identified prior to the commencment of ops is not, per se, exempt and must be mitigated against.
In my view, we have so few assets (people and platforms) these days that it is almost culpably negligent not do provide our Forces with the best available defences - becasue to lose only a very small number of our assets impinges quickly and significantly on our operational output - that's before you consider the legal, or even the moral arguments!
Flight Safety and Airworthiness are even more important in war than in peace?
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Two days ago Ainsworth claimed Nimrod was safe to fly, ALARP and therefore airworthy. MoD also claimed that Gp Capt Hickman had been misrepresented.
I now have the full transcript of Hickman's evidence, here is part of his evidence concerning aspects of ALARP and work still outstanding. Needless to say it presents a completely different picture to the one provided in Westminster Hall. Apologies for the length of this post, and the usual cautions apply, it is the official transcript but there might still be errors due to the quality of recording.
THE CORONER: So, to put it another way, the aircraft flying today and other days is not ALARP airworthy?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree. It is airworthy, it ‑‑
THE CORONER: No, ALARP airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...
THE CORONER: It is semantics.
MR RAWLINSON: My reading of 553 is the definition of airworthiness is in compliance with ALARP, which is either it being tolerable and ALARP, so that is the definition, unless I misunderstand it.
THE CORONER: Yes, but my point is that if one were to use the test for ALARP the aircraft is not airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.
THE CORONER: Yes. In other words if ALARP is the standard it is not airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not believe it to be the standard.
THE CORONER: Yes, but the answer is, it is not airworthy if ALARP is the standard. I do not know why it is so difficult to answer that question, it is simply dancing around the answer that you have already given.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think it ‑‑ well, for me it doesn’t answer ‑‑ it isn’t a question we should be asking.
THE CORONER: Your question is that the aircraft is airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: If it is tolerable?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: If it is tolerably safe then the aircraft is fit to fly, yes.
THE CORONER: Do you know whether that applies to civil aircraft, tolerably safe?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I don’t think they apply the same characteristics that we do for assessment.
MR RAWLINSON: Now, can I ask what timeframe you think is reasonable in the circumstances from the date that XV230 went down to the date when ALARP is achieved?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.
THE CORONER: When do you expect to?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.
MR RAWLINSON: So that would be about three and a quarter years post XV230 going down.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: So your target is in fact ALARP airworthiness?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I say, I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: What are you working towards then? I do not understand it.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I am working towards the position where I am tolerably safe and ALARP, I do not believe we can ‑‑ we are probably unlikely to get the position beyond tolerably safe, that is certainly the advice from QinetiQ, but we can reach the stage of tolerably safe and ALARP and that is ‑‑ that will be a perfectly acceptable position to be in.
THE CORONER: They are two different standards?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, effectively there is the ‑‑
THE CORONER: As low as reasonably practicable and tolerable are two different standards, or do they mean the same thing?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, they do not mean the same thing. No, the ‑‑
THE CORONER: So what do you understand ALARP to mean?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The tolerably safe means that is the combination of ‑‑ that is effectively the risk that we are undertaking, so that is the risk to the aircraft.
THE CORONER: So your goal then is to get your aircraft to the state where it is ALARP airworthy?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My ‑‑
THE CORONER: (overspeaking), is it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My goal is to ‑‑ we are already tolerably safe, my goal at the moment is to reduce that risk to as low as reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: Which is the term you do not recognise.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do recognise it. I do recognise the ALARP principle and it is the one that we have adopted, we are heading towards the tolerably safe and ALARP position.
MR RAWLINSON: Can you explain why it is that Air Commodore Baber had no difficulty with equating airworthiness to achieving ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.
I now have the full transcript of Hickman's evidence, here is part of his evidence concerning aspects of ALARP and work still outstanding. Needless to say it presents a completely different picture to the one provided in Westminster Hall. Apologies for the length of this post, and the usual cautions apply, it is the official transcript but there might still be errors due to the quality of recording.
THE CORONER: So, to put it another way, the aircraft flying today and other days is not ALARP airworthy?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree. It is airworthy, it ‑‑
THE CORONER: No, ALARP airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...
THE CORONER: It is semantics.
MR RAWLINSON: My reading of 553 is the definition of airworthiness is in compliance with ALARP, which is either it being tolerable and ALARP, so that is the definition, unless I misunderstand it.
THE CORONER: Yes, but my point is that if one were to use the test for ALARP the aircraft is not airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.
THE CORONER: Yes. In other words if ALARP is the standard it is not airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not believe it to be the standard.
THE CORONER: Yes, but the answer is, it is not airworthy if ALARP is the standard. I do not know why it is so difficult to answer that question, it is simply dancing around the answer that you have already given.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think it ‑‑ well, for me it doesn’t answer ‑‑ it isn’t a question we should be asking.
THE CORONER: Your question is that the aircraft is airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: If it is tolerable?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: If it is tolerably safe then the aircraft is fit to fly, yes.
THE CORONER: Do you know whether that applies to civil aircraft, tolerably safe?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I don’t think they apply the same characteristics that we do for assessment.
MR RAWLINSON: Now, can I ask what timeframe you think is reasonable in the circumstances from the date that XV230 went down to the date when ALARP is achieved?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.
THE CORONER: When do you expect to?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.
