- The Canberra - Unsafe in 1950, Still unsafe
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Months have passed since this accident-inspired thread faded gracefully. It had produced some fascinating reminiscences of the Canberra, and many of us enjoyed these insights.
However - hope folks won't mind an attempt to gently refocus by considering some pertinent questions:
Do we know any more facts about what happened back in the summer at Marham ?
Has there been any follow-up report ?
Has the Board of Inquiry finished ?
Do they know yet what happened ?
Do we know what has been done since to compensate for the loss of the T4 trainer aircraft ? Is there another one flying ?
2d L Pip
However - hope folks won't mind an attempt to gently refocus by considering some pertinent questions:
Do we know any more facts about what happened back in the summer at Marham ?
Has there been any follow-up report ?
Has the Board of Inquiry finished ?
Do they know yet what happened ?
Do we know what has been done since to compensate for the loss of the T4 trainer aircraft ? Is there another one flying ?
2d L Pip
Without wishing to pre-empt anything, I understand that:
The engines are still with RR.
The airframe is still strictly quarantined in a hangar at Marham.
The airframe was MUCH more badly damaged than appeared from the photos.
The impression that it would have been survivable had the crew stayed with it MAY not be accurate.
The aircraft ended up beside the main runway facing the way it had come.
There was a 'spare' T4 before the accident (perhaps two, though hours remaining on aircraft and engines make that unclear!).
I'm not sure if the accident had any bearing on the reported decision to bring forward the OSD to June 06.
The PR9 has continued to demonstrate its extraordinary usefulness.
I've heard diametrically opposed views as to whether any extension of service would have been cost effective or even possible, with limiting factors being cited as the upper wing skins and pressurisation cycles on the cabin.
The engines are still with RR.
The airframe is still strictly quarantined in a hangar at Marham.
The airframe was MUCH more badly damaged than appeared from the photos.
The impression that it would have been survivable had the crew stayed with it MAY not be accurate.
The aircraft ended up beside the main runway facing the way it had come.
There was a 'spare' T4 before the accident (perhaps two, though hours remaining on aircraft and engines make that unclear!).
I'm not sure if the accident had any bearing on the reported decision to bring forward the OSD to June 06.
The PR9 has continued to demonstrate its extraordinary usefulness.
I've heard diametrically opposed views as to whether any extension of service would have been cost effective or even possible, with limiting factors being cited as the upper wing skins and pressurisation cycles on the cabin.
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There was a 'spare' T4 before the accident (perhaps two, . . .
The "Blue Bomber" (WJ874) is currently undergoing a Minor at Hurn and will return to the sqn in Jan 2005 to continue crew training and familiarisation. It will be the only flying T.4 left in the RAF. The other T.4, WH849, is in long term storage but, due to the demands of the service, it is a source of spares and has been used as a Christmas Tree since 2002. It is doubtful if it will ever return now to service.
The "Blue Bomber" (WJ874) is currently undergoing a Minor at Hurn and will return to the sqn in Jan 2005 to continue crew training and familiarisation. It will be the only flying T.4 left in the RAF. The other T.4, WH849, is in long term storage but, due to the demands of the service, it is a source of spares and has been used as a Christmas Tree since 2002. It is doubtful if it will ever return now to service.
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Bee,
Having visited Shawbury's storage facility a few months ago, I can state that the two T4s they have are partly dismantled and look most unlikely to ever take to the skies again.
Having visited Shawbury's storage facility a few months ago, I can state that the two T4s they have are partly dismantled and look most unlikely to ever take to the skies again.
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The family were briefed on the sequence of events recently and at that stage the engines were still with RR.
Its looking like its still going to be 4 or so months before everything is finished maybe longer.
If anyone is interested a few of his mates are going to raise a glass to his memory once again and catch up on old times near Doncaster.
Cheers
Its looking like its still going to be 4 or so months before everything is finished maybe longer.
If anyone is interested a few of his mates are going to raise a glass to his memory once again and catch up on old times near Doncaster.
Cheers
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Indian Air Force Canberra crash
Another sad accident claims the lives of a pilot and navigator in the Indian Air Force.
The IAF hadn't had a Canberra accident in 14 years.
