Merlin Sqns to Merge
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Concur with DB.
I've been up to the smoke numerous times on a "Job" in a trusty, veritable old lady of the FAA, with only a doppler driven TANS and a raw radar, and every time managed to get there and back, with the aid of extremely helpful ATC.
Next............
I've been up to the smoke numerous times on a "Job" in a trusty, veritable old lady of the FAA, with only a doppler driven TANS and a raw radar, and every time managed to get there and back, with the aid of extremely helpful ATC.
Next............
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extpwron
Of course what you forget dear chap is that NONE of the grey helo fleet is equipped with said NAVAIDS - not in the User requirement.
I totally agree this is limiting but not a solid requirement for a war fighting oversea aircraft.
And actually the possession of such kit is NOT mandatory for military aircraft when operating in Controlled Airspace.
Oh and DB/FP I'll let you explain to Flypro how wrong he is.
Now what was that max load I carried at BD...1500kgs....2500kgs.....????
Anyway the landrover was fun!
Of course what you forget dear chap is that NONE of the grey helo fleet is equipped with said NAVAIDS - not in the User requirement.
I totally agree this is limiting but not a solid requirement for a war fighting oversea aircraft.
And actually the possession of such kit is NOT mandatory for military aircraft when operating in Controlled Airspace.
Oh and DB/FP I'll let you explain to Flypro how wrong he is.
Now what was that max load I carried at BD...1500kgs....2500kgs.....????
Anyway the landrover was fun!
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Hyd 3
Thank you for your PM.
I have considered carefully your comments.
However, after due consideration I have decided that it is pointless to have a sensible discussion with someone whose knowledge of the RN leads me increasingly to believe he is still doing "A" levels.
In short, and I hope you dont take this the wrong way, cause I know you're a sensitive soul.
STICK IT UP YOUR @RSE!!!
Thank you for your PM.
I have considered carefully your comments.
However, after due consideration I have decided that it is pointless to have a sensible discussion with someone whose knowledge of the RN leads me increasingly to believe he is still doing "A" levels.
In short, and I hope you dont take this the wrong way, cause I know you're a sensitive soul.
STICK IT UP YOUR @RSE!!!
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It has got a very good IRU/GPS, backed up by AHRS/DVS, which is other RN a/c's primary nav.
Anyway, we should be leading away from the Merlin Bashing. There is no doubt what so ever that the Merlin is a first class aircraft. A world beater. What is in doubt and what is absolutely scandalous is the support its receiving...i.e. NIL SUPPORT.... Thats what needs sorting out
Last edited by hyd3failure; 16th Feb 2005 at 08:14.
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Duncan - You said
etc etc...Sadly that doesn't change a thing and I should know....I was the one who was thrown out of the CI CTZ when the weather was too poor for SVFR and we didn't have any Procedural Kit.
BUt please lets get away from Bashing the Merlin...Its not the only aircraft not to have a fully IFR kit but the Nav kit in the Merlin is second to none and seeing as the only time it would require an IFR kit would be to Land at an Airfield whcih is inside Class D at Night (not many of those - Lyneham and Brize are the only 2 military AF's) or join an airway (dont need to do that)
Then there is no requirement for a IFR kit.
So back to the one thing that should be of concern and that is the support system which has let the aircraft down. Can anyone explain WHY the support system is so poor? Did we not thropw enough money at a support system? Is there a support system at all?
Adopt the callsign Rescue
BUt please lets get away from Bashing the Merlin...Its not the only aircraft not to have a fully IFR kit but the Nav kit in the Merlin is second to none and seeing as the only time it would require an IFR kit would be to Land at an Airfield whcih is inside Class D at Night (not many of those - Lyneham and Brize are the only 2 military AF's) or join an airway (dont need to do that)
Then there is no requirement for a IFR kit.
So back to the one thing that should be of concern and that is the support system which has let the aircraft down. Can anyone explain WHY the support system is so poor? Did we not thropw enough money at a support system? Is there a support system at all?
Last edited by hyd3failure; 16th Feb 2005 at 12:43.
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If this is such a great machine why are DPA proposing to spend 800+ million on MCSP? Is it so we can still hunt down those nasty Eastern European subs in the cold Atlantic?
Is it a case of "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" ? The bottom line is you have paid for 44 airframes and having read this thread it appears that you only have 8 available. I imagine the 50+ crews are well chuffed with that statistic no matter how good they percieve the machine to be.
Re Support - A huge amount of money is made by companies not declaring service and support costs only to add them later as PDS. BUT, I have not seen the URD (no reason why I should) so cannot honestly comment.
Well thats the grenade lobbed in - now time to close the hatches and retire to a safe area!
Is it a case of "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" ? The bottom line is you have paid for 44 airframes and having read this thread it appears that you only have 8 available. I imagine the 50+ crews are well chuffed with that statistic no matter how good they percieve the machine to be.
Re Support - A huge amount of money is made by companies not declaring service and support costs only to add them later as PDS. BUT, I have not seen the URD (no reason why I should) so cannot honestly comment.
Well thats the grenade lobbed in - now time to close the hatches and retire to a safe area!
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Re Support - A huge amount of money is made by companies not declaring service and support costs only to add them later as PDS
Miles
"Re Support - A huge amount of money is made by companies not declaring service and support costs only to add them later as PDS".
The purpose of PDS is to maintain the build standard. The "build standard" by definition includes all safety related matters. There are 17 core elements to PDS, but it does NOT include spares, repairs, mod sets, mod kits (two different things). Hence, it is not volume related - it costs the same whether you have 1 a/c or 1000. So, when a/c numbers are cut, and proportional savings are made to spares, repairs etc, PDS should not be cut. It always is, including Merlin. Therein lies one significant reason why support is generally poor.
The only exception to the above is that one of the core tasks is to maintain the PDS Reference Rig which, if non-proprietary, is owned by the MoD and must be available at 24 hours notice for front line use. This, and other elements, can be tailored to suit.
Unfortunately, PDS is widely regarded as a waste of money, stemming from the notion that if it doesn't generate a "due in" on a stock computer, we can't be buying anything useful. Many projects don't bother with it, or can't afford it because the Customer has said he doesn't want it. Then they wonder why one obsolete component is causing unavailability of kit or a/c.
