Future Carrier (Including Costs)
But even if that happens (and I really cant see why the finances are going to be better in 4 years time) i'll be several years before they turn up - The UK will only have 48 (or 16 active as per Evalu8ter's post). I can see the USMC being a permanent addition to the QE
But we had a case for over 100 F-35's....................... so an awful lot of things we thought we were going to do won't be possible.
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Hi folks,
can someone please explain why a combination of bow-ramp and a shortened catapult cannot or will not be used?
The bow-ramp would add its effect to a lower powered catapult (with a faster reloading cycle). I accept that a "beefed-up" nose gear might be required but surely that gets a thump on a conventional landing.
Maybe, future airframe designs could include this capability to make this viable.
That this method is not being used indicates that it is not workable, but I would appreciate more of a reason why.
Thank you.
can someone please explain why a combination of bow-ramp and a shortened catapult cannot or will not be used?
The bow-ramp would add its effect to a lower powered catapult (with a faster reloading cycle). I accept that a "beefed-up" nose gear might be required but surely that gets a thump on a conventional landing.
Maybe, future airframe designs could include this capability to make this viable.
That this method is not being used indicates that it is not workable, but I would appreciate more of a reason why.
Thank you.
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Well couple of reasons I can think of, If you operated an F18. it flies itself off so probably the computers expect it to be pretty much level on take off.. The other main one would be landing, If they miss the arrestor cable they do a bolter and go around again, so they're in both cases probably carrying to much speed to use a ramp?
That said the Russians catapult launch of a ski slope. but the cross deck used in landings does not have one.
JUST GUESSING.... ANYONE?
That said the Russians catapult launch of a ski slope. but the cross deck used in landings does not have one.
JUST GUESSING.... ANYONE?
Assuming the cat run ends before the start of the ramp, as is needed for a straight cat. The aircraft nose wheel then has to detach from the cat before the start of shuttle deceleration. So the nosewheel is probably clear of the deck at this point, not rolling along it.. At some point it will then hit the ramp producing a retarding force at the nosewheel as well as an upward one. The aircraft needs to be designed for this.
That it has not been done is probably because aircraft tend to be designed to fit existing carriers and any carrier upgrades are compatible with existing a/c fleets. Plus, if you have most of your capability built around a conventional cat launch, why would you want to change the whole way you do business when it seems to be working?
Steam catapults work best when straight, so they are not compatible with a ski jump entry and continuation up ramp. I know little about electric ones, but they may be able to accept the bend needed to run up the ramp. In that case it is probably easier to design a curved cat than an aircraft that can be catapulted into the ramp entry and your aircraft then does not have to carry a penalty into action..
You also need to look at what you would get back . Yes, Ski jumps are dirt cheap; same price per pound as best bacon someone once said. Their benefit though is greatest for vectored thrust aircraft which can support some weight with thrust and the rest with lift whilst also accelerating on the ballistic trajectory from the ramp exit until lift is sufficient to support the whole weight. The alternatives to the F35B/ramp combination don't have vectored thrust, so don't make the same gains. I think you would need to look at the total a/c energy off a cat/ramp combination and compare it with the a/c energy off a straight, but longer, cat only launch to see whether there was any benefit.
N
That it has not been done is probably because aircraft tend to be designed to fit existing carriers and any carrier upgrades are compatible with existing a/c fleets. Plus, if you have most of your capability built around a conventional cat launch, why would you want to change the whole way you do business when it seems to be working?
Steam catapults work best when straight, so they are not compatible with a ski jump entry and continuation up ramp. I know little about electric ones, but they may be able to accept the bend needed to run up the ramp. In that case it is probably easier to design a curved cat than an aircraft that can be catapulted into the ramp entry and your aircraft then does not have to carry a penalty into action..
You also need to look at what you would get back . Yes, Ski jumps are dirt cheap; same price per pound as best bacon someone once said. Their benefit though is greatest for vectored thrust aircraft which can support some weight with thrust and the rest with lift whilst also accelerating on the ballistic trajectory from the ramp exit until lift is sufficient to support the whole weight. The alternatives to the F35B/ramp combination don't have vectored thrust, so don't make the same gains. I think you would need to look at the total a/c energy off a cat/ramp combination and compare it with the a/c energy off a straight, but longer, cat only launch to see whether there was any benefit.
