Hawker Siddley became BAe
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Hawker Siddley became BAe
To settle a discussion can anyone provide a definitive year in which Hawker Siddley Aviation plants became British Aerospace ? e.g When did HSA Dunsfold become BAe Dunsfold ?
Last edited by Lower Hangar; 12th Feb 2014 at 10:47. Reason: Spelling
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Britsh Aerospace (BAe) was created in April 1977.
The Hawker Siddley Aviation Divisions (eg. Hatfield-Chester) were renamed as divsions of the BAe Aircraft group from 1 January 1978.
HD
The Hawker Siddley Aviation Divisions (eg. Hatfield-Chester) were renamed as divsions of the BAe Aircraft group from 1 January 1978.
HD
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Arguably, HSA didn't become BAeS but ceased to exist. It's assets were Nationalised along with those of BAC and Scottish Aviation and merged to create the "publicly owned" BAeS. It was in the Nation's best interests, apparently.
Quote:
Arguably, HSA didn't become BAeS but ceased to exist. It's assets were Nationalised along with those of BAC and Scottish Aviation and merged to create the "publicly owned" BAeS. It was in the Nation's best interests, apparently.
Mainly correct, but the nationalised company was only British Aerospace (BAe).
Much later, and long after re-privatisation, it was the acquisition of Marconi that got the "Systems" added to the name of the company.
Arguably, HSA didn't become BAeS but ceased to exist. It's assets were Nationalised along with those of BAC and Scottish Aviation and merged to create the "publicly owned" BAeS. It was in the Nation's best interests, apparently.
Mainly correct, but the nationalised company was only British Aerospace (BAe).
Much later, and long after re-privatisation, it was the acquisition of Marconi that got the "Systems" added to the name of the company.
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It was in the Nation's best interests, apparently.
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Allan Lupton. You are of course right. I misremembered the original name's abbreviation. I also incorrectly missed out HS Dynamics in the nationalised HS assets.
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Blacksheep. it hasn't been limited to Hatfield in recent years. Taking up your point;
, it has reminded me of the present day BAe incarnation, BASE. There was much weeping wailing over the cessation of shipbuilding in Portsmouth (again). Although they were not on "minimum wage", there wasn't much publicity given to the bulk of those made redundant being Polish; as I understand it.
Transport depots staffed by foreign workers on minimum wage incomes and IT companies where the employees remit all their spare cash to the folks back home in India are no substitute for proper jobs.
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British Airliners 'Nearly Get It Right' Shock!
Around this time Lord Douglas of Kirtleside made a visit to America where unrest over Pan Am’s enthusiasm for the DH 121 was growing. During this visit he was informed that Boeing were considering producing an aircraft in competition with the De Havilland design and so, for some insane reason which remains unexplained (and mention of things like ‘bribery’ and ‘corruption’ would be without any foundation in terms of supportive evidence) he suggested reciprocal visits between Seattle and Hatfield for ‘an exchange of ideas’.
The really remarkable thing was that instead of all the alarm bells ringing, the Hatfield team reacted with amazing enthusiasm to this suggestion and invited a top level team from Boeing to see everything they had on the DH 121 at Hatfield. Boeing were pretty gobsmacked at this, but naturally accepted with good grace and so it was that De Havilland freely handed over all its research to its closest rival while, at the same time, barring the British press from the factory for reasons of ‘security’. If you can figure that one out, let me know. ‘cos I can’t.
original Medway powered, 111 seat DH.121 as shown to Boeing
Immediately after this, in 1958, the UK then scored its second own goal. Having monitored the traffic levels of the previous three years, BEA got cold feet and thought the 121 was going to be too big. It was quickly scaled down to only 97 seats (as BEA’s word was the industry’s command in those days) and re-engined with the smaller R-R Spey, the emasculated version then appeared in 1962 as the Hawker Siddeley Trident 1, so close, but yet so far.
In 1959 Boeing gave the full go ahead to the 727, its spec matching that of the *original* DH 121 almost exactly. This might even be a coincidence, but even if it was, all that DH material exactly confirming their own findings must have helped enormously in the decision making process. When Boeing returned the favour, in 1960, they were very careful to make sure that the visiting De Havilland team, although well and courteously looked after, saw nothing of the 727 at all. The net result of all this was then when the world markets looked at the two aircraft the 727 was the clear winner every time and it ended up outselling the Trident by a factor of about 10 to 1, and deservedly so I might add.
