Mixture cuts to simulate engine failure on take off.
Thread Starter
Engine handling aside, it's all about risk management (God - I love those long words).
Because there is obviously a risk of mishandling when playing with simulated engine failures at relatively low altitude (and believe me I have had several situations where the pilot being trained/tested has caught me off guard by applying full wrong rudder during a simulated engine failure after take off) - it is safer to use the throttle method. But that is only my opinion - so it is a wise man that reads what the aircraft manufacturer has to say.
From the PA44 POH, Section 3, under Safety Tips:
Section 10 Report: VB-860
Quote:
"Experience has shown that the training advantage gained by pulling a mixture control or turning off the fuel to simulate engine failure at low altitude is not worth the risk assumed, therefore it is recommended that instead of using either of these procedures to simulate loss of power at low altitude, the throttle be retarded slowly to idle position. Fast reduction of power may be harmful to the engine. A power setting of 2000RPM and 11.5 in Hg MAP is recommended for simulated one engine operation.
Unquote.
As far as I am concerned, that is good enough for me.
One other point. Part of the asymmetric training includes practice at identification. That will normally be done in the upper air where any mis-handling by the student is quickly rectified while at a safe height.
Only when the student is considered consistently competent at the identification process would one normally proceed to the engine failure on take off practice. This too, should be done initially upper air until the student is competent.
Once that is OK then part of circuit training will be the occasional simulated engine failure after take off. This is primarily a handling exercise as the identification process has already been thoroughly covered earlier.
The argument that pulling the throttle after take off makes it obvious which engine has failed, is valid - but does it matter? Not really, because the student has already demonstrated his identification competence earlier on.
The mixture cut is certainly realistic - but as the Piper people say " it is not worth the risk assumed" - and it is hard to argue otherwise. The ever waiting litigation eagle would presumably quote from the POH.
Because there is obviously a risk of mishandling when playing with simulated engine failures at relatively low altitude (and believe me I have had several situations where the pilot being trained/tested has caught me off guard by applying full wrong rudder during a simulated engine failure after take off) - it is safer to use the throttle method. But that is only my opinion - so it is a wise man that reads what the aircraft manufacturer has to say.
From the PA44 POH, Section 3, under Safety Tips:
Section 10 Report: VB-860
Quote:
"Experience has shown that the training advantage gained by pulling a mixture control or turning off the fuel to simulate engine failure at low altitude is not worth the risk assumed, therefore it is recommended that instead of using either of these procedures to simulate loss of power at low altitude, the throttle be retarded slowly to idle position. Fast reduction of power may be harmful to the engine. A power setting of 2000RPM and 11.5 in Hg MAP is recommended for simulated one engine operation.
Unquote.
As far as I am concerned, that is good enough for me.
One other point. Part of the asymmetric training includes practice at identification. That will normally be done in the upper air where any mis-handling by the student is quickly rectified while at a safe height.
Only when the student is considered consistently competent at the identification process would one normally proceed to the engine failure on take off practice. This too, should be done initially upper air until the student is competent.
Once that is OK then part of circuit training will be the occasional simulated engine failure after take off. This is primarily a handling exercise as the identification process has already been thoroughly covered earlier.
The argument that pulling the throttle after take off makes it obvious which engine has failed, is valid - but does it matter? Not really, because the student has already demonstrated his identification competence earlier on.
The mixture cut is certainly realistic - but as the Piper people say " it is not worth the risk assumed" - and it is hard to argue otherwise. The ever waiting litigation eagle would presumably quote from the POH.
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Centaurus,
A risk management poser if I may sir.
You are the chief pilot of an RPT service involved in day/night operations from your aerodrome to an island community some 150 nm away. You have a fleet of six Queen Airs, a group of average but experienced pilots and a check captain.
One of your lads returns with a feathered engine, six frightened punters and a fire truck. Metallurgy tests suggest detonation. You decide to re-write your operations manual for the type and stipulate leaning procedures. In the course of your research you stumble upon Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin No 245-D. So whilst you are at it you decide to address the training situation with regard to simulated engine failures.