N
From memory, one of the limiting factors is entry-speed into the ramp, largely through nose-gear limits - which also affect the profile of the ramp. That basically means that end-speed of any cat is limited to that entry speed for the ramp. What that means is that any cat ends up being provided to accelerate the aircraft to a relatively low speed, so all you're doing is replacing a long flat deck run with a shorter one, enabled by a system that adds quite a bit of cost / complexity. The fact you're using a system also means that you end up slowing down launch rate (to allow shuttle return, line-up, aircraft hookup check etc. Duplicating that system for redundancy or increased launch rate will be problematic, given you have to align with a single ramp. You might get some extra safe parking deck area out of it, but not sure it's worth the effort and cost.
Significantly reducing the ramp angle means you'd end up with higher end speed and a longer cat, albeit potentially easier to include multiple ramps/cats, but it's still a marginal benefit, if any.
Significantly reducing the ramp angle means you'd end up with higher end speed and a longer cat, albeit potentially easier to include multiple ramps/cats, but it's still a marginal benefit, if any.
Two problems with nose gear off a ramp at increased speed: Compression of the nose leg on entry to the ramp and rapid extension of same on exit. Exceedence of either will knacker the leg and probably loosen a few teeth.
Mog
Mog
I would have thought a better solution would be a UAV with STOL performance. It would not need to be capable of hovering flight, just have enough augmented lift (probably from a degree of vectored thrust) to perform ski-jump take offs and SRVL landings.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Extend the port forward deck to fit an angled EMAL catapult to launch UCAV, retain the Ramp for the F-35B.
I would listen to the experts to understand if fitting cables would allow UCAV to land on the straight deck and bolter off the ramp or if that would also need use of an angled deck.
I would listen to the experts to understand if fitting cables would allow UCAV to land on the straight deck and bolter off the ramp or if that would also need use of an angled deck.
Several years ago I asked if studies were being done to retrofit mini-catapults to the QE's, sufficient to launch Hawk/Taranis size UAVs (9,000kg, 20,000lbs) or larger MQ-25 size (delivers 15,000 lb (6,800 kg) of fuel, prob about 40,000 lbs max weight). Response came there none, nor denial, which told me all I needed to know.
The Tesla model S Plaid has a top speed of 200 mph (320 km/h), go from 0-60 mph (97 km/h) in 1.99s and has regenerative braking. It weighs 4960 lbs, 2250 kg. There is more than one way of making a widget to accelerate/decelerate an aircraft rapidly down a deck and adapting the same commercial technology at both ends of the launch/recover sequence has some design/operate/train/maintain advantages. Technology in this area is progressing very quickly.
One option is angled catapult (added deck sponson, with or without some form of ramp) and angled recovery which has the advantage of leaving the main 'heavy' deck path clearer but the disadvantage of cutting into the port deck park area. As others have pointed out oleo loads on ramps are important. Just going down the main deck is the simplest path.
The Tesla model S Plaid has a top speed of 200 mph (320 km/h), go from 0-60 mph (97 km/h) in 1.99s and has regenerative braking. It weighs 4960 lbs, 2250 kg. There is more than one way of making a widget to accelerate/decelerate an aircraft rapidly down a deck and adapting the same commercial technology at both ends of the launch/recover sequence has some design/operate/train/maintain advantages. Technology in this area is progressing very quickly.
One option is angled catapult (added deck sponson, with or without some form of ramp) and angled recovery which has the advantage of leaving the main 'heavy' deck path clearer but the disadvantage of cutting into the port deck park area. As others have pointed out oleo loads on ramps are important. Just going down the main deck is the simplest path.
Last edited by petit plateau; 12th Mar 2021 at 11:17. Reason: delete repeat
Thread Starter
Back to the present - the NATO Exercise Dynamic Manta has involved Rafales from the French carrier FS Charles De Gaulle providing air defence for an ASW task group.
During the sea phase of the exercise, complex interactions between Dynamic Manta participating units and the Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group (CSG) were also carried out.
An air defence exercise with CSG air assets (4 x Rafale) increased the surface units anti-aircraft warfare capabilities, say NATO.
You may also find this declassified US Navy document interesting - Sea Based Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977
From page 159 of part 2 (page 370 of the PDF)
The Soviet threat was considered to include the long range naval aircraft Backfire as well as the older Bear, with 50 to 100 of the former anticipated by 1981. In addition "a fleet of 28 missile cruisers and 75 missile destroyers could challenge our surface supremacy while approximately 200 cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines could be deployed against us." Thus, it was, anticipated that the Soviets would mount a full three ~ dimensional threat in the North Atlantic.
