ATC Watcher...

Yes, I agree with your points re responsibility for control near FIR boundaries. You got me thinking also about the greater number of incidents that occur near FIR boundaries; for example, occasions when flight plan info wasn't passed, or coordination wasn't completed. In those scenarios, as you know, there is a greater risk of an incident near a boundary.

One curious statement (among many in this case...) was the statement by the Senegalese that they watched the HS-125 until it disappeared from radar at a position about 56 nautical miles west of Dakar (by the Lat and Long given) and that they were surmising the loss of transponder return at that point was due to fuel exhaustion. For an IFR aircraft to run out of fuel about 8 minutes past its destination makes no sense (IFR fuel reserves etc). In this case the flight planned alternate was Bamako, Mali, which makes the “fuel exhaustion” statement even more suspect.

There is of course the possibility that damage to the HS-125 included some kind of fuel tank or fuel line rupture, which could in turn lead to a much reduced range. But that proposition raises other questions that greatly reduce the probability of that scenario (even without considering the famous Mr. Occam…).

The statement by the Senegalese re the transponder of the HS-125 seems to negate the idea that a lack of operating transponder on the HS-125 would have been a factor in the mid-air collision. Whether the B-737 had an operating transponder, we don’t yet know. (We cannot assume an operating transponder, even for a relatively new aircraft, especially in this part of the world.) If both aircraft had operating transponders (on and functional) then why no TCAS alert? Or, if TCAS alert, why no avoidance manoeuver? There is obviously the separate, but related, issue of why no separation between the aircraft? Was separation not being applied, or was separation lost, or? Time will tell…

Janet, what that article says is that it's a good idea to fly with a licensed pilot, and that the names of FAA-licensed pilots are found in that register. That's about it, really. There's nothing "complimentary" to be found in having one's name listed in the register; it simply follows on from gaining an FAA license.

In fact, the Colgan accident pilots were listed there at the time of their accident, so that making any connection between increased safety of flight and this register, as this article does, really is quite silly. The writer seems either to know very little about commercial aviation, or else to want to mislead others who may know even less.

What moved you to quote it?

Sarcasm, I suspect.

Ok Chuks, my apologies if i got misunderstood.

What happened Janet flight?? Just a few hours ago you said:


Which is exactly what I was alluding to :ok:

The aircraft was visible on FR24 for most of it's flight so we may safely assume that at least Mode S and ADS-B out worked.

Grizz; I am expecting some more info today. From what I heard both a/c were on Bamako frequency, the 737 never reported a collision and later used " security" reasons to avoid landing at Cotonou and divert to Malabo"
the HS 125 never replied to ATC calls after crossing the 737 and it was Bamako that alerted Dakar of the radio failure ( not uncommon in this area) The collison occured in non-radar coverage so which aircraft was at the wrong assigned altitude is unknown. (the 737 FDR migt tell us this if it has been secured )

As to the HS125, where did you read/heard Dakar followed them on their transponder ? if yes then they must have been able to follow its altitude , which one, if it was constant, slow or abrupt descent, etc.. did not hear anything about that.

Like you I do not buy the "fuel exhaustion." at 50 or even 100 NM off the coast pas destination. must be more to that.

A malfunctioning or set on OFF or SBY transponder would explain the non-TCAS event. But then again the 737 FDR could tell us if an TCAS TA or RA was issued, if we ever going to see it..

Fuel exhaustion
 

without a clearer picture as to how the structure of the 125 may have been compromised it's hard to know.
Certainly, the statutory reserves that should still have been on board overhead destination would deliver the aircraft to point much further to the West.

But given the nature of collisions, it is entirely possible that fuel was being released from damaged tanks or severed fuel lines for the remainder of the flight.

It is just so unfortunate that the diversion from Cotonou to Malabo has erased the CVR recording of the accident-time conversations.
(If I am not mistaken, the B737-800 is equiped with a 120 min CVR).

But the FDR not, and it would tell us a lot too if it has been secured . Not sure if it has and who will be analyzing it . Or even if this is considered an accident in Equatoriak Guinea.

with the EG CAA, unfortunately it does depend on vested interests and "working relationships" for want of a better term.
Personal recent experience is that there are some very competent and experienced individuals operating in a highly politicised environment.

What is released and when should be reviewed through that filter.

De facto, Cieba is not a wholly independently owned concern operating under the full oversight a properly independent authority.

Hopefully the professionals will prevail in this case.

An update today:


"Late Sep 11th 2015 the French BEA reported that Senegal's Accident Investigation Commission (BEA) requested assistance by the French BEA. Three French investigators have been dispatched to Dakar. The French BEA reported that the HS-125 encountered a mid air collision with a Boeing 737-800 of Ceiba Intercontinental and subsequently crashed into the ocean killing all 7 aboard the HS-125."

Rumours heard that the HS125 had since a long time an unreliable Mode C transponder , but still kept its RVSM status. Known story in that part of the world unfortunately:hmm:

Any update??

Surprised this isn't here already, actually.



http://www.jacdec.de/2015/09/08/2015...stern-senegal/



On January 2016, the Senegal Bureau d’enquête et d’Analyse (BEA) reported an update to the current investigation process.

The Hawker HS-125 erroneously was flying at a level 1000 ft above their original clearance. ATC cleared the flight to 34.000 ft. (FL 340) but instead the pilots levelled of at 35.000 ft (FL 350) putting themselves on the same altitude as the opposite flying 737.



Air Traffic Control did not remind the pilots to correct their level nor did the pilots do any altitude changes before the collision took place.


The aircraft was involved in a mid-air collision with a smaller Hawker HS-125 business jet whilst flying over Senegal. The latter aircraft later crashed in sea killing all seven on board.



Ceiba flight CEL 71, a Boeing 737-800, was flying enroute at 35.000 ft, heading southeast on airway UA601, a few minutes east of Tambacounda VOR when it encountered opposite traffic at the same level.


The other aircraft was a Hawker HS-125 (registration 6V-AIM) opertated by Senegalair. This aircraft was on a medical flight from Ouagadougou to Dakar with four passengers (among them a patient) and three crewmembers.
It is understood that no reports about any conflict were transmitted to Bamako air traffic control. The controller later raised alarm when the HS-125 failed to answer to repeated calls.

TCAS
 

is not being mentioned anywhere.

Flying sub-saharan .. it's a no-go item in my book, never mind what the MEL might say.

It's time to adopt random lateral offsets on all airways.

How many more midair collisions will it take!

This is only effective if the other aircraft are Squawking which means they should have a serviceable Transponder too. All too often there are aircraft flying without a transponder and thus would be blind to your TCAS.

This case is still surrounded with "confidentiality" which leads to may rumours.
The latest we heard is that the transponder of the HS 125 was known to have "problems" , and even the whole aircraft airworthiness was questioned.

A Crew that took a wrong clearance / wrong read back, and flew at the wrong ALT combined with a U/S transponder could explain the accident. But it opens a lot of questions which obviously both ASECNA and the Senegalese CAA have difficulties with .

@ Teddy Robinson : TCAS is like Tango : you need to be 2 for it to work.

737?
 

What happened to the 737. Are there any reports bout that plane after landing?

Edit. I found it. Looks like the Hawker hit the winglet. http://www.jacdec.de/2015/09/08/2015...stern-senegal/