Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
GF - unfortunately, you have missed something...
B15's later posts, far from
ended up accusing all the families of being interested only in compensation, and nothing else. See post #763 on page 39 for the final attempt
One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...
B15's later posts, far from
putting a rational view into the Forum
One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...
Alba
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Gas Fitter said:
"It's a matter of military judgement taking all of the relevant factors into consideration and mitigating them as best as possible. There were bods on the ground that needed that type of support, which without it, could well have cost more than 14 lives. Difficult call, requiring big kahunas! Nevertheless, it was made. There's no 'risk-free' wars out there!"
The fact that a 'mission' needs/should be conducted should not needlessly put our aircrew at risk for what is conceived to be a 'critical mission'. We can assume that every time they go up in support of ops, they are supporting critical ops, but don't for one minute think that the war can be won on the basis of one platform. Maybe commanders out there should re-evaluate their knowledge of the combat estimate.
"It's a matter of military judgement taking all of the relevant factors into consideration and mitigating them as best as possible. There were bods on the ground that needed that type of support, which without it, could well have cost more than 14 lives. Difficult call, requiring big kahunas! Nevertheless, it was made. There's no 'risk-free' wars out there!"
The fact that a 'mission' needs/should be conducted should not needlessly put our aircrew at risk for what is conceived to be a 'critical mission'. We can assume that every time they go up in support of ops, they are supporting critical ops, but don't for one minute think that the war can be won on the basis of one platform. Maybe commanders out there should re-evaluate their knowledge of the combat estimate.
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Apart from the human misery, given the lack of resources that is now the lot of the armed forces it's stupid to mismanage them to the point that they are lost. The need to get some platform up to do the job is understood -this is perhaps an occasion when Gordon should simply open up his chequebook and buy what is needed (or pay for Nimrod to reach ALARP asap), instead of trying to fight wars on the cheap all the time. Why should our aircrew fly in an aircraft that is, by the RAF's own standards, not airworthy, especially if a big wad of cash will fix it faster?
I like to think of myself as a patriotic individual, it pains me to say it but when listening to some of the RAF witnesses (2 in particular) I was ashamed to be British and bitterly embarrassed for those brave members of the armed services that actually have some sense of professionalism, integrety, and honesty.
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Oilcan,
I wasn't trying to insinuate that I know. I'm not on the inside on this and as I expect that the hazard log is Restricted, I don't think people on the inside, with access are going to say.
Tapper's Dad may have been given such information at some point, and the safety case report would certainly have covered them, but as they are 'live', things may have moved on.... On the other hand.....
sw
I wasn't trying to insinuate that I know. I'm not on the inside on this and as I expect that the hazard log is Restricted, I don't think people on the inside, with access are going to say.
Tapper's Dad may have been given such information at some point, and the safety case report would certainly have covered them, but as they are 'live', things may have moved on.... On the other hand.....
sw
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Well I would like to think that the RAF can give the much needed cash for all aircraft in the fleet , but many of the case lately has been the Governments refusal to give the MOD/RAF/Navy/Army a larger budget to maintain all of the equally important assets needed for what has been asked. The Government has shown its annoyance to a few senior military figures for speaking out, althought not as many as you would like to think.
I really think the MOD will make swift quick changes but is being asked to do this with a very low budget , it must be very difficult task to share what pennies you have to all troops etc but I guess the Nimrod will be one of the top priorities, Its just up to the politicians to deliver and fast and maybe this inquest will push that, we will see and people will post if things dont.
I really think the MOD will make swift quick changes but is being asked to do this with a very low budget , it must be very difficult task to share what pennies you have to all troops etc but I guess the Nimrod will be one of the top priorities, Its just up to the politicians to deliver and fast and maybe this inquest will push that, we will see and people will post if things dont.
Gas fitter,
My second point was not directed at you specifically, and the full quote is...
As for the line taken by politicians and senior RAF officers to the effect....'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!
The point I was trying to make is that lots of politicans (such as Ainsworth) and senior officers are all now saying...'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', or words to that effect. The day after the loss of XV230, when the reasons for the loss were still unknown, and the aircraft "could" presumably be unfit to fly, a crew were sent up on almost a repeat mission. The point I was making is that, in the light of this fact, who can reasonably believe what the politicians/senior officers are saying. They have already sent it up at least once when they didn't know what was going on - so accepted a risk they now state they will never take!!