Studies had shown that at least three CVs would be required in the Northeast Atlantic primarily to block Soviet long range bombers, most notably Backfires, penetrating the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap into the open ocean. In addition, these carriers would serve to deter the movement of the Soviet surface fleet into the Atlantic basin as well as shielding Iceland and the vital sea lines of communication to England and Europe. As the ASW contest developed these carriers would be stationed at selected distances from the P-3 land bases so that the S- 3s could efficiently conduct area ASW search and SOSUS coordination while optimizing the shore based P-3 effort.
In addition, three carriers were needed in the central Atlantic - close to the mid- Atlantic shipping routes in order to aid in antisubmarine warfare, as well as to counter successful long range reconnaissance aircraft penetrations. This, of course, was the Atlantic Ocean area where the CVE Hunter-Killer Groups had operated most effectively during 1943 and 1944 against the German U-Boats.
The latter role sounds like the designed role for the Invincible class/Sea King/Sea Harrier. Not a million miles away from a possible QEC/F-35B Lightning/Merlin role.
During the sea phase of the exercise, complex interactions between Dynamic Manta participating units and the Charles de Gaulle Carrier Strike Group (CSG) were also carried out.
An air defence exercise with CSG air assets (4 x Rafale) increased the surface units anti-aircraft warfare capabilities, say NATO.
You may also find this declassified US Navy document interesting - Sea Based Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977
From page 159 of part 2 (page 370 of the PDF)
The Soviet threat was considered to include the long range naval aircraft Backfire as well as the older Bear, with 50 to 100 of the former anticipated by 1981. In addition "a fleet of 28 missile cruisers and 75 missile destroyers could challenge our surface supremacy while approximately 200 cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines could be deployed against us." Thus, it was, anticipated that the Soviets would mount a full three ~ dimensional threat in the North Atlantic.
Studies had shown that at least three CVs would be required in the Northeast Atlantic primarily to block Soviet long range bombers, most notably Backfires, penetrating the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap into the open ocean. In addition, these carriers would serve to deter the movement of the Soviet surface fleet into the Atlantic basin as well as shielding Iceland and the vital sea lines of communication to England and Europe. As the ASW contest developed these carriers would be stationed at selected distances from the P-3 land bases so that the S- 3s could efficiently conduct area ASW search and SOSUS coordination while optimizing the shore based P-3 effort.
In addition, three carriers were needed in the central Atlantic - close to the mid- Atlantic shipping routes in order to aid in antisubmarine warfare, as well as to counter successful long range reconnaissance aircraft penetrations. This, of course, was the Atlantic Ocean area where the CVE Hunter-Killer Groups had operated most effectively during 1943 and 1944 against the German U-Boats.
The latter role sounds like the designed role for the Invincible class/Sea King/Sea Harrier. Not a million miles away from a possible QEC/F-35B Lightning/Merlin role.
Thread Starter
Carriers are not just about fast jets!
A NATO publication: 2021 Cutting the Bow Wave
The Atlantic Nexus
The North Atlantic, Arctic and Baltic regions form a strategic ‘Atlantic Nexus’. As recently demonstrated in the Russian navy’s 2019 Exercise Ocean Shield, assets from both the Northern and Baltic fleets can be redirected to concentrate force across this area. The character of the Atlantic Nexus has changed remarkably since the Cold War. Then, as now, NATO’s critical challenge in the North Atlantic is to protect the sea lines of communication and transatlantic resupply in a conflict by keeping Russian forces contained above the Norwegian Sea. But the Arctic, once valuable only as the cover for Russia’s nuclear - powered, ballistic missile - carrying submarine force, is now a contested civil and economic space. Furthermore, the Baltic dilemma is inverted from its Cold War manifestation: then NATO’s strategy was to keep the Soviet Navy from breaking out into the Atlantic through the Danish Straits or the Kattegat; today, the strategy focuses on ensuring that NATO maritime forces can break in to help defend its Baltic Allies.
The Atlantic Nexus disappeared from NATO’s agenda after the demise of the Soviet Union, and until recently few were adept in the art of transatlantic maritime resupply. Since 2014, NATO has recognised the challenge and in 2018 empowered MARCOM as the 360 - degree Maritime Theatre Component Command while establishing Joint Force Command Norfolk with the mandate to secure Atlantic sea lines of communication. The US Second Fleet has been stood up again with a strong Arctic and North Atlantic focus. The German navy is developing a Baltic-facing maritime headquarters at Rostock with the ambition to take on coordination and (during a conflict) command roles for Allied naval forces in the Baltic. The Polish Navy is developing a similar capability.
