Another Fine Mess Tony? Or Is It Just Joined Up Government?
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Another Fine Mess Tony? Or Is It Just Joined Up Government?
Troops use up ammo as war with Taliban claims 14th life
By Neil Tweedie
Daily Telegraph 28/08/2006
By Neil Tweedie
Daily Telegraph 28/08/2006
British forces suffered their 14th combat death in Afghanistan yesterday as commanders admitted that intense fighting against the Taliban meant they were using up missiles, rockets and spares at an alarming rate.
The vital Apache attack helicopters have been particularly hard hit with a senior Army source claiming that stocks of weapons and components meant to last until April next year could be used up "well before Christmas".
British combat troops are so few on the ground in Helmand province - effectively one battalion, 500-600 fighting troops, to cover an area the size of Scotland - that they are having to call in air strikes by American B1 bombers and other aircraft on a daily basis.
The eight Apaches in Helmand are operating at full stretch, answering calls for help from British patrols and small outlying garrisons. The £1 billion in funding promised by the Treasury for the intended three-year deployment is being used up at a much faster rate than predicted and Apache units in Britain will have to be stripped of their weapons, spares and flying hours to cope. The MoD may have to ask for more money from the Treasury or face cutting other budgets.
The soldier killed in the early hours of yesterday was a member of 14 Signal Regiment, which specialises in electronic eavesdropping and jamming. He may have been monitoring Taliban communications. He died during an assault on what was described as a "platoon house" in Musa Qaleh in the north of Helmand.
Brigadier Ed Butler, the commander of the British contingent in Helmand, said: "The Taliban are a determined enemy, and the challenge of bringing security to Musa Qaleh is a continuing one. But we are well on track to succeed."
The statement was one of a number of optimistic assessments issuing from senior British officers, including one last week suggesting that the Taliban had "gone away to lick their wounds".
Objective reporting of the fighting in Helmand is lacking due to the refusal of commanders to have journalists at forward bases.
It has also emerged that the Royal Military Police are investigating six shooting incidents in Afghanistan involving British soldiers. The circumstances are unknown. British paratroopers have, as senior commanders admit, been involved in the most prolonged period of intense fighting since the Korean War. What should have been a security operation covering a major reconstruction effort to win "hearts and minds" has turned into a full-blown war.
The intensity of the air support needed to keep the Taliban attacks at bay is far beyond anything Government ministers expected when they authorised the deployment in January. US Air Force data show that Musa Qalah has been bombed by USAF B-1s, A-10 ground-attack aircraft and RAF Harriers on almost every day this month. US aircraft have attacked the town on more than 20 occasions and there was only one day this month that US aircraft did not bomb targets in Helmand province.
Before British troops arrived there was barely one call a week for air support.
In January, Mr Reid distanced Britain from US tactics that relied on heavy bombing. He said: "We are not going to Afghanistan to wage war - we are going in order to help the Afghan people."
Although it was intended that only six of the Apaches should fly daily, demands for air support mean that all eight are being flown to help troops pinned down. A number of the helicopters have been hit by Taliban fire but none has been seriously damaged.
The Boeing-made Apaches must have key components replaced after a set number of hours flying. Army Air Corps officers now say these are being used up at an alarming rate. Spares and usage of Hellfire missiles, rockets and 30mm chain gun ammunition is much higher than expected. One officer predicted the Apache budget for the financial year April 2006 would be used up well before Christmas.
The inauguration of the Army's third and final Apache regiment may have to be delayed to save money. "It could put at risk the fielding of the full Apache force structure", said a senior officer.
The UK force, due to number 4,500 by the autumn, is conducting operations from its desert base, Camp Bastion, near the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. Reinforcements announced last month by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, and the retention of the RAF Harrier force will further strain the defence budget. It was reported last week that the Army's Land Command is having to make £40 million of emergency cuts to cope.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "Supplies are restocked as and when they are needed."
She said that British troops were involved in a Nato mission and that US air support was a part of that mission.
The vital Apache attack helicopters have been particularly hard hit with a senior Army source claiming that stocks of weapons and components meant to last until April next year could be used up "well before Christmas".
