UPS crash in Dubai, featured on ACI.
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UPS crash in Dubai, featured on ACI.
This is a horrible horrible crash. The report was scary, nightmarish. Lithium batteries downed a 747 although the heroic actions from the crew avoided an even bigger catastrophe.
I just noticed Air Crash Investigation has made an episode about this event so I just watched it with great interest. It is actually a vivid insight into what might have been on that awful evening. I got a better understanding of the communication problems between the plane and ATC and the smoke problems were clearly visible, although I imagine they might have been even worse - more black, more solid.
Just wanted to notify everyone about this. I think I will dare recommend watching this episode even for you long time pros, just because of the excellent portrayal of circumstances in a fire event.
Here you have the direct download link to the report:
https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicat...013%202010.pdf
And here is a teaser from NatGeoTV-uk of the episode:
Watch Air Crash Investigation Videos Online - National Geographic Channel - UK
I think the episode is S15E02 and it is called Fatal Delivery.
I just noticed Air Crash Investigation has made an episode about this event so I just watched it with great interest. It is actually a vivid insight into what might have been on that awful evening. I got a better understanding of the communication problems between the plane and ATC and the smoke problems were clearly visible, although I imagine they might have been even worse - more black, more solid.
Just wanted to notify everyone about this. I think I will dare recommend watching this episode even for you long time pros, just because of the excellent portrayal of circumstances in a fire event.
Here you have the direct download link to the report:
https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublicat...013%202010.pdf
And here is a teaser from NatGeoTV-uk of the episode:
Watch Air Crash Investigation Videos Online - National Geographic Channel - UK
I think the episode is S15E02 and it is called Fatal Delivery.
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I watched this program on it's first airing. The first thing that struck me as absurd is that the pilots did not have smoke goggles or face-masks. The program highlighted how impossible it would have been for the F/O to to see anything. Then, when I read the report, I find they did have smoke goggles on. OK, the NTSB recommendation was for full face masks. I've used both in the sim and they are much better, but once again ACI has not been factually correct in a central area pertaining to a crash.
I was confused why the captain, when they turned back, disconnected the AP.
One also wonders what is the state of play these day for such cargos. Strengthening containers might be one thing, but what caused the fire in the first place? Was it a faulty battery that went into runaway? Were they defect or from dodgy producers? What are the ICAO rules now. If such large cargos of volatile high risk items are carried on long sectors is there a case to carry an extra fire trained crew member to monitor the cargo deck?
The malfunction of the air-con system not pressurising the flight deck was a real swiss cheese demonstration.
I was confused why the captain, when they turned back, disconnected the AP.
One also wonders what is the state of play these day for such cargos. Strengthening containers might be one thing, but what caused the fire in the first place? Was it a faulty battery that went into runaway? Were they defect or from dodgy producers? What are the ICAO rules now. If such large cargos of volatile high risk items are carried on long sectors is there a case to carry an extra fire trained crew member to monitor the cargo deck?
The malfunction of the air-con system not pressurising the flight deck was a real swiss cheese demonstration.
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I watched this program on it's first airing. The first thing that struck me as absurd is that the pilots did not have smoke goggles or face-masks. (...) Then, when I read the report, I find they did have smoke goggles on. (...) once again ACI has not been factually correct in a central area pertaining to a crash.
I was confused why the captain, when they turned back, disconnected the AP.
One also wonders what is the state of play these day for such cargos. Strengthening containers might be one thing, but what caused the fire in the first place? Was it a faulty battery that went into runaway? Were they defect or from dodgy producers? What are the ICAO rules now.
I was confused why the captain, when they turned back, disconnected the AP.
One also wonders what is the state of play these day for such cargos. Strengthening containers might be one thing, but what caused the fire in the first place? Was it a faulty battery that went into runaway? Were they defect or from dodgy producers? What are the ICAO rules now.
I too was intrigued by the disconnect. I am sure someone with cargo experience on a 747 might explain that.
As for what caused the fire: Lithium batteries need not be faulty to start their own heat. If a battery is shaken the wrong way, the separator may dislocate and cause a direct connection between anode and cathode. This can happen to any camera or mobile or laptop - and it has. It is just a feature of the Li-ion battery chemistry.
This is a more accurate view of a "button" battery or something from a mobile phone:
Li-Ion batteries are very sensitive to thermal runaway (Boeing knows about this...) and if one battery starts misbehaving it can easily heat up and set fire to surrounding batteries. Fun graph:
Some Li-ion batteries may even produce their own oxygen, depending on the ion composition and the surrounding flammable materials. One example:
IATA has taken some measures for this according to http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/d...ery-update.pdf (direct link to the 2016 update on Li-ion batteries as cargo).
