Schräge Musik
Coming late to the party and discussion, but I have always wondered why the H2S was in a ventral dome when there could have been space for either H2S or a turret under the nose, slightly aft of the bomb aimer.
I can't understand the provision of a nose turret - to my mind anyone sitting there is in the face of a 200 knot wind, plus rain, sleet, snow and in the dark, even if you saw a fighter from head on, at a closing combined speed of 500 mph, how much time would that give?
Up gunning from .303 to 0.5 calibre should have been a priority plus why would H2S have needed a ventral dome? It could have replaced the nose or mid upper turret, freeing the ventral position for a turret.
The main aspect was that the enemy would soon have worked out another weak spot and developed a form of attack at that place.
I still remain in awe of those Bomber Command crews who still went out night after night, knowing pals and other Squadrons had lost many aircraft, yet still went out again and again. They knew it was roulette, their number might not come up, if they had the right mascots and rituals, it would always be someone else.
With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight so much that was done in WW2 could have been done differently. But it wasn't.
Fortunately there were enough foolhardy souls to fill the gaps in the ranks and ensure final Victory.
I wasn't born then, but I know the debt I owe to them and every poor sod who put on the uniform and did their bit.
With an aircraft mounting 2 20mm or 30mm cannon, once you were the target, not much would save you.
I can't understand the provision of a nose turret - to my mind anyone sitting there is in the face of a 200 knot wind, plus rain, sleet, snow and in the dark, even if you saw a fighter from head on, at a closing combined speed of 500 mph, how much time would that give?
Up gunning from .303 to 0.5 calibre should have been a priority plus why would H2S have needed a ventral dome? It could have replaced the nose or mid upper turret, freeing the ventral position for a turret.
The main aspect was that the enemy would soon have worked out another weak spot and developed a form of attack at that place.
I still remain in awe of those Bomber Command crews who still went out night after night, knowing pals and other Squadrons had lost many aircraft, yet still went out again and again. They knew it was roulette, their number might not come up, if they had the right mascots and rituals, it would always be someone else.
With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight so much that was done in WW2 could have been done differently. But it wasn't.
Fortunately there were enough foolhardy souls to fill the gaps in the ranks and ensure final Victory.
I wasn't born then, but I know the debt I owe to them and every poor sod who put on the uniform and did their bit.
With an aircraft mounting 2 20mm or 30mm cannon, once you were the target, not much would save you.
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Some very interesting comments. I think that that of BEagle sums up my thoughts on the subject, that the powers that be knew, but did not do anything about it. I cannot believe the comment by Freeman Dyson that ORS knew nothing of Schräge Musik. to me it just sounds as if he is trying to justify his own role in the bombing war.
I quite agree with Icare9. Over the years I worked with some of the members of Bomber Command. Most of them did not talk about their experiences. Only one, a tail gunner, who was being shown around the Lancaster in the RAF Museum spoke briefly about what it was like on operations.
i would be interested to know more about the rejected Fighter Command "Havoc" idea mentioned by 682al
I still remain in awe of those Bomber Command crews who still went out night after night, knowing pals and other Squadrons had lost many aircraft, yet still went out again and again. They knew it was roulette, their number might not come up, if they had the right mascots and rituals, it would always be someone else.
i would be interested to know more about the rejected Fighter Command "Havoc" idea mentioned by 682al
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I think that BEagle sums up my thoughts on the subject, that the powers that be knew, but did not do anything about it. I cannot believe the comment by Freeman Dyson that ORS knew nothing of Schräge Musik. to me it just sounds as if he is trying to justify his own role in the bombing war.
Consider that the downward firing "scare gun", downward vision blisters (referenced by longer ron above) and the Rose rear turret combining heavier armament and - importantly - a much improved downward vision for the gunner, were all Bomber Command initiatives aimed at thwarting attacks from below. I think history has got this subject wrong.
p.s. The Havoc system was devised by Nash and Thompson (the turret people) and was rather more complicated than a S-M installation in that control of the guns was in the hands of an observer in the nose compartment. By the time it had been trialed, Fighter Command opinion was that the Beaufighter (soon to be followed by the Mosquito) had more than ample forward firing armament to tackle German bombers.
It didn't stop further trials with Beaufighter and Mosquito having four gun turrets installed along the lines of the Defiant, which would have allowed attacks from the beam - or from beneath...
A must-read, first hand, article on British Bomber losses and the official understanding of them here:
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/4...-intelligence/
by Freeman Dyson, eminent theoretician and member of the wartime operational research unit
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/4...-intelligence/
by Freeman Dyson, eminent theoretician and member of the wartime operational research unit
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I have just got round to fully reading the Dyson Freeman article. I really got it wrong. he was not trying to pass the buck, but admitted that his department missed the signs. My apologies. I must say that I am rather pleased to have been wrong as I have a lot of respect for Dyson.
Thanks to 682al for the copy of the memo from Bomber Harris. It confirms that he and his team did know about Schräge Musik and wanted something done. As with only fitting .303 guns instead of .50 cannons, it was the penny-pinchers at the top who did nothing about it.
Thanks to 682al for the copy of the memo from Bomber Harris. It confirms that he and his team did know about Schräge Musik and wanted something done. As with only fitting .303 guns instead of .50 cannons, it was the penny-pinchers at the top who did nothing about it.
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Slightly off topic. Reading this thread and the work of the ORS reminded me of something I'd read ages ago, so I yomped upstairs and dug out the book.
It contains a very short section on the work of Abraham Wald and the US Statistical Research Group during WW11. Wald, a mathematician, was asked the following question by the US military following bomber raids in the European theatre: 'Our planes are coming back covered in bullet holes, More in the fuselage, least in the engines. We need to concentrate armour in areas of the greatest need, where the planes are getting hit the most. So exactly, how much armour belonged on those parts of the plane?'
