Aircraft spares delivery in WW2
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Aircraft spares delivery in WW2
Given the huge number of aircraft types operated and the rates of loss and damage by the the RAF and USAF in the UK in the Second World War, keeping a steady supply of parts must have been a constant headache. Its well known that the Air Transport Auxiliary delivered complete aircraft, but what about smaller spares? Were all deliveries by road and rail or were parts flown to the end users as well?
As most road signs were removed to hinder any possible German invasion, plus we didn't have the motorway network that we do now, not to mention disruption to the rail network from the larger cities being bombed, its hard to see how any part could get from one end of the country quickly.
Are there any good books or websites which describe how it was done?
As most road signs were removed to hinder any possible German invasion, plus we didn't have the motorway network that we do now, not to mention disruption to the rail network from the larger cities being bombed, its hard to see how any part could get from one end of the country quickly.
Are there any good books or websites which describe how it was done?
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As there certainly was produced spares there might have been some logistics to get the goods delivered, however the effort haven't been mentioned much afterwards.
The logistics were as essential for the airbases as for the habours and the advancing armies(*) and was undoubtly performed Somehow and since the airbases did get the food; fuel and ammo they needed, spareparts must have been delivered in the same way.
Anyhow, I have an idea about scrapping parts from worn out aircrafts was one of the mechanics finest abilities and might have kept more planes in the air than actual aknowledged!
(*): Interested in the subject ought to read about the impressive Red Ball Express:
The Red Ball Express Information Page
The logistics were as essential for the airbases as for the habours and the advancing armies(*) and was undoubtly performed Somehow and since the airbases did get the food; fuel and ammo they needed, spareparts must have been delivered in the same way.
Anyhow, I have an idea about scrapping parts from worn out aircrafts was one of the mechanics finest abilities and might have kept more planes in the air than actual aknowledged!
(*): Interested in the subject ought to read about the impressive Red Ball Express:
The Red Ball Express Information Page
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Anyhow, I have an idea about scrapping parts from worn out aircrafts was one of the mechanics finest abilities and might have kept more planes in the air than actual aknowledged!
My experience in China and the Far East suggest that the Russian aircraft operating system relies on Xmas Trees to keep a reducing number of aircraft flying. The Third World is littered with cheap Russian aircraft that have run out of spares or the wherewithal to get them. Even the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force suffered the same fate.
On my first visit to a PLAAF base in 1996 there was a line of aircraft with operating examples at one end and derelict, stripped wrecks at the other. There has been a complete changeover of equipment since then but I would be surprised if the old habits have died. At that time even civil aviation was the same with Russian equipment. At Tanjian there were a group of ex-Aeroflot 154s being used as spares for China Northwest's aircraft. The wholesale transfer to Western aircraft happily brought that system to a close.
On my first visit to a PLAAF base in 1996 there was a line of aircraft with operating examples at one end and derelict, stripped wrecks at the other. There has been a complete changeover of equipment since then but I would be surprised if the old habits have died. At that time even civil aviation was the same with Russian equipment. At Tanjian there were a group of ex-Aeroflot 154s being used as spares for China Northwest's aircraft. The wholesale transfer to Western aircraft happily brought that system to a close.
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Here are two books that shed some light on the utter shambles that was a major feature of the WW2 production of war materiel and spares - and the logistics of getting that materiel and those spares to the front line, during the War.
The history of the AAF during WW2 (Chapter 10 - The Production Record is the most pertinent chapter here)
The Logistics of War - 1941-1955
WW2 was a constant sharp learning curve for all involved, and the Americans ability to manage industrial production for war equipment was sorely tested many times during the War.
Time after time, orders were placed for equipment by military divisions, only for those orders to be doubled or quadrupled a month later - or cancelled completely as new designs took precedence.
It was a constant struggle to try and balance the raw material production and the factory production to meet the expected demand - and a struggle to try and get a handle on the amount and type of spares needed - and to then get them to the front lines.
In vast numbers of cases, early on in the War, equipment was cannibalised to keep other items of equipment operating. It was the easiest and quickest way of keeping aircraft going.
In the early part of WW2, this cannibalisation was a major problem, resulting in huge numbers of aircraft becoming unserviceable due to them being stripped to keep other aircraft in the air.
It was not until serious changes were made to the level of spares production (around late 1942), that the spares shortages started to become alleviated.
In many cases, sea shipping was the primary delivery method for all spares. Huge storage depots were established near ports and in secure close inland areas, as beachheads progressed further into enemy territories.
Trucks and rail were the secondary delivery methods, moving spares and materiel from the base storage depots.