Your dilemma: do you continue using the throttle to simulate engine failures or do you opt for the mixture control as advised in the SB?
The former will ensure the safety of the crew during training but may jeopardise the safety of a planeload of passengers during a scheduled service. So how do you address the risk?
Although your PA44 may cope with throttle closures the technique is not necessarily upward compatible with more sophisticated large piston engines!
A risk management poser if I may sir.
You are the chief pilot of an RPT service involved in day/night operations from your aerodrome to an island community some 150 nm away. You have a fleet of six Queen Airs, a group of average but experienced pilots and a check captain.
One of your lads returns with a feathered engine, six frightened punters and a fire truck. Metallurgy tests suggest detonation. You decide to re-write your operations manual for the type and stipulate leaning procedures. In the course of your research you stumble upon Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin No 245-D. So whilst you are at it you decide to address the training situation with regard to simulated engine failures.
Your dilemma: do you continue using the throttle to simulate engine failures or do you opt for the mixture control as advised in the SB?
The former will ensure the safety of the crew during training but may jeopardise the safety of a planeload of passengers during a scheduled service. So how do you address the risk?
Although your PA44 may cope with throttle closures the technique is not necessarily upward compatible with more sophisticated large piston engines!
Thread Starter
I think it boils down to the definition of "rapid" throttle movement.
Obviously a snapped close throttle is detrimental to the good health of the engine. I do not see a measured throttle closure of (say) 3-4 seconds as "Rapid". Have you ever watched the auto-throttles go from idle to full power on a CFM 56? Now I call that pretty fast throttle opening by what I was used to on other engines - but that rate of throttle movement is normal, otherwise the engine manufacturer would not design the autothrottle system that way if it was going to compromise the engine operation.
What has that to do with a piston engine throttle movement you may ask?
The answer lies in the perception of the operator (pilot). A steady measured closure of the throttle should be perfectly acceptable engine handling for a simulated failure. If not, it is doubtful that the engine would be certified. After all aero-engines go through unbelievably rigorous testing during the certification process.
It also drawing a very long bow to accuse a testing officer of stuffing an engine in the future by his decision to close the throttle rather than the mixture. Did the engine tear down positively confirm this as the reason for the engine to fall apart?
What was his rate of throttle closure? Was this rate of closure conveyed to the engine manufacturer and their opinion recorded?
It is all too easy to blame the last pilot for a perceived wrong action when there could be other factors present beyond his control.
Interestingly some years ago in Australia the chief pilot of a C402 operation was killed along with six haplees pax when his aircraft suffered an apparent engine failure shortly after lift off. He failed to get around to feathering the dead prop and soon after flipped inverted due Vmca.
It transpired that he and all his pilots had only ever carried out their proficiency checks - which included simulated engine failures after take off - in a PA44. The engine failure procedures and associated handling were entirely different. It was all to save costs of course - but proved in the end to be false economy...
Obviously a snapped close throttle is detrimental to the good health of the engine. I do not see a measured throttle closure of (say) 3-4 seconds as "Rapid". Have you ever watched the auto-throttles go from idle to full power on a CFM 56? Now I call that pretty fast throttle opening by what I was used to on other engines - but that rate of throttle movement is normal, otherwise the engine manufacturer would not design the autothrottle system that way if it was going to compromise the engine operation.
What has that to do with a piston engine throttle movement you may ask?
The answer lies in the perception of the operator (pilot). A steady measured closure of the throttle should be perfectly acceptable engine handling for a simulated failure. If not, it is doubtful that the engine would be certified. After all aero-engines go through unbelievably rigorous testing during the certification process.
It also drawing a very long bow to accuse a testing officer of stuffing an engine in the future by his decision to close the throttle rather than the mixture. Did the engine tear down positively confirm this as the reason for the engine to fall apart?
What was his rate of throttle closure? Was this rate of closure conveyed to the engine manufacturer and their opinion recorded?
