|
Any updates, somewhere ?
|
Originally Posted by Marlon Brando
(Post 10088594)
Any updates, somewhere ?
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/ |
Nothing about the black boxes? I mean they should already know something...:sad: International newspapers says nothing...
|
Originally Posted by butterfly68
(Post 10089531)
Nothing about the black boxes? I mean they should already know something...:sad: International newspapers says nothing...
|
Anyone know the nationality of the flight crew ?
|
Originally Posted by The Deec
(Post 10089750)
Anyone know the nationality of the flight crew ?
|
Indeed, both Turkish ladies. One recently rated and one recently upgraded.
Originally Posted by aterpster
(Post 10089771)
Weren't they Turk ladies?
|
Originally Posted by lektem
(Post 10089879)
The body of the captain has not been found, yet. There is no body, no trace of her, no DNA.
|
https://www.google.it/amp/s/www.wash...6bc_story.html
The bodies were all found as the black boxes. Usually for the CVR it doesnt take so long to read it... |
Originally Posted by Marlon Brando
(Post 10088594)
Any updates, somewhere ?
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem...liyor-2289103/ https://i.sozcu.com.tr/wp-content/up...foto-sozcu.jpg But the next article contains interesting details. https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiy...7kGCXriPV2Owbg https://cdn1.ntv.com.tr/gorsel/turki...80312100011101 I think that is inside the airplane. The red balloons are filled with helium? The next foto a red balloon partial visible as well. They took it to the flight? Isn't it the same like dry ice....hidden DG? https://cdn1.ntv.com.tr/gorsel/turki...80312100011101 |
Not DG, it's non-restricted RNG under the allowance
|
|
|
Shades of the CRJ crash in Sweden a few years ago?
|
An all too familiar mishap following an instrument disagreement on a transport jet.
Narrative from the link above: Narrative: A Turkish Challenger 604 corporate jet impacted a mountain near Shahr-e Kurd in Iran, killing all 11 on board. The aircraft departed Sharjah, UAE at 13:11 UTC on a flight to Istanbul, Turkey. The aircraft entered Tehran FIR fifteen minutes later and the Tehran ACC controller cleared the flight to climb to FL360 according to its flight plan. About 14:32, the pilot requested FL380, which was approved. Before reaching that altitude, the left and right airspeeds began to diverge by more than 10 knots. The left (captain's) airspeed indicator showed an increase while the right hand (copilot's) airspeed indicator showed a decrease. A caution aural alert notified the flight crew of the difference. Remarks by the flight crew suggested that an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message appeared on the EICAS. As the aircraft was climbing, the crew reduced thrust to idle. Approximately 63 seconds later, while approaching FL380, the overspeed aural warning (clacker) began to sound, indicating that the indicated Mach had exceeded M 0.85. Based on the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the aircraft, the pilot flying should validate the IAS based on the aircraft flight manual and define the reliable Air Data Computer (ADC) and select the reliable Air Data source. The pilot did not follow this procedure and directly reduced engine power to decrease the IAS after hearing the clacker. The actual airspeed thus reached a stall condition. The copilot tried to begin reading of the 'EFIS COMP MON' abnormal procedure for three times but due to pilot interruption, she could not complete it. Due to decreasing speed, the stall aural warning began to sound, in addition to stick shaker and stick pusher activating repeatedly. The crew then should have referred to another emergency procedure to recover from the stall condition. While the stick pusher acted to pitch down the aircraft to prevent a stall condition, the captain was mistakenly assumed an overspeed situation due to the previous erroneous overspeed warning and pulled on the control column. The aircraft entered a series of pitch and roll oscillations. The autopilot was disengaged by the crew before stall warning, which ended the oscillations. Engine power began to decrease on both sides until both engines flamed out in a stall condition. From that point on FDR data was lost because the electric bus did not continue to receive power from the engine generators. The CVR recording continued for a further approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds on emergency battery power. Stall warnings, stick shaker and stick pusher activations continued until the end of the recording. The aircraft then impacted mountainous terrain. |
Does anyone know how to just fly anymore? |
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
(Post 10298242)
Does anyone know how to just fly anymore? |
After Air France, it is scary to think this is still happening. Probably a factor in the Lion Air crash as well.
|
Pretty bad ! the Air France A330 accident isn’t a good comparaison in term of design philosophy. The 604/605 share pretty much the same stall warning system of the 601. It’s bullet proof and old technology. Barely relies on the ADCs, it uses an ALT input to fine tune the trigger point of the shaker and pusher. but other than that, it soley relies on stand alone analog AOA vanes and a proven analog stall computer. The 604/605 might not be a hot rod in the high thirties but it’s a proven aircraft, built like a tank, and has been trusted by major corporations like BOEING to transport their management for the last 20 years. |
:mad::ugh::ugh::ugh: Can we have PILOTS flying aircraft please!!!
|
More incompetence in a cockpit. |
Very sad and incredible. I think that blaming the pilots., which are not here anymore, doesn't help. I think that many accidents are nowadays related to unreliable instruments reading and bad manual flying skills related to bad problem solving. That's scary.
Looking at the future and with shortage of pilots, we need to be able to elevate the quality of training and give the pilots all the tools to become proficient and confortable to solve all problems in complex cockpit situations. |
I wish training still included flying somewhere in the course ... |
That is exactly what is scary about the scenario in 20 years time. By then, most pilots sitting in both seats will have come come through an approved school and accelerated themselves into a flying computer which has eroded what basic flying skills they ever had. All the old guys from the military or GA will have retired. If you can't revert to Power+Attitude=Perf. when deprived of your flight instruments, what hope is there that aircraft can be saved if the instruments fail?
|
But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time. The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly. |
Originally Posted by macdo
(Post 10298706)
That is exactly what is scary about the scenario in 20 years time.