I agree companies milk the support element. The reasons for them being able to do so (and allowed to, which is worse) are many and varied but my own opinion is that the MoD bury themselves in the minutae of ILS, producing rafts of plans at great expense which no-one reads; when it can be broken down into Ranging, Scaling, Documentation and Packaging. Get those right and front line will be happy. (Training should not be part of ILS - ILSMs deliver to a LSD usually 3 months before ISD. This is no use if a pilot takes 6 months to train. See Apache!).
"Re Support - A huge amount of money is made by companies not declaring service and support costs only to add them later as PDS".
The purpose of PDS is to maintain the build standard. The "build standard" by definition includes all safety related matters. There are 17 core elements to PDS, but it does NOT include spares, repairs, mod sets, mod kits (two different things). Hence, it is not volume related - it costs the same whether you have 1 a/c or 1000. So, when a/c numbers are cut, and proportional savings are made to spares, repairs etc, PDS should not be cut. It always is, including Merlin. Therein lies one significant reason why support is generally poor.
The only exception to the above is that one of the core tasks is to maintain the PDS Reference Rig which, if non-proprietary, is owned by the MoD and must be available at 24 hours notice for front line use. This, and other elements, can be tailored to suit.
Unfortunately, PDS is widely regarded as a waste of money, stemming from the notion that if it doesn't generate a "due in" on a stock computer, we can't be buying anything useful. Many projects don't bother with it, or can't afford it because the Customer has said he doesn't want it. Then they wonder why one obsolete component is causing unavailability of kit or a/c.
I agree companies milk the support element. The reasons for them being able to do so (and allowed to, which is worse) are many and varied but my own opinion is that the MoD bury themselves in the minutae of ILS, producing rafts of plans at great expense which no-one reads; when it can be broken down into Ranging, Scaling, Documentation and Packaging. Get those right and front line will be happy. (Training should not be part of ILS - ILSMs deliver to a LSD usually 3 months before ISD. This is no use if a pilot takes 6 months to train. See Apache!).
Toxteth
“Why is Merlin ILS/ARM so ####ed-up
Who's responsible/accountable for the current dire support state of affairs ”
I’m sorry, I can’t address specifics on current Merlin support. My post addressed a general financial issue. PDS and Spares/Repairs MUST ALWAYS be separate issues because one is volume related, the other not. If PDS takes a proportional hit every time – and remember Merlin Mk1 went from 103 to 44 a/c in 20 years – but still costs the same, then clearly you have less money to buy spares and effect repairs.
FAA support as a whole took hits of 33% in 1989, 28% in 91 and 28% in 92. These are the ones I remember most. The last two were arbitrary with no cunning plan to offset the reduction with any specific efficiency measure. However the 33% was supposedly offset by the creation of the Aircraft Support Executive (Navy), which replaced a few offices in London with a building full of staff at Yeovilton. Their primary function was to achieve that 33% financial saving. They failed. (Little wonder, as they had absolutely no control over the factors that could make such savings). A long time ago you may say, but remember the ISD date was meant to be early 90s (or was it 89?) so people have been putting money in the pot for Merlin support for well over 20 years. This can only have reduced.
It is the responsibility of the Requirement Manager and ILSM (until the mid-90s they were one and the same job) to make sufficient Materiel and Financial provision for any given item in the inventory. For spares, it is his primary function to ensure sufficient provision is made to maintain depot stock levels at a level determined by a simple formula. (Few could tell you that). After the ISD, his responsibility transfers to the “Support Authority”, or whatever they call themselves now. (Again, few could tell you that, or recite/explain the formula and the implications of failing to maintain the integrity of any given element). It remains, however, a permanent RN EP instruction and is there for all to read. It is unfair to pick on individuals, because even if they make sufficient provision, political decisions to make cutbacks will always prevail.
You ask about ILS/ARM. I offered my opinion on ILS and would only add that I’ve put it into practice many times, with no problem – but have never bothered to read the Def Stan. It’s a menace. ARM is another misunderstood concept. At the risk of being contentious, Operators care about Availability and Maintainers about Maintainability. Reliability has very little to do with it, some obvious reasons being:
1. The RqM is instructed to assume a certain “reliability” when calculating his Materiel and Financial provision bid. For avionics, the default is 500 hours for any LRU. He is, uniquely, permitted to over-rule this using “engineering judgement” (assuming he’s an engineer). Few are, so the process stops there (if it’s even begun in the first place). However, a knowledgeable RqM engineer would know, for example, that no airborne military radar transmitter has ever achieved 500 hours, so would be permitted to reduce the figure to something sensible, therefore generating more spares. If he doesn’t, you’re short of money and spares. Equally, he’d know that 2000 is very poor for a radio, so would reduce the bid, with an aim of roughly balancing the bid over the entire fleet. This is why you have the frustrating experience of hangars full of certain spares, and none of others. This is not rocket science but, believe me, I’ve seen a bid for 10 LRUs (IFF systems, so not something you can really leave behind) to effect a full fleet fit to 13 aircraft, and provide spares for CVS, 2nd line rigs, PDS, training and depot stock. At £400k a shot, the deficit is not peanuts, so something else had to give. He got promoted.
2. It is a fallacy that reliability is measured in Mean Time Between Failures, so spares holding should not be based on reliability. It is the act of removal from he a/c, for whatever reason, that generates the demand for logistic support; not a failure. The main difference is the “No Fault Found Rate”. Only the manufacturer is interested in the actual failure rate because if there is a NFF, he is not responsible and is paid over and above the repair contract to turn it round. (He can’t simply return it because, at the very least, it must be re-certified, packed, shipped, etc.). Therefore, it is a primary function of the Support Authority to reduce the NFF rate to as near zero as possible; or make compensatory provision. (Few could tell you that). Only at zero will MTBF and MTBR (removals) roughly coincide. Given the policy since 1991 to allow war reserves to lie unserviceable, and to reduce Contingency stocks (a different thing) to zero, ANY NFFs will create a shortage unless the reliability wildly exceeds the prediction; more so in small a/c fleets where spares are measured in ones and twos. The RN in particular suffer here because, while they may have spares, they are often at sea and unavailable to shore based units. The RAF on the other hand have a simple, efficient distribution system between UK/Germany etc.