I know that some freighters refuse Li-ion batteries as cargo, prompting them to go by sea instead. SAS Cargo does this: Lithium batteries - SAS Cargo/Airfreight/Safety and Security and the ICAO banned them as cargo on passenger planes (still allowed on freighters!) until 2018: Interim Ban Placed on Lithium-Ion-Battery Cargo Shipments on Passenger Planes - WSJ
Last edited by MrSnuggles; 7th Mar 2016 at 10:14. Reason: clarifying ICAO
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This might be a stupid question but could the side FO/Capt windows not be opened once the aircraft was low enough? I understand the cabin would still been pressured but surely depressurizing the cabin then opening the window would've helped clear some smoke?
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The 747 does not have openable direct vision/crew escape windows. Crew escape provision is via a cockpit roof hatch.
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The 747 does not have openable direct vision/crew escape windows. Crew escape provision is via a cockpit roof hatch.
Is that part of any specified procedure; or is it only for the lateral thinkers? Given that the cockpit was supposed to remain at a higher pressure than the cargo deck, but obviously wasn't, some lateral thinking might be appropriate, but given the extremely high stress levels & critical nature of the scenario it is obvious why it there was no surplus capacity to do so.
Is that part of any specified procedure; or is it only for the lateral thinkers? Given that the cockpit was supposed to remain at a higher pressure than the cargo deck, but obviously wasn't, some lateral thinking might be appropriate, but given the extremely high stress levels & critical nature of the scenario it is obvious why it there was no surplus capacity to do so.
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RAT 5
Are you suggesting they should have popped the roof hatch to vent the smoke? That sounds like an intriguing scenario. :-)
Anyone here who knows if that would have been an option? Could you do that in flight? Would it work?
Are you suggesting they should have popped the roof hatch to vent the smoke? That sounds like an intriguing scenario. :-)
Anyone here who knows if that would have been an option? Could you do that in flight? Would it work?
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The autopilot disconnects more than once as the pilot flying wanted a rapid descent to FL100 during the 180 deg turn back.The AP is reconnected as the pilot flying discovers that there is no pitch control: 'I have no control of the airplane'.
Unfortunately the control issues weren't clarified with the pilot monitoring as the number of cascading failures increased and the problem solving became difficult. They deviate from the smoke SOP by pulling the smoke handle, a legacy from the B747-100, that opens a small vent in the roof. Unfortunately , this only compounded the problem as they had effectively put themselves in chimney between the burning cargo and the atmosphere due to the smoke vent venturi effect.
As the cockpit filled with thick, dense smoke, the visibility also became an issue. They had standard oxygen masks with separate smoke googles.
10 months following the UPS accident, an Asiana B744F had the same type of event, crashing into the China sea with similar controllabilty, cockpit vision and communication problems. The Asiana B744F aft fuselage section separated in-flight.
Unfortunately the control issues weren't clarified with the pilot monitoring as the number of cascading failures increased and the problem solving became difficult. They deviate from the smoke SOP by pulling the smoke handle, a legacy from the B747-100, that opens a small vent in the roof. Unfortunately , this only compounded the problem as they had effectively put themselves in chimney between the burning cargo and the atmosphere due to the smoke vent venturi effect.
As the cockpit filled with thick, dense smoke, the visibility also became an issue. They had standard oxygen masks with separate smoke googles.
10 months following the UPS accident, an Asiana B744F had the same type of event, crashing into the China sea with similar controllabilty, cockpit vision and communication problems. The Asiana B744F aft fuselage section separated in-flight.
Boeing 747 cockpit windows don't open.
IIRC in the UK type certificate it says "certified on the basis of equivalent safety".
I always wondered what that meant.
However, opening the window may not have helped. In the 1973 Varig B707 crash near Paris I believe they had the cockpit windows open but they still could not see much.
IIRC in the UK type certificate it says "certified on the basis of equivalent safety".
I always wondered what that meant.
However, opening the window may not have helped. In the 1973 Varig B707 crash near Paris I believe they had the cockpit windows open but they still could not see much.
After a smoke incident which I have described in the 'Accidents and Close Calls' thread I took part in some tests on both VC10s and 707s to see how opening the DV window might help.
On the VC10 test a smoke bomb was set off in the rear of the flight deck and the path of the smoke checked. Two things were observed; (1) the smoke swirled across the instrument panel in front of the pilot towards the opened DV window (both sides were tried) further reducing the visibility, and (2) the noise was such that communications were virtually nil.
When I tried later (without smoke) to see what it was like on the 707, again the noise totally drowned out all communication. Thus in my view opening the DV window is a very last resort which would leave the pilot using the open DV window operating virtually solo from that point on.
On the VC10 test a smoke bomb was set off in the rear of the flight deck and the path of the smoke checked. Two things were observed; (1) the smoke swirled across the instrument panel in front of the pilot towards the opened DV window (both sides were tried) further reducing the visibility, and (2) the noise was such that communications were virtually nil.
When I tried later (without smoke) to see what it was like on the 707, again the noise totally drowned out all communication. Thus in my view opening the DV window is a very last resort which would leave the pilot using the open DV window operating virtually solo from that point on.