British combat troops are so few on the ground in Helmand province - effectively one battalion, 500-600 fighting troops, to cover an area the size of Scotland - that they are having to call in air strikes by American B1 bombers and other aircraft on a daily basis.
The eight Apaches in Helmand are operating at full stretch, answering calls for help from British patrols and small outlying garrisons. The £1 billion in funding promised by the Treasury for the intended three-year deployment is being used up at a much faster rate than predicted and Apache units in Britain will have to be stripped of their weapons, spares and flying hours to cope. The MoD may have to ask for more money from the Treasury or face cutting other budgets.
The soldier killed in the early hours of yesterday was a member of 14 Signal Regiment, which specialises in electronic eavesdropping and jamming. He may have been monitoring Taliban communications. He died during an assault on what was described as a "platoon house" in Musa Qaleh in the north of Helmand.
Brigadier Ed Butler, the commander of the British contingent in Helmand, said: "The Taliban are a determined enemy, and the challenge of bringing security to Musa Qaleh is a continuing one. But we are well on track to succeed."
The statement was one of a number of optimistic assessments issuing from senior British officers, including one last week suggesting that the Taliban had "gone away to lick their wounds".
Objective reporting of the fighting in Helmand is lacking due to the refusal of commanders to have journalists at forward bases.
It has also emerged that the Royal Military Police are investigating six shooting incidents in Afghanistan involving British soldiers. The circumstances are unknown. British paratroopers have, as senior commanders admit, been involved in the most prolonged period of intense fighting since the Korean War. What should have been a security operation covering a major reconstruction effort to win "hearts and minds" has turned into a full-blown war.
The intensity of the air support needed to keep the Taliban attacks at bay is far beyond anything Government ministers expected when they authorised the deployment in January. US Air Force data show that Musa Qalah has been bombed by USAF B-1s, A-10 ground-attack aircraft and RAF Harriers on almost every day this month. US aircraft have attacked the town on more than 20 occasions and there was only one day this month that US aircraft did not bomb targets in Helmand province.
Before British troops arrived there was barely one call a week for air support.
In January, Mr Reid distanced Britain from US tactics that relied on heavy bombing. He said: "We are not going to Afghanistan to wage war - we are going in order to help the Afghan people."
Although it was intended that only six of the Apaches should fly daily, demands for air support mean that all eight are being flown to help troops pinned down. A number of the helicopters have been hit by Taliban fire but none has been seriously damaged.
The Boeing-made Apaches must have key components replaced after a set number of hours flying. Army Air Corps officers now say these are being used up at an alarming rate. Spares and usage of Hellfire missiles, rockets and 30mm chain gun ammunition is much higher than expected. One officer predicted the Apache budget for the financial year April 2006 would be used up well before Christmas.
The inauguration of the Army's third and final Apache regiment may have to be delayed to save money. "It could put at risk the fielding of the full Apache force structure", said a senior officer.
The UK force, due to number 4,500 by the autumn, is conducting operations from its desert base, Camp Bastion, near the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. Reinforcements announced last month by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, and the retention of the RAF Harrier force will further strain the defence budget. It was reported last week that the Army's Land Command is having to make £40 million of emergency cuts to cope.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "Supplies are restocked as and when they are needed."
She said that British troops were involved in a Nato mission and that US air support was a part of that mission.
Supplies are restocked as and when they are needed
If - stressing the IF - this is the case, then surely either the Government hasn't got a handle on what's going on, or MoD hasn't, or MoD has and isn't telling the Government, or the higher echelon field commanders haven't a scooby's, or somesuch other failure of communications has occurred between the unit commanders on the ground and the MoD spokesman quoted above.
IF the above apocryphal story is true, then surely someone somewhere needs to make a decision to fix the problem - no water = no fit troops = no hearts and minds.
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Perhaps a little contraversial, but when they're killing our lads and dragging us into yet another unneccessary war, who gives a sh 
it about their hearts and minds?
What are going to achieve out there? I know why Tosspot Tony decided to meddle, but now things have got worse, what are we going to achieve?
it about their hearts and minds?What are going to achieve out there? I know why Tosspot Tony decided to meddle, but now things have got worse, what are we going to achieve?