3. Another factor which is often overlooked is the effect of misuse, especially on COTS equipment. While COTS may be cheaper up front, it is rarely specified and designed for robust military use (hence, “Commercial”). In general, there is simply no point in raising a fault report on COTS kit, because the MoD will find it almost impossible to prove that it was used within the design parameters. If you do, you’re tying up a much needed spare in an investigation which will bear no fruit (especially if you’ve cut PDS money).
Ah, I hear you ask, but surely he contractor works out what to sell us under ILS? Partly true, but the money available to him stems entirely from the above process, which commenced around 1981 for Merlin. Often, the contractor must take a risk by buying in what he thinks are low stocks of very expensive items, because there is no money to buy more. He will be protected from comebacks by declaring his concern up front.
Sorry for the long post. I could write a book, but one already exists. Nobody seems to read it.
“Why is Merlin ILS/ARM so ####ed-up
Who's responsible/accountable for the current dire support state of affairs ”
I’m sorry, I can’t address specifics on current Merlin support. My post addressed a general financial issue. PDS and Spares/Repairs MUST ALWAYS be separate issues because one is volume related, the other not. If PDS takes a proportional hit every time – and remember Merlin Mk1 went from 103 to 44 a/c in 20 years – but still costs the same, then clearly you have less money to buy spares and effect repairs.
FAA support as a whole took hits of 33% in 1989, 28% in 91 and 28% in 92. These are the ones I remember most. The last two were arbitrary with no cunning plan to offset the reduction with any specific efficiency measure. However the 33% was supposedly offset by the creation of the Aircraft Support Executive (Navy), which replaced a few offices in London with a building full of staff at Yeovilton. Their primary function was to achieve that 33% financial saving. They failed. (Little wonder, as they had absolutely no control over the factors that could make such savings). A long time ago you may say, but remember the ISD date was meant to be early 90s (or was it 89?) so people have been putting money in the pot for Merlin support for well over 20 years. This can only have reduced.
It is the responsibility of the Requirement Manager and ILSM (until the mid-90s they were one and the same job) to make sufficient Materiel and Financial provision for any given item in the inventory. For spares, it is his primary function to ensure sufficient provision is made to maintain depot stock levels at a level determined by a simple formula. (Few could tell you that). After the ISD, his responsibility transfers to the “Support Authority”, or whatever they call themselves now. (Again, few could tell you that, or recite/explain the formula and the implications of failing to maintain the integrity of any given element). It remains, however, a permanent RN EP instruction and is there for all to read. It is unfair to pick on individuals, because even if they make sufficient provision, political decisions to make cutbacks will always prevail.
You ask about ILS/ARM. I offered my opinion on ILS and would only add that I’ve put it into practice many times, with no problem – but have never bothered to read the Def Stan. It’s a menace. ARM is another misunderstood concept. At the risk of being contentious, Operators care about Availability and Maintainers about Maintainability. Reliability has very little to do with it, some obvious reasons being:
1. The RqM is instructed to assume a certain “reliability” when calculating his Materiel and Financial provision bid. For avionics, the default is 500 hours for any LRU. He is, uniquely, permitted to over-rule this using “engineering judgement” (assuming he’s an engineer). Few are, so the process stops there (if it’s even begun in the first place). However, a knowledgeable RqM engineer would know, for example, that no airborne military radar transmitter has ever achieved 500 hours, so would be permitted to reduce the figure to something sensible, therefore generating more spares. If he doesn’t, you’re short of money and spares. Equally, he’d know that 2000 is very poor for a radio, so would reduce the bid, with an aim of roughly balancing the bid over the entire fleet. This is why you have the frustrating experience of hangars full of certain spares, and none of others. This is not rocket science but, believe me, I’ve seen a bid for 10 LRUs (IFF systems, so not something you can really leave behind) to effect a full fleet fit to 13 aircraft, and provide spares for CVS, 2nd line rigs, PDS, training and depot stock. At £400k a shot, the deficit is not peanuts, so something else had to give. He got promoted.
2. It is a fallacy that reliability is measured in Mean Time Between Failures, so spares holding should not be based on reliability. It is the act of removal from he a/c, for whatever reason, that generates the demand for logistic support; not a failure. The main difference is the “No Fault Found Rate”. Only the manufacturer is interested in the actual failure rate because if there is a NFF, he is not responsible and is paid over and above the repair contract to turn it round. (He can’t simply return it because, at the very least, it must be re-certified, packed, shipped, etc.). Therefore, it is a primary function of the Support Authority to reduce the NFF rate to as near zero as possible; or make compensatory provision. (Few could tell you that). Only at zero will MTBF and MTBR (removals) roughly coincide. Given the policy since 1991 to allow war reserves to lie unserviceable, and to reduce Contingency stocks (a different thing) to zero, ANY NFFs will create a shortage unless the reliability wildly exceeds the prediction; more so in small a/c fleets where spares are measured in ones and twos. The RN in particular suffer here because, while they may have spares, they are often at sea and unavailable to shore based units. The RAF on the other hand have a simple, efficient distribution system between UK/Germany etc.
3. Another factor which is often overlooked is the effect of misuse, especially on COTS equipment. While COTS may be cheaper up front, it is rarely specified and designed for robust military use (hence, “Commercial”). In general, there is simply no point in raising a fault report on COTS kit, because the MoD will find it almost impossible to prove that it was used within the design parameters. If you do, you’re tying up a much needed spare in an investigation which will bear no fruit (especially if you’ve cut PDS money).
Ah, I hear you ask, but surely he contractor works out what to sell us under ILS? Partly true, but the money available to him stems entirely from the above process, which commenced around 1981 for Merlin. Often, the contractor must take a risk by buying in what he thinks are low stocks of very expensive items, because there is no money to buy more. He will be protected from comebacks by declaring his concern up front.
Sorry for the long post. I could write a book, but one already exists. Nobody seems to read it.
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@tucumseh
Thanks. Shame you're not in a position to address specifics on Merlin support.
Your hypothesis appears to put forward that Merlin suffers from the wider support issues of the whole FAA as a consequence of cuts throughout the 80s and early nineties.
But why is Merlin so badly affected by this compared with other RN aircraft types?
Bearing in mind that the Merlin LSD was in 98, the lack of funding as result of earlier cuts would have been a known quantity by then. So was a Nelsonian eye turned towards the shortfalls to allow the aircraft to proceed from LSD to ISD? Was it a case of b*gger the consequences and let's get the aircraft into service anyway? If so, with the benefit of hindsight, that's looking like a fairly crass decision!