For what it is worth, I wasn't passing judgement on whether or not the operational decision taken immediately after the loss of 230 was correct (which it would appear you think I was), rather I was passing comment on the faith we can put in senior office/ploitician's statements.
Hope that clarifys thhings somewhat!
My second point was not directed at you specifically, and the full quote is...
As for the line taken by politicians and senior RAF officers to the effect....'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!
The point I was trying to make is that lots of politicans (such as Ainsworth) and senior officers are all now saying...'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', or words to that effect. The day after the loss of XV230, when the reasons for the loss were still unknown, and the aircraft "could" presumably be unfit to fly, a crew were sent up on almost a repeat mission. The point I was making is that, in the light of this fact, who can reasonably believe what the politicians/senior officers are saying. They have already sent it up at least once when they didn't know what was going on - so accepted a risk they now state they will never take!!
For what it is worth, I wasn't passing judgement on whether or not the operational decision taken immediately after the loss of 230 was correct (which it would appear you think I was), rather I was passing comment on the faith we can put in senior office/ploitician's statements.
Hope that clarifys thhings somewhat!
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DA4ORCE:
yep, but I've also seen
-which wouls suggest that resources are the limiting factor in getting ALARP soonest, and (I may be wrong but) generally resources equals cash.
Keepittidy:
Yep also - the problem (again) is that if the cash to fix Nimrod comes from the existing pool, then all that is being altered is priorities - I'm surprised that this isn't simply the outcome, promise the earth and then rob some other important budget blind to pay for the required fixes, the usual cosmetic changes. The overall picture for the armed forces only actually improved if new cash, from outside the existing MOD budget, is injected.
It's all symptomatic of second class thinking at high level - the concept of lean has been misunderstood. It's one of those ideas where reversibility is assumed without a moment of thought - "an effective 'lean' system still does the job whilst saving money...ergo (decides HMG) if you save money then it's lean...so it'll automatically work okay." At which point they slice another inch off the pile of fivers sitting in front of the relevant Admiral / Field Marshall/ Air Chief Marshall and everyone gets a knighthood.
yep, but I've also seen
"This morning he [Coroner] asked Hickman who was still in court though not in the box whether if he as the coroner said that it had to be ALARP as soon as possible it would have any effect on the process. Hickman's response was "no it wouldnt have any effect, it's driven by resources".
Keepittidy:
Yep also - the problem (again) is that if the cash to fix Nimrod comes from the existing pool, then all that is being altered is priorities - I'm surprised that this isn't simply the outcome, promise the earth and then rob some other important budget blind to pay for the required fixes, the usual cosmetic changes. The overall picture for the armed forces only actually improved if new cash, from outside the existing MOD budget, is injected.
It's all symptomatic of second class thinking at high level - the concept of lean has been misunderstood. It's one of those ideas where reversibility is assumed without a moment of thought - "an effective 'lean' system still does the job whilst saving money...ergo (decides HMG) if you save money then it's lean...so it'll automatically work okay." At which point they slice another inch off the pile of fivers sitting in front of the relevant Admiral / Field Marshall/ Air Chief Marshall and everyone gets a knighthood.
If resources aren't an issue why aren't there Nimrods now at ever major aviation technical centre in the country, Marshalls of Cambridge, Heathrow, etc with civy techies swarming over them carried out BOI recommendations.
Or why isn't there a tented city of techies from Waddo, St Athan, Cosford, Leuchars, etc currently set up at Kinloss working 3 shifts 24/7 to get the work done.
I think you'll find resources aren't an issue when politicians/senior officers are asked, but when it actually comes to opening the chequebook and providing the manpower...............
Or why isn't there a tented city of techies from Waddo, St Athan, Cosford, Leuchars, etc currently set up at Kinloss working 3 shifts 24/7 to get the work done.
I think you'll find resources aren't an issue when politicians/senior officers are asked, but when it actually comes to opening the chequebook and providing the manpower...............
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Pleeeeese don't ask me to do the airtests.
