Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs by Lewis Page
Two considered arguments
1) In a book purporting to be a serious critique of procurement, he makes no mention of the most obvious example of a more successful alternative procurement strategy (the Jaguar upgrade) nor even of the best Dark Blue example - the Sea King ASAC 7.
2) He dismisses the Tornado IDS as a great British fiasco, misconceived from the start, still poor after much upgrading. Ignoring the relative capabilities, he judges the Harrier 'excellent'. This is over-simplistic, opinionated, unsupported, sub-Carlo Kopp nonsense. He says that the RAF lost five of its 45 Tornados during the first seven days of Desert Storm - all to ground anti aircraft fire in the vicinity of their targets, and clearly implied that all were lost on JP233 missions. He regarded the loss rate as unsustainable and suicidal. In fact, the RAF lost six RAF Tornados during the entire war, two of them at medium level. The four losses during the first week included one while running in for a loft attack, one 'during' a loft delivery, and one after a low level loft attack.
In 100 JP233 sorties, only one aircraft was lost - and that while egressing from the target. It seems clear that leaving the sanctuary of low level (even briefly) was what caused losses…..
And he got the number of Tornados on strength wrong, too.
3) In dealing with Typhoon he stresses the type's Cold War origins, conveniently ignoring the fact that "the Eurofighter Typhoon's genesis has left it uniquely well suited to the post Cold War environment. Far from being a narrowly focused and over-specialised Cold War bomber-destroyer (like the Tornado ADV) the Typhoon was always intended to be a versatile, affordable, swing-role fighter and fighter-bomber, while UK out-of-area and regional reinforcement commitments meant that great emphasis was placed on deployability, maintainability and supportability. For the UK, what would become the Eurofighter was always seen as a Jaguar replacement, and expanded air-to-air capabilities were added as an afterthought. The influence of the Jaguar was such that Eurofighter was designed to have the same California Bearing Ratio, meaning that it could taxi on the same soft surfaces, while the STOL requirement required that the aircraft could operate from a 500 metre strip with a meaningful warload."
He gives a much higher programme unit cost than the NAO does.
He suggests that seven squadrons would require just 140 aircraft over the type's lifetime, apparently unaware of the fact that: "232 aircraft are required to sustain an active RAF fleet of 137 aircraft, covering the seven front-line squadrons, the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU), and the Operational Evaluation Unit. Each squadron will have one in-use reserve aircraft, and the OCU will have two in-use reserves, giving a total of nine. The remaining aircraft allow for assumptions of attrition and overall use of the aircraft over the planned 25 year life of the aircraft, with the last aircraft being scheduled for delivery in 2014."
He is apparently blissfully unaware of the work now being done on providing the aircraft with an interim 'austere' air to ground capability.
4) In dealing with Apache costs he ignores the proportion of the cost that will flow straight back into the exchequer as tax, when comparing a sterling purchase of a UK assembled airframe with a dollar purchase of an import. It's still expensive, but this sort of thing smacks of carelessness, ignorance, or not letting inconvenient fact stand in the way of a good argument.
5) His analysis of helicopter lift (and especially of Merlin HC3) is equally simplistic, and equally awry.
I cannot believe that I'm wasting time talking about such a ridiculous, stupid, book.
1) In a book purporting to be a serious critique of procurement, he makes no mention of the most obvious example of a more successful alternative procurement strategy (the Jaguar upgrade) nor even of the best Dark Blue example - the Sea King ASAC 7.
2) He dismisses the Tornado IDS as a great British fiasco, misconceived from the start, still poor after much upgrading. Ignoring the relative capabilities, he judges the Harrier 'excellent'. This is over-simplistic, opinionated, unsupported, sub-Carlo Kopp nonsense. He says that the RAF lost five of its 45 Tornados during the first seven days of Desert Storm - all to ground anti aircraft fire in the vicinity of their targets, and clearly implied that all were lost on JP233 missions. He regarded the loss rate as unsustainable and suicidal. In fact, the RAF lost six RAF Tornados during the entire war, two of them at medium level. The four losses during the first week included one while running in for a loft attack, one 'during' a loft delivery, and one after a low level loft attack.
In 100 JP233 sorties, only one aircraft was lost - and that while egressing from the target. It seems clear that leaving the sanctuary of low level (even briefly) was what caused losses…..