I acknowledge that for any new aircraft the LSA and resulting RoS and support provisioning will be immature, being based on a limited dataset of prototype aircraft. But surely the 'good book' (which you readily admit nobody bothers to read; perhaps therein lies the problem) calls for processes and funding to be in place to allow the ILS to be modified based on in-service experience? I would have thought somebody would have made some through-life cost projections?
Is it not the responsibility of the ILSM to ensure at LSD that the mechanisms to handle in-service shortfalls are in place? The current crisis strikes me as a major constraint rather than a shortfall.
You can't be telling me that our EP procedures allow a situation to develop wherein, after 20% of the planned life of the equipment, 75% of the aircraft will be unavailable and unsupportable.
Why wasn't this declared at LSD and managed accordingly? Sounds like the writing has been on the wall for a long time. It appears that the MOD has been blundering along for six years assuming 42 aircraft can be supported then all of a sudden, shock, horror, f*ck me, sorry chaps, bit of a crisis, you can only play with eight til we sort out this mess!!! I supposed structured long term risk management is less fun that knee-jerk crisis management?
I can't imagine that after 6 years we've suddenly discovered a whole raft of faults that had never arisen before, requiring a complete new set of spares. I assume an in-service ARM warranty was levied on industry. If so, why weren't these issues addressed during the warranty period? They must have been known about. Was no redress sought at the time?
I remember quite a few years back a whole centre-spread in one of the daily tabloids under the banner headline "Multi-million £ new Navy helicopter held together with Sellotape," highlighting the lack of spares. It had the usual MOD Spokesperson quote along the lines of, the issues are known and being addressed. Sounds like it!!
TOG
Thanks. Shame you're not in a position to address specifics on Merlin support.
Your hypothesis appears to put forward that Merlin suffers from the wider support issues of the whole FAA as a consequence of cuts throughout the 80s and early nineties.
But why is Merlin so badly affected by this compared with other RN aircraft types?
Bearing in mind that the Merlin LSD was in 98, the lack of funding as result of earlier cuts would have been a known quantity by then. So was a Nelsonian eye turned towards the shortfalls to allow the aircraft to proceed from LSD to ISD? Was it a case of b*gger the consequences and let's get the aircraft into service anyway? If so, with the benefit of hindsight, that's looking like a fairly crass decision!
I acknowledge that for any new aircraft the LSA and resulting RoS and support provisioning will be immature, being based on a limited dataset of prototype aircraft. But surely the 'good book' (which you readily admit nobody bothers to read; perhaps therein lies the problem) calls for processes and funding to be in place to allow the ILS to be modified based on in-service experience? I would have thought somebody would have made some through-life cost projections?
Is it not the responsibility of the ILSM to ensure at LSD that the mechanisms to handle in-service shortfalls are in place? The current crisis strikes me as a major constraint rather than a shortfall.
You can't be telling me that our EP procedures allow a situation to develop wherein, after 20% of the planned life of the equipment, 75% of the aircraft will be unavailable and unsupportable.
Why wasn't this declared at LSD and managed accordingly? Sounds like the writing has been on the wall for a long time. It appears that the MOD has been blundering along for six years assuming 42 aircraft can be supported then all of a sudden, shock, horror, f*ck me, sorry chaps, bit of a crisis, you can only play with eight til we sort out this mess!!! I supposed structured long term risk management is less fun that knee-jerk crisis management?
I can't imagine that after 6 years we've suddenly discovered a whole raft of faults that had never arisen before, requiring a complete new set of spares. I assume an in-service ARM warranty was levied on industry. If so, why weren't these issues addressed during the warranty period? They must have been known about. Was no redress sought at the time?
I remember quite a few years back a whole centre-spread in one of the daily tabloids under the banner headline "Multi-million £ new Navy helicopter held together with Sellotape," highlighting the lack of spares. It had the usual MOD Spokesperson quote along the lines of, the issues are known and being addressed. Sounds like it!!
TOG
Toxteth
"But why is Merlin so badly affected by this compared with other RN aircraft types?"
I tried to keep my post simple, while getting across the main issues. Merlin did indeed suffer more in the Halifax savings of 88-on. When the savings were mooted in 86 it was appreciated legacy a/c and equipment had deeply embedded support infrastructures – most avionics had a 1A, 2B, 3BC, 4CD maintenance policy. To change so drastically so close to OSD would be more trouble than it was worth. Bearing in mind Wx, Sk5/6, Canberra T4/T22/TT18, Hunter GA11/T8C/T8M/T7, Heron C1/C4, Devon C2/C20 were due out of service, or transferred to RAF, within a few years, they took a lesser hit. Merlin took 33% because most of its support was not in place in 86 (some of the avionics were, because it retains 70/80s kit used in other a/c) and so there was time to plan a support strategy which could live with 33%. How many in Merlin IPT know of Halifax and so can articulate a case around these draconian cuts?
"Is it not the responsibility of the ILSM to ensure at LSD that the mechanisms to handle in-service shortfalls are in place?"
The role of the ILSM is not always clear. Most project managers would say they MUST have control of all staff if they are to be accountable. But the days are long gone when the PM was the senior person on a project. To someone of my vintage, RqM and ILSM is something you do before promotion to PM. Nowadays, inexperienced RqMs and ILSMs are often senior to the equally inexperienced PMs, and have a different line management chain; they have authority but no responsibility. RqMs are embedded in IPTs but are DEC staff. It is only recently that the ILSM became part of the IPT.
"You can't be telling me that our EP procedures allow a situation to develop wherein, after 20% of the planned life of the equipment, 75% of the aircraft will be unavailable and unsupportable".
Not if you follow them correctly. Ask any RqM/ILSM what the formula for working out the depot stock to support a front line RN aircraft is…….. (They’d probably answer that this is the supply manager’s job, but the SM only manages what the RqM and ILSM determine the requirement to be, and only then if it is subsequently bought). Even if they work it out and make the bid, an ILSM has no control over what money is voted to meet his requirement. I always say – why not ask why some far more complex projects are delivered with effortless competence? Instead of inquests on the likes of Merlin years after the ISD, why not identify good practice in successful projects, and mandate it. A suggestion that has been rejected many times.
"I supposed structured long term risk management is less fun that knee-jerk crisis management?"