Money doesn't = manpower, and certainly doesn't = expertise.
Biggus, you are joking - right.
Last edited by OilCan; 26th May 2008 at 22:47.
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Lab Queen
Well, when he is presented with experts like that, the coroner has no chance of making an accurate assessment. The diagrams you saw were drawn during MR1 days, before the MR2 was built. There is not a single picture-style image (similar in style to one you refer to) of the SCP connection to the crossfeeed pipe in any book that I have ever seen, except in the parts catalogue. There are plenty of schematic air supplies diagrams showing the SCP connecting into the crossfeed pipe, but they do not portray any other systems or the zonal location of the connection.
The floor panel of the dry bay includes the fairing around the SCP elbow, where it exits the bomb bay. The SCP elbow, within that fairing, is therefore at the bottom of that bay. All fluid in that bay will fall onto that elbow. That fact is at the core of the BOI's findings. I understand that the BOI team's technical expert was not given an opportunity to clarify this, and other very important and relevant issues. The Coroner knew that the BOI expert had all the answers, but he chose not to take his evidence. What on earth is that about?
When a BOI team comes up with a finding of un-airworthiness that leaves the SoS with no choice but to apologise, it would be reasonable to assume that the BOI team has not been steered from above.
The Coroner was misled by some experts and consequently made an incorrect diagnosis of the cause of the fire. He was also misled by an incorrect analysis of the extant risks.
Ed
It was the experts who stated the only fuel pipes above the SCP were the vent and feed pipes, that the others are below and that there would not be fuel in the vent and or feed system which would give rise to sustain the fire. The diagrams provided in court also show vent and feed are the only ones above.
The floor panel of the dry bay includes the fairing around the SCP elbow, where it exits the bomb bay. The SCP elbow, within that fairing, is therefore at the bottom of that bay. All fluid in that bay will fall onto that elbow. That fact is at the core of the BOI's findings. I understand that the BOI team's technical expert was not given an opportunity to clarify this, and other very important and relevant issues. The Coroner knew that the BOI expert had all the answers, but he chose not to take his evidence. What on earth is that about?
When a BOI team comes up with a finding of un-airworthiness that leaves the SoS with no choice but to apologise, it would be reasonable to assume that the BOI team has not been steered from above.
The Coroner was misled by some experts and consequently made an incorrect diagnosis of the cause of the fire. He was also misled by an incorrect analysis of the extant risks.
Ed
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Well, when he is presented with experts like that, the coroner has no chance of making an accurate assessment. The diagrams you saw were drawn during MR1 days, before the MR2 was built.
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There were some poor witnesses, the kind who are labeled expert and yet can not recall technical details in relation to their expertise. Many times the coroner asked for clarification from the BoI panel who were in attendance for the entire three weeks.
It was not the coroners job to disregard the evidence provided in the BoI report, but it is his job to take into account every possible and probable cause, which he did and he sought the opinions of the BoI panel in doing so. He can only make his conclusions on what evidence is presented before him, he did ask several times for the MoD to provide specific documents, some were forthcoming, if late, but some failed to appear.
The narrative did not give one specific cause for the fire, it gave the most probable causes due to the evidence and testimony of the witnesses. The coroner is not an expert, in simple terms he is one who gathers information and fact of an event and has to make a judgement on what is before him. That isn't helped when you have witnesses who have both held the same position, IPTL stands strong on this, contradict each other.
The facts which were brought to light during the inquest, the most probable causes, what may or may not have happened that day will always be open to debate. Out of all of the evidence there is only thing which stands out and which can never be disputed, that 14 brave men died while doing their job in the most professional manner.
I don't know how many of you have heard the voice recording but I'm sure those who have done will be aware, there's no fear, they just do what they have been trained for.
Just spotted Mick's post, to add to his. The problem wasn't just the source of ignition, it was also to find what sustained the fire. If the blow-off had tracked into 7 bay, causing a pool fire, once that fuel had burnt off the fire goes out. There had to have been a constant fuel supply, otherwise you are missing one of the three factors to produce fire.
