Why no news!!

Wouldn't the Asiana 747 send ACARS reports of malfunctions (or lack of malfunctions...) as the UPS cargo fire aircraft did?

No news, no loss of face!:ugh:

Wheres the Boeing investigation?
Why was it up to Asiana to retrieve the bodies?
Where's the FDR/CVR?
Where's the ACARS data?
Whats the truth behind the $29 M insurance policy and suicide rumour?
Where is the NTSB assigned accredited representative preliminary report?

Seems to be a LOT of missing information and news. Typically when this happens there is something very suspicious?

The Boeing investigation continues. Asiana is contracting with the same compaony that discovered and raised parts of the AF aircraft from the S. Atlantic. Visibility is extremely poor in these waters and the actual continuence
of the recovery effort for the black boxes will resume in a few months when conditions improve.

Sad that because this was a freighter that the world's media is paying it no attention.....

Salvage of Asiana 991..
 

Crash: Asiana B744 near Jeju on Jul 28th 2011, fire in cargo hold

Don't know if this has been posted before, but this caught my eye:

'The aircraft had been carrying 39,331 kg of cargo, 18,934 kg of which were loaded at Incheon Airport. A total of 2,092 kg was declared as dangerous goods, loaded near the left cargo door on the main deck. These goods consisted of flammable liquids, corrosive liquids and lithium-ion batteries, the shipment consisting of 198 cells rated at 25Ah at 3.65V. All dangerous cargo had been placed onto 2 palletes and had been loaded without problems, no observation of damage or leakages. The goods had been previously stored according to regulations. The captain had supervised the transport from the warehouse and loading of the two palettes onto position ML and PR on the aircraft.':confused: Seems especially strange in light of speculation about possible suicide of the captain...

seems an odd statement , 'Captain supervised transport from warehouse and loading' !!! Never heard of this before, maybe check that its loaded correctly etc when on main deck .

Interim Report available here:

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"http://www.araib.go.kr"

(There is an English option but the .pdf may take a couple of attempts to download correctly):8

CargoFlyer11 & bvcu
 

I think some misinterpretation of the report is responsible for the statement.

The report says:-

It is not unusual for the Captain or F/O to observe the loading of DG pallets next to the main cargo door. Part of the normal pre-flight inspection involves a walk around all accessible areas of the Main Deck cargo area after loading is completed.

(Total cargo weight was 65,938kg)

Report I've seen quoted mentions main area of fire damage to be around the main-deck cargo door, with sooth traces running all the way forward to around the CL/CR position. This indicates the fire was strongest at the PL (door) position, but it does not necessarily follow that's where the fire started - though it is likely to be the case.

The report states two pallets with DGR, including flammable liquids (Class 3), corrosives (Cl. 8) and Li-Io batteries (Cl. 9), were loaded on MR and PL, but it does not state how the DG was spread over the two. According to IATA separation criteria you can load Cl. 9 with anything, and there's no requirement to keep Cl. 3 and 8 separated. There's a nice 2.2 tons cocktail for you to ponder, and it's worth mentioning that those separation criteria apply equally to pax and cargo aircraft. And while such a thing as "Cargo Aircraft Only" shipment does exist, what makes a particular substance liable to that restriction is governed largely by quantity per package. Thus if you need to ship 200kg of "nasty" you could do it in 2 x 100kg packages and that would be CAO, or you could do 100 x 2kg packages and that would be acceptable on a pax aircraft.

Still, the biggest danger is not the declared DG but all the unknown and nu-declared shyte we're unknowingly carrying. My position has always been that no cargo carrying aircraft, be it full cargo or lower-deck on a slave boat, departs without some kind of nu-declared DG onboard.

Why put lithium batteries on the maindeck?
 

The fire started on the main deck near the side cargo door. Which is where two pallets with DG were loaded in position ML & PR. The pallets contained, among other DG; lithium batteries and photo-resist/IC, a highly flammable fluid.

I question the practice of loading lithium batteries on the maindeck, which is a class E compartment on the B747. Firefighting in a class E compartment is by depressurizing it to 25.000 feet. The FAA has reported that depressurization is ineffective in extinguishing lithium fires. The bellies of a B747 are class C compartments, with halon fire extinguishing. The halon may not put out the lithium fire itself, but it will certainly help to keep the fire down in the surrounding packaging material such as cardboard boxes, plastic sheeting and other flammable material.

And smoke from a lower belly fire would take longer to reach the cockpit.

An added advantage of stowing Lithium batteries in the lower belly would be the extra distance from the vulnerable flight control cables, which run above the ceiling of the main deck.

In the UPS B747 crash at Dubai pitch control was affected within mere minutes of the fire warning. The Asiana crew did not report loss of rudder control untill 12 minutes after reporting a cargo fire, possibly because the fire started much further aft. Allthough from the altitude graph it appears their altitude varied quite a bit.

All this could buy the flight crew extra time to divert, ditch or make an off-airport landing.

ASAP.

I know of one cargo carrier (B777F) who has banned lithium batteries from the main-deck, consigning them to lower-deck Class C compartments only. A rather prudent step, if you ask me.

In an ideal world these batteries should, perhaps, be subject to an outright ban. But if you do that you might as well turn the lights out for air cargo. Thus a more safe way must be found to transport these units, and Class C compartment only is one component of a risk mitigating strategy.