The good book says a project should have a risk manager and robust process. In practice, the risk manager is the “told you so” job that no-one wants because he’s seen as a troublemaker. Ambitious PMs don't like robust RMs. It’s usually a minor part of someone’s job, although something like Merlin probably has a full-time RM. Often, the first risk you identify is “Not enough money to sustain the fleet/fit policy”. Without exception the answer is “Deal with it, but only in your own time”. You can see why people actively avoid risk management.
A major problem is that invariably the first risk register is that developed by DPA, but DPA should actually inherit one from DEC, and have been party to it from Day 1. I’m sure someone in DEC would agree with this, but I’ve never met him. This explains, in part, why so long passes with nothing done. By the time the PM moans about no spares funding, the EP scrutineers will point out, correctly, that successive bids over many years have not changed. It is then up to the PM to declare planning blight (if he dare risk his career!) but through no fault of his own.
"I assume an in-service ARM warranty was levied on industry. If so, why weren't these issues addressed during the warranty period? They must have been known about. Was no redress sought at the time?"
So long as the CLS contractor meets his turn round time, Availability is entirely down to the MoD.
I explained the difference between MTBF and MTBR. I imagine you will find that the kit meets its contracted reliability figures. To be honest, I’ve never known any avionics that didn’t. I’ve been unhappy with some figures I thought low (like a single LRU dragging down the system MTBF) but more often than not the cost-effective solution is not to increase reliability but to compensate elsewhere. (More spares, quicker TRT, better training etc). Had a problem with SK radar Tx/Rx once. RN wanted a 10% increase in reliability. Cost - £10M (85 prices). Problem solved for £50k by buying 30 modulator cards for Culdrose. Reliability remained the same, but availability improved immeasurably. People often confuse one with the other. What would you rather have? Average reliability but available spares so an a/c can fly with minimum maintenance; or very reliable kit at twice the cost but no spares when it does (inevitably) fail? I’d go for the first, but perhaps Merlin veers towards the latter? One must also apply common sense to manufacturer’s reliability predictions. I was once quoted 200,000 hours MTBF on a PCB. That’s 600 flying years! If I’d accepted that no spares would be bought.
Maintainability is a design issue, of both the kit and the platform. It is approved at various design reviews and demonstrations. Thereafter, it is the MoD’s liability.
"I remember quite a few years back a whole centre-spread in one of the daily tabloids under the banner headline "Multi-million £ new Navy helicopter held together with Sellotape," highlighting the lack of spares. It had the usual MOD Spokesperson quote along the lines of, the issues are known and being addressed. Sounds like it!!"
Can’t say I remember this, but SK5/6 relied heavily on green waterproof tape on the Control Radar Set to stop ingress of oil from the MGB drip tray. Worked a treat. Far cheaper than sealing it up and redesigning the cooling system, or redesigning the tray. Not sure the observers were happy with the oil though. Got into their coffee. (Sorry Roy / Steve).
"But why is Merlin so badly affected by this compared with other RN aircraft types?"
I tried to keep my post simple, while getting across the main issues. Merlin did indeed suffer more in the Halifax savings of 88-on. When the savings were mooted in 86 it was appreciated legacy a/c and equipment had deeply embedded support infrastructures – most avionics had a 1A, 2B, 3BC, 4CD maintenance policy. To change so drastically so close to OSD would be more trouble than it was worth. Bearing in mind Wx, Sk5/6, Canberra T4/T22/TT18, Hunter GA11/T8C/T8M/T7, Heron C1/C4, Devon C2/C20 were due out of service, or transferred to RAF, within a few years, they took a lesser hit. Merlin took 33% because most of its support was not in place in 86 (some of the avionics were, because it retains 70/80s kit used in other a/c) and so there was time to plan a support strategy which could live with 33%. How many in Merlin IPT know of Halifax and so can articulate a case around these draconian cuts?
"Is it not the responsibility of the ILSM to ensure at LSD that the mechanisms to handle in-service shortfalls are in place?"
The role of the ILSM is not always clear. Most project managers would say they MUST have control of all staff if they are to be accountable. But the days are long gone when the PM was the senior person on a project. To someone of my vintage, RqM and ILSM is something you do before promotion to PM. Nowadays, inexperienced RqMs and ILSMs are often senior to the equally inexperienced PMs, and have a different line management chain; they have authority but no responsibility. RqMs are embedded in IPTs but are DEC staff. It is only recently that the ILSM became part of the IPT.
"You can't be telling me that our EP procedures allow a situation to develop wherein, after 20% of the planned life of the equipment, 75% of the aircraft will be unavailable and unsupportable".
Not if you follow them correctly. Ask any RqM/ILSM what the formula for working out the depot stock to support a front line RN aircraft is…….. (They’d probably answer that this is the supply manager’s job, but the SM only manages what the RqM and ILSM determine the requirement to be, and only then if it is subsequently bought). Even if they work it out and make the bid, an ILSM has no control over what money is voted to meet his requirement. I always say – why not ask why some far more complex projects are delivered with effortless competence? Instead of inquests on the likes of Merlin years after the ISD, why not identify good practice in successful projects, and mandate it. A suggestion that has been rejected many times.
"I supposed structured long term risk management is less fun that knee-jerk crisis management?"
The good book says a project should have a risk manager and robust process. In practice, the risk manager is the “told you so” job that no-one wants because he’s seen as a troublemaker. Ambitious PMs don't like robust RMs. It’s usually a minor part of someone’s job, although something like Merlin probably has a full-time RM. Often, the first risk you identify is “Not enough money to sustain the fleet/fit policy”. Without exception the answer is “Deal with it, but only in your own time”. You can see why people actively avoid risk management.
A major problem is that invariably the first risk register is that developed by DPA, but DPA should actually inherit one from DEC, and have been party to it from Day 1. I’m sure someone in DEC would agree with this, but I’ve never met him. This explains, in part, why so long passes with nothing done. By the time the PM moans about no spares funding, the EP scrutineers will point out, correctly, that successive bids over many years have not changed. It is then up to the PM to declare planning blight (if he dare risk his career!) but through no fault of his own.
"I assume an in-service ARM warranty was levied on industry. If so, why weren't these issues addressed during the warranty period? They must have been known about. Was no redress sought at the time?"
So long as the CLS contractor meets his turn round time, Availability is entirely down to the MoD.