It is all too easy to blame the last pilot for a perceived wrong action when there could be other factors present beyond his control.
Interestingly some years ago in Australia the chief pilot of a C402 operation was killed along with six haplees pax when his aircraft suffered an apparent engine failure shortly after lift off. He failed to get around to feathering the dead prop and soon after flipped inverted due Vmca.
It transpired that he and all his pilots had only ever carried out their proficiency checks - which included simulated engine failures after take off - in a PA44. The engine failure procedures and associated handling were entirely different. It was all to save costs of course - but proved in the end to be false economy...
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Centaurus,
I have never seen rapid throttle movement defined. Certainly most operators of big pistons would consider three or four seconds excessively fast and constituting abuse of the engine! Normally the throttles are ‘walked’ up and down the quadrant by side-to-side wrist movement.
Power was always reduced gradually. From cruise at 31 inches to descent at 25 inches took several minutes of throttle walking. The next reduction was to 21 inches at 5 miles and 18-21 on base to 50 ft. When landing was assured further reduction occurred during the round-out and landing roll. The technique was not only to prevent detuning of the engine but also to avoid shock cooling.
For some handling insights on these engines try this thread: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=53550&highlight=GTSIO
Any mishandling of such engines will reduce engine life in a cumulative form, some actions more so than others. Sure I can’t unequivocally pin the failure in my instance back to the previous IRT but the consensus of opinion at the time was that the technique might not have helped. The metallurgy report found fatigue cracks in the gudgeon pin but obviously could not pinpoint the events that caused such cracks.
In arguing for throttle over mixture with such engines I think that courts would be swayed by the documentation at hand and the accepted code of practice implemented by the majority of operators. Try convincing counsel for the plaintiff that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ such a technique would not compromise ones duty of care particularly in the light of a mandatory SB to the contrary. Try arguing what constitutes rapid throttle movement when most operators think as in the thread above.
I have never seen rapid throttle movement defined. Certainly most operators of big pistons would consider three or four seconds excessively fast and constituting abuse of the engine! Normally the throttles are ‘walked’ up and down the quadrant by side-to-side wrist movement.
Power was always reduced gradually. From cruise at 31 inches to descent at 25 inches took several minutes of throttle walking. The next reduction was to 21 inches at 5 miles and 18-21 on base to 50 ft. When landing was assured further reduction occurred during the round-out and landing roll. The technique was not only to prevent detuning of the engine but also to avoid shock cooling.
For some handling insights on these engines try this thread: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=53550&highlight=GTSIO
Any mishandling of such engines will reduce engine life in a cumulative form, some actions more so than others. Sure I can’t unequivocally pin the failure in my instance back to the previous IRT but the consensus of opinion at the time was that the technique might not have helped. The metallurgy report found fatigue cracks in the gudgeon pin but obviously could not pinpoint the events that caused such cracks.
In arguing for throttle over mixture with such engines I think that courts would be swayed by the documentation at hand and the accepted code of practice implemented by the majority of operators. Try convincing counsel for the plaintiff that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ such a technique would not compromise ones duty of care particularly in the light of a mandatory SB to the contrary. Try arguing what constitutes rapid throttle movement when most operators think as in the thread above.
Thread Starter
Dragchute.
Could I refer you to an excellent technical article by Kas Thomas, an aeronautical engineer and publisher of many papers on aero engine maintenance. In the March 1996 issue of TBO Advisor (USA) he wrote "Shock Cooling - Myth or Reality". His article examined the physics and metallurgy of "shock cooling" and concluded that contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is not a major contributor to cylinder head cracking.
He said there was no scientific proof that cooling plays a significant role in cylinder damage in aviation. He explained that every pilot flies through rain occasionally and rain should make a very effective coolant (more so than mere air, certainly). Yet know one ascribes cylinder damage to flying through too much rain.