The Military's expected answer was fuselage and other high hit areas.
Wald and his team proved the opposite, you put the armour where there aren't any/least bullet holes. The explanation being, the reason that the engines on returning aircraft showed fewer hits was that planes that were heavily hit in the engines weren't coming back, whereas those returning with a fuselage like a swiss cheese is pretty strong evidence that hits to the fuselage can (and should) be tolerated. You can't count the bullet holes on aircraft that don't return.
Interestingly, Wald was classed as an enemy alien (Romanian Jew) and, in theory, not cleared to read the reports he was authoring.
If this is old news, I apologise.
It contains a very short section on the work of Abraham Wald and the US Statistical Research Group during WW11. Wald, a mathematician, was asked the following question by the US military following bomber raids in the European theatre: 'Our planes are coming back covered in bullet holes, More in the fuselage, least in the engines. We need to concentrate armour in areas of the greatest need, where the planes are getting hit the most. So exactly, how much armour belonged on those parts of the plane?'
The Military's expected answer was fuselage and other high hit areas.
Wald and his team proved the opposite, you put the armour where there aren't any/least bullet holes. The explanation being, the reason that the engines on returning aircraft showed fewer hits was that planes that were heavily hit in the engines weren't coming back, whereas those returning with a fuselage like a swiss cheese is pretty strong evidence that hits to the fuselage can (and should) be tolerated. You can't count the bullet holes on aircraft that don't return.
Interestingly, Wald was classed as an enemy alien (Romanian Jew) and, in theory, not cleared to read the reports he was authoring.
If this is old news, I apologise.
Similar story from WW1.
After the troops were given tin helmets the medics found they were treating more men with head injuries. Didn't seem to make sense until it was realised that the men with head injuries survived to be treated because the tin helmets reduced the severity of the head injuries. Without the helmets they would never have survived to be treated.
Could Wald have been aware of this, and applied the same logic to the damaged aircraft?
After the troops were given tin helmets the medics found they were treating more men with head injuries. Didn't seem to make sense until it was realised that the men with head injuries survived to be treated because the tin helmets reduced the severity of the head injuries. Without the helmets they would never have survived to be treated.
Could Wald have been aware of this, and applied the same logic to the damaged aircraft?
Bomber Command may not have known about Schrage Musik, but in the summer of 43, 1 Group gunnery leaders were teaching their gunners to ask pilots to dip a wing to look for fighters below. This was possibly before the official advent of SM in August 43. In July 44 an intact Ju88 Night Fighter landed at Woodbridge. However the only thing that BC learned was that 'Monica' was being homed in on by the night fighters. It had no SM guns.It would be interesting to know if the captured pilot knew of, or made any references to SM. After D Day, the tide slowly turned in favour of the bombers.
Attacking a bomber from underneath with front firing guns or even a turret is in my opinion pure folly and virtual suicide for a night fighter pilot. To quote from an X user of SM with whom I corresponded: 'To shoot into the fuselage too near was dangerous because the aircraft could explode of bombs and oxygen-bottles.
We were aiming for between engines Nr 1 and 2 left side a short second and then moved away right away. In most cases the fuel tanks between the engines and wing were burning, so the boys had time to parachute from fuselage.'
There were a number of recorded cases, where bombers just caught fire in level flight and with no warning. One must wonder about debriefings and of attacks that failed, were they widely circulated? Don't forget SM did not use tracer, so no one was aware of the attack. It would seem odd though that no reports did get back to England from survivors. Freeman Dyson though mentioned before that the escape hatch on a Lanc was an inch or so too small for a fully clothed crew member to escape from with ease. However, nothing was done to remedy the situation and he calculated that 10,000 crew members died needlessly.
BC powers that be were as mentioned in Max Hastings book still telling crews to use IFF over enemy territory as crews believed it interfered with German radar, when the opposite was true. Also as mentioned here earlier, 'Scarecrow Flares' were not some pyrotechnic fired up by the Germans, but aircraft , usually fully ladened receiving a direct hit. BC seemed in both cases to have decided that moral would be affected if the truth was known. I often wonder if the same was true of SM?
Attacking a bomber from underneath with front firing guns or even a turret is in my opinion pure folly and virtual suicide for a night fighter pilot. To quote from an X user of SM with whom I corresponded: 'To shoot into the fuselage too near was dangerous because the aircraft could explode of bombs and oxygen-bottles.
We were aiming for between engines Nr 1 and 2 left side a short second and then moved away right away. In most cases the fuel tanks between the engines and wing were burning, so the boys had time to parachute from fuselage.'
There were a number of recorded cases, where bombers just caught fire in level flight and with no warning. One must wonder about debriefings and of attacks that failed, were they widely circulated? Don't forget SM did not use tracer, so no one was aware of the attack. It would seem odd though that no reports did get back to England from survivors. Freeman Dyson though mentioned before that the escape hatch on a Lanc was an inch or so too small for a fully clothed crew member to escape from with ease. However, nothing was done to remedy the situation and he calculated that 10,000 crew members died needlessly.
BC powers that be were as mentioned in Max Hastings book still telling crews to use IFF over enemy territory as crews believed it interfered with German radar, when the opposite was true. Also as mentioned here earlier, 'Scarecrow Flares' were not some pyrotechnic fired up by the Germans, but aircraft , usually fully ladened receiving a direct hit. BC seemed in both cases to have decided that moral would be affected if the truth was known. I often wonder if the same was true of SM?
Last edited by rolling20; 28th Aug 2017 at 18:18.