And he got the number of Tornados on strength wrong, too.
3) In dealing with Typhoon he stresses the type's Cold War origins, conveniently ignoring the fact that "the Eurofighter Typhoon's genesis has left it uniquely well suited to the post Cold War environment. Far from being a narrowly focused and over-specialised Cold War bomber-destroyer (like the Tornado ADV) the Typhoon was always intended to be a versatile, affordable, swing-role fighter and fighter-bomber, while UK out-of-area and regional reinforcement commitments meant that great emphasis was placed on deployability, maintainability and supportability. For the UK, what would become the Eurofighter was always seen as a Jaguar replacement, and expanded air-to-air capabilities were added as an afterthought. The influence of the Jaguar was such that Eurofighter was designed to have the same California Bearing Ratio, meaning that it could taxi on the same soft surfaces, while the STOL requirement required that the aircraft could operate from a 500 metre strip with a meaningful warload."
He gives a much higher programme unit cost than the NAO does.
He suggests that seven squadrons would require just 140 aircraft over the type's lifetime, apparently unaware of the fact that: "232 aircraft are required to sustain an active RAF fleet of 137 aircraft, covering the seven front-line squadrons, the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU), and the Operational Evaluation Unit. Each squadron will have one in-use reserve aircraft, and the OCU will have two in-use reserves, giving a total of nine. The remaining aircraft allow for assumptions of attrition and overall use of the aircraft over the planned 25 year life of the aircraft, with the last aircraft being scheduled for delivery in 2014."
He is apparently blissfully unaware of the work now being done on providing the aircraft with an interim 'austere' air to ground capability.
4) In dealing with Apache costs he ignores the proportion of the cost that will flow straight back into the exchequer as tax, when comparing a sterling purchase of a UK assembled airframe with a dollar purchase of an import. It's still expensive, but this sort of thing smacks of carelessness, ignorance, or not letting inconvenient fact stand in the way of a good argument.
5) His analysis of helicopter lift (and especially of Merlin HC3) is equally simplistic, and equally awry.
I cannot believe that I'm wasting time talking about such a ridiculous, stupid, book.
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Procurement Issues
As someone who writes under his own name I hesitate to be seen as contributing to some of the wilder comments on this thread, but I do think that some of the contributors have lost sight of the main message - I have to accept probably because there are too many inaccuracies in Page's book, particularly with regard to his opinions on operational issues. These have also been ably pointed out by other contributors. However the central message he is trying to get across, namely that the procurement system has far too often let down the front line in terms of cost, timescales and performance remains a good one, and some of his examples such as the SA80 saga and the very public domain Nimrod AEW and MR4 fiascos are pretty accurate. Apart from the obvious and sometimes quite major inaccuracies. my main disappointment with the book was that he ignored the costs of “servicing” the demands of procurement linked organisations such as dstl, QinetiQ, DOSG etc with the vast amounts of data and reports they need even for procurement of a so called off the shelf system. Add in QA and ILS data and reports needed for the audit trails, much of which my friends tell me is only destined to tick a box and then gather dust in a filing cabinet and you can see how it is that a “hangar - coat” soon approaches the cost of a “hangar – aircraft” – don’t write back it is a joke!
Unfortunately even if you accept that he was trying to write for a more general audience based only on headline issues, the great British public is more interested in the salacious aspects of "reality" TV than in the real world of news of this type - even today's top story of further government incompetence in letting 1000 foreign prisoners out without deporting them will soon be forgotten by most people. Unless things have changed even within the military establishment there will be some senior officers and civil servants who have little interest in getting procurement right even though intellectually they well understand how important it is.
If you would like a more accurate understanding of defence procurement issues than is provided by Page’s book read Brigadier Bill Kincaid's excellent series of books: A Dinosaur in Whitehall, Dancing With the Dinosaur and Dinosaur in Permafrost. Bill was Director of Operational Requirements (Land) until 1995 and is Editor of RUSI Defence News, and I suggest that his "pedigree" is not in doubt.