If shock cooling were a definate hazard, your engine should fall apart when you bring the mixture into idle cut-off at the end of a flight because CHT's fall off at a rate of 100 degF per minute or more, in the first few seconds of shut down - triple the rate that starts the typical shock cooling annunciator blinking. Does anyone complain that repeated shut downs are causing head cracking? Of course not.
Then why are we worried about pulling the throttle back?
And in another article- this time by John Deakin who writes in Avweb - the excellent US aviation website.
Deakin writes: "I know of no real data, old or new, that supports any of the theories about "shock cooling" being particularly harmful. I thinks it's a load ofpoppycock, invented to give pilots something to sound knowledgeable about, when talking to the less experienced, and it gives flying instructors yet another procedure with which to hammer on trainees.
He goes on to say:
"On the contrary there seems to be considerable evidence that "shock cooling" is not particularly harmful. Airplanes flown regularly (and hard) seem to be the ones that regularly go to TBO and beyond. Some of these are flown in the harshest conditions found on earth such as the jungles, the artic and the desert. Above all, training aircraft are subjected to the very operations that cause the most severe shock cooling on virtually every flight, with constant simulated engine failures, aborted take offs, long power-off glides and sudden application of full power.
Aircrft that tow gliders routinely go to TBO and they are doing constant full-power climbs at low airspeeds followed by steep power off descents.
How about aerobatic aircraft which go from wide open to power off in all attitudes, at all airspeeds, show after show, sometimes multiple shows per day.
Bob Hoover goes from a full power setting into instant feather at very high speeds (probably beyond red-line), flies for several minutes that way doing his wonderful act, then fires them up and within seconds, goes to full power again. He reports that he routinely goes to TBO!
Even if there is something to the various "shock cooling" theories, I don't think it's the major factor many make it out to be. On the otherhand, if we are to worry so much about shock cooling, what about "shock heating" ? Every take off involves going from near idle power to full power within a few seconds". .................
I was fascinated by your technique of "walking the throttles" as perceived good engine handling. I believe you may be victim of a myth here. "Walking the throttles" was a technique often used in the DC3 which sometimes had a sticking throttle friction nut. Pilots would tighten the friction nut on line up and it would be damnably difficult to open up both throttles equally and smoothly because the friction nut may not clamp on each throttle with equal pressure - or simply one throttle cable might be stiff and the other OK. By "walking" the throttles until reaching full power the technique supposedly prevented one throttle from bursting forward before the other and causing the aircraft to swing.
Pratt and Whitney warned against this technique (which was very wide-spread) because it meant that the power was being introduced in jerks - instead of one smooth power application.
It seems that this myth has lasted all these years! It really is not sound engine handling to "walk the throttles" for the reason given and I would suggest that the manufacturer does not have that technique in your aircraft POH. Nor does the faintly ridiculous dribbling off of power from top of descent that you mention in your post. Some of these myths are quite tiresome and so unnecessary.
While I don't have that much experience on the small light aircraft engines of the type you operate, I do have fairly extensive experience on the large 2500 HP radials. Interestingly, we didn't "walk the throttles" and shock cooling was not a problem - if it existed - even though these engines had a huge frontal area.
It seems that in the interests of perceived good engine handling , you may be doing an awful lot of throttle fiddling for little effect on TBO times. Time to read the engine manufacturer's pilot operating manual, perhaps?
Finally back to the original point of this post - which was throttle or mixture closure to simulate engine failure on take off.
I guess we must agree to disagree. A slow closure of three to four seconds using the throttle is quite safe. A rapid movement of the mixture control to idle-cut off shortly after take off is not...
Could I refer you to an excellent technical article by Kas Thomas, an aeronautical engineer and publisher of many papers on aero engine maintenance. In the March 1996 issue of TBO Advisor (USA) he wrote "Shock Cooling - Myth or Reality". His article examined the physics and metallurgy of "shock cooling" and concluded that contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is not a major contributor to cylinder head cracking.
He said there was no scientific proof that cooling plays a significant role in cylinder damage in aviation. He explained that every pilot flies through rain occasionally and rain should make a very effective coolant (more so than mere air, certainly). Yet know one ascribes cylinder damage to flying through too much rain.