It was not the coroners job to disregard the evidence provided in the BoI report, but it is his job to take into account every possible and probable cause, which he did and he sought the opinions of the BoI panel in doing so. He can only make his conclusions on what evidence is presented before him, he did ask several times for the MoD to provide specific documents, some were forthcoming, if late, but some failed to appear.
The narrative did not give one specific cause for the fire, it gave the most probable causes due to the evidence and testimony of the witnesses. The coroner is not an expert, in simple terms he is one who gathers information and fact of an event and has to make a judgement on what is before him. That isn't helped when you have witnesses who have both held the same position, IPTL stands strong on this, contradict each other.
The facts which were brought to light during the inquest, the most probable causes, what may or may not have happened that day will always be open to debate. Out of all of the evidence there is only thing which stands out and which can never be disputed, that 14 brave men died while doing their job in the most professional manner.
I don't know how many of you have heard the voice recording but I'm sure those who have done will be aware, there's no fear, they just do what they have been trained for.
Just spotted Mick's post, to add to his. The problem wasn't just the source of ignition, it was also to find what sustained the fire. If the blow-off had tracked into 7 bay, causing a pool fire, once that fuel had burnt off the fire goes out. There had to have been a constant fuel supply, otherwise you are missing one of the three factors to produce fire.
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nige post #799
Very enlightening, thank you.
Mick
the original Mk2 fuel system was identicle to the Mk1 in almost every respect, the Mk2 only being modified with the advent of AAR in 82 and again a little later when the system was tidied up. The 'blow off' has always been there to protect the tank during normal ground refuelling. The routing of the Xfeed pipe differed slightly between the Mk1 & Mk2 at the point where it passes from the bomb bay to the Stbd 7 tank dry bay. This was to facilitate the addition of the offtake to the SCP.
- hope that helps.
"This morning he [Coroner] asked Hickman who was still in court though not in the box whether if he as the coroner said that it had to be ALARP as soon as possible it would have any effect on the process. Hickman's response was "no it wouldnt have any effect, it's driven by resources".
Mick
the original Mk2 fuel system was identicle to the Mk1 in almost every respect, the Mk2 only being modified with the advent of AAR in 82 and again a little later when the system was tidied up. The 'blow off' has always been there to protect the tank during normal ground refuelling. The routing of the Xfeed pipe differed slightly between the Mk1 & Mk2 at the point where it passes from the bomb bay to the Stbd 7 tank dry bay. This was to facilitate the addition of the offtake to the SCP.
- hope that helps.
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As we scratch around trying to understand this very big subject, I sought the big picture view, without getting into the complex detail, this I think is where we should focus now.
"The big problem with ppprooone and to a lesser extent the inquest is that people get bogged down in unnecessary detail. Yes, it's necessary at some point. Blow off valves and fuel leak runs are vital to understand, but discussing them in this context diverts from the big issue - that MoD admitted not implementing their own airworthiness regs, and that failure will generally apply across the MoD. MoD will be happy with this diversion, and I suspect it's a deliberate ploy by some. Many think the issue gets down to the 30 recommendations, and if the risks contained therein are reduced ALARP then the aircraft is airworthy, safe, fit for purpose and serviceable. Not true - mitigating them will help, but nothing more.
It is a Requirement that the Project Director (in the case of MR2, the IPTL) discusses the Top Ten (or 5 or 20, whatever is agreed) risks with his boss (1 or 2 Star) every month. In MoD(PE) and DPA, the requirement was 2 Star be notified of progress, regardless of the PD's rank/grade. Clearly, the time involved is inordinate, so they have "traffic light system" and if it shows all greens, then 2 Star would tick the box. In this context, safety and Risk management are two items and if either shows red or amber he MUST address it. If there are Class A (unacceptable) safety risks, it MUST show red. If there are Class Bs (tolerable and ALARP) which are not ALARP, it MUST be red. Not only does he see the individual risk but he sees at a glance that the process of IMPLEMENTING the mandated airworthiness regs is failing.
To answer to your question Nige, THIS is where there have been senior failings in both MR2 and MRA4 - lack of management oversight; and is where one needs to focus."
Oil Can refers to post 799, this for me, is key and one wonders if Hickman meant to mention resources in this way. I was told by a Group Capt last year that the RAF would love to have a host of safety and defensive measures on the MRA4 but the money simply was not available. "...their hands slip on the greasy pole if they annoy bosses but highlighting risks and, worse, seek resources to mitigate them."