I explained the difference between MTBF and MTBR. I imagine you will find that the kit meets its contracted reliability figures. To be honest, I’ve never known any avionics that didn’t. I’ve been unhappy with some figures I thought low (like a single LRU dragging down the system MTBF) but more often than not the cost-effective solution is not to increase reliability but to compensate elsewhere. (More spares, quicker TRT, better training etc). Had a problem with SK radar Tx/Rx once. RN wanted a 10% increase in reliability. Cost - £10M (85 prices). Problem solved for £50k by buying 30 modulator cards for Culdrose. Reliability remained the same, but availability improved immeasurably. People often confuse one with the other. What would you rather have? Average reliability but available spares so an a/c can fly with minimum maintenance; or very reliable kit at twice the cost but no spares when it does (inevitably) fail? I’d go for the first, but perhaps Merlin veers towards the latter? One must also apply common sense to manufacturer’s reliability predictions. I was once quoted 200,000 hours MTBF on a PCB. That’s 600 flying years! If I’d accepted that no spares would be bought.
Maintainability is a design issue, of both the kit and the platform. It is approved at various design reviews and demonstrations. Thereafter, it is the MoD’s liability.
"I remember quite a few years back a whole centre-spread in one of the daily tabloids under the banner headline "Multi-million £ new Navy helicopter held together with Sellotape," highlighting the lack of spares. It had the usual MOD Spokesperson quote along the lines of, the issues are known and being addressed. Sounds like it!!"
Can’t say I remember this, but SK5/6 relied heavily on green waterproof tape on the Control Radar Set to stop ingress of oil from the MGB drip tray. Worked a treat. Far cheaper than sealing it up and redesigning the cooling system, or redesigning the tray. Not sure the observers were happy with the oil though. Got into their coffee. (Sorry Roy / Steve).
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I suspect from your posts that you were neither responsible for nor in a position to fix Merlin support; you are however obviously very experienced in logistics acquisition.
As such I am intrigued as to why you appear to be defending the indefensible. You may not mean it but the tone of your posts conveys a sense of that's how it's always worked in DPA, get over it.
Grateful for your insights but I'm not asking you personally to provide satisfactory answers to the Merlin problem: you are clearly not in a position to do so.
The inference is they weren't for Merlin. Why not?
But I believe that those who fly/maintain this aircraft deserve to be told why it's so royally 
ed-up. If this thread is to be believed there are 50 odd crews unable to fly. Can't be doing their morale much good. Maybe if somebody explained to them why it's like it is, and that there's also a glimmer of hope in the future, it might stop them wanting to leave in droves. Perhaps some of them will then be in a position in years to come to avoid the same pitfalls, when they do their DPA broadening jobs. Can't beat understanding the lessons of history.
Not least we the taxpayers. If there's only an active fleet of eight aircraft, then on an average day there's probably only four of these airborne at any one time. That means the taxpayer has forked out over £1bn for each flying aircraft!!! Great vfm.
Wholeheartedly agree. Do we have any?
Rejected by whom and for what reason? That fills me with dread. Are we about to make all the same mistakes again for Merlin CSP?
TOG
I suspect from your posts that you were neither responsible for nor in a position to fix Merlin support; you are however obviously very experienced in logistics acquisition.
As such I am intrigued as to why you appear to be defending the indefensible. You may not mean it but the tone of your posts conveys a sense of that's how it's always worked in DPA, get over it.
Grateful for your insights but I'm not asking you personally to provide satisfactory answers to the Merlin problem: you are clearly not in a position to do so.
Not if you follow them correctly.
Instead of inquests on the likes of Merlin years after the ISD
ed-up. If this thread is to be believed there are 50 odd crews unable to fly. Can't be doing their morale much good. Maybe if somebody explained to them why it's like it is, and that there's also a glimmer of hope in the future, it might stop them wanting to leave in droves. Perhaps some of them will then be in a position in years to come to avoid the same pitfalls, when they do their DPA broadening jobs. Can't beat understanding the lessons of history. Not least we the taxpayers. If there's only an active fleet of eight aircraft, then on an average day there's probably only four of these airborne at any one time. That means the taxpayer has forked out over £1bn for each flying aircraft!!! Great vfm.
why not identify good practice in successful projects, and mandate it
A suggestion that has been rejected many times.
TOG
Toxteth
”I suspect from your posts that you were neither responsible for nor in a position to fix Merlin support; you are however obviously very experienced in logistics acquisition”.
Any project manager should be experienced in logistics acquisition. If not, he’s no experience of an area that spends 70%+ of the through life costs and shouldn’t be in the post. (Just an opinion – none of the DPA XB agree with me and they are ultimately responsible for recruitment policy and setting standards). It’s just something you do before being a PM. The RN have a set of permanent EP Instructions laying down the basics, and it (was) a pre-requisite that you had experience in repair/overhaul, diagnostics, supervision, QA, engineering design and contractor management before becoming RqM/ILSM. Then you became a PM. Sometimes impractical to have done all that, but you get the drift. But if you have done it, you find you commit fewer howlers when a PM, because you know the right question to ask. Same in any profession I guess. Question – How many 21 year old graduates straight out of university do the RN have as senior pilots? None? So why’s it ok in project management?
”As such I am intrigued as to why you appear to be defending the indefensible. You may not mean it but the tone of your posts conveys a sense of that's how it's always worked in DPA, get over it”.
Sorry, didn’t mean to convey such an impression. I thought my point was that many do it correctly / efficiently. DPA is very stovepiped and a lot of wheel reinventing goes on. Lots of “new” initiatives which are actually mandated policy, practiced by hundreds. It has always been so because they look at unsuccessful projects and think “We must fix this or that”. What they should do is also look at successful projects, where they would learn there is no need to fix it, just disseminate existing good practice.
”Grateful for your insights but I'm not asking you personally to provide satisfactory answers to the Merlin problem: you are clearly not in a position to do so”.
No, I’m not! They could employ me as a consultant at £1000 a day to teach them the basics. But it would only take a day, then what would I do?
“But I believe that those who fly/maintain this aircraft deserve to be told why it's so royally ed-up. If this thread is to be believed there are 50 odd crews unable to fly. Can't be doing their morale much good. Maybe if somebody explained to them why it's like it is, and that there's also a glimmer of hope in the future, it might stop them wanting to leave in droves. Perhaps some of them will then be in a position in years to come to avoid the same pitfalls, when they do their DPA broadening jobs. Can't beat understanding the lessons of history".