Dinosaur in Permafrost is a critique of Smart Procurement based on interviews through all sides of the procurement community and you can find a summary at
www.ukdf.org.uk/bookextracts/BA03.doc
As a consultant working a lot with overseas companies and Israeli ones in particular, I found the first two and last quotes (below) taken from the critique particularly true as I have often heard their project managers make similar comments - the Israelis, whose kit, for obvious reasons, generally works, cannot understand why the UK constantly has to re-invent the wheel - always impacting on cost and schedule even if not on performance (but we did have the only rifled tank gun in the Western World as well!). However, it would also be wrong to condemn the whole of the organisation - too often the good people in the DPA, I still think the majority, are as frustrated as the front line by the number of hoops that they have to jump through to get anywhere and to get a decision - but they still have to follow the rules to get the job done at all. In fact it could be argued that they actually achieve a lot of successes despite the rules!
“Process is deemed more important than the project.”
“It’s all process – have we lost sight of what we are trying to do?”
“XDs [Executive Directors in the DPA] are trying to find a role, but will it be one that adds value?”
“When things go wrong, the old adversarial mentality returns.”
“Many small companies may lose interest in MOD business altogether.”
“DPA sees innovation as a threat.”
Another area that you procurement buffs might like to look at is the DPA Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005 – available on the MOD web site under DPA. Section 28 “Losses and Special payments” makes fascinating reading – OK it was only £173M in a budget of around £12B, but is even this acceptable, and whose heads rolled? Amongst the lost projects is the £14M+ hole in the ground at RAF Henlow where the new aircrew centrifuge ought to be – a procurement disaster that was both predictable and predicted by both the competition (and I declare my interest here) and by the fact that the chosen company was being sued by the USN, had to re-structure its finances to take the contract - to reduce the commercial risks to MOD (not that this appears to have worked) and was the subject of complaints from within the RAF itself against their performance on other equipment previously delivered. Still MOD did follow the rules by writing to my client to ask if he had any objection to the DPA project manager, who was ultimately responsible for the procurement decision, working as a consultant for the chosen vendor!
Other areas of interest in the DPA report include that old favourite Nimrod 4, the now infamous BOWMAN project and even cancellation of a classified project on the C130J costing a whole £1.7M as a cost savings measure – wonder if they are now having to re-instate it for Afghanistan.
Unfortunately even if you accept that he was trying to write for a more general audience based only on headline issues, the great British public is more interested in the salacious aspects of "reality" TV than in the real world of news of this type - even today's top story of further government incompetence in letting 1000 foreign prisoners out without deporting them will soon be forgotten by most people. Unless things have changed even within the military establishment there will be some senior officers and civil servants who have little interest in getting procurement right even though intellectually they well understand how important it is.
If you would like a more accurate understanding of defence procurement issues than is provided by Page’s book read Brigadier Bill Kincaid's excellent series of books: A Dinosaur in Whitehall, Dancing With the Dinosaur and Dinosaur in Permafrost. Bill was Director of Operational Requirements (Land) until 1995 and is Editor of RUSI Defence News, and I suggest that his "pedigree" is not in doubt.
Dinosaur in Permafrost is a critique of Smart Procurement based on interviews through all sides of the procurement community and you can find a summary at
www.ukdf.org.uk/bookextracts/BA03.doc
As a consultant working a lot with overseas companies and Israeli ones in particular, I found the first two and last quotes (below) taken from the critique particularly true as I have often heard their project managers make similar comments - the Israelis, whose kit, for obvious reasons, generally works, cannot understand why the UK constantly has to re-invent the wheel - always impacting on cost and schedule even if not on performance (but we did have the only rifled tank gun in the Western World as well!). However, it would also be wrong to condemn the whole of the organisation - too often the good people in the DPA, I still think the majority, are as frustrated as the front line by the number of hoops that they have to jump through to get anywhere and to get a decision - but they still have to follow the rules to get the job done at all. In fact it could be argued that they actually achieve a lot of successes despite the rules!
“Process is deemed more important than the project.”
“It’s all process – have we lost sight of what we are trying to do?”
“XDs [Executive Directors in the DPA] are trying to find a role, but will it be one that adds value?”
“When things go wrong, the old adversarial mentality returns.”
“Many small companies may lose interest in MOD business altogether.”
“DPA sees innovation as a threat.”