The cavalier attitude toward safety that was mentioned, that resulted in standing Management and Resource risks appears to have fallen on deaf ears. I doubt that is the case private and the pressing need for change will hopefully become irresistible when Cave gets round to issuing his own report.
"JSP553 requires competence, experience and corporate knowledge. Clearly, these were missing. This is not a SAFETY Risk, it is a MANAGEMENT Risk and a RESOURCE Risk, which results in an emerging/secondary SAFETY Risk. Fix the primary risks, and you reduce (mitigate) the others."
Perhaps the RAF should begin this task by removing some of the people at the centre of these very clear and startling management failings.
"The big problem with ppprooone and to a lesser extent the inquest is that people get bogged down in unnecessary detail. Yes, it's necessary at some point. Blow off valves and fuel leak runs are vital to understand, but discussing them in this context diverts from the big issue - that MoD admitted not implementing their own airworthiness regs, and that failure will generally apply across the MoD. MoD will be happy with this diversion, and I suspect it's a deliberate ploy by some. Many think the issue gets down to the 30 recommendations, and if the risks contained therein are reduced ALARP then the aircraft is airworthy, safe, fit for purpose and serviceable. Not true - mitigating them will help, but nothing more.
It is a Requirement that the Project Director (in the case of MR2, the IPTL) discusses the Top Ten (or 5 or 20, whatever is agreed) risks with his boss (1 or 2 Star) every month. In MoD(PE) and DPA, the requirement was 2 Star be notified of progress, regardless of the PD's rank/grade. Clearly, the time involved is inordinate, so they have "traffic light system" and if it shows all greens, then 2 Star would tick the box. In this context, safety and Risk management are two items and if either shows red or amber he MUST address it. If there are Class A (unacceptable) safety risks, it MUST show red. If there are Class Bs (tolerable and ALARP) which are not ALARP, it MUST be red. Not only does he see the individual risk but he sees at a glance that the process of IMPLEMENTING the mandated airworthiness regs is failing.
To answer to your question Nige, THIS is where there have been senior failings in both MR2 and MRA4 - lack of management oversight; and is where one needs to focus."
Oil Can refers to post 799, this for me, is key and one wonders if Hickman meant to mention resources in this way. I was told by a Group Capt last year that the RAF would love to have a host of safety and defensive measures on the MRA4 but the money simply was not available. "...their hands slip on the greasy pole if they annoy bosses but highlighting risks and, worse, seek resources to mitigate them."
The cavalier attitude toward safety that was mentioned, that resulted in standing Management and Resource risks appears to have fallen on deaf ears. I doubt that is the case private and the pressing need for change will hopefully become irresistible when Cave gets round to issuing his own report.
"JSP553 requires competence, experience and corporate knowledge. Clearly, these were missing. This is not a SAFETY Risk, it is a MANAGEMENT Risk and a RESOURCE Risk, which results in an emerging/secondary SAFETY Risk. Fix the primary risks, and you reduce (mitigate) the others."
Perhaps the RAF should begin this task by removing some of the people at the centre of these very clear and startling management failings.
Last edited by nigegilb; 27th May 2008 at 09:29.
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Oilcan
No it doesnt and couldnt now, but the lack of manpower and the lack of expertise are a direct result of the failure to fund in the first place and the ludicrous 2004 decision to make large cuts at a time when the services were as busy as at any time in recent history are directly responsible for both.
Re your post on the diagrams
Not sure the differences you point out do help my understanding of anything other than the basis behind Ed's point. I do realise the blow-off was always part of the system. But as I understand it the tests, diagrams and "tea stain" evidence not only showed that the fuel from a blow-off could not get up into the No 7 bay but also that the angle at which the No 1 tank was lying during tanking was not as accentuated as the BoI believed.
Money doesn't = manpower, and certainly doesn't = expertise.
Re your post on the diagrams
Not sure the differences you point out do help my understanding of anything other than the basis behind Ed's point. I do realise the blow-off was always part of the system. But as I understand it the tests, diagrams and "tea stain" evidence not only showed that the fuel from a blow-off could not get up into the No 7 bay but also that the angle at which the No 1 tank was lying during tanking was not as accentuated as the BoI believed.