As for this accident it seems that yes, the pilots are to blame. |
the pilots are to blame |
Atakacs.
Dear Sir, I bet my boat that in 20 years there is still a pilot in any transport category aircraft and the oars that there is still two!! Specially the 100 000 plus produced from ca 1970 to ca 2038. Most of them piloted by qualified crew, as basic training and recurrent training has to get better. Murphy and Darwin is hard at work weeding out the weak and incompetent on line, as the schools, CAAs and Flight-training Departments are not capable of stopping them. Being run by money, not safety. The exception looks to be the USA , and every day that goes, I get greater respect for the FAA system. The European system so loved by insiders and outsiders alike, are severely flawed. Incompetent pilots get command every day. Rising two levels above competency level is endemic , I am afraid! Regards Cpt B |
Originally Posted by atakacs
(Post 10298735)
As for this accident it seems that yes, the pilots are to blame. /sarcasm. I have to wonder if the cockpit gradient was a factor here. Interrupting the FO's attempts to complete a checklist that might have helped address the situation smells suspiciously like a captain with CRM issues. |
Originally Posted by spoon84
(Post 10298617)
Very sad and incredible. I think that blaming the pilots., which are not here anymore, doesn't help. I think that many accidents are nowadays related to unreliable instruments reading and bad manual flying skills related to bad problem solving. That's scary.
Looking at the future and with shortage of pilots, we need to be able to elevate the quality of training and give the pilots all the tools to become proficient and confortable to solve all problems in complex cockpit situations. |
Originally Posted by J.O.
(Post 10298909)
Sure thing, remove pilots and no more accidents will occur. :hmm:
/sarcasm. I have to wonder of the cockpit gradient was a factor here. Interrupting the FO's attempts to complete a checklist that might have helped address the situation smells suspiciously like a captain with CRM issues. |
I think it is difficult not to blame the pilots of being at fault for crashing the aircraft. The fact that they clearly were not capable of dealing with the situation was most likely the fault of their training. As for CRM, I imagine the confusion and lack of a disciplined response to the emergency was again, a fault of their training and ability to perceive the problem and work as a team to solve.
|
|
Power and pitch, know your plane. I'm no top gun, but I know roughly the power settings and pitch my CRJ will do in the different phases of flight. Who in their right mind will pull thrust to idle in a climb and then sit and stare for a minute watching airspeed still climb, without thinking something is not quite right? I hope that is just a mistake in the description on ASN.
EFIS COMP MON is not a very hard caution message to deal with. It should normally combine with an indication on the PFD to tell you which comparison has failed (pitch/roll/alt/ias/hdg etc). The QRH steps for it combined with IAS indication are literally to cross check the instruments, determine which one is likely correct and switch to that side data source. If no indication for IAS seems correct, go to unreliable airspeed and fly according to pitch/power tables. |
Way back, I issued a met warning in Palma one night when our BAC 1-11 showed nothing on one ASI and over 350 on the other. We'd just lifted off. The aircraft was thrown over some hangers to the left of the runway. We climbed away and everything was normal after that except that Barcelona became very busy that night.
The relevant point here is that with those conditions, accelerative side forces in those conditions may just have caused a momentary difference in the pitot/static pressures that triggered the difference warning. Not long, but an age if the wrong conclusions are arrived at. |
get hyper focused on the immediate task (that "fly the airplane first" thing) and shed nonessentials until it's under control |
I blame the modern system. Geared to automatics. Why isn't this scenario trained for and practised???. Which of the 3 has the most potential to be unreliable?? Attitude? Power indication? or A/S that has been through some sort of ADC? 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing but all the crew had to do was fly an attitude and a power setting. If you have forgotten the power setting, then it should be in the QRH, should it not?.Flying skills are well down the list of priorities for most outfits of today. These sort of failures and how to deal with them, should be practised in training. from ab initio onwards. A known power setting plus attitude will give a know A/S, whether it be IAS or TAS. Even some sense would be drawn from a G/S read out, corrected for wind.. So fly an attitude for level flight and a known power setting. That would have kept them flying under control and this must be a memory item or reflex action. If the auto pilot plays up, we fly manually, and don't use it. right? If the airspeeds are showing ambiguity, don't use them.
Anyone have any ideas why this training is not in place??? We are moving away from the basics and have been for a long time. Yes, if the computers keep playing up, we are going to see more of this. Pilots now are becoming over reliant on automation. |
Originally Posted by lucille
(Post 10298725)
But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time. The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly. |
50 page interim here in English (scroll down to entry 8):
https://www.cao.ir/web/english/inves...teLayout=false |
But don’t you just love it when they say Capt. XYZ has 19,000 hours and is very experienced. How so? I ask, when 18,800 of those has been sitting staring out of the window with the AP engaged. Its no more useful experience than sitting in First Class, sipping Champagne and logging the time. The odd chap I know who dares to hand fly an approach will never do so with the A/T disengaged. It’s no wonder no one can fly. In those 19,000 hours he has probably had about 5 days as a professional airline pilot where he really frightened himself. These occasions might have been unforecast bad weather or technical problems or near mid air collisions or swiss cheese holes lining up on him. He will have done many more simulator checks than an inexperienced pilot and will have seen unreliable airspeed numerous times and had he been faced with the conditions that caused this terrible accident above he might just have paused when the Mach overspeed clacker sounded. He (or she) might have looked at the copilot's ASI, felt that something was wrong and then realised the situation rather than closing the thrust levers on the basis of a faulty indication. So don't knock the 19,000 hour pilot, it is true 18,000 hours of time may have been spent on autopilot but his years of experience may have given him the skills needed to cope with the unexpected, unbriefed situation that might just avoid an event becoming an accident. |
| All times are GMT. The time now is 06:57. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.