Spares were only delivered by air as a last resort, if excessive numbers of vital aircraft and equipment were being stood down, due to a critical spares shortage.
In the SW Pacific, the U.S. had major problems with supply bases not being able to keep up, with the fast island-hopping progress of the frontline troops.
As a result, much war materiel and spares were rendered useless due to supplies arriving before warehouses could be built - so the materiel and spares were stored in the open and suffered badly from exposure to the weather - which was usually wet, salty, and humid throughout much of the Pacific region.
On one Pacific island near Vanuatu, a U.S. storage facility for war materiel in 1943, contained the mind-boggling value (in 1943 dollar terms) of US$9M worth of new stores and spares.
However, a very large part of this huge stores and spares stockpile was reduced to worthlessness - firstly, by poor storage in the open - and secondly by the fact that the U.S. troops had leap-frogged so far ahead of the island, it became nearly useless as a supply base - and it was more efficient for shipping to bypass the island, and deliver new supplies and spares to up near the front lines, that were by now, a long way away.
In Europe, supply problems were compounded by inadequate records showing what materiel and spares was located on each ship that arrived - resulting in a mad scramble to try and find the location of vital spares, ammunition and equipment, that was crucial to the military advance.
All in all, the entire Second World War constituted major lessons in equipment production, management, delivery, and logistics for the Allies.
One of the most interesting statistics of WW2 aircraft production was the fact that as the War progressed, the average size of Allied aircraft being produced, increased substantially - while the average size of the Axis aircraft produced, reduced in size.
This was due to an emphasis on production of 4-engined aircraft such as bombers and heavy transports amongst the Allies, while the Axis production retreated to defensive aircraft such as single-seat fighters and smaller attack aircraft, as the War started to go badly for them.
The history of the AAF during WW2 (Chapter 10 - The Production Record is the most pertinent chapter here)
The Logistics of War - 1941-1955
WW2 was a constant sharp learning curve for all involved, and the Americans ability to manage industrial production for war equipment was sorely tested many times during the War.
Time after time, orders were placed for equipment by military divisions, only for those orders to be doubled or quadrupled a month later - or cancelled completely as new designs took precedence.
It was a constant struggle to try and balance the raw material production and the factory production to meet the expected demand - and a struggle to try and get a handle on the amount and type of spares needed - and to then get them to the front lines.
In vast numbers of cases, early on in the War, equipment was cannibalised to keep other items of equipment operating. It was the easiest and quickest way of keeping aircraft going.
In the early part of WW2, this cannibalisation was a major problem, resulting in huge numbers of aircraft becoming unserviceable due to them being stripped to keep other aircraft in the air.
It was not until serious changes were made to the level of spares production (around late 1942), that the spares shortages started to become alleviated.
In many cases, sea shipping was the primary delivery method for all spares. Huge storage depots were established near ports and in secure close inland areas, as beachheads progressed further into enemy territories.
Trucks and rail were the secondary delivery methods, moving spares and materiel from the base storage depots.
Spares were only delivered by air as a last resort, if excessive numbers of vital aircraft and equipment were being stood down, due to a critical spares shortage.
In the SW Pacific, the U.S. had major problems with supply bases not being able to keep up, with the fast island-hopping progress of the frontline troops.
As a result, much war materiel and spares were rendered useless due to supplies arriving before warehouses could be built - so the materiel and spares were stored in the open and suffered badly from exposure to the weather - which was usually wet, salty, and humid throughout much of the Pacific region.
On one Pacific island near Vanuatu, a U.S. storage facility for war materiel in 1943, contained the mind-boggling value (in 1943 dollar terms) of US$9M worth of new stores and spares.
However, a very large part of this huge stores and spares stockpile was reduced to worthlessness - firstly, by poor storage in the open - and secondly by the fact that the U.S. troops had leap-frogged so far ahead of the island, it became nearly useless as a supply base - and it was more efficient for shipping to bypass the island, and deliver new supplies and spares to up near the front lines, that were by now, a long way away.
In Europe, supply problems were compounded by inadequate records showing what materiel and spares was located on each ship that arrived - resulting in a mad scramble to try and find the location of vital spares, ammunition and equipment, that was crucial to the military advance.
All in all, the entire Second World War constituted major lessons in equipment production, management, delivery, and logistics for the Allies.
One of the most interesting statistics of WW2 aircraft production was the fact that as the War progressed, the average size of Allied aircraft being produced, increased substantially - while the average size of the Axis aircraft produced, reduced in size.