At the heart of this Atlantic challenge is the submarine threat. Recent years have seen an explosion in studies on the need to protect transatlantic sea lines of communication against the Russian submarine force as part of NATO’s credible deterrent posture. These have been paralleled by conversations and planning inside the Alliance. Unsurprisingly, reinvigorating NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability is a high priority for NATO and MARCOM. More than any other form of naval warfare, ASW operations must battle the elements as much as an adversary. The sheer size of the oceans presents difficulties for both attacker and defender, not least as the result of the reduced fleets of surface ships, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft on all sides. New technology also portends a change in both the lethality of submarines and the possibility of detecting them by non-acoustic means.
But there is a second dilemma in relation to the Atlantic Nexus: the peacetime impact of the Russian navy’s ‘Kalibrisation’ coupled with these forces’ presence in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. This leaves the western flank of Europe potentially vulnerable to missile attack from the sea. Although of limited use in a protracted and major conflict, such naval forces fit well with a hybrid strategy based on a short-war model that seeks to intimidate the Alliance into backing down in a crisis.
Effective deterrence in this scenario depends on NATO’s ability to counter that threat and assure Allies through its credible naval capability and persistent presence when needed, before crisis occurs. That requires a fully resourced Standing Naval Force and close coordination among Allied forces operating under national command.
The defence of Norway and Iceland presents unusual joint challenges that have maritime power at their core. Both countries occupy critical strategic space in the Atlantic Nexus. Carrier strike and amphibious power projection provide the main, although by no means exclusive, sword and shield in contesting the North Atlantic in a conflict. New questions abound: how can NATO best use aircraft carriers in the North Atlantic given today’s technologies? How does the Kalibrisation of the Russian fleet alter both Russian and NATO strategy? Arguably, Norway and Iceland are even more valuable to the Alliance deterrent posture today than during the Cold War, given NATO’s need to reinforce its ability to operate in contested northern waters against credible adversary forces.
A NATO publication: 2021 Cutting the Bow Wave
The Atlantic Nexus
The North Atlantic, Arctic and Baltic regions form a strategic ‘Atlantic Nexus’. As recently demonstrated in the Russian navy’s 2019 Exercise Ocean Shield, assets from both the Northern and Baltic fleets can be redirected to concentrate force across this area. The character of the Atlantic Nexus has changed remarkably since the Cold War. Then, as now, NATO’s critical challenge in the North Atlantic is to protect the sea lines of communication and transatlantic resupply in a conflict by keeping Russian forces contained above the Norwegian Sea. But the Arctic, once valuable only as the cover for Russia’s nuclear - powered, ballistic missile - carrying submarine force, is now a contested civil and economic space. Furthermore, the Baltic dilemma is inverted from its Cold War manifestation: then NATO’s strategy was to keep the Soviet Navy from breaking out into the Atlantic through the Danish Straits or the Kattegat; today, the strategy focuses on ensuring that NATO maritime forces can break in to help defend its Baltic Allies.
The Atlantic Nexus disappeared from NATO’s agenda after the demise of the Soviet Union, and until recently few were adept in the art of transatlantic maritime resupply. Since 2014, NATO has recognised the challenge and in 2018 empowered MARCOM as the 360 - degree Maritime Theatre Component Command while establishing Joint Force Command Norfolk with the mandate to secure Atlantic sea lines of communication. The US Second Fleet has been stood up again with a strong Arctic and North Atlantic focus. The German navy is developing a Baltic-facing maritime headquarters at Rostock with the ambition to take on coordination and (during a conflict) command roles for Allied naval forces in the Baltic. The Polish Navy is developing a similar capability.
At the heart of this Atlantic challenge is the submarine threat. Recent years have seen an explosion in studies on the need to protect transatlantic sea lines of communication against the Russian submarine force as part of NATO’s credible deterrent posture. These have been paralleled by conversations and planning inside the Alliance. Unsurprisingly, reinvigorating NATO’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability is a high priority for NATO and MARCOM. More than any other form of naval warfare, ASW operations must battle the elements as much as an adversary. The sheer size of the oceans presents difficulties for both attacker and defender, not least as the result of the reduced fleets of surface ships, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft on all sides. New technology also portends a change in both the lethality of submarines and the possibility of detecting them by non-acoustic means.