Agree. Nothing wrong with learning from experience, but my experience is that Post Project Evaluation Reports are widely ignored. They are only required two years after ISD, so by definition most who would remember anything have finished their tour and are long gone, and the person who writes them merely reports on the immediate service reaction to the kit, not the management process by which it got there. For the PPER to be valuable, you need continuity – perhaps not quite the old cradle to grave notion, but certainly more than two years and then off on promotion because you’ve made the project look good in a couple of reports, but in fact left a pile of unsolved risks and problems behind. Far too many senior managers within MoD have neither initiated nor completed a project, never mind a range of projects across different technical disciplines in each phase. As I intimated before, an organisation whose primary task is to manage the procurement of equipment for the services regards its PMs as second class minions. The majority are at the lowest or second lowest grade for their specialisation in DPA. They are responsible and accountable, but few have real authority. Yet many of their seniors contribute nothing to this primary task. In my last IPT we had a 15 man “Management Board” telling me how to do my job, and most had the power to delay my projects if they didn’t like my punctuation, or something equally unimportant. Only 4 were my senior. None were experienced PMs. Tells a story.
”I suspect from your posts that you were neither responsible for nor in a position to fix Merlin support; you are however obviously very experienced in logistics acquisition”.
Any project manager should be experienced in logistics acquisition. If not, he’s no experience of an area that spends 70%+ of the through life costs and shouldn’t be in the post. (Just an opinion – none of the DPA XB agree with me and they are ultimately responsible for recruitment policy and setting standards). It’s just something you do before being a PM. The RN have a set of permanent EP Instructions laying down the basics, and it (was) a pre-requisite that you had experience in repair/overhaul, diagnostics, supervision, QA, engineering design and contractor management before becoming RqM/ILSM. Then you became a PM. Sometimes impractical to have done all that, but you get the drift. But if you have done it, you find you commit fewer howlers when a PM, because you know the right question to ask. Same in any profession I guess. Question – How many 21 year old graduates straight out of university do the RN have as senior pilots? None? So why’s it ok in project management?
”As such I am intrigued as to why you appear to be defending the indefensible. You may not mean it but the tone of your posts conveys a sense of that's how it's always worked in DPA, get over it”.
Sorry, didn’t mean to convey such an impression. I thought my point was that many do it correctly / efficiently. DPA is very stovepiped and a lot of wheel reinventing goes on. Lots of “new” initiatives which are actually mandated policy, practiced by hundreds. It has always been so because they look at unsuccessful projects and think “We must fix this or that”. What they should do is also look at successful projects, where they would learn there is no need to fix it, just disseminate existing good practice.
”Grateful for your insights but I'm not asking you personally to provide satisfactory answers to the Merlin problem: you are clearly not in a position to do so”.
No, I’m not! They could employ me as a consultant at £1000 a day to teach them the basics. But it would only take a day, then what would I do?
“But I believe that those who fly/maintain this aircraft deserve to be told why it's so royally ed-up. If this thread is to be believed there are 50 odd crews unable to fly. Can't be doing their morale much good. Maybe if somebody explained to them why it's like it is, and that there's also a glimmer of hope in the future, it might stop them wanting to leave in droves. Perhaps some of them will then be in a position in years to come to avoid the same pitfalls, when they do their DPA broadening jobs. Can't beat understanding the lessons of history".
Agree. Nothing wrong with learning from experience, but my experience is that Post Project Evaluation Reports are widely ignored. They are only required two years after ISD, so by definition most who would remember anything have finished their tour and are long gone, and the person who writes them merely reports on the immediate service reaction to the kit, not the management process by which it got there. For the PPER to be valuable, you need continuity – perhaps not quite the old cradle to grave notion, but certainly more than two years and then off on promotion because you’ve made the project look good in a couple of reports, but in fact left a pile of unsolved risks and problems behind. Far too many senior managers within MoD have neither initiated nor completed a project, never mind a range of projects across different technical disciplines in each phase. As I intimated before, an organisation whose primary task is to manage the procurement of equipment for the services regards its PMs as second class minions. The majority are at the lowest or second lowest grade for their specialisation in DPA. They are responsible and accountable, but few have real authority. Yet many of their seniors contribute nothing to this primary task. In my last IPT we had a 15 man “Management Board” telling me how to do my job, and most had the power to delay my projects if they didn’t like my punctuation, or something equally unimportant. Only 4 were my senior. None were experienced PMs. Tells a story.
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Again I'm not qualified to answer the Merlin question but a few of my experiences might be common enough to be close to the mark.
Entire project costs go over budget - cannot cut number of platforms for political or operational impact reasons - reduce the support budget.
Through life support costs in original bid too high in EP bid and may stop programme - cut support costs we'll get money in later years.
Large export order has come in, needs immediate delivery to ensure contractor wins contract - give them the spares pack you bought.
Quote from DPA PM " The manufaturer has guaranteed a 6000 hr MTBF, thats longer than the life of the airframe I do not need to buy any spares".
Spares buy against 3 MOBs, now have 2 continuos OOA to support as well.
20% year on year budget cuts in DLO for at least 3 years.
Entire project costs go over budget - cannot cut number of platforms for political or operational impact reasons - reduce the support budget.
Through life support costs in original bid too high in EP bid and may stop programme - cut support costs we'll get money in later years.
Large export order has come in, needs immediate delivery to ensure contractor wins contract - give them the spares pack you bought.
Quote from DPA PM " The manufaturer has guaranteed a 6000 hr MTBF, thats longer than the life of the airframe I do not need to buy any spares".
Spares buy against 3 MOBs, now have 2 continuos OOA to support as well.
20% year on year budget cuts in DLO for at least 3 years.
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After my giggles subsided, I thought I would reply to Former Pioneers dig at the smally grey Westland fraternity.
Quote; "Or is it that you are worried that, as soon as the powers that be realise that if they cancel the Future Lynx, they can spend the money instead on an EO/IR and Air->Surface for the Merlin, then the Fleet will get much greater capability and commonality?"