This was due to an emphasis on production of 4-engined aircraft such as bombers and heavy transports amongst the Allies, while the Axis production retreated to defensive aircraft such as single-seat fighters and smaller attack aircraft, as the War started to go badly for them.
Last edited by onetrack; 17th Sep 2015 at 12:13.
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Thanks for the explanation onetrack!
We must have in mind that WW2 was the first really mechanised war and as with the tactics the logistics was quite different to the first war, wich probably had to be optimised through time.
The Germans invented the 'blitzkrieg' [flashwar] and might have foreseen the problems around logistics, however the invading armoured divisions easily lost contact with the essentiel fuel tankers wich should follow them.
The problems for US forces under their 'Island hopping', shows how difficult it is for the logistics to follow the development whilst no general would delay any opportunity due to the argument of spareparts being caught behind the frontline.
I have to admit that I'm quite sceptic around the British prepareness to the logistic problems. SS Thistelgorm wich should supply the british build-up in Egypt was sunk in the Red Sea. When later found it have become a much attractive diving-object, but what is interesting is the listing of the cargo where in between are lots of creates with wellingtons. Wellingtons for a desert battle is probably a good sign of the British logistics :-/
We must have in mind that WW2 was the first really mechanised war and as with the tactics the logistics was quite different to the first war, wich probably had to be optimised through time.
The Germans invented the 'blitzkrieg' [flashwar] and might have foreseen the problems around logistics, however the invading armoured divisions easily lost contact with the essentiel fuel tankers wich should follow them.
The problems for US forces under their 'Island hopping', shows how difficult it is for the logistics to follow the development whilst no general would delay any opportunity due to the argument of spareparts being caught behind the frontline.
I have to admit that I'm quite sceptic around the British prepareness to the logistic problems. SS Thistelgorm wich should supply the british build-up in Egypt was sunk in the Red Sea. When later found it have become a much attractive diving-object, but what is interesting is the listing of the cargo where in between are lots of creates with wellingtons. Wellingtons for a desert battle is probably a good sign of the British logistics :-/
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This from Wiki:
I was surprised by the railway locomotives nearly 65 ft long and 70+ tons each and 23 were lost at sea!
Last voyage
She set sail on her fourth and final voyage from Glasgow on 2 June 1941, destined for Alexandria, Egypt. The vessel’s cargo included: Bedford trucks, Universal Carrier armoured vehicles, Norton 16H and BSA motorcycles, Bren guns, cases of ammunition, and 0.303 rifles as well as radio equipment, Wellington boots, aircraft parts, railway wagons[3] and two LMS Stanier Class 8F steam locomotives.[4] These steam locomotives and their associated coal and water tenders were carried as deck cargo and were for the Egyptian Railways. The rest of the cargo was for the Allied forces in Egypt. At the time the Thistlegorm sailed from Glasgow in June, this was the Western Desert Force, which in September 1941 became part of the newly formed Eighth Army. The crew of the ship, under Captain William Ellis, were supplemented by 9 naval personnel to man the machine gun and the anti-aircraft gun.
She set sail on her fourth and final voyage from Glasgow on 2 June 1941, destined for Alexandria, Egypt. The vessel’s cargo included: Bedford trucks, Universal Carrier armoured vehicles, Norton 16H and BSA motorcycles, Bren guns, cases of ammunition, and 0.303 rifles as well as radio equipment, Wellington boots, aircraft parts, railway wagons[3] and two LMS Stanier Class 8F steam locomotives.[4] These steam locomotives and their associated coal and water tenders were carried as deck cargo and were for the Egyptian Railways. The rest of the cargo was for the Allied forces in Egypt. At the time the Thistlegorm sailed from Glasgow in June, this was the Western Desert Force, which in September 1941 became part of the newly formed Eighth Army. The crew of the ship, under Captain William Ellis, were supplemented by 9 naval personnel to man the machine gun and the anti-aircraft gun.
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The Germans invented the 'blitzkrieg' [flashwar] and might have foreseen the problems around logistics, however the invading armoured divisions easily lost contact with the essentiel fuel tankers wich should follow them.
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The loss of merchant ships and their crews must have been hard to swallow, but in many cases, I guess the cargo was more valuable than the ship.
If a ship managed a return journey and started a 2nd voyage it was a bonus.
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The Americans lost 15 MILLION tons of shipping (including cargo tonnage) from late 1941 to late 1944 simply because of the deadly efficiency of the U-boats against lightly-armed merchant shipping, which was the primary delivery method from the U.S. for War materiel.
