Does the UAE publish accident reports?
Join Date: Sep 2006
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If you need to ask
Then you don't need to know.
In general GCAA accident reports are superb PR documents.
The GCAA report on the DXB UPS, will ensure that ATC, APT facilites and the regulatory authority are not to blame.
The recent EY diversion due to a passengers supply of petrol leaking in the cabin, being a typical response. He was allowed to continue his journey in peace.
Well it was Ramadan.
glf
In general GCAA accident reports are superb PR documents.
The GCAA report on the DXB UPS, will ensure that ATC, APT facilites and the regulatory authority are not to blame.
The recent EY diversion due to a passengers supply of petrol leaking in the cabin, being a typical response. He was allowed to continue his journey in peace.
Well it was Ramadan.
glf
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NTSB is not the regulatory authority
The GCAA will produce the report, and take into consideration all and any outside, (interested and INVITED) parties.
Protocol dictates that should the NTSB, or even CNN decide that the report is not what they expected, then they can issue their own seperate additional unofficial report.
The 707 in Sharjah, has no conclusive report: "as the black box was unavailable" the cause if the accident in not know.
However within moments of the accident the official view was "there is no blaim associated with the airport or atc".
The glider in Morocco, and the UAE pilot.
The helicopter in Abu Dhabi, and the actual person at the controls at the time of the accident.
The GCAA are the only source of the OFFICIAL report.
If you seek clarification re responsable ATM management refer to the associated ATC threads.
End game.
glf
Protocol dictates that should the NTSB, or even CNN decide that the report is not what they expected, then they can issue their own seperate additional unofficial report.
The 707 in Sharjah, has no conclusive report: "as the black box was unavailable" the cause if the accident in not know.
However within moments of the accident the official view was "there is no blaim associated with the airport or atc".
The glider in Morocco, and the UAE pilot.
The helicopter in Abu Dhabi, and the actual person at the controls at the time of the accident.
The GCAA are the only source of the OFFICIAL report.
If you seek clarification re responsable ATM management refer to the associated ATC threads.
End game.
glf
Join Date: May 2006
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Yep you are right it is all shrouded in Secrecy in the third world country trying to hide the truth for their Arab bothers
Except there is a report:
http://www.icao.int/fsix/sr/reports/...nal_report.pdf
As no-one thinks it exists here are the guts:
(h) The crew approach briefing for a non precision approach to Sharjah Runway 12 VOR/DME stated non-published approach chart figures for final approach track and minima.
(i) Just prior to intercepting the final approach in day VFR conditions the Captain advised the First Officer to fly the approach. The First Officer either for cultural or professional reasons, stated that he did not consider himself capable or prepared for this approach.
(j) The First Officer flew the approach adequately in azimuth but high on the descent profile; at least 60 kt fast initially and not configured correctly in accordance with the SOPs.
(k) The flap 10, flap 25 and landing gear were lowered above their respective limiting speeds, as described in the AOM and SOPs to decelerate the aircraft.
(n) The Captain took over during the final approach and shortly afterwards, the ground range selectors were lifted and the power levers momentarily moved from the flight idle position through the mechanical stop to the ground control range at
a time the secondary (automatic) stop was not available. This action was not in compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures and Aircraft Flight Manual warning.
(o) The pitch on both propellers moved rapidly into a ground control range to an undetermined blade angle but considered to be approximately +3 degrees.
(p) The aircraft pitched down most likely due to a combination of disrupted airflow created by the propellers over the wing and tailplane and altered aerodynamic moment effects. The asymmetric propeller drag effects induced and maintained a roll to the left.
(q) Within 2 sec of the commencement of the event, the power levers were moved back into the flight control range to the take off setting. Due to the unpredictable propeller behaviour within the ground control range in flight, movement of the power lever to the flight control range would have little initial effect on the movement of the propeller pitch towards the flight control range.
(r) The left propeller pitch continued to move to a full reverse position due to resultant negative blade twisting moments, localized forces and a lack of oil pressure hydraulic effect. It remained in a full reverse position until impact. The right hand propeller pitch gradually moved from the ground control range towards the flight control range as permitted by the resultant positive blade twisting moments, localized forces and hydraulic effect.
(s) The aircraft descended in an extreme nose low left bank attitude until impact.
3.2 Cause
The power levers were moved by a pilot from the flight idle position into the ground control range, which led to an irreversible loss of flight control.
So sounds like the captain thought reverse thrust might be a great way of slowing the plane down!
Except there is a report:
http://www.icao.int/fsix/sr/reports/...nal_report.pdf
As no-one thinks it exists here are the guts:
(h) The crew approach briefing for a non precision approach to Sharjah Runway 12 VOR/DME stated non-published approach chart figures for final approach track and minima.
(i) Just prior to intercepting the final approach in day VFR conditions the Captain advised the First Officer to fly the approach. The First Officer either for cultural or professional reasons, stated that he did not consider himself capable or prepared for this approach.
(j) The First Officer flew the approach adequately in azimuth but high on the descent profile; at least 60 kt fast initially and not configured correctly in accordance with the SOPs.
(k) The flap 10, flap 25 and landing gear were lowered above their respective limiting speeds, as described in the AOM and SOPs to decelerate the aircraft.
(n) The Captain took over during the final approach and shortly afterwards, the ground range selectors were lifted and the power levers momentarily moved from the flight idle position through the mechanical stop to the ground control range at
a time the secondary (automatic) stop was not available. This action was not in compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures and Aircraft Flight Manual warning.
(o) The pitch on both propellers moved rapidly into a ground control range to an undetermined blade angle but considered to be approximately +3 degrees.
(p) The aircraft pitched down most likely due to a combination of disrupted airflow created by the propellers over the wing and tailplane and altered aerodynamic moment effects. The asymmetric propeller drag effects induced and maintained a roll to the left.
(q) Within 2 sec of the commencement of the event, the power levers were moved back into the flight control range to the take off setting. Due to the unpredictable propeller behaviour within the ground control range in flight, movement of the power lever to the flight control range would have little initial effect on the movement of the propeller pitch towards the flight control range.
(r) The left propeller pitch continued to move to a full reverse position due to resultant negative blade twisting moments, localized forces and a lack of oil pressure hydraulic effect. It remained in a full reverse position until impact. The right hand propeller pitch gradually moved from the ground control range towards the flight control range as permitted by the resultant positive blade twisting moments, localized forces and hydraulic effect.
(s) The aircraft descended in an extreme nose low left bank attitude until impact.
3.2 Cause
The power levers were moved by a pilot from the flight idle position into the ground control range, which led to an irreversible loss of flight control.
So sounds like the captain thought reverse thrust might be a great way of slowing the plane down!