MR RAWLINSON: So that would be about three and a quarter years post XV230 going down.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: So your target is in fact ALARP airworthiness?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I say, I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: What are you working towards then? I do not understand it.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I am working towards the position where I am tolerably safe and ALARP, I do not believe we can ‑‑ we are probably unlikely to get the position beyond tolerably safe, that is certainly the advice from QinetiQ, but we can reach the stage of tolerably safe and ALARP and that is ‑‑ that will be a perfectly acceptable position to be in.
THE CORONER: They are two different standards?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, effectively there is the ‑‑
THE CORONER: As low as reasonably practicable and tolerable are two different standards, or do they mean the same thing?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, they do not mean the same thing. No, the ‑‑
THE CORONER: So what do you understand ALARP to mean?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The tolerably safe means that is the combination of ‑‑ that is effectively the risk that we are undertaking, so that is the risk to the aircraft.
THE CORONER: So your goal then is to get your aircraft to the state where it is ALARP airworthy?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My ‑‑
THE CORONER: (overspeaking), is it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My goal is to ‑‑ we are already tolerably safe, my goal at the moment is to reduce that risk to as low as reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: Which is the term you do not recognise.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do recognise it. I do recognise the ALARP principle and it is the one that we have adopted, we are heading towards the tolerably safe and ALARP position.
MR RAWLINSON: Can you explain why it is that Air Commodore Baber had no difficulty with equating airworthiness to achieving ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.
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And this is what Bob said in the Westminster Hall debate;
Another term that causes confusion—and I understand why—is ALARP or “as low as reasonably practicable”. I used to think—and one’s intuition makes one think this—that ALARP is a level of safety below perfection, but it is not. It is part of a process derived from the HSE policy guidance. We make ALARP judgments on an ongoing basis to ensure that we continually drive down the level of risk to equipment. The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
Does anyone have a clue what is going on in the upper echelons of the RAF, MoD and Nimrod IPT? Because I haven't, apart from an awful lot of spinning.
Another term that causes confusion—and I understand why—is ALARP or “as low as reasonably practicable”. I used to think—and one’s intuition makes one think this—that ALARP is a level of safety below perfection, but it is not. It is part of a process derived from the HSE policy guidance. We make ALARP judgments on an ongoing basis to ensure that we continually drive down the level of risk to equipment. The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
Does anyone have a clue what is going on in the upper echelons of the RAF, MoD and Nimrod IPT? Because I haven't, apart from an awful lot of spinning.
Last edited by nigegilb; 3rd Jul 2008 at 15:17.
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Nigegilb
Strange that isn't it the Head of the Nimrod IPTL and for the airworthiness fo the Nimrod saying it would not be ALARP untril the end of the year.
Then less than 6 weeks later Bob Ainsworth claims the Nimrod was safe to fly, ALARP and therefor airworthy.
MoD also claimed that Gp Capt Hickman had been misrepresented.
I don't think so Mr Ainsworth not at all !!!!
Transcript from Inquest
MR RAWLINSON: So can we pause there for a moment. That for a risk, in fact, you have to demonstrate in order for ALARP -- forgive me, I will rephrase that: in order for a risk in the middle level to be acceptable you must prove that it is ALARP?
AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, we have to be satisfied it is as low as reasonably practicable.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes. And just touching base to our definitions, if it is not ALARP it is not in compliance with duties placed upon you by 553?
AIR CDRE BABER: Correct.
MR RAWLINSON: Can I put it this way, as cordially as I may, that the buck stopped with you when it came to ensuring the airworthiness of the aircraft type.
AIR CDRE BABER: I’m responsible for the airworthiness of the type.
MR RAWLINSON: Did anything equivalent to annexe C exist at the time that you were in post?
AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, but not in this format. For example, paragraph 4, I put it in my current capacity based on work I’ve done with the Australian Air Force. So portions of this existed but large portions did not. What I have been seeking to do in my current role, which is I am the Airworthiness Regulator, is to try and make clear the IPT leader’s responsibilities in a clearer way.
Note AIR CDRE BABER:IPT leader from 2002-2004 and Airworthiness Regulator
Strange that isn't it the Head of the Nimrod IPTL and for the airworthiness fo the Nimrod saying it would not be ALARP untril the end of the year.
Then less than 6 weeks later Bob Ainsworth claims the Nimrod was safe to fly, ALARP and therefor airworthy.
MoD also claimed that Gp Capt Hickman had been misrepresented.
I don't think so Mr Ainsworth not at all !!!!
Transcript from Inquest
MR RAWLINSON: So can we pause there for a moment. That for a risk, in fact, you have to demonstrate in order for ALARP -- forgive me, I will rephrase that: in order for a risk in the middle level to be acceptable you must prove that it is ALARP?
AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, we have to be satisfied it is as low as reasonably practicable.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes. And just touching base to our definitions, if it is not ALARP it is not in compliance with duties placed upon you by 553?
AIR CDRE BABER: Correct.
MR RAWLINSON: Can I put it this way, as cordially as I may, that the buck stopped with you when it came to ensuring the airworthiness of the aircraft type.
AIR CDRE BABER: I’m responsible for the airworthiness of the type.
MR RAWLINSON: Did anything equivalent to annexe C exist at the time that you were in post?
AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, but not in this format. For example, paragraph 4, I put it in my current capacity based on work I’ve done with the Australian Air Force. So portions of this existed but large portions did not. What I have been seeking to do in my current role, which is I am the Airworthiness Regulator, is to try and make clear the IPT leader’s responsibilities in a clearer way.
Note AIR CDRE BABER:IPT leader from 2002-2004 and Airworthiness Regulator
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Nigegilb;
Thank you for the Hickman transcript. As I have said before he was the first person to mention the non-standard term "tolerably safe". He rejects the the coroner's "ALARP Airworthy" statement because it is not defined anywhere, but insists on using his none defined term.
I know I keep bring up the "tolerably safe" topic, but I do so because I believe it to be political spin introduced into the QQ report by IPT. It is my understanding the the draft copy of the report did not contain such a statement, because QQ know that it has no real meaning. They were encouraged to introduce the term after the "for comments" review by others, outside the organisation.
If anyone has proof that the draft contained this statement, please PM me.
DV
Thank you for the Hickman transcript. As I have said before he was the first person to mention the non-standard term "tolerably safe". He rejects the the coroner's "ALARP Airworthy" statement because it is not defined anywhere, but insists on using his none defined term.
I know I keep bring up the "tolerably safe" topic, but I do so because I believe it to be political spin introduced into the QQ report by IPT. It is my understanding the the draft copy of the report did not contain such a statement, because QQ know that it has no real meaning. They were encouraged to introduce the term after the "for comments" review by others, outside the organisation.
If anyone has proof that the draft contained this statement, please PM me.
DV
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May 2008 – Gp Capt Hickman, Head of IPT (giving evidence on oath to the Coroner)
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.
July 2008 – Bob Ainsworth (speaking in the House of Commons)
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
------------------------------------------------------------
Something wrong Mr Ainsworth? You forgot to sit down with your co-defendants and get you story straight!
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.
July 2008 – Bob Ainsworth (speaking in the House of Commons)
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
------------------------------------------------------------
Something wrong Mr Ainsworth? You forgot to sit down with your co-defendants and get you story straight!
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Surely this difference simply comes down to whether the aircraft (and it doesn't have to be a Nimrod, or even military) is right now ALARP, or will be in the future.
If the aircraft is not yet ALARP, the issue then surely becomes whether that state is being approached "As Soon As Reasonably Practical". If it is then at any given instant in time the aircraft is ALARP given where it started from.
Almost even civilian aircraft out there with an AD against it does not meet the absolute standards for "safety" - but as long as you are proceeding towards that state in a timely fashion you are considered airworthy.
Therefore I don't see an inherent contradiction between "we have not yet reached the final goal for ALARP" and "we are ALARP at this instant" if you are in the middle of some kind of refit exercise. If you started applying the requirement for the final ALARP condition at the instant any issue was discovered, it would be practically impossible to keep aircraft in an airworthy state.
If the aircraft is not yet ALARP, the issue then surely becomes whether that state is being approached "As Soon As Reasonably Practical". If it is then at any given instant in time the aircraft is ALARP given where it started from.
Almost even civilian aircraft out there with an AD against it does not meet the absolute standards for "safety" - but as long as you are proceeding towards that state in a timely fashion you are considered airworthy.
Therefore I don't see an inherent contradiction between "we have not yet reached the final goal for ALARP" and "we are ALARP at this instant" if you are in the middle of some kind of refit exercise. If you started applying the requirement for the final ALARP condition at the instant any issue was discovered, it would be practically impossible to keep aircraft in an airworthy state.
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How many years do you want? 5, 10, until MRA4 comes in, will it ever get there, is all this just a ruse to pass the baton to MRA4 but continue to fly a non-airworthy aircraft? As has been stated it is very simple to work out how long it will take to reach ALARP merely a question of man hours. This has slipped from end of the year to an expected date of June 09. You are a clever chap scientist give me your best definition of "expected"? Now do you expect Nimrod to be ALARP next June? I don't. Now we hear from Ainsworth, that Nimrod was ALARP all along, IPTL was wrong. MoD just used up its last bit of credibility.
Hickman's evidence clashes with his predecessor, any sympathy for Hickman is removed because he is failing to recognise 553.
Fine old mess?
"For goodness sake, the BoI report was, if I recall, first circulated 13??? months ago. Am I right in saying it was reviewed again and delayed? Even if the IPT completely ignored it or were frozen out of this process (very unlikely) they would have known the criticism in Oct last year. But, 28 months ago they got the QQ report on fuel leaks, which is a catalogue of airworthiness failures. Very clearly indeed, they knew of the problems but did nothing."
Edited as per post below, ta. Point is the brackets are there, they were fitted for a reason, but the fire extinguishant is not there. Furthermore, dry bay protection was spec'd in 1981/2. Why wasn't it fitted?
Hickman's evidence clashes with his predecessor, any sympathy for Hickman is removed because he is failing to recognise 553.
Fine old mess?
"For goodness sake, the BoI report was, if I recall, first circulated 13??? months ago. Am I right in saying it was reviewed again and delayed? Even if the IPT completely ignored it or were frozen out of this process (very unlikely) they would have known the criticism in Oct last year. But, 28 months ago they got the QQ report on fuel leaks, which is a catalogue of airworthiness failures. Very clearly indeed, they knew of the problems but did nothing."