I cant confirm it yet, but it seems like this was a PR 57. The report claims that both pilot and navigator were advised to eject. The only other marks that the IAF has are T.54s and B(I) 58s. The T.54 would be carrying 2 pilots and the B(I)58 does not have an ejection seat for the navigator. I believe only 4-5 are fully operational (though there were reports of upto 12 being rotated - IAF intends to fly them to 2010) in roles similar to 39 Sqn RAF.
Putting this message in this thread not to cause controversy but because it seemed to be the one that referred to Canberra accidents.
Here is the link to it http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/n...hp?newsid=4847
There are some inaccuracies in the news article but Indian journalists have absolutely no clue about the Air Force - we dont seem to have knowledgeable ones like Jackonicko.
Worf
The IAF hadn't had a Canberra accident in 14 years.
I cant confirm it yet, but it seems like this was a PR 57. The report claims that both pilot and navigator were advised to eject. The only other marks that the IAF has are T.54s and B(I) 58s. The T.54 would be carrying 2 pilots and the B(I)58 does not have an ejection seat for the navigator. I believe only 4-5 are fully operational (though there were reports of upto 12 being rotated - IAF intends to fly them to 2010) in roles similar to 39 Sqn RAF.
Putting this message in this thread not to cause controversy but because it seemed to be the one that referred to Canberra accidents.
Here is the link to it http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/n...hp?newsid=4847
There are some inaccuracies in the news article but Indian journalists have absolutely no clue about the Air Force - we dont seem to have knowledgeable ones like Jackonicko.
Worf
There are some inaccuracies in the news article but Indian journalists have absolutely no clue about the Air Force - we dont seem to have knowledgeable ones like Jackonicko.
*blushing*
Gee fellas. Lil ol' me? Shucks!
But Pushpindar Singh (at Vayu) seems very switched on, writes extremely well, and is a top bloke. And I read a superb long piece on the MiG-27 upgrade somewhere, but can't remember the author's name.
Gee fellas. Lil ol' me? Shucks!
But Pushpindar Singh (at Vayu) seems very switched on, writes extremely well, and is a top bloke. And I read a superb long piece on the MiG-27 upgrade somewhere, but can't remember the author's name.
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Jackonicko,
Pushpindar Singh is more of an aviation historian - not so much a journalist. And I doubt that any of the Indian newspapers/media outlets even bother to contact him. Otherwise our reporting would be MUCH better.
A bunch of younger folks are emerging, including Jagan who runs the IAF portion of the Bharat Rakshak site and who has written a book on the 1965 war that is must read. (If not for any other reason than the fact that the IAF used British aircraft in post WWII war operations more than the RAF ever did!)
The Mig-27 article you talk about is written by B Harry - a mysterious writer who we believe is a tech person in the aircraft industry. The internet has allowed knowledgeable people to publish and extend their reach without having the kind of financial backing that Pushpindar Singh had. (Not to take anything away from him).
Worf
Pushpindar Singh is more of an aviation historian - not so much a journalist. And I doubt that any of the Indian newspapers/media outlets even bother to contact him. Otherwise our reporting would be MUCH better.
A bunch of younger folks are emerging, including Jagan who runs the IAF portion of the Bharat Rakshak site and who has written a book on the 1965 war that is must read. (If not for any other reason than the fact that the IAF used British aircraft in post WWII war operations more than the RAF ever did!)
The Mig-27 article you talk about is written by B Harry - a mysterious writer who we believe is a tech person in the aircraft industry. The internet has allowed knowledgeable people to publish and extend their reach without having the kind of financial backing that Pushpindar Singh had. (Not to take anything away from him).
Worf
Worf - I just got me copy of Jagan/Samir's book 
was lying un-picked-up for ages!
And I concur the part about Harry / Jagan and their accuracy. Sadly the mainstream media still consists of people who believe that new aircraft prototypes are "test fired" and not "test flown".
was lying un-picked-up for ages!And I concur the part about Harry / Jagan and their accuracy. Sadly the mainstream media still consists of people who believe that new aircraft prototypes are "test fired" and not "test flown".
I was posted (appointed) to RAF Waton in late 1966 when we formed 360 out of separate RN and RAF ECM squadrons. We had to wait for the T17s to appear so flew the RAF's T4s and B2s while we waited. 3 RN crew got airborne on pilot training one evening and the pilots got the engine failure somewhat wrong. The nav ejected but it is thought tried to beat the system and was killed.
