Real Fast Jet Navigation In The 1967 Six Day War
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From: Saudi Arabia
Real Fast Jet Navigation In The 1967 Six Day War
I would like to ask the experts how in the real circumstances a fast jet navigation at low level could have been implemented during the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel Air Force (IAF) decapitated the Arab air forces during Operation Moked on 5 June 1967?
I recently read Shlomo Aloni's book Six-Day War 1967: Operation Focus and the 12 hours that changed the Middle East. I am particularly interested in the long-range airstrikes conducted by the IAF against the Egyptian Luxor, Ras Banas, Hurghada, and the Iraqi H-3 airfields. These missions were flown mainly by the single-seat Sud Aviation Vautour IIA from the 110th Sq. based at Ramat David AB, and reportedly at low altitudes to avoid enemy radar and air defense.
The book quotes the airmen, who participated in these missions, and who claim that they were flying "straight line from Ramat David" to their targets. Radio silence was universally applied, but it's unclear whether it was limited to comm radios or to IFF, as well. There was no mention on navigation aids or instruments used in Operation Moked except the waypoints listed below, which were devised for the IAF strike pilots.
Given the relatively long distance from the departure base to the targets and the alleged scarcity of intel eg. on the H-3 airbase in Iraq, with full respect, would it be really feasible for the airmen to find their distant targets while relying only on dead reckoning and using no navaids at low altitude? Did the IAF indeed rely on 5 June 1967 only on VFR and dead reckoning, or did they also use the ADFs, which were present on IAF jets in that time? The ADFs could have been tuned either to NDBs, even located on adversary land, and also to the commercial broadcast transmitters. I am particularly interested in feasibility of such long range interdiction using the 1950s/1960s technology without getting lost over the desert.
Any comments are welcome.
I recently read Shlomo Aloni's book Six-Day War 1967: Operation Focus and the 12 hours that changed the Middle East. I am particularly interested in the long-range airstrikes conducted by the IAF against the Egyptian Luxor, Ras Banas, Hurghada, and the Iraqi H-3 airfields. These missions were flown mainly by the single-seat Sud Aviation Vautour IIA from the 110th Sq. based at Ramat David AB, and reportedly at low altitudes to avoid enemy radar and air defense.
The book quotes the airmen, who participated in these missions, and who claim that they were flying "straight line from Ramat David" to their targets. Radio silence was universally applied, but it's unclear whether it was limited to comm radios or to IFF, as well. There was no mention on navigation aids or instruments used in Operation Moked except the waypoints listed below, which were devised for the IAF strike pilots.
- Point Telem and Point Boaz (surprisingly at sea)
- Point Hagan in Sinai
- Point Gimmel close to the Dead Sea (perhaps close to the contemporary NEOMI waypoint)
- Point Tiach at the border between Israel and Egypt
Given the relatively long distance from the departure base to the targets and the alleged scarcity of intel eg. on the H-3 airbase in Iraq, with full respect, would it be really feasible for the airmen to find their distant targets while relying only on dead reckoning and using no navaids at low altitude? Did the IAF indeed rely on 5 June 1967 only on VFR and dead reckoning, or did they also use the ADFs, which were present on IAF jets in that time? The ADFs could have been tuned either to NDBs, even located on adversary land, and also to the commercial broadcast transmitters. I am particularly interested in feasibility of such long range interdiction using the 1950s/1960s technology without getting lost over the desert.
Any comments are welcome.