If shock cooling were a definate hazard, your engine should fall apart when you bring the mixture into idle cut-off at the end of a flight because CHT's fall off at a rate of 100 degF per minute or more, in the first few seconds of shut down - triple the rate that starts the typical shock cooling annunciator blinking. Does anyone complain that repeated shut downs are causing head cracking? Of course not.
Then why are we worried about pulling the throttle back?
And in another article- this time by John Deakin who writes in Avweb - the excellent US aviation website.
Deakin writes: "I know of no real data, old or new, that supports any of the theories about "shock cooling" being particularly harmful. I thinks it's a load ofpoppycock, invented to give pilots something to sound knowledgeable about, when talking to the less experienced, and it gives flying instructors yet another procedure with which to hammer on trainees.
He goes on to say:
"On the contrary there seems to be considerable evidence that "shock cooling" is not particularly harmful. Airplanes flown regularly (and hard) seem to be the ones that regularly go to TBO and beyond. Some of these are flown in the harshest conditions found on earth such as the jungles, the artic and the desert. Above all, training aircraft are subjected to the very operations that cause the most severe shock cooling on virtually every flight, with constant simulated engine failures, aborted take offs, long power-off glides and sudden application of full power.
Aircrft that tow gliders routinely go to TBO and they are doing constant full-power climbs at low airspeeds followed by steep power off descents.
How about aerobatic aircraft which go from wide open to power off in all attitudes, at all airspeeds, show after show, sometimes multiple shows per day.
Bob Hoover goes from a full power setting into instant feather at very high speeds (probably beyond red-line), flies for several minutes that way doing his wonderful act, then fires them up and within seconds, goes to full power again. He reports that he routinely goes to TBO!
Even if there is something to the various "shock cooling" theories, I don't think it's the major factor many make it out to be. On the otherhand, if we are to worry so much about shock cooling, what about "shock heating" ? Every take off involves going from near idle power to full power within a few seconds". .................
I was fascinated by your technique of "walking the throttles" as perceived good engine handling. I believe you may be victim of a myth here. "Walking the throttles" was a technique often used in the DC3 which sometimes had a sticking throttle friction nut. Pilots would tighten the friction nut on line up and it would be damnably difficult to open up both throttles equally and smoothly because the friction nut may not clamp on each throttle with equal pressure - or simply one throttle cable might be stiff and the other OK. By "walking" the throttles until reaching full power the technique supposedly prevented one throttle from bursting forward before the other and causing the aircraft to swing.
Pratt and Whitney warned against this technique (which was very wide-spread) because it meant that the power was being introduced in jerks - instead of one smooth power application.
It seems that this myth has lasted all these years! It really is not sound engine handling to "walk the throttles" for the reason given and I would suggest that the manufacturer does not have that technique in your aircraft POH. Nor does the faintly ridiculous dribbling off of power from top of descent that you mention in your post. Some of these myths are quite tiresome and so unnecessary.
While I don't have that much experience on the small light aircraft engines of the type you operate, I do have fairly extensive experience on the large 2500 HP radials. Interestingly, we didn't "walk the throttles" and shock cooling was not a problem - if it existed - even though these engines had a huge frontal area.
It seems that in the interests of perceived good engine handling , you may be doing an awful lot of throttle fiddling for little effect on TBO times. Time to read the engine manufacturer's pilot operating manual, perhaps?
Finally back to the original point of this post - which was throttle or mixture closure to simulate engine failure on take off.
I guess we must agree to disagree. A slow closure of three to four seconds using the throttle is quite safe. A rapid movement of the mixture control to idle-cut off shortly after take off is not...
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I'm in the group that cut the mixture control to simulate engine failure shortly after take off.
My reasoning is not that it gives the student a harder job of identification (as suggested by Cenaurus) but rather I believe it gives a more REALISTIC simulation of what will happen.
