I have never understood why Harris didn't send in the mainforce for follow up raids in the preceding days. The damage done would surely have been quite severe after the initial breaches.

IIRC, Hastings expresses surprise that there was no attempt to disrupt the repairs (which would be the only really profitable target). Perhaps because Harris didn't really believe in the operation?

Hastings seems to be very balanced on both Harris and Gibson, with criticism (severe criticism, in the case of Harris) but not just for the sake of being revisionist. On Gibson, he has no doubt at all that he was heroic, whilst being aware that heroes are not always comfortable to be around (a perception that goes back at least to the Iliad).

"although Arthur Harris is most definitely a bad guy in Hasting’s view."
I'm not sure why it's necessary for people, safely remote from the responsibilities of wartime command to reduce things to " good guy, bad guy". Good guys come second - many examples, but Auchinleck serves. Maybe a modernism.

I have read the book, but I do not think I learned anything further than I already knew and I believe the Sweetman book to be a better book in that respect. Max,s view on Gibson and Harris are largely in line with others who served with them. My late aunt was a driver on 617 Sq and she was also of the do not meet your heroes brigade, with regards to Gibson.

As for Max Hastings other works I have generally enjoyed them all, and his book on shooting and country pursuit's I particularly enjoyed. As an aside, aged 14 I was an exchange student in the village Frondenburg and actually met someone who witnessed the "Mohne Catastrophe" as a little girl. She was my hosts mother. When I asked how high the water came on the house I was staying in, she pointed at the roofline of the 3 story dwelling which was about 15m. I also subsequently swam the width of the Sorpe Dam during that trip. Also fished on Eder and Sorpe catching some good size Pike in both, which put me off swimming the width of each of the dams, which I was planning to do !!
Kind regards
Mr Mac

A colleague was a Sgt Nav on his first op on the first mission after the dams raid. They were assured that there would be little flak or searchlights as a result of the dams raid. Intelligence had overlooked that guns and searchlights used generators. He spent the rest of the was as a POW.

In 1942, the realistic alternatives for Bomber Command were area bombing or no bombing. By 1944, much more focused bombing (not necessarily precise, but with targets more selective than a city) was possible. The case against Harris is that he persisted in area bombing rather than recognising that possibilities had changed. It was a virtue in Harris that he did not try to cover up or beautify the area bombing policy, which had been adopted by others before he was in command, and to which at the time there was no realistic alternative. The case against him is that he persisted in that policy even after more directed targeting was possible, that he did so to the point of insubordination (it is a question why he was not sacked), and that he did so partly to demonstrate the power of an air force as the critical independent strategic power, rather than to win the war as quickly as possible.

One interesting point to emerge from Hastings' book is that the crews involved in Chastise, the best known precision bombing operation of the war, were not untroubled by the very large number of civilian casualties it caused. In the circumstance of the time, even "precision" bombing would inevitably kill many civilians, and the case against Harris's policy was not that he was blood-thirsty, but bloody-minded.

I have read that he insisted that "his" bombers were used solely for strategic rather than tactical purposes even when elements of Bomber Command were highly capable of delivering precise attacks on specific targets. Hence on D-Day 617 Sqn were used for dropping Window to simulate a convoy across the Straits of Dover**, when possibly some tactical attacks on Normandy blockhouses with Tallboys might have saved many lives on Omaha and Utah beaches?

**And the aircrew were then told that this sortie did not count as an operational one for their tour!! Not sure if that got resolved satisfactorily.

I daresay Harris and his mindset may as you say not have led him to believe in the operation. The Battle of the Ruhr was still on going and the industrial centres were still the main targets. I think also one has to remember that Harris didn't like 'elites'. He had previously opposed the formation of 'pathfinders' before being overruled. Personally I think that every surviving member should have been grounded from ops, their contribution to the war effort having been done.

I am still amazed at the vitriol poured on Harris..we were at war, and he had a particularly nasty job to do...
Anyone on the receiving end of the Luftwaffe in numerous British cities in 1940/41 would not have minded one jot that Bomber Command was giving Germans a taste of their own medicine!
Its easy for us sitting in our armchairs 75 years after to denigrate military leaders for their actions..but stopping Hitler was the priority, by whatever means available.

Yes, hindsight from the safety of your home 75 years on is a wonderful thing.... for one thing we are all transformed into experts! How many people have had a gun fired at them I wonder? It does give you a slightly different take on things.
People are very happy to criticise Harris, how many have been in charge of anyone, let alone whole Command, which at certain times was responsible for the major part of the countrys offensive war effort.
Sadly it's a characteristic of our present times that we feel it necessary to beat ourselves up for events in our past. But, these events are gone and are just part of history.

Steven Ambrose in his book "Wild Blue" perpetuates the myth that the Americans were the masters of precision bombing (i.e the good guys) and Harris pushing area bombing (i.e the not so good guy) conveniently forgets that Curtis LeMay took Harris' idea and used it against Japan. I have never seen any reasonable alternative proposed to taking the war to Germany prior to D-Day.

I have not read the previous page and apologies if already mentioned but the other factor with US 'precision' bombing that mostly gets overlooked is that when the US air forces really got into their stride with large formation bombing in europe - only the Formation 'Lead' and 'Deputy Lead' (if required) would be using a bomb sight on the aiming point,the other aircraft would just 'toggle' when they saw 'Lead' drop.The toggling was done either by the a/c Bombardier (if carried) or by an NCO gunner trained to be a 'Togglier'.When you look at the size of the formations - the bomb 'spread' would sure have needed a large pickle barrel !
Of course when the target weather was overcast - the toggling was initiated by using 'Mickey' radar sets (H2X).

It would be wrong to "pour vitriol" on Harris for pursuing, vigorously, a policy that was made by his superiors: and we should remember that one of his motivations was avoiding the huge loss of life caused by the trench warfare he saw in the Great War. Questioning whether sticking to that policy in an unmodified form, in defiance of direct orders, was calculated to finish the war as quickly as possible, with as little loss as life as possible (including, though not primarily, German civilians) is surely important. War is, unfortunately, unavoidable, and we still see great powers using the weapons they have, or are committed to having, without considering whether they are the best way of achieving war aims. Trying to defeat al Qaeda by bombing caves is an example.

The problems surrounding Portal would have solved lots of problems in the RAF, which opens yet other cans of worms. The 'plenty of criticism' at the time was only only really evident after these events in question. It's a little like the 'look at me, I didn't agree' reactions that many of the OKW & OKH upper echelons displayed. It all stems really from weak leadership.