Another area that you procurement buffs might like to look at is the DPA Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005 – available on the MOD web site under DPA. Section 28 “Losses and Special payments” makes fascinating reading – OK it was only £173M in a budget of around £12B, but is even this acceptable, and whose heads rolled? Amongst the lost projects is the £14M+ hole in the ground at RAF Henlow where the new aircrew centrifuge ought to be – a procurement disaster that was both predictable and predicted by both the competition (and I declare my interest here) and by the fact that the chosen company was being sued by the USN, had to re-structure its finances to take the contract - to reduce the commercial risks to MOD (not that this appears to have worked) and was the subject of complaints from within the RAF itself against their performance on other equipment previously delivered. Still MOD did follow the rules by writing to my client to ask if he had any objection to the DPA project manager, who was ultimately responsible for the procurement decision, working as a consultant for the chosen vendor!
Other areas of interest in the DPA report include that old favourite Nimrod 4, the now infamous BOWMAN project and even cancellation of a classified project on the C130J costing a whole £1.7M as a cost savings measure – wonder if they are now having to re-instate it for Afghanistan.
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Nimrod Serial Numbers
I know I'll probably get some stick for this, but since I'm sat at home skiving off work, board stupid, I'll clear up the nimrod serial number debate for you.
The two prototypes and the only ones that were converted Comet 4C's were XV147 and XV 148.
The ones built as MR1's and later converted to MR2's were XV226 to XV263. The three original R1's were XW664 to XW666. The aircraft new built as MR2's (and slightly heavier due to American bauxite being used to produce the aluminum) were XZ280 to XZ287. The aircraft used for the AEW program (lowest hours in the fleet) were XV261 to XV263 and all the XZ's except 84 which is now at Warton with the MRA4 project along with some of the original MR1's and the airframe that used to sit behind the motor club by the sports hangar (XV253). XV 249 was converted into a R1 to replace XW666.
By the way XV147 was the only one to have Avon engines, it's fuselage was also used as the MRA4 mockup at Warton.
The two prototypes and the only ones that were converted Comet 4C's were XV147 and XV 148.
The ones built as MR1's and later converted to MR2's were XV226 to XV263. The three original R1's were XW664 to XW666. The aircraft new built as MR2's (and slightly heavier due to American bauxite being used to produce the aluminum) were XZ280 to XZ287. The aircraft used for the AEW program (lowest hours in the fleet) were XV261 to XV263 and all the XZ's except 84 which is now at Warton with the MRA4 project along with some of the original MR1's and the airframe that used to sit behind the motor club by the sports hangar (XV253). XV 249 was converted into a R1 to replace XW666.
By the way XV147 was the only one to have Avon engines, it's fuselage was also used as the MRA4 mockup at Warton.
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[QUOTE]Having friends who are ex UAS as well as having worked with a fair number of ex UAS my views are not outdated. On average former UAS students are no better than direct entrants. If the RAF does not get any noticeable gains from the money spent on the UAS it is just a 'flying club'.[QUOTE]
You can blame that on the demise of the Chipmunks at the UASs. In 1965-67 I was desk officer at MOD for Cranwell, the FTSs and the UASs (TF1b). "All-through jet training" was the buzz-word and all direct entrants and Cranwell cadets cut their teeth on the JP before going on to Gnats at Valley or Varsities at Oakington (as I remember it). Trouble was, the JP was so ridiculously easy to fly that almost everyone passed the course and nearly all the scrubbing was done at the most expensive stage - ie AFS or OCU. The UAS cadets, on the other hand, had done their 100 hrs or so on Chippies which demanded real handling skills and coordination (not as much as the Tiger Moth, but still a challenge to those with two left feet). Consequently the scrub rate for ex-UAS students was dramatically lower at AFS/OCU than for the other streams. In defending the UASs against the 1965 Treasury attack, I had this factor costed and offset against the cost of running the UASs. We won and , I believe , Chipmunk "grading" was introduced soon after.
You can blame that on the demise of the Chipmunks at the UASs. In 1965-67 I was desk officer at MOD for Cranwell, the FTSs and the UASs (TF1b). "All-through jet training" was the buzz-word and all direct entrants and Cranwell cadets cut their teeth on the JP before going on to Gnats at Valley or Varsities at Oakington (as I remember it). Trouble was, the JP was so ridiculously easy to fly that almost everyone passed the course and nearly all the scrubbing was done at the most expensive stage - ie AFS or OCU. The UAS cadets, on the other hand, had done their 100 hrs or so on Chippies which demanded real handling skills and coordination (not as much as the Tiger Moth, but still a challenge to those with two left feet). Consequently the scrub rate for ex-UAS students was dramatically lower at AFS/OCU than for the other streams. In defending the UASs against the 1965 Treasury attack, I had this factor costed and offset against the cost of running the UASs. We won and , I believe , Chipmunk "grading" was introduced soon after.