There are countless thousands of new items of war equipment on the bottom of the Atlantic - tanks, guns, trucks, Caterpillar tractors, jeeps, huge numbers of aircraft engines and spares - everything that Armies needed to operate.
It took the Americans far too long to find ways to effectively counter the U-boat menace. For the U-boats, destroying merchant shipping was like a shooting ducks on a pond, and the merchantmen losses were appalling.
The U-boats sank a total of 2828 Allied ships, and the vast majority of them either carried new war materiel, or were oil tankers.
Rommel lost his major advantage and the opportunity to wipe the Allies out in Africa, simply because the Germans did not understand the importance of logistics and the need to keep up the required level of vital supplies and spares for mechanised forces.
Rommels tanks ran out of fuel because the Germans weren't organised enough to keep up the level of fuel that Rommel required for his advance.
No doubt the Desert Fox was furious over the lack of support that saw his advance stalled for such a basic requirement.
To add to the irony, he was operating in the area where the some of the worlds greatest supplies of oil were located and produced!
There are countless thousands of new items of war equipment on the bottom of the Atlantic - tanks, guns, trucks, Caterpillar tractors, jeeps, huge numbers of aircraft engines and spares - everything that Armies needed to operate.
It took the Americans far too long to find ways to effectively counter the U-boat menace. For the U-boats, destroying merchant shipping was like a shooting ducks on a pond, and the merchantmen losses were appalling.
The U-boats sank a total of 2828 Allied ships, and the vast majority of them either carried new war materiel, or were oil tankers.
Rommel lost his major advantage and the opportunity to wipe the Allies out in Africa, simply because the Germans did not understand the importance of logistics and the need to keep up the required level of vital supplies and spares for mechanised forces.
Rommels tanks ran out of fuel because the Germans weren't organised enough to keep up the level of fuel that Rommel required for his advance.
No doubt the Desert Fox was furious over the lack of support that saw his advance stalled for such a basic requirement.
To add to the irony, he was operating in the area where the some of the worlds greatest supplies of oil were located and produced!
There's a clue in an extract from a 50th. anniversary book for RAF Stafford. I quote -
" The first receipts and issues recorded in the Unit's own right were in May 1940, and comprised 1,231 tons 9cwt. received and 54tons 18cwt. despatched. Similarly, the MT Squadron's activities and workload escalated rapidly, so that by June 1940 the vehicles were running almost 30,000 miles a month. While the role of 16 MU, in the Battle of Britain, was directly quite limited, attitudes changed markedly and developed a much more urgent approach to meeting the RAF's needs"
In the same book - July 1941. 5,704 tons received, 4,123 tons despatched and 223,548 miles driven by MT.
" The first receipts and issues recorded in the Unit's own right were in May 1940, and comprised 1,231 tons 9cwt. received and 54tons 18cwt. despatched. Similarly, the MT Squadron's activities and workload escalated rapidly, so that by June 1940 the vehicles were running almost 30,000 miles a month. While the role of 16 MU, in the Battle of Britain, was directly quite limited, attitudes changed markedly and developed a much more urgent approach to meeting the RAF's needs"
In the same book - July 1941. 5,704 tons received, 4,123 tons despatched and 223,548 miles driven by MT.
"The Germans invented the 'blitzkrieg' [flashwar] and might have foreseen the problems around logistics, however the invading armoured divisions easily lost contact with the essentiel fuel tankers wich should follow them. "
I believe the early Panzers were deliberately designed to run on just about any fuel for just that reason.
I believe the early Panzers were deliberately designed to run on just about any fuel for just that reason.
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Rommel lost his major advantage and the opportunity to wipe the Allies out in Africa, simply because the Germans did not understand the importance of logistics and the need to keep up the required level of vital supplies and spares for mechanised forces. .......
No doubt the Desert Fox was furious over the lack of support that saw his advance stalled for such a basic requirement.
No doubt the Desert Fox was furious over the lack of support that saw his advance stalled for such a basic requirement.
And basically it wasn't probably the planning and production, but merely the transportation (across the Mediterranian) that became decimated by the allied forces :-/
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I believe the early Panzers were deliberately designed to run on just about any fuel for just that reason
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I
To supply the problems in the PTO: in Late '44 Joe Forster flew a 800 mile returning flight with only one engine of his P-38 working.
Details from the story is that to reach the target at eastern Borneo they had to refuel at a primitive landing-strip 800 miles from the target, wich was the same he returned to on the single engine. Though not having much more than minor damages no mechanics were at hand at the refuelling-strip and the P-38 couldn't take-off on only one engine efter refuelling, hence after Joe Forster managed to be flewn back to his sq, his P-38 became standing unrepaired until a point where it simply was dozed into the sea whilst the parked plane was a danger for the users of the airfield.