How and why?
Well, the canopy was ejected by a switch on the left side wall which was wire locked and gated. The cover had to lifted away from the switch before it could be moved up to fire the canopy. A TWO handed operation. Then you could fire the seat. When first introduced to the setup we tried to work out ways to do it one handed and it is thought that the nav (observer RN) may have tried to do just that. If so the canopy may not have fired (or cleared the plane I don't recall exactly) prior to his seat firing. His death I believe created a redesign of the system and the nav and others through the years may well owe their lives to someone loosing his.
How and why?
Well, the canopy was ejected by a switch on the left side wall which was wire locked and gated. The cover had to lifted away from the switch before it could be moved up to fire the canopy. A TWO handed operation. Then you could fire the seat. When first introduced to the setup we tried to work out ways to do it one handed and it is thought that the nav (observer RN) may have tried to do just that. If so the canopy may not have fired (or cleared the plane I don't recall exactly) prior to his seat firing. His death I believe created a redesign of the system and the nav and others through the years may well owe their lives to someone loosing his.
Having now read the BoI report at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Ab...dOfInquiry.htm , I have a few observations:
1. In the VC10, which (the handling pilot) flew previously, an engine failure during a 'roller' landing was never cause for an abort, because the aircraft never decelerates below V1 during a correctly flown roller. Hence it would probably have been deeply ingrained into his mind to 'GO' with an engine failure during a roller purely due to previous experience on the VC10. I find the comments made by AOC 3 Gp and endorsed by C-in-C STC:
"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."
to be inconsistent with operation of Perf A aircraft such as the VC10..... Are they really advocating practising aborts from above V1 on a regular basis? Even in the simulator? Such an 'across the board' recommendation seems somewhat surprising, to say the least.
2. The policy of practising such totally unnecessary night asymmetric roller landings on the Canberra does not appear to have been questioned. Asymmetric landings or asymmetric overshoots - fine. But what on earth was the point in practising rollers after asymmetric landings - particularly at night? I can understand symmetric rollers with a subsequent simulated single engine failure, but emphatically NOT a roller following an asymmetric landing.
RIP Reichmann
1. In the VC10, which (the handling pilot) flew previously, an engine failure during a 'roller' landing was never cause for an abort, because the aircraft never decelerates below V1 during a correctly flown roller. Hence it would probably have been deeply ingrained into his mind to 'GO' with an engine failure during a roller purely due to previous experience on the VC10. I find the comments made by AOC 3 Gp and endorsed by C-in-C STC:
"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."
to be inconsistent with operation of Perf A aircraft such as the VC10..... Are they really advocating practising aborts from above V1 on a regular basis? Even in the simulator? Such an 'across the board' recommendation seems somewhat surprising, to say the least.
2. The policy of practising such totally unnecessary night asymmetric roller landings on the Canberra does not appear to have been questioned. Asymmetric landings or asymmetric overshoots - fine. But what on earth was the point in practising rollers after asymmetric landings - particularly at night? I can understand symmetric rollers with a subsequent simulated single engine failure, but emphatically NOT a roller following an asymmetric landing.
RIP Reichmann
Last edited by BEagle; 15th Feb 2006 at 23:30.
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I find the comments from C-in-C STC:
"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."
"I therefore recommend that the syllabi for all in-service aircraft types be reviewed to consider including regular expereince of aborted rollers."
I don't think that it was C-in-C STC that said that. In fact, it's quite noticable that he didn't comment on that suggestion at all.
The comment was made by AOC 3 Gp at Part 4 para 6 and was endorsed by C-in-C STC at Part 5 para 3.
I have amended my earlier post accordingly.
I have amended my earlier post accordingly.
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Thanks Begs, but the way I read it, the C-in-C endorsed the board's recommendations, not necessarily the AOC's comments. Here's another thought on your comments:
Speaking as someone who has aborted a roller landing from above V1 (which of course is quite safe to do soon after touchdown if, for example, you decide to turn a roller landing into a full stop landing and simply don't open the throttles), does the V1 figure have much meaning in the context of a roller landing? I always thought that scheduled performance calculations were considered from a standing start.
Speaking as someone who has aborted a roller landing from above V1 (which of course is quite safe to do soon after touchdown if, for example, you decide to turn a roller landing into a full stop landing and simply don't open the throttles), does the V1 figure have much meaning in the context of a roller landing? I always thought that scheduled performance calculations were considered from a standing start.