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Whats that saying,
Hearts and minds. I'm not interested in winning their hearts and minds. Grab them by the balls and their hearts and minds have no choice but to follow.
Hearts and minds. I'm not interested in winning their hearts and minds. Grab them by the balls and their hearts and minds have no choice but to follow.
is this FreakRepublic?
Hearts and Minds is more lethal to the enemy than anything falling off a Tornado/Harrier/A10/B1B, H&M is recruit denial, its shelter denial, its free food denial, its safe area denial.
H&M is what will win in A'stan, Bombing is what will lose in A'stan. Bombing is FireFighting - what does it produce? charred, broken wet ****.
Hearts and Minds is more lethal to the enemy than anything falling off a Tornado/Harrier/A10/B1B, H&M is recruit denial, its shelter denial, its free food denial, its safe area denial.
H&M is what will win in A'stan, Bombing is what will lose in A'stan. Bombing is FireFighting - what does it produce? charred, broken wet ****.
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Telegraph Leader, 28 August 2006
Equip soldiers properly
Equip soldiers properly
We've said it before, and we'll no doubt say it again. British troops are as brave, willing and deadly as any in the world.
But they are let down by poor procurement and an inefficient MoD. We report today that our forces in Afghanistan are short of ammunition and are to be supplied with drones bought off the shelf from America, because of the inadequacy of our own kit. British weaponry, it seems, is not suited to the rough conditions of Helmand province.
The reason for this is that, deep down, our generals are still gearing up to fight the Cold War. Our defence procurement is Euro-centric, designed to protect the Continent from a modern conventional attack. As such, it is ill-suited to the theatres in which our soldiers are commonly deployed.
What use is the Eurofighter, the most expensive item in the history of the MoD, in the Afghan campaign? What about our new nuclear submarines? Are they, perhaps, to be dismantled and carried across the Hindu Kush by mule train, and then reassembled in mountain lakes to take on the Taliban?
The purchase of drones is a welcome, if belated, development. Far more needs to be done if the British Army is to be properly suited to out-of-area deployment. We need modern military computers, guided satellites, air- and sea-lift capacity. And the best way to secure these things is to buy them from the Americans, so as not to have to duplicate the research and development costs that have already been sunk into them.
Sadly, our political leaders, for ideological reasons, prefer to participate in costly and inefficient European consortia than simply to purchase what we need from across the Atlantic. And our top brass, partly because they can see which way the wind is blowing and partly out of sheer inertia, are too ready to go along with them. It is the young British soldier, "wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains", as Kipling put it, who is left to pay the price.
But they are let down by poor procurement and an inefficient MoD. We report today that our forces in Afghanistan are short of ammunition and are to be supplied with drones bought off the shelf from America, because of the inadequacy of our own kit. British weaponry, it seems, is not suited to the rough conditions of Helmand province.
The reason for this is that, deep down, our generals are still gearing up to fight the Cold War. Our defence procurement is Euro-centric, designed to protect the Continent from a modern conventional attack. As such, it is ill-suited to the theatres in which our soldiers are commonly deployed.
What use is the Eurofighter, the most expensive item in the history of the MoD, in the Afghan campaign? What about our new nuclear submarines? Are they, perhaps, to be dismantled and carried across the Hindu Kush by mule train, and then reassembled in mountain lakes to take on the Taliban?
The purchase of drones is a welcome, if belated, development. Far more needs to be done if the British Army is to be properly suited to out-of-area deployment. We need modern military computers, guided satellites, air- and sea-lift capacity. And the best way to secure these things is to buy them from the Americans, so as not to have to duplicate the research and development costs that have already been sunk into them.
Sadly, our political leaders, for ideological reasons, prefer to participate in costly and inefficient European consortia than simply to purchase what we need from across the Atlantic. And our top brass, partly because they can see which way the wind is blowing and partly out of sheer inertia, are too ready to go along with them. It is the young British soldier, "wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains", as Kipling put it, who is left to pay the price.