The story shows partly a surprisingly neglectance of keeping aircrafts in the air, and partly that the supply of new aircrafts had to be more than sufficient :-/
The story is to read at:
P-38
On one Pacific island near Vanuatu, a U.S. storage facility for war materiel in 1943, contained the mind-boggling value (in 1943 dollar terms) of US$9M worth of new stores and spares.
However, a very large part of this huge stores and spares stockpile was reduced to worthlessness - firstly, by poor storage in the open - and secondly by the fact that the U.S. troops had leap-frogged so far ahead of the island, it became nearly useless as a supply base - and it was more efficient for shipping to bypass the island, and deliver new supplies and spares to up near the front lines, that were by now, a long way away.
However, a very large part of this huge stores and spares stockpile was reduced to worthlessness - firstly, by poor storage in the open - and secondly by the fact that the U.S. troops had leap-frogged so far ahead of the island, it became nearly useless as a supply base - and it was more efficient for shipping to bypass the island, and deliver new supplies and spares to up near the front lines, that were by now, a long way away.
Details from the story is that to reach the target at eastern Borneo they had to refuel at a primitive landing-strip 800 miles from the target, wich was the same he returned to on the single engine. Though not having much more than minor damages no mechanics were at hand at the refuelling-strip and the P-38 couldn't take-off on only one engine efter refuelling, hence after Joe Forster managed to be flewn back to his sq, his P-38 became standing unrepaired until a point where it simply was dozed into the sea whilst the parked plane was a danger for the users of the airfield.
The story shows partly a surprisingly neglectance of keeping aircrafts in the air, and partly that the supply of new aircrafts had to be more than sufficient :-/
The story is to read at:
P-38
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Flybiker7000 - Yes, the SAS and the LRDG were major reasons that were assisting in preventing supplies reaching Rommel - but Hitler was also fighting WW2 on 3 fronts by September 1942.
Hitlers primary support was to the Eastern Front, and the German forces in the Middle East were denied the support that Rommel requested at that crucial time - particularly, increased fuel supplies.
The final crushing of the Axis forces in the Middle East came with the Battle of El Alamein, where the Germans and Italians were slowly overwhelmed by the greatly increased force and equipment numbers of the Eighth Army (recently boosted by substantial amounts of U.S. equipment, including Sherman tanks). Increased Allied airpower also played a very big part in the Battle of El Alamein.
Rommel saw what was going to happen long before the Battle of El Alamein and urged Hitler to evacuate all the German troops in the Middle East - but Hitler expressly forbade evacuation, and instructed his forces to entrench themselves and fight.
The final straw for the Axis forces was the sinking at Tobruk, of the Italian oil tanker Tergestea - by Vickers Wellingtons torpedo bombers of 38 Sqdn RAF - and the oil tanker Proserpina, by Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers of 42 Sqdn RAF.
Rommel noted dejectedly in his diary, that with the sinking of these two oil tankers, it effectively signalled the end of the Axis forces ability to fight in the Middle East.
When the Axis capitulation in the Middle East came, 130,000 Axis troops surrendered and became POW's. This was essentially the major turning point of WW2 for the Allies in their European advance.
Hitlers primary support was to the Eastern Front, and the German forces in the Middle East were denied the support that Rommel requested at that crucial time - particularly, increased fuel supplies.
The final crushing of the Axis forces in the Middle East came with the Battle of El Alamein, where the Germans and Italians were slowly overwhelmed by the greatly increased force and equipment numbers of the Eighth Army (recently boosted by substantial amounts of U.S. equipment, including Sherman tanks). Increased Allied airpower also played a very big part in the Battle of El Alamein.
Rommel saw what was going to happen long before the Battle of El Alamein and urged Hitler to evacuate all the German troops in the Middle East - but Hitler expressly forbade evacuation, and instructed his forces to entrench themselves and fight.
The final straw for the Axis forces was the sinking at Tobruk, of the Italian oil tanker Tergestea - by Vickers Wellingtons torpedo bombers of 38 Sqdn RAF - and the oil tanker Proserpina, by Bristol Beaufort torpedo bombers of 42 Sqdn RAF.
Rommel noted dejectedly in his diary, that with the sinking of these two oil tankers, it effectively signalled the end of the Axis forces ability to fight in the Middle East.
When the Axis capitulation in the Middle East came, 130,000 Axis troops surrendered and became POW's. This was essentially the major turning point of WW2 for the Allies in their European advance.