Edited as per post below, ta. Point is the brackets are there, they were fitted for a reason, but the fire extinguishant is not there. Furthermore, dry bay protection was spec'd in 1981/2. Why wasn't it fitted?
Last edited by nigegilb; 3rd Jul 2008 at 22:24.
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nigegilb, the brackets you refer to in the bomb-bay are most likely the brackets for fitting the supplementary fire suppressant system designed for use with the bomb-bay range extension fuel tanks, which, incidentally, have never ever been fitted at Kinloss. They are a myth, listed in old A.P.'s and training notes but never seen or used.
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It's now just over 36 hours since I asked the question of Ed100, Spanners, MightyHunter AGE, Madmark and others.............
What sort of equipment is used at Kinloss to detect and locate fuel leaks?
MightyHunter AGE - I should have felt that as an AGE, you would have known the answer off the top of your head! So what is it please?
What sort of equipment is used at Kinloss to detect and locate fuel leaks?
MightyHunter AGE - I should have felt that as an AGE, you would have known the answer off the top of your head! So what is it please?
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XV230 exploded on the 2nd Sept 2006 because it was not airworthy therefore not ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.
THE CORONER: When do you expect to?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.
So if it is ALARP at the end of the year the RAF/MOD will have taken 2 yrs and 3 months since XV230.
ALARP is a level of risk, therefore for 2 yrs and 3 months this aircraft has and continues to fly with risks to the lives of the aircrew higher than it should be by the RAF'S own standards.
Depending on who you believe, Mr Hickman or Mr Ainsworth or neither.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.
THE CORONER: When do you expect to?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.
So if it is ALARP at the end of the year the RAF/MOD will have taken 2 yrs and 3 months since XV230.
ALARP is a level of risk, therefore for 2 yrs and 3 months this aircraft has and continues to fly with risks to the lives of the aircrew higher than it should be by the RAF'S own standards.
Depending on who you believe, Mr Hickman or Mr Ainsworth or neither.
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ALARP and Elbow
THE CORONER: But what about fuel leaking say from the vent system on to the electrical components?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, well, as I have said, a leak tolerant design, there is I agree, there is a risk of fuel leaking on to electrical components, and we have examined that. The mitigation steps for that are a 30 day inspection of all the electrical components to look for signs of the arcing that might lead to that sort of ignition. But the advice from QinetiQ on the electrical hazard is that and I think it is in the combustion study report that the likelihood of electrical arcing at altitude is makes the likelihood of electrical ignition unlikely. So we have advice, I have advice from QinetiQ, which tells me that once the aircraft is airborne electrical sparking is very unlikely because of the altitudes that we fly at, and so that adds additional mitigation for that sort of electrical ignition.
THE CORONER: Yes, but you see, the aircraft has to get up there and come down, does it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, I accept that, yes.
THE CORONER: But there is a risk in those two processes.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: So when we add together all the little bits of evidence that we have heard you are still satisfied, are you, that there is no cause for concern for the members of the families that the aircraft is flying to an altitude where fuel is less likely to be ignited by an arc?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. It is not just me saying it, I have had an independent fuel safety system review conducted by QinetiQ, that was a very extensive piece of work, it took them six months to conduct that and they re did everything, they re did the zonal hazard analysis, they tell me that the aircraft is tolerably safe to fly and that is why I am reassured.
THE CORONER: Tolerably safe to fly is an expression we have not heard about yet.
MR RAWLINSON: Tolerably safe, I understand it is an engineering term, but being as neutral as I may, tolerably safe does not amount to being safe so as to be risk removed or reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: ALARP, as low as reasonably practicable, is the test for airworthiness, is it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. I will clarify. The aircraft is, and the QinetiQ report says this, the QinetiQ report says the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP, and I would agree.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes, I accept that. But are we to go through JSP553 to reassure ourselves that the test for airworthiness is to achieve ALARP?
THE CORONER: Well, this witness has said that is not the test. It was set as a test that was given in evidence by the Defence Secretary before Parliament.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Can I refer you to (inaudible), if I refer you to DEF STAN 00 56?
MR RAWLINSON: Before we get to that can we go to JSP553 please. Were you in court when I cross examined Air Commodore Baber?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear me go through at some perhaps tedious length those regulations which applied to his office as IPTL?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear him agree with me the propositions that insofar as he was concerned the application was to reduce risk to the lowest level reasonably practicable?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Now, with that in mind, I wonder whether Mr Webb could provide you with volume 9.
THE CORONER: Before we go there, just to get this point, you are accepting in this court that this aircraft flying today is not ALARP but tolerably safe?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable, we have not taken them yet.
THE CORONER: Yes, I just wanted to clear that up. What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.
THE CORONER: I want to be clear, absolutely clear about where we are, before Mr Rawlinson goes on with his questions.
MR RAWLINSON: Do I really need to take you to paragraph 1.39, the requirements of the HSWA, the Health and Safety at Work Act, is to reduce risks so far as reasonably practicable.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I understand the regulations, yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Well, with your understanding of the regulations, can you please agree that in order to be airworthy the aircraft must be ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. What you are suggesting is the aircraft must be at the ALARP stage to fly and I am saying no, we have to demonstrate a route to ALARP, but we do not need to be ALARP to fly.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, I did not say that, what I said was to be airworthy, as defined in JSP553, it must be ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree.