It seems to me that many of the arguements against this practice fail to allow for the fact that the check pilot/instructor is also in the aircraft monitering what the pilot under check is doing.
IMO the first action after an EFATO, and what I always briefed, was to maintain control of the aircraft and and seek to achieve nominated S/E climb sped. With the aircraft in control the old "pitch up, pwr up, gear up, flap up, dead leg, dead engine, confirm with throttle, feather". The feather being a touch drill only and once correctly indicated by Bloggs, zero thrust was set with the mx and throttle being set appropriately.
During all of this I did not sit there fat dumb and happy but actually listended to and closely monitered Bloggs calls and actions to make sure he did not do the wrong thing.
To those who worry about mis identification and the wrong throttle being retarded, well isn't that why you are on board and if the worst did happen, well at least it will be on the safe side of the most dangerous situation of VMCA.
Never once in the many initals and endosements I carried out did the mx cable break and I put that in the same category as if the throttle cable broke. IE: there is not much you can do about it and the reality is that the throttle cable has an equal chance to that of the mx cable breaking.
Never once did the engine ever fail to start instantly once the mx was slid forward
To those who have mention concerns about the climb performance in this configeration, bear in mind that there is generally only two POB so in all probability the aircraft would be many kgs well below MTOW.
I can't see what the fuss is about, not one post on this subject has convinced me of any danger and in fact Centaurus post re the C402 crash which killed 7 persons convices me that realistic training has more merit than not.
As for lawers having your guts for garters if it all goes wrong, tell me what justification there is for that occur, or does that classify as a emotive throwaway comment made in order to add weight to the arguement for the against.
Regards
My reasoning is not that it gives the student a harder job of identification (as suggested by Cenaurus) but rather I believe it gives a more REALISTIC simulation of what will happen.
It seems to me that many of the arguements against this practice fail to allow for the fact that the check pilot/instructor is also in the aircraft monitering what the pilot under check is doing.
IMO the first action after an EFATO, and what I always briefed, was to maintain control of the aircraft and and seek to achieve nominated S/E climb sped. With the aircraft in control the old "pitch up, pwr up, gear up, flap up, dead leg, dead engine, confirm with throttle, feather". The feather being a touch drill only and once correctly indicated by Bloggs, zero thrust was set with the mx and throttle being set appropriately.
During all of this I did not sit there fat dumb and happy but actually listended to and closely monitered Bloggs calls and actions to make sure he did not do the wrong thing.
To those who worry about mis identification and the wrong throttle being retarded, well isn't that why you are on board and if the worst did happen, well at least it will be on the safe side of the most dangerous situation of VMCA.
Never once in the many initals and endosements I carried out did the mx cable break and I put that in the same category as if the throttle cable broke. IE: there is not much you can do about it and the reality is that the throttle cable has an equal chance to that of the mx cable breaking.
Never once did the engine ever fail to start instantly once the mx was slid forward
To those who have mention concerns about the climb performance in this configeration, bear in mind that there is generally only two POB so in all probability the aircraft would be many kgs well below MTOW.
I can't see what the fuss is about, not one post on this subject has convinced me of any danger and in fact Centaurus post re the C402 crash which killed 7 persons convices me that realistic training has more merit than not.
As for lawers having your guts for garters if it all goes wrong, tell me what justification there is for that occur, or does that classify as a emotive throwaway comment made in order to add weight to the arguement for the against.
Regards
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Very much enjoying this discussion. However if by using the mixture you do have an incedent and the the infamous CAA get involved I think that they may quote AIC 52/1999 at the board of enquiry.
6.3 Piston Engines
6.3.1 Generally the throttle may initially be moved smoothly to the closed position; the mixture control or Idle Cut-Off should not be used to simulate engine failure. Reference to the engine manufacturer's recommendations should clarify the technique in particular cases. When the trainee has identified the 'failed' engine and completed his 'touch only' feathering drill the throttle should be advanced to the zero thrust position.