But there is a second dilemma in relation to the Atlantic Nexus: the peacetime impact of the Russian navy’s ‘Kalibrisation’ coupled with these forces’ presence in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. This leaves the western flank of Europe potentially vulnerable to missile attack from the sea. Although of limited use in a protracted and major conflict, such naval forces fit well with a hybrid strategy based on a short-war model that seeks to intimidate the Alliance into backing down in a crisis.
Effective deterrence in this scenario depends on NATO’s ability to counter that threat and assure Allies through its credible naval capability and persistent presence when needed, before crisis occurs. That requires a fully resourced Standing Naval Force and close coordination among Allied forces operating under national command.
The defence of Norway and Iceland presents unusual joint challenges that have maritime power at their core. Both countries occupy critical strategic space in the Atlantic Nexus. Carrier strike and amphibious power projection provide the main, although by no means exclusive, sword and shield in contesting the North Atlantic in a conflict. New questions abound: how can NATO best use aircraft carriers in the North Atlantic given today’s technologies? How does the Kalibrisation of the Russian fleet alter both Russian and NATO strategy? Arguably, Norway and Iceland are even more valuable to the Alliance deterrent posture today than during the Cold War, given NATO’s need to reinforce its ability to operate in contested northern waters against credible adversary forces.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 15th Mar 2021 at 23:44.
WEBF - a word to the wise - don't post the same article in multiple threads - the Mods don't like it .. it got me banned from Rumours & News for 2 years.........................
Regarding the 138 figure, I do know that some modelling was being done circa 97/98. Of course it was just known as JSF at that time and, IIR, that was just after Main Gate 1. When was the "Initial Gate"? I was supplying some "supportability" data to Farnborough to help feed the various War scenarios so, sadly, I never got involved in the modelling itself. That was done by a great team of boffins at Farnborough who I really enjoyed working with. Certainly one of them has subsequently had a very successful career with DSTL since then which is really very good to see!
What figures they came up with I have no idea but the scenarios were varied and quite in-depth (as in they modelled right back down into the depths of the supply chain, through the carrier deck/hangar capacity to handle certain sortie rates and then on into the battle space itself) in order to derive Fleet numbers to support each scenario. If that supported the 138 then that was derived/proved way beyond a "1 for 1" replacement exercise. Or, just maybe, no-one has ever been able to agree the "requirement scenario/s" so it stuck with the 138 lifetime estimate with a smaller "at any given time" Fleet size, probably as a result of the Farnborough work. I have no idea - others on here may know more!
Anyway, an update? https://www.airforce-technology.com/...fleet-numbers/
this is he actual wording from the Review - now available on line
Develop the next generation of naval vessels, including Type 32 frigates and Fleet Solid Support ships, and deliver our plans for eight Type 26 and five Type 31 frigates.
Progress our Carrier Strike capabilities, with at least 48 F-35s by 2025.
Develop the next generation of naval vessels, including Type 32 frigates and Fleet Solid Support ships, and deliver our plans for eight Type 26 and five Type 31 frigates.
Progress our Carrier Strike capabilities, with at least 48 F-35s by 2025.
And Johnson's wording in the Commons today in reply to a question:
"at least after the review we will have 24 frigates as against the 15 we have now"
RN has 13 Frigates...
"at least after the review we will have 24 frigates as against the 15 we have now"
RN has 13 Frigates...
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Pr00ne,
Best tell the navy, they list 15 frigates. Including Glasgow and Belfast.
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-org.../surface-fleet
Best tell the navy, they list 15 frigates. Including Glasgow and Belfast.
https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-org.../surface-fleet
ORAC,
They have 13 Type 23 Frigates, all Type 23. Glasgow and Belfast are chunks of metal being put together in two BAE shipyards in Glasgow with the first of type due in service in 2027...
They have 13 Type 23 Frigates, all Type 23. Glasgow and Belfast are chunks of metal being put together in two BAE shipyards in Glasgow with the first of type due in service in 2027...
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
As I say, tell the navy - if they add them on their website they have 15, doubtless they brief the same number to Downing Street.
Their toys after all, so their choice when to add or remove them from the declared surface fleet.
Their toys after all, so their choice when to add or remove them from the declared surface fleet.