Hellbound
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The glorified flying club argument is just the same for air cadets and in the modern world both provide the same benefit to the Service by exposing people to the Service who otherwise might not develop an interest. Whatever happens with retention, there will always be a need to recruit high calibre graduates and since cadetships dried up there is precious little else to catch the attention of potential candidates. The UAS' provide that exposure. Just wonder what is in it for the non-flying specializations now...
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My 2d worth
Originally Posted by LCRAYMYX
delurking after a long time reading this forum.
if lewis page is having a dig at the RAF surely this quote back fires on him
The navy employes their own meteorologists, even though they do other jobs on board, such as oceanography. The air force rent them.
if lewis page is having a dig at the RAF surely this quote back fires on him
The navy employes their own meteorologists, even though they do other jobs on board, such as oceanography. The air force rent them.
Yeah, the RAF pays for it's Met services, the same as any other customer, and we are civilians. I say this as a metman sat in the dark all alone on a station (hear the violins) trying to figure out how cloudy it'll be tomorrow (not much I think) and also as one of the group that get sent out with the RAF to *other* places. Even then the RAF doesn't actually pay us directly as we are all sponsored reservists that are paid by our employer (Met Office, trading firm of MOD) to go out and do our job. We get officer training, but not as much as the regulars, obviously, and when in uniform we're expected to bahave as any other uniformed specialist.
Just wanted to fly the flag, which in our case is a chicken on a stick.
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Carrier
WhiteOvies
"how plausible is it really that carriers haven't made a difference since 1982? Didn't see much HNS during Sierra Leone, and Italy was a bit foggy at times for the RAF to fly missions over Bosnia, to mention a couple of egs. "
WhiteOvies,
I dont want to digress either. I certainly do not want to get involved in a slanging match but please note I did say "decisive" contribution. I stand by for corrections but I dont believe that our carriers have made a "decisive" contribution since 1982. I understand that another land based aircraft force was on stand by for Sierra Leone and there were plenty of other NATO types over the Balkans meaning that our carrier contribution wasnt critical. Indeed, if the truth be known, there was serious high level opposition in the CAOC against the UK deploying a carrier at that time because it wasnt needed.
All I am saying is that a case can be made and should have been made by the author of "Lions" for AND against buying 2 enormous big F-off aircraft carriers. He didnt do that and by omitting a balanced argument revealed his tome as biased and pants
"how plausible is it really that carriers haven't made a difference since 1982? Didn't see much HNS during Sierra Leone, and Italy was a bit foggy at times for the RAF to fly missions over Bosnia, to mention a couple of egs. "
WhiteOvies,
I dont want to digress either. I certainly do not want to get involved in a slanging match but please note I did say "decisive" contribution. I stand by for corrections but I dont believe that our carriers have made a "decisive" contribution since 1982. I understand that another land based aircraft force was on stand by for Sierra Leone and there were plenty of other NATO types over the Balkans meaning that our carrier contribution wasnt critical. Indeed, if the truth be known, there was serious high level opposition in the CAOC against the UK deploying a carrier at that time because it wasnt needed.
All I am saying is that a case can be made and should have been made by the author of "Lions" for AND against buying 2 enormous big F-off aircraft carriers. He didnt do that and by omitting a balanced argument revealed his tome as biased and pants
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Not quite sure how a Sea Harriers, as capable as they are, can stop people killing, maiming, raping, beating (and so on) each other? I'm sure there are other navy vesels can provide helo support for such ops?
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Sir PWA,
Ok we'll agree to disagree on that one, all the arguments are on the CVF thread and I doubt any of our opinions on the matter will make a blind bit of difference to the Treasury anyway
I quite agree that any argument needs to show both sides and it's not the most balanced book on the subject matter (see John Blakeley's post for details).
FF
The same could be said for any FJ, although a 1000lb-er on the bad guys seems to work. I quite agree helos full of troops do the job much better, otherwise I suspect NI might have been different. Buccs and bombs on Belfast? (not a serious suggestion but a possible 'what if' sideline.)