Last edited by LFFC; 16th Feb 2006 at 00:48.
Converting a roller into a full-stop landing is not that straightforward in something like a VC10. In a full-stop, the handling pilot calls for idle thrust, then 'spoiler' (which includes idle reverse) as the mainwheels touch, followed if required by 'full reverse' after the nosewheel is on the RW. All those actions are completed by the non-handling pilot; however, the air engineer closes the throttles to idle. Whereas during a roller, the handling pilot calls 'roll' and initiates the forward throttle movement, the air engineer sets the briefed thrust and the non-handling pilot reconfigures the flaps. Changing the 'roll' series of actions into a 'land' sereis of actions would thus be fairly complex in a multi-crew aeroplane.*
A decison to 'abort' a roller would be even more fraught with hazard in the VC10. The LDR assumes a touchdown at a certain point and speed, followed by normal retardation processes - and there are strict requirements governing the LDA/LDR ratio which depend upon various factors such as runway contamination and landing configuration. How far down the runway would an 'aborted roller' be safe? For it to be entirely feasible, you would need to assure that it could be initiated right up to the normal rotate speed for the roller - which would require enormous runway lengths if it was to cover all feasible landing configurations.... So, because the aeroplane is always capable of flying with a single failure at any time during the roller (something which was frequently practised by the instructor pulling back an outboard throttle as the 'roll' call was made), an 'aborted roller' was never considered.
Guidance on aborting between V1 and Vr can never be specific; about the only cause we ever considered was 'if the likelihood of the aircraft taking off safely is less than that of surviving a runway overrun' - such as a massive multiple birdstrike taking out 3 or 4 engines.
I remain of the opinion that aborting a roller in something like a VC10 goes totally against established practice and is fraught with hazard. Hence a 'Roller = GO' mentality deeply embedded in an ex-VC10 pilot's long term memory could reasonably well be expected.
RIP
*over 3 years since I last flew the VC10, so I can't guarantee the accuracy of the foregoing!
A decison to 'abort' a roller would be even more fraught with hazard in the VC10. The LDR assumes a touchdown at a certain point and speed, followed by normal retardation processes - and there are strict requirements governing the LDA/LDR ratio which depend upon various factors such as runway contamination and landing configuration. How far down the runway would an 'aborted roller' be safe? For it to be entirely feasible, you would need to assure that it could be initiated right up to the normal rotate speed for the roller - which would require enormous runway lengths if it was to cover all feasible landing configurations.... So, because the aeroplane is always capable of flying with a single failure at any time during the roller (something which was frequently practised by the instructor pulling back an outboard throttle as the 'roll' call was made), an 'aborted roller' was never considered.
Guidance on aborting between V1 and Vr can never be specific; about the only cause we ever considered was 'if the likelihood of the aircraft taking off safely is less than that of surviving a runway overrun' - such as a massive multiple birdstrike taking out 3 or 4 engines.
I remain of the opinion that aborting a roller in something like a VC10 goes totally against established practice and is fraught with hazard. Hence a 'Roller = GO' mentality deeply embedded in an ex-VC10 pilot's long term memory could reasonably well be expected.
RIP
*over 3 years since I last flew the VC10, so I can't guarantee the accuracy of the foregoing!
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I've only just noticed this thread - I'm not sure why it deserved any intelligent response in the first place, seen as it was based on a throw-away line which was both grossly inaccurate and rather silly.
As we all know, the Canberra has been a hugely successful aircraft and was never, ever described as "dangerous" by anyone, in fact it proved to be a very reliable airframe which serived the RAF (and lots of other forces) very well indeed. Such was the Canberra's relatively docile handling qualities, the RAF routinely posted less-able pilots to Canberra units, if they felt that they weren't quite ready to take-on the "fast jets".
Enough of the "Sun" headlines please
As we all know, the Canberra has been a hugely successful aircraft and was never, ever described as "dangerous" by anyone, in fact it proved to be a very reliable airframe which serived the RAF (and lots of other forces) very well indeed. Such was the Canberra's relatively docile handling qualities, the RAF routinely posted less-able pilots to Canberra units, if they felt that they weren't quite ready to take-on the "fast jets".
Enough of the "Sun" headlines please