Even *if* Boeing did pilfer the design concept, it was nobody’s fault but our own that we had the perfect rival, but bottled it.
The really remarkable thing was that instead of all the alarm bells ringing, the Hatfield team reacted with amazing enthusiasm to this suggestion and invited a top level team from Boeing to see everything they had on the DH 121 at Hatfield. Boeing were pretty gobsmacked at this, but naturally accepted with good grace and so it was that De Havilland freely handed over all its research to its closest rival while, at the same time, barring the British press from the factory for reasons of ‘security’. If you can figure that one out, let me know. ‘cos I can’t.
original Medway powered, 111 seat DH.121 as shown to Boeing
Immediately after this, in 1958, the UK then scored its second own goal. Having monitored the traffic levels of the previous three years, BEA got cold feet and thought the 121 was going to be too big. It was quickly scaled down to only 97 seats (as BEA’s word was the industry’s command in those days) and re-engined with the smaller R-R Spey, the emasculated version then appeared in 1962 as the Hawker Siddeley Trident 1, so close, but yet so far.
In 1959 Boeing gave the full go ahead to the 727, its spec matching that of the *original* DH 121 almost exactly. This might even be a coincidence, but even if it was, all that DH material exactly confirming their own findings must have helped enormously in the decision making process. When Boeing returned the favour, in 1960, they were very careful to make sure that the visiting De Havilland team, although well and courteously looked after, saw nothing of the 727 at all. The net result of all this was then when the world markets looked at the two aircraft the 727 was the clear winner every time and it ended up outselling the Trident by a factor of about 10 to 1, and deservedly so I might add.
Even *if* Boeing did pilfer the design concept, it was nobody’s fault but our own that we had the perfect rival, but bottled it.
Blacksheep is right about the Hatfield economy but IMO we were actually the victim of the post-privatisation use of a property company to manage the "real estate" and some strange site cost/output analysis which only recognised complete aeroplanes as output.
The former saw better housing development potential at Hatfield than at (say) Woodford and the latter included the costs of the 125 design staff, airbus subassembly construction, 146 design and subassembly construction and so forth but only counted those 146s finally assembled at Hatfield as output.
The end was in 1993 some 16 years post-nationalisation.
The former saw better housing development potential at Hatfield than at (say) Woodford and the latter included the costs of the 125 design staff, airbus subassembly construction, 146 design and subassembly construction and so forth but only counted those 146s finally assembled at Hatfield as output.
The end was in 1993 some 16 years post-nationalisation.
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This is of a piece with the myth of When Brits Ruled the Air.
The "private" owners of UK aero firms, pre-1977 Nationalisation, were nothing of the sort: this industry did not spend its own money, it spent ours, either (or both) as Treasury Launch Aid (computed as 50% of estimated R&D+Production Investment), and as progress payments on orders placed by BEAC and BOAC, parastatals, whose losses and capital investment fell to us, proud owners. Strong they surely were on techno-innovation; averse they surely were on financial risk. So, to Trident.
The DH Enterprise, and other Britfirms, in 1957 addressed a brewing BEAC Requirement for a prime-pairs jet. DH spread the upfront financial exposure by collaborating with Fairey and Hunting, who would take design and production and cost of defined chunks. BEAC selected their DH.121+RB141 Medway; Airco (the Special Purpose vehicle) and RR applied for Launch Aid, BEAC for fleet capital sanction. During Ministers' review, BEAC revisited forward projections of pax/freight demand: not addressed in any of the we wuz robbed yarns was that happy cartels owned each prime city-pair route: revenue pooling. 9 am departure: BEAC, 10 am departure: Air France; 50% cost, 50% revenue, at fixed, common prices. No competition. Cosy. BEAC scaled down to (what emerged as Trident 1E), aligned to Comet 4B and Caravelle: more capacity would not be admissible in the reciprocal deals.
