Human Factors - taken seriously?
Joined: Sep 2000
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
From: Halifax, N.S. Canada
I worked for a company that was practically in the
forefront of embracing Human Factors, big program
citing the virtues, admitted that the bean counters were convinced by the dollar-saving potential, but so what? Many of us were thrilled
that our main goal-safety-would be heightened by
an understanding management that would now magically back us up on any call that had a remote
safety concern. They spent a bundle, even had
fuellers, catering, etc. on the training program.
This seems like a good idea after having a caterer
tell me he "didn't hit it that hard" after turning
a 146 aileron into a chip bag. I took training as
an "incident investigator" (Rat Patrol to some of
the non-believers). I would be paid up to 4 hours
overtime to investigate in-house incidents. All
results would be considered by a "board", and only
out-and-out negligence would be grounds for disciplinary action. In my opinion, the two main
results were: 1- all concerns went out the window when a Supervisors on-time-performance bonus was at stake 2- a lot of the guys laughed behind everyones backs after being absolved for incidents
that were well-known to be the result of incompetence. Roll out the "Company Norms" line,
and walk away with a smile. It is definitely one
thing to say you have a Human Factors Program, and
another thing altogether to implement one intelligently. I still believe very strongly in
the concept, but I think it needs a lot of work.
I remember reading about a program at Qantas, which left the developement of the program to a
group of Engineers, and it seemed to be, on paper
at least, one of the more "real" programs. It seems that HF can become one of those little industries of its own, and end up with too many
people involved that have no knowledge of what really takes place in Aircraft Maintenance. The
idea that it must start someplace is valid, but
perhaps accepting HF on other peoples terms is not
in the best interests of those directly involved.
forefront of embracing Human Factors, big program
citing the virtues, admitted that the bean counters were convinced by the dollar-saving potential, but so what? Many of us were thrilled
that our main goal-safety-would be heightened by
an understanding management that would now magically back us up on any call that had a remote
safety concern. They spent a bundle, even had
fuellers, catering, etc. on the training program.
This seems like a good idea after having a caterer
tell me he "didn't hit it that hard" after turning
a 146 aileron into a chip bag. I took training as
an "incident investigator" (Rat Patrol to some of
the non-believers). I would be paid up to 4 hours
overtime to investigate in-house incidents. All
results would be considered by a "board", and only
out-and-out negligence would be grounds for disciplinary action. In my opinion, the two main
results were: 1- all concerns went out the window when a Supervisors on-time-performance bonus was at stake 2- a lot of the guys laughed behind everyones backs after being absolved for incidents
that were well-known to be the result of incompetence. Roll out the "Company Norms" line,
and walk away with a smile. It is definitely one
thing to say you have a Human Factors Program, and
another thing altogether to implement one intelligently. I still believe very strongly in
the concept, but I think it needs a lot of work.
I remember reading about a program at Qantas, which left the developement of the program to a
group of Engineers, and it seemed to be, on paper
at least, one of the more "real" programs. It seems that HF can become one of those little industries of its own, and end up with too many
people involved that have no knowledge of what really takes place in Aircraft Maintenance. The
idea that it must start someplace is valid, but
perhaps accepting HF on other peoples terms is not
in the best interests of those directly involved.
Joined: Sep 2001
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
From: Stansted
Our lot have just taken MEMS/MEDA on board, following a rather expensive incident - I don't think it was a reaction to the incident, we were already on the road to accepting MEMS/MEDA when it happened. The gods in the ivory towers have accepted it too, because they have been convinced of the potential cost saving. Time will tell!
Sad to say there are still many, many individuals who feel that punishment is the only way to reduce errors; it is changing, but slowly. I've made maintenance errors before, and so have all of you, and we'll all continue to do so. We're only human after all. It's just that sometimes you find out the error yourself, sometimes another person spots it, and occasionally it gets pointed out to everyone by the aircraft! If you get yourself an open culture on safety, everyone's a winner.
It will take time though..................
Sad to say there are still many, many individuals who feel that punishment is the only way to reduce errors; it is changing, but slowly. I've made maintenance errors before, and so have all of you, and we'll all continue to do so. We're only human after all. It's just that sometimes you find out the error yourself, sometimes another person spots it, and occasionally it gets pointed out to everyone by the aircraft! If you get yourself an open culture on safety, everyone's a winner.
It will take time though..................
Joined: Jul 2000
Posts: 179
Likes: 0
From: Denver, Co. usa
Dont look at the FAA in America for Human Factors. Day/ night differences dont exist. I needed a column in my log book for SWPFC, Sleep While Pilot Fin Command , when i was flying coast to coast in the USA at night. Years ago, about 5, there was a big meeting of FAA, companies and pilots to get modern rules. And that was that. Fini.
Thread Starter
Pilots' Pal
Joined: Nov 1998
Posts: 1,158
Likes: 0
From: USA
Banana,
Fatigue has already been cited as a factor in several incidents/accidents. In these cases, if fatigue didn't cause the accident, it was contributory in the events leading up to it. More worrying is your quote from management about wishing to employ more staff but citing economic reasons for not doing so. The Accountable Manager (at least under JAR 145) is entirely responsible for matters such as this. On their heads be it, theoretically at least, if something goes wrong as a result their parsimonious policies.
Fatigue has already been cited as a factor in several incidents/accidents. In these cases, if fatigue didn't cause the accident, it was contributory in the events leading up to it. More worrying is your quote from management about wishing to employ more staff but citing economic reasons for not doing so. The Accountable Manager (at least under JAR 145) is entirely responsible for matters such as this. On their heads be it, theoretically at least, if something goes wrong as a result their parsimonious policies.