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From MSN News:
Afghan weapons not depleted: MoD
Defence chiefs have denied that the fierce fighting in Afghanistan has depleted stocks of ammunition and vehicle spares.
A day after a member of 14 Signal Regiment was shot dead when rebels attacked his platoon house in Musa Qaleh, the Ministry of Defence insisted commanders in the central Asian state are "content" with their equipment and supplies.
The comments followed claims that weapons and components intended to last until April could be used up by December.
The MoD may have to ask for more money from the Treasury or find savings elsewhere as its £1bn fighting fund was rapidly depleted, it has been reported.
Eight British Apache attack helicopters were said to be particularly hard hit, and running flat-out to meet demands for support.
British soldiers have met fierce resistance in parts of Afghanistan, particularly Helmand province in the south, on their security and reconstruction mission.
The 8,000-strong Nato force in the country is now made up largely of British, Canadian and Dutch troops, as well as some US personnel.
Rebel fighters, including Taliban militants, have mounted a series of attacks on bases and vehicle patrols.
Brigadier Ed Butler, commander of the UK taskforce in the troubled Helmand region, has admitted that operations in northern Helmand are "demanding".
An MoD spokeswoman said: "There is no problem with resupply logistics. Equipment is being resupplied as it is needed. In terms of Apache helicopters, we are operating as part of a coalition. It is a Nato mission, not just a British mission.
Defence chiefs have denied that the fierce fighting in Afghanistan has depleted stocks of ammunition and vehicle spares.
A day after a member of 14 Signal Regiment was shot dead when rebels attacked his platoon house in Musa Qaleh, the Ministry of Defence insisted commanders in the central Asian state are "content" with their equipment and supplies.
The comments followed claims that weapons and components intended to last until April could be used up by December.
The MoD may have to ask for more money from the Treasury or find savings elsewhere as its £1bn fighting fund was rapidly depleted, it has been reported.
Eight British Apache attack helicopters were said to be particularly hard hit, and running flat-out to meet demands for support.
British soldiers have met fierce resistance in parts of Afghanistan, particularly Helmand province in the south, on their security and reconstruction mission.
The 8,000-strong Nato force in the country is now made up largely of British, Canadian and Dutch troops, as well as some US personnel.
Rebel fighters, including Taliban militants, have mounted a series of attacks on bases and vehicle patrols.
Brigadier Ed Butler, commander of the UK taskforce in the troubled Helmand region, has admitted that operations in northern Helmand are "demanding".
An MoD spokeswoman said: "There is no problem with resupply logistics. Equipment is being resupplied as it is needed. In terms of Apache helicopters, we are operating as part of a coalition. It is a Nato mission, not just a British mission.
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Coming home to roost? Why can we see but Tony and cronies cannot?
We've failed in Iraq: let's get it right in Afghanistan
By Col Tim Collins
Telegraph 06/08/2006
We've failed in Iraq: let's get it right in Afghanistan
By Col Tim Collins
Telegraph 06/08/2006
The pessimistic assessment of the situation in Iraq by the outgoing UK ambassador, William Patey, which was leaked last week, warning that "a low intensity civil war" was more likely than a transition to a stable democracy, comes at a time when the situation on the ground in Iraq has never been so unstable. Senior American commanders are admitting that sectarian attacks, and the emergence of more unified and confrontational Shia militias, threaten to tear Iraq apart.
Meanwhile, British troops are engaged alongside our US and Nato allies in a mission in Afghanistan in which we must not fail, because the consequences of any failure there, unlike in Iraq, will be felt on our own doorstep in the equally lethal forms of increased heroin supply and increased domestic terrorism. An Afghanistan not brought into the 21st century will be fertile territory for both.
During my numerous visits to Iraq and in discussion with former colleagues in the Army, one thing is clear: the UK has failed in its strategic objectives of achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The policy of handing over the provinces we control must continue and be accelerated so that we can bring our Forces home as soon as possible. Only then can we address our main effort in Afghanistan with adequate force "packaging".
Once having pulled back from Iraq, Government ministers should question why we did not succeed. If they were asked, senior commanders would tell them that the failure in Iraq was down to a half-hearted approach to the problem and an under-resourced and overstretched force being asked to perform the impossible. We cannot afford as a nation to repeat these failures in Afghanistan.