Ok we'll agree to disagree on that one, all the arguments are on the CVF thread and I doubt any of our opinions on the matter will make a blind bit of difference to the Treasury anyway
I quite agree that any argument needs to show both sides and it's not the most balanced book on the subject matter (see John Blakeley's post for details).FF
The same could be said for any FJ, although a 1000lb-er on the bad guys seems to work. I quite agree helos full of troops do the job much better, otherwise I suspect NI might have been different. Buccs and bombs on Belfast? (not a serious suggestion but a possible 'what if' sideline.)
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More on the Nimrod Front: XV 262 was an MR1 and was stripped out at St Mawgan about 80/81 ish for its ferry, presumably to Woodford for conversion to AEW. It was never a MR2. XZ 284 escaped conversion because it was being used at Boscombe Down at the time and had some non standard kit fitted to it which made maintenance on it when it went to St Mawgan interesting. It had all sorts of additional and undocumented cabling. Oh and a 1/8 drill stuck in the intercom cable. So it was the only XZ serial in the MR fleet.
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Not Long Here
If there was no new build MR2's please explain why their reg was XZ not XV and why they were, on average, 2000lbs heavier than the rest of the fleet due to a different spec of aluminum being used. Ever flown one because I have!!
If there was no new build MR2's please explain why their reg was XZ not XV and why they were, on average, 2000lbs heavier than the rest of the fleet due to a different spec of aluminum being used. Ever flown one because I have!!
No new build MR.2s. All conversions of MR.1s.
"Nimrod MR.Mk 1 Last 8 production aircraft (second batch) delivered with updated communications system - as later used on MR.Mk 2. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg). "
http://aeroflt.users.netlink.co.uk/t...rod/nimrod.htm
"Nimrod MR.Mk 1 Last 8 production aircraft (second batch) delivered with updated communications system - as later used on MR.Mk 2. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg). "
http://aeroflt.users.netlink.co.uk/t...rod/nimrod.htm
Sideshow Bob,
I think Teeej has given you the detail on the XZ build. Of my 8500 Nimrod hours, 1500 were Mark 1, of which some time was spent in XZ 280, 281, 282, 283 and 285.
There is a discrepancy in the article in that the above 5 airframes came back from Luqa and flew with the sqns before being converted to AEW, 84 went to Boscombe before becoming the only XZ MR2, and, as far as I recall 86 and 87 never actually made sqn service but went to the AEW 3 programme directly.
Hope that clarifies things for you
I think Teeej has given you the detail on the XZ build. Of my 8500 Nimrod hours, 1500 were Mark 1, of which some time was spent in XZ 280, 281, 282, 283 and 285.
There is a discrepancy in the article in that the above 5 airframes came back from Luqa and flew with the sqns before being converted to AEW, 84 went to Boscombe before becoming the only XZ MR2, and, as far as I recall 86 and 87 never actually made sqn service but went to the AEW 3 programme directly.
Hope that clarifies things for you
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Not Long Here
Since 284 escaped your l203 log book I think that adds weight to my recollection that it was the only newbuild MR2...
any ex-woodford bods want to share the facts with all the nimrod spotters on this thread??
Since 284 escaped your l203 log book I think that adds weight to my recollection that it was the only newbuild MR2...
any ex-woodford bods want to share the facts with all the nimrod spotters on this thread??
Nimrod Spotting, post No.12, suggests that:
Which, if accurate, suggests that XZ284 started as an MR1 but metamorphosed into an MR2. Whether that means that it was a new-build MR2, or an MR1 I'll let others decide
The last batch of eight Nimrods (c/ns 8042-8049) is slightly more complicated: apparently only XZ280, 281, 282, 283 and 285 were completed as MR.1s, XZ284 was finished as an MR.2 and XZ286 and 287 were actually completed as AEW.3 variants.
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Originally Posted by South Bound
The glorified flying club argument is just the same for air cadets and in the modern world both provide the same benefit to the Service by exposing people to the Service who otherwise might not develop an interest. Whatever happens with retention, there will always be a need to recruit high calibre graduates and since cadetships dried up there is precious little else to catch the attention of potential candidates. The UAS' provide that exposure. Just wonder what is in it for the non-flying specializations now...