None of the above applied anywhere else on earth, except Australia. In US, business success of Viscount, FH-27 and (initially) L.188 Electra, led by 1959 to interest in a medium haul jet: the Denver/Rockies Case required in excess of 2 engines; 720 was in hand, but would not offer sensible seat costs on medium haul. So Boeing explored a Trijet, not because DH was already doing it, but because that made sense. It surely made sense to listen to DH's thoughts, but it would not have made sense to workshare, to join Airco, because Boeing already enjoyed all the scale economy they could need, from commonality with cascades of 707/KC-135/B-52. Gorilla, not minnow.
727 had RB141 Medway right up to first sale signature; Pratt bought the job by inventing a fan variant of a military engine and stepping up to its full R&D cost. Something neither RR or DH ever did.
These endless we wuz robbed myths are truly tiresome.
The "private" owners of UK aero firms, pre-1977 Nationalisation, were nothing of the sort: this industry did not spend its own money, it spent ours, either (or both) as Treasury Launch Aid (computed as 50% of estimated R&D+Production Investment), and as progress payments on orders placed by BEAC and BOAC, parastatals, whose losses and capital investment fell to us, proud owners. Strong they surely were on techno-innovation; averse they surely were on financial risk. So, to Trident.
The DH Enterprise, and other Britfirms, in 1957 addressed a brewing BEAC Requirement for a prime-pairs jet. DH spread the upfront financial exposure by collaborating with Fairey and Hunting, who would take design and production and cost of defined chunks. BEAC selected their DH.121+RB141 Medway; Airco (the Special Purpose vehicle) and RR applied for Launch Aid, BEAC for fleet capital sanction. During Ministers' review, BEAC revisited forward projections of pax/freight demand: not addressed in any of the we wuz robbed yarns was that happy cartels owned each prime city-pair route: revenue pooling. 9 am departure: BEAC, 10 am departure: Air France; 50% cost, 50% revenue, at fixed, common prices. No competition. Cosy. BEAC scaled down to (what emerged as Trident 1E), aligned to Comet 4B and Caravelle: more capacity would not be admissible in the reciprocal deals.
None of the above applied anywhere else on earth, except Australia. In US, business success of Viscount, FH-27 and (initially) L.188 Electra, led by 1959 to interest in a medium haul jet: the Denver/Rockies Case required in excess of 2 engines; 720 was in hand, but would not offer sensible seat costs on medium haul. So Boeing explored a Trijet, not because DH was already doing it, but because that made sense. It surely made sense to listen to DH's thoughts, but it would not have made sense to workshare, to join Airco, because Boeing already enjoyed all the scale economy they could need, from commonality with cascades of 707/KC-135/B-52. Gorilla, not minnow.
727 had RB141 Medway right up to first sale signature; Pratt bought the job by inventing a fan variant of a military engine and stepping up to its full R&D cost. Something neither RR or DH ever did.
These endless we wuz robbed myths are truly tiresome.
That takes me back, my apprenticeship started in 1972 with HSA at Bitteswell and ended when that bitch, Thatcher, decided our usefulness was at an end.
I was also working at Hatfield when it closed as well.
Just call me albatross
I was also working at Hatfield when it closed as well.
Just call me albatross
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Possible Thread drift but how did Mrs T have any influence on closing Bitteswell? AVRO Whitworth division, if I remember rightly, before the workers' friends took over.
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(then Nationalised) BAe did close Bitteswell in her time - 30/6/82. (then privatised) BAe closed Hatfield in her successor, Major's, time - 4/94. Both were closed because BAe then had more land than aero work: simple fact, nobody's fault.
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Not so much "robbed", Ken - as much as we seem to have repeatedly - and in part, willingly - given away a significant R&D advantage.
There's no question that the powers that be on this side of the pond were responsible for an utter lack of business acumen. Nationalised or not, it would have been relatively simple to propose a licensing arrangement for the original DH.121 design either in whole or in part. The avionics (and in particular blind autoland) alone were almost a decade ahead of anything anyone else had.
There's no question that the powers that be on this side of the pond were responsible for an utter lack of business acumen. Nationalised or not, it would have been relatively simple to propose a licensing arrangement for the original DH.121 design either in whole or in part. The avionics (and in particular blind autoland) alone were almost a decade ahead of anything anyone else had.