The Government needs to rethink its defence policy now and prepare fully for the conflict ahead. That means expanding and improving our ability to deliver a rapid ground effect at short notice and in a -sustainable manner. This reorganisation must be radical and it must begin with the culture of leadership in the Armed Forces. The feeble appeasers among the top brass, many still yearning to fight the Cold War, need to be cleared out to make way for a more dynamic and aggressive new breed equal to the scourge of global terrorism.
Commanders must empathise with the men they lead and be prepared to put their jobs on the line for them, just as the troops at the front are prepared to put their necks on the line for the nation. As a guide, any prospective Army commander should study Blair's defence of his closest clique, Prescott, Blunkett et al, and aim to deliver that sort of loyalty downwards, too. Remember, it is for the good of the nation.
The morale of all the Armed Forces, but the Army in particular, needs a boost. Money needs to be spent on recruitment and the generals need to defend their servicemen and women's terms of service and accommodation from an envious Civil Service, as a doberman would defend its bone from a poodle.
Just as important, the equipment needs of the Forces must be addressed and the accepted policy of "in the nick of time" replaced with some sensible form of forward planning: a policy eschewed by Blair and his administration at the cost of British lives. Ask the widow of Sergeant Steve Roberts, who died because there wasn't enough kit delivered in time and not everybody was trained on the kit that was there (Sgt Roberts did not have body armour: he was accidentally shot by a comrade insufficiently trained on his tank-mounted machine gun). I must add that it was not the soldier's fault either. The new Minimi light machine gun only arrived with my Battalion, the Royal Irish, the night before we crossed into Iraq. When asked about training on it, my response was: "It's on-the-job training, lads - we have no choice; this is war".
Several prominent members of the House of Lords have expressed their disquiet about helicopter support for forces deployed in combat zones. Senior ministers and civil servants tut-tut about this from the safety of Westminster. I commanded an Air Assault Battalion in war - here are the facts. The UK's helicopter fleet is exhausted. It is too small to begin with and many of the aircraft are elderly. The effects of operating in the deserts of Iraq and in the hot and high environments of Afghanistan have taken a serious toll of the main components, and there is a crisis in the availability of spares and, more importantly, in the skilled technicians who fit them. We have a finite number of pilots and they are badly overstretched, too.
The hostile conditions - physical and military - in both theatres dictate that much of the daily administrative movement must be done by air, increasing the workload on the airframes and crews, and depriving the front line of support. So the helicopters are not available when needed and soldiers are going on patrol on foot or in antique vehicles such as the Spartan in which three men were killed in Afghanistan last week. These were designed in the 1950s and provide no protection against the modern weapons with which most guerrillas are equipped. Like the Snatch Land Rovers, they are not fit for purpose in the 21st century.
No war can be fought without sufficient numbers of troops, so front-line units must reflect the age-old norms for deployment. And there must also be sufficient, uncommitted reserves - of one fifth to one third the size of the deployed combat troops - to deal with the all-too-common unexpected. Additionally, we need to hold an uncommitted reserve at home to deal with the unexpected globally.
Finally, there needs to be a realistic exploration of workable short-term solutions. There are available now, for instance, support helicopters with British firms, piloted by retired British Services pilots, some of them Special Forces, ready to go forward to do whatever is required in Afghanistan. The US already harnesses private companies for these tasks. Why not our own nation in support of the hard-pressed servicemen?
Tony Blair has delayed his holiday to reflect on the crisis in the Lebanon. While you are at it, Tony, give five quality minutes to the plight of your own Armed Forces.
• Col Tim Collins commanded the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment during the invasion of Iraq, 2003
Meanwhile, British troops are engaged alongside our US and Nato allies in a mission in Afghanistan in which we must not fail, because the consequences of any failure there, unlike in Iraq, will be felt on our own doorstep in the equally lethal forms of increased heroin supply and increased domestic terrorism. An Afghanistan not brought into the 21st century will be fertile territory for both.