MR RAWLINSON: Could you bear with me one moment, sir; I just want to dig out my notes. I will do it very briefly. First of all, let us have a look at 1.15:
“The Secretary of State requires that the airworthiness arrangements for military aircraft should be at least as effective as those for civil aircraft contained in the ANO, Air Navigation Order, and should comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act where relevant. This is particularly important in roles that are paralleled in civil operations, such as where passengers are carried.”
Now, can we accept that 1.15 brings into play the Health and Safety at Work Act?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes. Now, having drawn that into play, we will then go back to 1.39, having brought the HSWA into play, the requirements of the HSWA is to reduce risks so far as to be practicable. This is implemented by the adoption of the ALARP principle, which states that safety should be improved beyond the safety target baseline criteria when reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: Did you know about that section?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Well, what is the room for doubt? Please explain how it is that the HSWA incorporates to reduce risk if reasonably practicable, when that necessarily incorporates ALARP, or is it to be suggested that the IPT leader does not truly understand the nature of the duties imposed upon him?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am trying to explain is that you are in managing a risk you are allowed time to ALARP it, it does not have to be instantaneous, you are allowed to introduce measures to ALARP a risk.
THE CORONER: Where does it say that?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: DEF STAN 00 56, which is our safety management system.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, DEF STAN 00 56, is that not the matter between you and British Aerospace?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: It is the defence standard for safety management systems.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, is it not the defence standard that deals with the relationship between you and British Aerospace? I was corrected when I cross examined, I think it was Air Commodore Baber, on the DEF STAN, and he made it clear to me that the purpose of the DEF STAN is to set up a duty of practice. That is right, is it not, or do you misunderstand the nature of the DEF STAN, which one was it?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My understanding is it is a defence standard, it is a standard to which we must comply for defence, so similar to 970, (inaudible) design, it is the standard that we must comply with, and in there are duties for the contractor, yes, but also for the duty holder, which is me.
MR RAWLINSON: I am looking at page 381, the preface to the DEF STAN, section a:
“This Part of the Defence Standard provides requirements for the management of safety. It can be applied to any MOD project and can be applied in any phase of a project’s life. This Standard shall be used by Defence Contractors as required by contract. The effective application of this Standard requires close cooperation between all parties, as the responsibility for the achievement of safety is shared.”
That being said, what part of DEF STAN does apply to you rather than BAE?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think the most helpful paragraph, if I can just refer to my notes, I can probably ...
THE CORONER: To put it simply, as long as you are doing something about the risk it is safe to fly, is it?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The paragraph is 10.7.1, Risk Reduction, page 11 on mine.
MR RAWLINSON: Tell me what it says; we will go through it together:
“Unless otherwise specified, the Contractor shall establish Tolerability Criteria based on relevant legislation, standards and MOD policy, in agreement with the Duty Holder. These shall form the basis for making an assessment as to whether a risk is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.”
We have been through this path before in this inquest, you can be tolerable, but if you are tolerable you have to be ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: So is that an acceptance?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: If I could just read, it says:
“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”
MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors? It is your aircraft; it is your aircraft you are trying to persuade us is now airworthy. We have not got to tolerability and ALARP because the report told you we are not at ALARP, and if we want to really bandy around 00 56 together, we have the definition of what is safe in annex A, risk has been safety, because risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is tolerably acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.
THE CORONER: You would say there is a difference between tolerable and ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I would say that
THE CORONER: So “and” does not mean tolerable and ALARP, it separates the two?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The position we are in is we are tolerable but we are not yet ALARP, and I would argue that I am able to introduce mitigation strategies to get there, before I get there.
THE CORONER: To put it as I did before you were reading, so you did not have a chance to answer, it is safe flying as long as you are doing something about the risk?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: And that pertains if all you have done about the risk is to have some off line conversations with BAE?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I think I’ve we’ve got comprehensive mitigation strategies in place and but we cannot argue, and my line is we cannot argue that we are ALARP; I could not argue we were ALARP yet.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, well, as I have said, a leak tolerant design, there is I agree, there is a risk of fuel leaking on to electrical components, and we have examined that. The mitigation steps for that are a 30 day inspection of all the electrical components to look for signs of the arcing that might lead to that sort of ignition. But the advice from QinetiQ on the electrical hazard is that and I think it is in the combustion study report that the likelihood of electrical arcing at altitude is makes the likelihood of electrical ignition unlikely. So we have advice, I have advice from QinetiQ, which tells me that once the aircraft is airborne electrical sparking is very unlikely because of the altitudes that we fly at, and so that adds additional mitigation for that sort of electrical ignition.
THE CORONER: Yes, but you see, the aircraft has to get up there and come down, does it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, I accept that, yes.
THE CORONER: But there is a risk in those two processes.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: So when we add together all the little bits of evidence that we have heard you are still satisfied, are you, that there is no cause for concern for the members of the families that the aircraft is flying to an altitude where fuel is less likely to be ignited by an arc?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. It is not just me saying it, I have had an independent fuel safety system review conducted by QinetiQ, that was a very extensive piece of work, it took them six months to conduct that and they re did everything, they re did the zonal hazard analysis, they tell me that the aircraft is tolerably safe to fly and that is why I am reassured.