RAF gives assurances on Nimrod safety
This may be repeating stuff in earlier posts, but I' m posting it so that we can all see what these people actually wanted us know they said, on the record. This is an MoD News Release, what they call 'A Defence Policy and Business news article'
airsound
23 May 08
Minister of State for the Armed Forces Bob Ainsworth MP and the RAF's most senior engineer, Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, have made statements following the conclusion of the Inquest into the crash of RAF Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006 in which 14 servicemen lost their lives.
Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air), said:
"My thoughts today are first and foremost with the families and friends of those who died, and with the men and women of the Armed Forces, who I know feel the loss of their colleagues very deeply.
"From the evidence heard at the Inquest, and from the findings of the Board of Inquiry, it is clear that the crew of XV230 acted with the utmost professionalism in the face of a complex and demanding emergency situation. I pay tribute to their courage and dedication.
"With respect to the airworthiness of the aircraft today, we have stopped air-to-air refuelling and no longer use the very hot air systems in flight. This eradicates any dangers from the serious design failures noted by the Coroner that have been present in this aircraft since the 1980s. These measures have been supplemented with enhanced aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures to ensure the aircraft, as it is today, is safe to fly.
"In addition, to ensure we can operate the aircraft safely until its planned retirement from service, we have in place an effective package of more permanent measures which are being progressed as quickly as practicable. All of this work and our safety assessment are based on advice from both inside and outside the Department.
"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."
Bob Ainsworth said:
"My thoughts are with the families, friends and colleagues of those who died in XV230. On behalf of the MOD and the Royal Air Force, I would like to apologise again to the families of those who died for our failings which led to this tragic incident.
"I would like to reassure all those concerned that the Chief of the Air Staff has reaffirmed to me that the Nimrod is airworthy, and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident. The independent review of the airworthiness and safety of the Nimrod is ongoing.
"I have noted the coroner's comments and I will consider them carefully. The Nimrod is saving lives in operational theatres every day. However, if it was not safe we would not be flying it; it is safe with the measures we have taken and that is why we will not be grounding the fleet.
"Finally, in remembering the crew of V230, we must not forget that that they acted with the utmost professionalism throughout and I pay tribute to them."
Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne MP, added:
"The deaths of 14 brave servicemen in Afghanistan nearly two years ago was a profound and tragic accident, and my thoughts and sympathies are with their families today. The safety and security of our service personnel is an absolute priority for me. That is why I have sought the advice of the RAF’s most senior officers and have been assured that the changes we have made to the Nimrod mean that it safe to fly."
Minister of State for the Armed Forces Bob Ainsworth MP and the RAF's most senior engineer, Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, have made statements following the conclusion of the Inquest into the crash of RAF Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006 in which 14 servicemen lost their lives.
Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air), said:
"My thoughts today are first and foremost with the families and friends of those who died, and with the men and women of the Armed Forces, who I know feel the loss of their colleagues very deeply.
"From the evidence heard at the Inquest, and from the findings of the Board of Inquiry, it is clear that the crew of XV230 acted with the utmost professionalism in the face of a complex and demanding emergency situation. I pay tribute to their courage and dedication.
"With respect to the airworthiness of the aircraft today, we have stopped air-to-air refuelling and no longer use the very hot air systems in flight. This eradicates any dangers from the serious design failures noted by the Coroner that have been present in this aircraft since the 1980s. These measures have been supplemented with enhanced aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures to ensure the aircraft, as it is today, is safe to fly.
"In addition, to ensure we can operate the aircraft safely until its planned retirement from service, we have in place an effective package of more permanent measures which are being progressed as quickly as practicable. All of this work and our safety assessment are based on advice from both inside and outside the Department.
"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."
Bob Ainsworth said:
"My thoughts are with the families, friends and colleagues of those who died in XV230. On behalf of the MOD and the Royal Air Force, I would like to apologise again to the families of those who died for our failings which led to this tragic incident.
