Union Bust 2
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Union Bust 2
War on the Waterfront
Growing up in a conservative environment I held a firm belief that unions were the enemy of progress and self serving obstacles. When I became an employee myself I slowly began to realise that most unions actually got on well with employers and it was a case of the militant few earning a bad name for all. One of the unions that I still considered in the original category was the waterside workers, although I wouldn?t have been able to name the union ? I just thought of them as ?the wharfies?.
Despite this prejudice I was somewhat disturbed when I heard stories about the mass sacking and lockout of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) in dubious circumstances. I am not a believer in the maxim that the end justifies the means so as the hidden agenda emerged I was dismayed at the lengths to which the managements had apparently gone. It was not until I took a closer look as part of my union-buster education that I realised how naive I had been.
In 1996 the Australian national election saw the Conservatives take government on a platform that included industrial relations reform. It immediately set up a ?Waterfront Task Force? which consisted of the Minister for Transport and Regional Development, John Sharp, and the Minister for Industrial Relations, Peter Reith. They reported directly to the Prime Minister, John Howard. Reith called in Paul Houlihan, an industrial relations consultant and former National Farmers Federation (NFF) industrial relations director, to help write the legislation that would be used against unions in the days to come (The Age, David Elias, 17 June 1998).
Sharp states that it was his life?s work to reform the waterfront. "For a young and ambitious politician like Sharp, the Waterfront was a great local issue on which to build a national political career" (?War and Peace? by David Elias, The Age Newspaper, 17 June 1998).
Houlihan is an interesting character as it turns out. He is known as a tough advocate for employers and is a celebrated union-buster. He is the architect of a famous defeat of the Mudginberri meat workers with Peter Costello, now federal Treasurer, then union-buster lawyer. These two, along with ?kingmaker? and former Victorian Liberal Party President Michael Kroger, were founding members of the ultra right wing H.R. Nicholls Society ? something that I?d never heard of and would have to look into.
The task force realised that waterfront reform was to be no easy task and tendered out for a consultant to do the planning. The tender was awarded under extreme secrecy to ACIL Economics, run by economist David Trebeck, the former director of the Liberal Party?s policy unit and another early member of the Nicholls Society ? I really had to look into that. By happy coincidence Houlihan was named as a sub-contractor to ACIL. All the players were formerly or currently involved with the National Farmers Federation (NFF). The first official meetings began in May 1996, nearly two years before the resulting dispute.
The covert war plan was complex and covered many contingencies. A new group of companies called PCS were formed, with Houlihan and other NFF officers as the Directors, with the intent of recruiting and training non-union workers to work through any dispute that may arise. This training commenced in Dubai but it wasn?t long before word got back to the MUA that something was up. The plan was then accelerated and a cover up was attempted.
On January 28, 1998 Patrick Stevedores cancelled the evening and midnight shifts at Webb dock and guards armed with riot gear were moved in to lock the workers out. So secret was the plan that NFF affiliates were shocked by the move. The Western Australian Farmer?s Federation General Secretary stated that he was opposed to the plan and that he had a good working relationship with the Maritime Union. The Graingrowers spokesman expressed his concern as productivity at the bulk terminals was world?s best practice and concerned farmers did not want their bumper harvest jeopardised by a dispute. Clearly some of the stakeholders, for whom the waterfront reform was supposed to benefit, were not only unaware of the plan ? they were not happy about it.
Later cross-examination in court revealed that the government task force broached the plan with the Stevedore companies and not the other way round. Curiously, the preparation began nearly two years before and several Senate Estimate Committees have so far failed to secure the reports commissioned by the government from the 'consultants - so far. The government was not interested in the apparent reluctance from these companies and one CEO stated that he wasn?t given much option. I find it interesting to again see that the actual driving force behind the union-bust is external to the executive of the Company in question.
Once again the strategy is obvious in retrospect. An external stakeholder, in this case a new government with a political and ideological agenda, directs that the union be busted. Negotiations are entered however management are not there in good faith ? they are controlling the time line and trying to anger and frustrate the union team. The real agenda becomes apparent when the covert alternative dispute workforce is discovered. Despite unambiguous statements rejecting the union-bust, management then move to sack and lockout the workforce. Management hope that the union will breach the new legislation written by Houlihan preventing secondary industrial action; so they could then sue the union out of financial existence.
As the plan unfolded, the Prime Minister and his team were visibly ecstatic, almost drunk with the euphoria of victory ? but the battle had actually just begun. The Minister for Industrial Relations even declared victory to all who would listen and waxed lyrical about a new era in ?waterfront? management.
A plan is of course vulnerable to unexpected moves by your opponent. Rather than walk down the well worn road of conventional industrial dispute, the union leadership took advice from their International Transport Federation (ITF) brothers in North America and the UK - they have suffered under Thatcher and Reagan and know the union-buster?s game. They advise against conventional industrial action and mobilise their international membership for support. Management are taken by surprise and attack the union leadership legally. The union-buster plan backfires when as part of their defence the union leadership subpoena management and the truth gets out ? ?discovery? works both ways and the union have nothing to hide. The government goes into damage control mode as the courts order reinstatement of the workforce. A significant lever in defeating the union-bust was the rallying of brother ?labour? groups from all over the world. The decisive factor however was the rekindled internal unity after many years of a dormant MUA. The government was put in an untenable position where they were forced to decide whether to further unify the worlds unions against them or to retreat hastily ? they opted for the latter. It should be noted that the second wave of the government?s union-busting strategy was never implemented and Peter Reith left the Ministry at the next election.
While it is true that no-one wins an industrial dispute, it is important not to lose one. By demonstrating great restraint, and a superior understanding of the union-busters game, the MUA were able to implement advice from brother unions who had the experience and had learnt the lessons. This was an encouraging lesson for me.