THE CORONER: Tolerably safe to fly is an expression we have not heard about yet.
MR RAWLINSON: Tolerably safe, I understand it is an engineering term, but being as neutral as I may, tolerably safe does not amount to being safe so as to be risk removed or reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: ALARP, as low as reasonably practicable, is the test for airworthiness, is it not?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. I will clarify. The aircraft is, and the QinetiQ report says this, the QinetiQ report says the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP, and I would agree.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes, I accept that. But are we to go through JSP553 to reassure ourselves that the test for airworthiness is to achieve ALARP?
THE CORONER: Well, this witness has said that is not the test. It was set as a test that was given in evidence by the Defence Secretary before Parliament.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Can I refer you to (inaudible), if I refer you to DEF STAN 00 56?
MR RAWLINSON: Before we get to that can we go to JSP553 please. Were you in court when I cross examined Air Commodore Baber?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear me go through at some perhaps tedious length those regulations which applied to his office as IPTL?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear him agree with me the propositions that insofar as he was concerned the application was to reduce risk to the lowest level reasonably practicable?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Now, with that in mind, I wonder whether Mr Webb could provide you with volume 9.
THE CORONER: Before we go there, just to get this point, you are accepting in this court that this aircraft flying today is not ALARP but tolerably safe?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable, we have not taken them yet.
THE CORONER: Yes, I just wanted to clear that up. What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.
THE CORONER: I want to be clear, absolutely clear about where we are, before Mr Rawlinson goes on with his questions.
MR RAWLINSON: Do I really need to take you to paragraph 1.39, the requirements of the HSWA, the Health and Safety at Work Act, is to reduce risks so far as reasonably practicable.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I understand the regulations, yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Well, with your understanding of the regulations, can you please agree that in order to be airworthy the aircraft must be ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. What you are suggesting is the aircraft must be at the ALARP stage to fly and I am saying no, we have to demonstrate a route to ALARP, but we do not need to be ALARP to fly.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, I did not say that, what I said was to be airworthy, as defined in JSP553, it must be ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree.
MR RAWLINSON: Could you bear with me one moment, sir; I just want to dig out my notes. I will do it very briefly. First of all, let us have a look at 1.15:
“The Secretary of State requires that the airworthiness arrangements for military aircraft should be at least as effective as those for civil aircraft contained in the ANO, Air Navigation Order, and should comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act where relevant. This is particularly important in roles that are paralleled in civil operations, such as where passengers are carried.”
Now, can we accept that 1.15 brings into play the Health and Safety at Work Act?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes. Now, having drawn that into play, we will then go back to 1.39, having brought the HSWA into play, the requirements of the HSWA is to reduce risks so far as to be practicable. This is implemented by the adoption of the ALARP principle, which states that safety should be improved beyond the safety target baseline criteria when reasonably practicable.
THE CORONER: Did you know about that section?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Well, what is the room for doubt? Please explain how it is that the HSWA incorporates to reduce risk if reasonably practicable, when that necessarily incorporates ALARP, or is it to be suggested that the IPT leader does not truly understand the nature of the duties imposed upon him?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am trying to explain is that you are in managing a risk you are allowed time to ALARP it, it does not have to be instantaneous, you are allowed to introduce measures to ALARP a risk.
THE CORONER: Where does it say that?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: DEF STAN 00 56, which is our safety management system.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, DEF STAN 00 56, is that not the matter between you and British Aerospace?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: It is the defence standard for safety management systems.
MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, is it not the defence standard that deals with the relationship between you and British Aerospace? I was corrected when I cross examined, I think it was Air Commodore Baber, on the DEF STAN, and he made it clear to me that the purpose of the DEF STAN is to set up a duty of practice. That is right, is it not, or do you misunderstand the nature of the DEF STAN, which one was it?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: My understanding is it is a defence standard, it is a standard to which we must comply for defence, so similar to 970, (inaudible) design, it is the standard that we must comply with, and in there are duties for the contractor, yes, but also for the duty holder, which is me.
MR RAWLINSON: I am looking at page 381, the preface to the DEF STAN, section a:
“This Part of the Defence Standard provides requirements for the management of safety. It can be applied to any MOD project and can be applied in any phase of a project’s life. This Standard shall be used by Defence Contractors as required by contract. The effective application of this Standard requires close cooperation between all parties, as the responsibility for the achievement of safety is shared.”
That being said, what part of DEF STAN does apply to you rather than BAE?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think the most helpful paragraph, if I can just refer to my notes, I can probably ...
THE CORONER: To put it simply, as long as you are doing something about the risk it is safe to fly, is it?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The paragraph is 10.7.1, Risk Reduction, page 11 on mine.
MR RAWLINSON: Tell me what it says; we will go through it together:
“Unless otherwise specified, the Contractor shall establish Tolerability Criteria based on relevant legislation, standards and MOD policy, in agreement with the Duty Holder. These shall form the basis for making an assessment as to whether a risk is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.”
We have been through this path before in this inquest, you can be tolerable, but if you are tolerable you have to be ALARP.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: So is that an acceptance?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: If I could just read, it says:
“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”
MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors? It is your aircraft; it is your aircraft you are trying to persuade us is now airworthy. We have not got to tolerability and ALARP because the report told you we are not at ALARP, and if we want to really bandy around 00 56 together, we have the definition of what is safe in annex A, risk has been safety, because risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is tolerably acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.