Commonality!! Pity we hadn't gone to that a few years earlier, then the all singing, all dancing helo with computers would have provided all our maritime cover this year and last year............er, maybe not. Between you and the antics of Buff there would be zip aircover for the Fleet with the FW gap pre JSF.
I think that the powers that be have just realised the impact of the Merlin CSP which will only just get the beast somewhere near it's promised capabilities, still minus the above goodies though.
Fully agree, worldbeater in ASW, but don't dilute the pedigree.
The plotting boards and pencils are now at AL 45 with majority MK8 and the imminent Saturn introduction.
I
Gear down and welded
Quote; "Or is it that you are worried that, as soon as the powers that be realise that if they cancel the Future Lynx, they can spend the money instead on an EO/IR and Air->Surface for the Merlin, then the Fleet will get much greater capability and commonality?"
Commonality!! Pity we hadn't gone to that a few years earlier, then the all singing, all dancing helo with computers would have provided all our maritime cover this year and last year............er, maybe not. Between you and the antics of Buff there would be zip aircover for the Fleet with the FW gap pre JSF.
I think that the powers that be have just realised the impact of the Merlin CSP which will only just get the beast somewhere near it's promised capabilities, still minus the above goodies though.
Fully agree, worldbeater in ASW, but don't dilute the pedigree.
The plotting boards and pencils are now at AL 45 with majority MK8 and the imminent Saturn introduction.
I
Gear down and welded
Engineer R
Unfortunately your post is depressingly familiar, and the scenarios increasingly common.
If I may pick one.
Quote from DPA PM "The manufacturer has guaranteed a 6000 hr MTBF, that’s longer than the life of the airframe I do not need to buy any spares".
Having sat on both sides of the fence I’d deal with it this way.
Raise a Risk Notification Form on his programme, ensuring him, his risk manager and the Customers are copied. A simple e-mail these days. The risk being that his decision is placing viability, sustainability and availability at risk, through knowingly disregarding permanent EP instructions which permit a minimum of one spare to be procured, regardless of reliability prediction. He does not have the authority to over-rule this, only the Requirement Manager has. If the RqM does, then fine, it’s a Customer decision, but it doesn’t stop you raising a RNF. The RM would simply ask that the RqM explains his decision. The way most risk scores are calculated, such a risk would rate quite high and be visible to his bosses; who normally ask for the top 10 in monthly reports – and anything that is novel or contentious. I’d say a nil spares plan is contentious, but not novel. It would also be raised at a wider forum, the Programme Management Committee. Either way, he is duty bound to address the risk and provide an answer, which is part of the audit trail for all time. That way, you have a named individual who is accountable. There are variations on this theme, which I’m sure you know of.
All this applies to anything, on any programme. It is the way the end user can raise concerns and you MUST get an answer.
You don’t say if the RqM made financial provision for spares (if he didn’t, the entire bid fails scrutiny unless he explains why, but this is often ignored by DPA) or what the (mandatory) Ranging and Scaling Meeting recommended. This is where the R&S Manager would point out that a guarantee of 6000 MTBF doesn’t actually mean anything to front line if they have any reason at all to remove the item. I've pulled out my calculator, and on a fleet of 44 Merlins, flying say 300 hours a year with a repair pipeline time of 12 months and 6000 MTBF, you'd buy 4.75 (5) spares, plus one Contingency. If the PLT was 6 months (which is pretty good - often impossible - for something at sea) then it would be 3+1). This assumes minimum 1st/2nd line recovery rates are achieved. On such a relativety small fleet the difference caused by front line, reserve, engineering pool and training aircraft would be negligible. Remember, this is over and above spare LRUs held on board or at an air station. That would be the RqM's starting point and he could adjust using engineering judgement (or perhaps whether or not he believed the contractor!). It's also the ILSM's starter if he has a CLS contract to negotiate.
As I don’t sit on the fence, I’d say "your" PM is a prat. No doubt he will soon be promoted. Hope you get a good replacement.
Unfortunately your post is depressingly familiar, and the scenarios increasingly common.
If I may pick one.
Quote from DPA PM "The manufacturer has guaranteed a 6000 hr MTBF, that’s longer than the life of the airframe I do not need to buy any spares".
Having sat on both sides of the fence I’d deal with it this way.
Raise a Risk Notification Form on his programme, ensuring him, his risk manager and the Customers are copied. A simple e-mail these days. The risk being that his decision is placing viability, sustainability and availability at risk, through knowingly disregarding permanent EP instructions which permit a minimum of one spare to be procured, regardless of reliability prediction. He does not have the authority to over-rule this, only the Requirement Manager has. If the RqM does, then fine, it’s a Customer decision, but it doesn’t stop you raising a RNF. The RM would simply ask that the RqM explains his decision. The way most risk scores are calculated, such a risk would rate quite high and be visible to his bosses; who normally ask for the top 10 in monthly reports – and anything that is novel or contentious. I’d say a nil spares plan is contentious, but not novel. It would also be raised at a wider forum, the Programme Management Committee. Either way, he is duty bound to address the risk and provide an answer, which is part of the audit trail for all time. That way, you have a named individual who is accountable. There are variations on this theme, which I’m sure you know of.
All this applies to anything, on any programme. It is the way the end user can raise concerns and you MUST get an answer.
You don’t say if the RqM made financial provision for spares (if he didn’t, the entire bid fails scrutiny unless he explains why, but this is often ignored by DPA) or what the (mandatory) Ranging and Scaling Meeting recommended. This is where the R&S Manager would point out that a guarantee of 6000 MTBF doesn’t actually mean anything to front line if they have any reason at all to remove the item. I've pulled out my calculator, and on a fleet of 44 Merlins, flying say 300 hours a year with a repair pipeline time of 12 months and 6000 MTBF, you'd buy 4.75 (5) spares, plus one Contingency. If the PLT was 6 months (which is pretty good - often impossible - for something at sea) then it would be 3+1). This assumes minimum 1st/2nd line recovery rates are achieved. On such a relativety small fleet the difference caused by front line, reserve, engineering pool and training aircraft would be negligible. Remember, this is over and above spare LRUs held on board or at an air station. That would be the RqM's starting point and he could adjust using engineering judgement (or perhaps whether or not he believed the contractor!). It's also the ILSM's starter if he has a CLS contract to negotiate.
As I don’t sit on the fence, I’d say "your" PM is a prat. No doubt he will soon be promoted. Hope you get a good replacement.