During my numerous visits to Iraq and in discussion with former colleagues in the Army, one thing is clear: the UK has failed in its strategic objectives of achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The policy of handing over the provinces we control must continue and be accelerated so that we can bring our Forces home as soon as possible. Only then can we address our main effort in Afghanistan with adequate force "packaging".
Once having pulled back from Iraq, Government ministers should question why we did not succeed. If they were asked, senior commanders would tell them that the failure in Iraq was down to a half-hearted approach to the problem and an under-resourced and overstretched force being asked to perform the impossible. We cannot afford as a nation to repeat these failures in Afghanistan.
The Government needs to rethink its defence policy now and prepare fully for the conflict ahead. That means expanding and improving our ability to deliver a rapid ground effect at short notice and in a -sustainable manner. This reorganisation must be radical and it must begin with the culture of leadership in the Armed Forces. The feeble appeasers among the top brass, many still yearning to fight the Cold War, need to be cleared out to make way for a more dynamic and aggressive new breed equal to the scourge of global terrorism.
Commanders must empathise with the men they lead and be prepared to put their jobs on the line for them, just as the troops at the front are prepared to put their necks on the line for the nation. As a guide, any prospective Army commander should study Blair's defence of his closest clique, Prescott, Blunkett et al, and aim to deliver that sort of loyalty downwards, too. Remember, it is for the good of the nation.
The morale of all the Armed Forces, but the Army in particular, needs a boost. Money needs to be spent on recruitment and the generals need to defend their servicemen and women's terms of service and accommodation from an envious Civil Service, as a doberman would defend its bone from a poodle.
Just as important, the equipment needs of the Forces must be addressed and the accepted policy of "in the nick of time" replaced with some sensible form of forward planning: a policy eschewed by Blair and his administration at the cost of British lives. Ask the widow of Sergeant Steve Roberts, who died because there wasn't enough kit delivered in time and not everybody was trained on the kit that was there (Sgt Roberts did not have body armour: he was accidentally shot by a comrade insufficiently trained on his tank-mounted machine gun). I must add that it was not the soldier's fault either. The new Minimi light machine gun only arrived with my Battalion, the Royal Irish, the night before we crossed into Iraq. When asked about training on it, my response was: "It's on-the-job training, lads - we have no choice; this is war".
Several prominent members of the House of Lords have expressed their disquiet about helicopter support for forces deployed in combat zones. Senior ministers and civil servants tut-tut about this from the safety of Westminster. I commanded an Air Assault Battalion in war - here are the facts. The UK's helicopter fleet is exhausted. It is too small to begin with and many of the aircraft are elderly. The effects of operating in the deserts of Iraq and in the hot and high environments of Afghanistan have taken a serious toll of the main components, and there is a crisis in the availability of spares and, more importantly, in the skilled technicians who fit them. We have a finite number of pilots and they are badly overstretched, too.
The hostile conditions - physical and military - in both theatres dictate that much of the daily administrative movement must be done by air, increasing the workload on the airframes and crews, and depriving the front line of support. So the helicopters are not available when needed and soldiers are going on patrol on foot or in antique vehicles such as the Spartan in which three men were killed in Afghanistan last week. These were designed in the 1950s and provide no protection against the modern weapons with which most guerrillas are equipped. Like the Snatch Land Rovers, they are not fit for purpose in the 21st century.
No war can be fought without sufficient numbers of troops, so front-line units must reflect the age-old norms for deployment. And there must also be sufficient, uncommitted reserves - of one fifth to one third the size of the deployed combat troops - to deal with the all-too-common unexpected. Additionally, we need to hold an uncommitted reserve at home to deal with the unexpected globally.
Finally, there needs to be a realistic exploration of workable short-term solutions. There are available now, for instance, support helicopters with British firms, piloted by retired British Services pilots, some of them Special Forces, ready to go forward to do whatever is required in Afghanistan. The US already harnesses private companies for these tasks. Why not our own nation in support of the hard-pressed servicemen?
Tony Blair has delayed his holiday to reflect on the crisis in the Lebanon. While you are at it, Tony, give five quality minutes to the plight of your own Armed Forces.
• Col Tim Collins commanded the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment during the invasion of Iraq, 2003