THE CORONER: You would say there is a difference between tolerable and ALARP?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I would say that
THE CORONER: So “and” does not mean tolerable and ALARP, it separates the two?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: The position we are in is we are tolerable but we are not yet ALARP, and I would argue that I am able to introduce mitigation strategies to get there, before I get there.
THE CORONER: To put it as I did before you were reading, so you did not have a chance to answer, it is safe flying as long as you are doing something about the risk?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: And that pertains if all you have done about the risk is to have some off line conversations with BAE?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I think I’ve we’ve got comprehensive mitigation strategies in place and but we cannot argue, and my line is we cannot argue that we are ALARP; I could not argue we were ALARP yet.
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Hickman's claim for time
"I notice that when Hickman was asked to justify his assertion -re time to achieve ALARP, he quoted 00-56 Ch 10.7.1. ("Risk Reduction").
Notwithstanding the fact that 10.7.1 makes no reference to the subject, except the general issue of Risk Reduction, there is much more to Ch. 10 and he was being disingenuous. The process requires MoD to DEMONSTRATE that safety has been achieved (be it broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP).
Def Stan 00-56....
*/(A system is safe) when risk has been DEMONSTRATED to have been reduced to a level that is ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given operating environment. /
/(A risk is ALARP) when it has been DEMONSTRATED that the cost of any further risk reduction, where the cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction./*
The key issues here are the *Tolerability Criteria* agreed between the contractor and MoD and the ability to demonstrate. The former is the baseline against which all risk assessments are conducted. I suspect that they have no such thing, or it has not been subject to continuous review. All this makes Ainsworth's statement all the more meaningless.
Notwithstanding the fact that 10.7.1 makes no reference to the subject, except the general issue of Risk Reduction, there is much more to Ch. 10 and he was being disingenuous. The process requires MoD to DEMONSTRATE that safety has been achieved (be it broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP).
Def Stan 00-56....
*/(A system is safe) when risk has been DEMONSTRATED to have been reduced to a level that is ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given operating environment. /
/(A risk is ALARP) when it has been DEMONSTRATED that the cost of any further risk reduction, where the cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction./*
The key issues here are the *Tolerability Criteria* agreed between the contractor and MoD and the ability to demonstrate. The former is the baseline against which all risk assessments are conducted. I suspect that they have no such thing, or it has not been subject to continuous review. All this makes Ainsworth's statement all the more meaningless.
Last edited by nigegilb; 4th Jul 2008 at 05:56.
Nige
Your last (edit to add, last but one) post quoting the actual transcript is very illuminating. It comes across a quite a witch hunt. Until your post I had started to form the impression that the Gp Capt had made a mistake or got his facts a bit muddled, but infact his lines can be interpreted consistently with the most recent statements on the ALARP status of the aircraft.
He actually acknowledges / tries to point out here that there is an intrinsic ALARP argument to be made when you are working towards taking all practical measures (though I can see how it could be confusing for those not familiar with such principles).
The questionner here completely misses the point he makes but then attacks him. It appears as if they weren't even listening or trying to understand the perspective he was putting forward.
On seeing the actual working and interruptions/overspeaking - the way in which he was being badgered and questioned is frankly incredible - I'm quite shocked at the way he was being treated/dismissed. The coroner spouts a load of nonsense like "ALARP Airworthy" and clearly sneers/snorts at the Gp Capt as if he's an idiot when he tries to point out thats not really a correct term. It seems clear from the above that the coroner only wanted to hear things that supported the conclusion he'd already decided he wanted to reach, rather than try and understand the actual facts and issues.
Your last (edit to add, last but one) post quoting the actual transcript is very illuminating. It comes across a quite a witch hunt. Until your post I had started to form the impression that the Gp Capt had made a mistake or got his facts a bit muddled, but infact his lines can be interpreted consistently with the most recent statements on the ALARP status of the aircraft.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am trying to explain is that you are in managing a risk you are allowed time to ALARP it, it does not have to be instantaneous, you are allowed to introduce measures to ALARP a risk.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: If I could just read, it says:
“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”
MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors?
“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”
MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors?
On seeing the actual working and interruptions/overspeaking - the way in which he was being badgered and questioned is frankly incredible - I'm quite shocked at the way he was being treated/dismissed. The coroner spouts a load of nonsense like "ALARP Airworthy" and clearly sneers/snorts at the Gp Capt as if he's an idiot when he tries to point out thats not really a correct term. It seems clear from the above that the coroner only wanted to hear things that supported the conclusion he'd already decided he wanted to reach, rather than try and understand the actual facts and issues.
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Ref post #1250,
I don't think the coroner shows himself in a good light here:
Arguing that his mis-use of "ALARP airworthiness" is "semantics" but then to go on and, purely from the transcript words, badger the witness about the semantics of his words does nothing for me. However, Mr Rawlinson seems to be much more switched on, but still isn't completely correct in his terminology.
sw
I don't think the coroner shows himself in a good light here:
THE CORONER: No, ALARP airworthy.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...
THE CORONER: It is semantics.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.
GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.
MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...