"I would like to reassure all those concerned that the Chief of the Air Staff has reaffirmed to me that the Nimrod is airworthy, and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident. The independent review of the airworthiness and safety of the Nimrod is ongoing.
"I have noted the coroner's comments and I will consider them carefully. The Nimrod is saving lives in operational theatres every day. However, if it was not safe we would not be flying it; it is safe with the measures we have taken and that is why we will not be grounding the fleet.
"Finally, in remembering the crew of V230, we must not forget that that they acted with the utmost professionalism throughout and I pay tribute to them."
Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne MP, added:
"The deaths of 14 brave servicemen in Afghanistan nearly two years ago was a profound and tragic accident, and my thoughts and sympathies are with their families today. The safety and security of our service personnel is an absolute priority for me. That is why I have sought the advice of the RAF’s most senior officers and have been assured that the changes we have made to the Nimrod mean that it safe to fly."
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The safety and security of our service personnel is an absolute priority for me. That is why I have sought the advice of the RAF’s most senior officers and have been assured that the changes we have made to the Nimrod mean that it safe to fly."
Join Date: Jul 2003
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About a buoy15
GF - unfortunately, you have missed something...
B15's later posts, far from
Quote:
putting a rational view into the Forum
ended up accusing all the families of being interested only in compensation, and nothing else. See post #763 on page 39 for the final attempt
One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...
B15's later posts, far from
Quote:
putting a rational view into the Forum
ended up accusing all the families of being interested only in compensation, and nothing else. See post #763 on page 39 for the final attempt
One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...
Join Date: Mar 2005
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Gasfitter,
No, because his insult is that they are chasing compensation.
Compensation won't bring loved ones back. Campaigning to make sure no-one else has to go through the same again, now that's different, and far more noble.
Don't get tarred with the same stick as b15.
sw
But will he be vindicated when/if any compensation is forthcoming?
Compensation won't bring loved ones back. Campaigning to make sure no-one else has to go through the same again, now that's different, and far more noble.
Don't get tarred with the same stick as b15.
sw
Join Date: Mar 2006
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I know we all have day jobs but I have a specific question for Edset, or anyone else who can answer. First a precis of some specific questions at the Inquest.
["Our reaction to leaks through the vent system was to introduce a checking system by blowing air through it.
Do you use soapy water like with a bicycle tyre?
Yes. And we listen for hissing air. Done in hangar. We cease all other maint work while this is going on, so they can hear whistling of leaks." ]
Edset, there was a suggestion that Leak test Test Equipment may have been “lost” and was not available in theatre.
Is this the case?
Is this “listening” a new test has it been validated by the DA as a proper methodology?
Have the APs been amended?
People trained?
Surely a repair is not complete unless verified in accordance with the AP - which calls up defined test equipment?
Can Edset confirm that there are engineering concessions signed as the repairs could not be verified if this test equipment is not available.
The aircraft under test obviously needs to be demonstrably serviceable.
Regards,
Nige
Edited to add that if the MoD are taken to the cleaners over the deaths of 14 people and it runs into millions it might just change a few attitudes regarding the proper funding of airworthiness issues in general.
Sadly in this case an almost cost-free fix could have prevented their deaths.
["Our reaction to leaks through the vent system was to introduce a checking system by blowing air through it.
Do you use soapy water like with a bicycle tyre?
Yes. And we listen for hissing air. Done in hangar. We cease all other maint work while this is going on, so they can hear whistling of leaks." ]
Edset, there was a suggestion that Leak test Test Equipment may have been “lost” and was not available in theatre.
Is this the case?
Is this “listening” a new test has it been validated by the DA as a proper methodology?
Have the APs been amended?
People trained?
Surely a repair is not complete unless verified in accordance with the AP - which calls up defined test equipment?
Can Edset confirm that there are engineering concessions signed as the repairs could not be verified if this test equipment is not available.
The aircraft under test obviously needs to be demonstrably serviceable.
Regards,
Nige
Edited to add that if the MoD are taken to the cleaners over the deaths of 14 people and it runs into millions it might just change a few attitudes regarding the proper funding of airworthiness issues in general.
Sadly in this case an almost cost-free fix could have prevented their deaths.
Last edited by nigegilb; 27th May 2008 at 13:44.