Growing up in a conservative environment I held a firm belief that unions were the enemy of progress and self serving obstacles. When I became an employee myself I slowly began to realise that most unions actually got on well with employers and it was a case of the militant few earning a bad name for all. One of the unions that I still considered in the original category was the waterside workers, although I wouldn?t have been able to name the union ? I just thought of them as ?the wharfies?.
Despite this prejudice I was somewhat disturbed when I heard stories about the mass sacking and lockout of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) in dubious circumstances. I am not a believer in the maxim that the end justifies the means so as the hidden agenda emerged I was dismayed at the lengths to which the managements had apparently gone. It was not until I took a closer look as part of my union-buster education that I realised how naive I had been.
In 1996 the Australian national election saw the Conservatives take government on a platform that included industrial relations reform. It immediately set up a ?Waterfront Task Force? which consisted of the Minister for Transport and Regional Development, John Sharp, and the Minister for Industrial Relations, Peter Reith. They reported directly to the Prime Minister, John Howard. Reith called in Paul Houlihan, an industrial relations consultant and former National Farmers Federation (NFF) industrial relations director, to help write the legislation that would be used against unions in the days to come (The Age, David Elias, 17 June 1998).
Sharp states that it was his life?s work to reform the waterfront. "For a young and ambitious politician like Sharp, the Waterfront was a great local issue on which to build a national political career" (?War and Peace? by David Elias, The Age Newspaper, 17 June 1998).
Houlihan is an interesting character as it turns out. He is known as a tough advocate for employers and is a celebrated union-buster. He is the architect of a famous defeat of the Mudginberri meat workers with Peter Costello, now federal Treasurer, then union-buster lawyer. These two, along with ?kingmaker? and former Victorian Liberal Party President Michael Kroger, were founding members of the ultra right wing H.R. Nicholls Society ? something that I?d never heard of and would have to look into.
The task force realised that waterfront reform was to be no easy task and tendered out for a consultant to do the planning. The tender was awarded under extreme secrecy to ACIL Economics, run by economist David Trebeck, the former director of the Liberal Party?s policy unit and another early member of the Nicholls Society ? I really had to look into that. By happy coincidence Houlihan was named as a sub-contractor to ACIL. All the players were formerly or currently involved with the National Farmers Federation (NFF). The first official meetings began in May 1996, nearly two years before the resulting dispute.
The covert war plan was complex and covered many contingencies. A new group of companies called PCS were formed, with Houlihan and other NFF officers as the Directors, with the intent of recruiting and training non-union workers to work through any dispute that may arise. This training commenced in Dubai but it wasn?t long before word got back to the MUA that something was up. The plan was then accelerated and a cover up was attempted.
On January 28, 1998 Patrick Stevedores cancelled the evening and midnight shifts at Webb dock and guards armed with riot gear were moved in to lock the workers out. So secret was the plan that NFF affiliates were shocked by the move. The Western Australian Farmer?s Federation General Secretary stated that he was opposed to the plan and that he had a good working relationship with the Maritime Union. The Graingrowers spokesman expressed his concern as productivity at the bulk terminals was world?s best practice and concerned farmers did not want their bumper harvest jeopardised by a dispute. Clearly some of the stakeholders, for whom the waterfront reform was supposed to benefit, were not only unaware of the plan ? they were not happy about it.
Later cross-examination in court revealed that the government task force broached the plan with the Stevedore companies and not the other way round. Curiously, the preparation began nearly two years before and several Senate Estimate Committees have so far failed to secure the reports commissioned by the government from the 'consultants - so far. The government was not interested in the apparent reluctance from these companies and one CEO stated that he wasn?t given much option. I find it interesting to again see that the actual driving force behind the union-bust is external to the executive of the Company in question.
Once again the strategy is obvious in retrospect. An external stakeholder, in this case a new government with a political and ideological agenda, directs that the union be busted. Negotiations are entered however management are not there in good faith ? they are controlling the time line and trying to anger and frustrate the union team. The real agenda becomes apparent when the covert alternative dispute workforce is discovered. Despite unambiguous statements rejecting the union-bust, management then move to sack and lockout the workforce. Management hope that the union will breach the new legislation written by Houlihan preventing secondary industrial action; so they could then sue the union out of financial existence.
As the plan unfolded, the Prime Minister and his team were visibly ecstatic, almost drunk with the euphoria of victory ? but the battle had actually just begun. The Minister for Industrial Relations even declared victory to all who would listen and waxed lyrical about a new era in ?waterfront? management.
A plan is of course vulnerable to unexpected moves by your opponent. Rather than walk down the well worn road of conventional industrial dispute, the union leadership took advice from their International Transport Federation (ITF) brothers in North America and the UK - they have suffered under Thatcher and Reagan and know the union-buster?s game. They advise against conventional industrial action and mobilise their international membership for support. Management are taken by surprise and attack the union leadership legally. The union-buster plan backfires when as part of their defence the union leadership subpoena management and the truth gets out ? ?discovery? works both ways and the union have nothing to hide. The government goes into damage control mode as the courts order reinstatement of the workforce. A significant lever in defeating the union-bust was the rallying of brother ?labour? groups from all over the world. The decisive factor however was the rekindled internal unity after many years of a dormant MUA. The government was put in an untenable position where they were forced to decide whether to further unify the worlds unions against them or to retreat hastily ? they opted for the latter. It should be noted that the second wave of the government?s union-busting strategy was never implemented and Peter Reith left the Ministry at the next election.
While it is true that no-one wins an industrial dispute, it is important not to lose one. By demonstrating great restraint, and a superior understanding of the union-busters game, the MUA were able to implement advice from brother unions who had the experience and had learnt the lessons. This was an encouraging lesson for me.