THE CORONER: It is semantics.
sw
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How many years do you want? 5, 10, until MRA4 comes in, will it ever get there, is all this just a ruse to pass the baton to MRA4 but continue to fly a non-airworthy aircraft? As has been stated it is very simple to work out how long it will take to reach ALARP merely a question of man hours. This has slipped from end of the year to an expected date of June 09. You are a clever chap scientist give me your best definition of "expected"? Now do you expect Nimrod to be ALARP next June? I don't. Now we hear from Ainsworth, that Nimrod was ALARP all along, IPTL was wrong. MoD just used up its last bit of credibility.
based on June 09 completion and Sep 06 awareness of hazard (and recognizing that THAT may be a very suspect date, but more of that later) then you have 33 months total reaction time, or 16.5 months average, assuming linear accomplishment. The design has a current service life of about 40 years. It probably originally had something like a 20 year design life. Split the different: 30 years, 360 months. So current end date for rectification is equivalent to an average reaction time of just under 5% of design life. That would be a hazard 50 times worse than design target.
Previously it was stated that the design risk targets for Nimrod were ten times that for civil. Hence the design risk for a specific system failure (which we'll define this hazard as resulting from) is 1 per 100 million FH. A risk 50 times that would be one per 2 million FH. So far there's been one incident, and substantially fewer than 2 million FH. So a probability based on event occurrence would suggest that the expected completion date is indeed aligned with the risk.
Add to that, additional mitigation is already in place, reducing the risk today from that at the time of the accident. Which in effect buys more time to complete the full mitigation.
Overall, from the outside, a 3 year total retrofit period does not seem out of line with the apparent residual risk, certainly from a civil/JAR viewpoint.
By comparison, look at the compliance times for typical recent airworthiness directives in the civil world. Compliance times in years are the norm, not the exception. Indeed, due to the FAA's legal constraints, any "non emergency" AD - which this would likely be considered, emergency ADs tend to be purely procedural - is treated as a new piece of regulation and actually has a public review and comment process. Six months to ISSUE the AD isn't that unusual.
I understand the frustration with an apparently slow pace to complete a rectification - I have a whole drawer of Tshirts for that - and I certainly do not buy the argument that a successfully completed flight is evidence of airworthiness. But the fact is that a three year rectification is no big surprise for these kinds of things I'm afraid.
Where there is an issue, as mentioned above, is if the date of awareness of the defect is not Sep 06. If there's a report in the 80s identifying the hazard that is at best highly embarrasing. But, again unfortunately, it's human nature for people not to want to hear bad news, and getting people to acknowledge and act upon the seriousness of a potential safety hazard is a great deal harder than after the event. It's not an excuse for not being proactive, but sadly reaction is very much the norm.
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Scientist I am very familiar with the problems of convincing the military to be proactive, I guess that is why this thread and for a long time the Herc thread ran and ran. In this case, if dry bay protection had been fitted at any time between 1981 and 2006 we most probably would not have been having this discussion. VC10 received upgrades in the mid 90s but Nimrod didn't. Why is that?
I strongly believe implementation of airworthiness regs has broken down, which is why I am pushing this hard. RE JFZ's alleged witch hunt. Difficult for me to answer because I was not there, but I understand that Baber, Hickman's predecessor was a very strong witness and clearly Hickman was interpreting the regs in a different way. Until the ALARP discussion Hickman had been doing well and there is a lot of evidence presented by him before the ALARP passage. I read the Coroner's line of questioning as more exasperation, but perhaps someone who was there could comment. ALARP airworthy is not a phrase we are familiar with but we all know what he means. Tolerably safe is also not a phrase I am familiar with but Hickman uses this phrase and I do not know what he means. That said, I agree, the exchange does appear to be adversarial, which belies the myth that the Inquest procedure is non=adversarial, a line trotted out by the MoD when spinning about the families not needing legal representation. Remember the MoD were represented by a barrister in court who could have stepped in at any time, many of the families at these inquests cannot afford legal representation, the MoD has spent £100,000s on the best advice.
My point about the date slippage is how can this procedure slip 6 months in the course of 6 weeks? Thank you for your definition of expected, but the short answer is that this can also slip again indefinitely.
I strongly believe implementation of airworthiness regs has broken down, which is why I am pushing this hard. RE JFZ's alleged witch hunt. Difficult for me to answer because I was not there, but I understand that Baber, Hickman's predecessor was a very strong witness and clearly Hickman was interpreting the regs in a different way. Until the ALARP discussion Hickman had been doing well and there is a lot of evidence presented by him before the ALARP passage. I read the Coroner's line of questioning as more exasperation, but perhaps someone who was there could comment. ALARP airworthy is not a phrase we are familiar with but we all know what he means. Tolerably safe is also not a phrase I am familiar with but Hickman uses this phrase and I do not know what he means. That said, I agree, the exchange does appear to be adversarial, which belies the myth that the Inquest procedure is non=adversarial, a line trotted out by the MoD when spinning about the families not needing legal representation. Remember the MoD were represented by a barrister in court who could have stepped in at any time, many of the families at these inquests cannot afford legal representation, the MoD has spent £100,000s on the best advice.
My point about the date slippage is how can this procedure slip 6 months in the course of 6 weeks? Thank you for your definition of expected, but the short answer is that this can also slip again indefinitely.