I throw this in to continue what is a lively and interesting discussion
6.3 Piston Engines
6.3.1 Generally the throttle may initially be moved smoothly to the closed position; the mixture control or Idle Cut-Off should not be used to simulate engine failure. Reference to the engine manufacturer's recommendations should clarify the technique in particular cases. When the trainee has identified the 'failed' engine and completed his 'touch only' feathering drill the throttle should be advanced to the zero thrust position.
I throw this in to continue what is a lively and interesting discussion
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AltHold
A debate that will always harbour two camps. On the one hand are those who subscribe to the immediate concerns associated with training accidents and opt for throttle. Alternatively are those who prefer mixture as the safest course of action. In the latter technique two schools of thought sway trainers; a more realistic demonstration and consideration for the next guy to fly or travel in the aircraft.
Centaurus has suggested that the PA44 manual prefers the former method and if the manual states such, one cannot diverge. Sweet Surrender raised the issue of Lycoming bulletin 245D and that must certainly have some weight on the larger GA piston engines.
I think your CAA is having an each way bet on AIC 52/1999. A government approach to risk management. There are two ‘outs’ in the AIC, the first is the word ‘generally’ and the second deals with ‘engine manufacturer’s recommendations should clarify the technique in particular cases’.
In either case risk management issues must prevail. The trainer must consider the possibility of the student to incorrectly identify a failed engine and be in a position to restore power to the opposite side. As Centaurus so correctly pointed out, much of initial asymmetric training is conducted at a safe altitude, then the student is introduced to asymmetric go-rounds before dealing with the final stages shortly after take-off. This in itself is a form of risk management.
In training and checking line pilots it is incumbent upon the operator to prescribe a method that will both safeguard his pilots during training and not lead to possible damage that may occur at some later stage of flight. Training and checking organisations are normally attached to a transport type operation and therefore the AOC holder has a greater responsibility towards the travelling public.
I have some further issues to take up with Centaurus in relation to his last post but at this stage I choose not to cloud the debate.
A debate that will always harbour two camps. On the one hand are those who subscribe to the immediate concerns associated with training accidents and opt for throttle. Alternatively are those who prefer mixture as the safest course of action. In the latter technique two schools of thought sway trainers; a more realistic demonstration and consideration for the next guy to fly or travel in the aircraft.
Centaurus has suggested that the PA44 manual prefers the former method and if the manual states such, one cannot diverge. Sweet Surrender raised the issue of Lycoming bulletin 245D and that must certainly have some weight on the larger GA piston engines.
I think your CAA is having an each way bet on AIC 52/1999. A government approach to risk management. There are two ‘outs’ in the AIC, the first is the word ‘generally’ and the second deals with ‘engine manufacturer’s recommendations should clarify the technique in particular cases’.
In either case risk management issues must prevail. The trainer must consider the possibility of the student to incorrectly identify a failed engine and be in a position to restore power to the opposite side. As Centaurus so correctly pointed out, much of initial asymmetric training is conducted at a safe altitude, then the student is introduced to asymmetric go-rounds before dealing with the final stages shortly after take-off. This in itself is a form of risk management.
In training and checking line pilots it is incumbent upon the operator to prescribe a method that will both safeguard his pilots during training and not lead to possible damage that may occur at some later stage of flight. Training and checking organisations are normally attached to a transport type operation and therefore the AOC holder has a greater responsibility towards the travelling public.
I have some further issues to take up with Centaurus in relation to his last post but at this stage I choose not to cloud the debate.
Thread Starter
Selected words from that immortal Frank Sinatra ballad:
"There were times I'm sure you knew-
When I bit off more than I could chew-
Regrets I've had a few - but then again too few to mention
I did what I had to do - and saw it through ......
"I did it my way".
That seems to neatly sum up the whole discussion, n'est ce pas?
"There were times I'm sure you knew-
When I bit off more than I could chew-
Regrets I've had a few - but then again too few to mention
I did what I had to do - and saw it through ......
"I did it my way".
That seems to neatly sum up the whole discussion, n'est ce pas?
