WWII night interception q?
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WWII night interception q?
Would an RAF Pilot carrying out a night interception during WWII be required to seek authorisation to engage an enemy aircraft?
Also a case I'm interested in may or may not have involved granting "safe passage". In practice, would this have been possible? If so how could it be done involving as few people as possible?
Also a case I'm interested in may or may not have involved granting "safe passage". In practice, would this have been possible? If so how could it be done involving as few people as possible?
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There were always many interested bods involved in the initial contact and subsequent tracking.
It was only at filter room where a contact could first be disregarded and quietly ignored. From there up the chain a contact could be disregarded by any of the controllers.
RDF or Radar (depends on pre 1943 or post 1943) almost always picked up the trace and started the plot. 1940 or so had a low altitude restriction but this was soon plugged with CHL.
The plot was 'told' to the filter room who compared to known movements from the Movement Liaison Section (MLS) and defined as one of three conditions. The plot would be started for all three conditions but only 'told' up the chain of command if considered hostile or unknown.
Details of the plot track regardless of condition would be passed to Observer Corps and to Coastguard stations in the area as early warning of track.
From this point any OC post would report sight or sound and filter room would be checked against known track/plot to continually update the track.
Again any designated friendly plot would not be told up command.
For any plot that was designated hostile or unknown an intercept could be ordered if thought necessary.
Later in the war GCI would be used to control the approach but in all cases the AI pilot would need to have visual and convince himself of the target as hostile before attack.
In a sense the tasking of an AI intercept would be sanction for attack but final decision was crew/pilot alone.
So many eyes and ears would be aware of the plot but usually only 'higher ups' could sanction the plot as friendly.
There were a few exceptions like the Ju88 that defected to Dyce. It was plotted doing orbits off the coast and the RCAF pilots sent out to intercept decided not to engage and to escort it in.
Regards
Ross
It was only at filter room where a contact could first be disregarded and quietly ignored. From there up the chain a contact could be disregarded by any of the controllers.
RDF or Radar (depends on pre 1943 or post 1943) almost always picked up the trace and started the plot. 1940 or so had a low altitude restriction but this was soon plugged with CHL.
The plot was 'told' to the filter room who compared to known movements from the Movement Liaison Section (MLS) and defined as one of three conditions. The plot would be started for all three conditions but only 'told' up the chain of command if considered hostile or unknown.
Details of the plot track regardless of condition would be passed to Observer Corps and to Coastguard stations in the area as early warning of track.
From this point any OC post would report sight or sound and filter room would be checked against known track/plot to continually update the track.
Again any designated friendly plot would not be told up command.
For any plot that was designated hostile or unknown an intercept could be ordered if thought necessary.
Later in the war GCI would be used to control the approach but in all cases the AI pilot would need to have visual and convince himself of the target as hostile before attack.
In a sense the tasking of an AI intercept would be sanction for attack but final decision was crew/pilot alone.
So many eyes and ears would be aware of the plot but usually only 'higher ups' could sanction the plot as friendly.
There were a few exceptions like the Ju88 that defected to Dyce. It was plotted doing orbits off the coast and the RCAF pilots sent out to intercept decided not to engage and to escort it in.
Regards
Ross
Last edited by XH175; 30th Oct 2013 at 17:30.
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Thanks for a very helpful post, XH. What rank/level would filter room have equated to? Would observer corps observations be passed to the same filter room?
The dyce night fighter isn't the one I was examining but that's a fascinating case. I had read it was "prearranged" Does the fact it was orbiting show that's not the case?
The dyce night fighter isn't the one I was examining but that's a fascinating case. I had read it was "prearranged" Does the fact it was orbiting show that's not the case?
Paxing All Over The World
ShotOne It also differred with where the AI machine was. Your question is about home defence?
Later in the war, Beaufighters and Mosquitos performed 'Night Intruder Operations' to support the bomber stream. For them, once their AI showed a track - it was for the crew alone to pursue, identify, engage as they decided.
If you want more information, I can direct you to my father's book on the subject. With his pilot, they carried out 104 operations, mostly over occupied territory and mostly with Sq. 141. Send a P.M. if you wish as I cannot publicise details in the forum.
Later in the war, Beaufighters and Mosquitos performed 'Night Intruder Operations' to support the bomber stream. For them, once their AI showed a track - it was for the crew alone to pursue, identify, engage as they decided.
If you want more information, I can direct you to my father's book on the subject. With his pilot, they carried out 104 operations, mostly over occupied territory and mostly with Sq. 141. Send a P.M. if you wish as I cannot publicise details in the forum.
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Raid Reporting and Control Aspects for the UK was an evolving beast during the period 1939-45.
In essence it was three main phases :-
Day Ops 1939-40
Here the coast RDF was the main electrical detection means looking out from the coast with Observer Corps reporting tracks inland by sight and ear.
Jim Crow flights were used to shadow enemy formations and report track/ formation splits/confirmation of strengths of fighter and bomber component. So this could be considered escorting but more often than not it became a fighter dogfight.
Pip squeak used as d/f to aid position plotting and bring fighters into visual range of targets.
Night Ops 1940-42
Coast RDF main detection aid but with increased use and training of aural tracking by Observer Corps. Limited use of Gun Laying Radar (GLR) as trial.
Pip squeak not updated quickly enough to enable night visual range but experiments of priority use gave some success. Of note was that one Observer Post on coast of Scotland used their telephone and normal reporting system to control a fighter and bring it into visual range of target at night.
On the other side of the coin a post in Devon tracked and reported the movements of a farmer using a machine to plough a field several miles from the post in poor visibility.
Night Ops 1943 -45
Increased use of GCI sets to augment Observer Corps reporting.
In one case of exceptional weather an Observer Post in the north of England visually reported the inbound track of a supersonic V2. Later analysis proved the report correct.
In between there were numerous tweaks of operational use to address changing tactics.
The rank of the bods was interchangeable it was the post that gave the authority.
At the RAF Filter Rooms the duty bod in charge was the Filter Room Controller but in addition there were duty MLS staff, Identification Officer, ROC Liaison Officers etc all between F/O to S/L rank. Add to these the Plotters and Tellers etc.
OC posts reported in small location base clumps to Inland OC Centres and these reported to the Filter Rooms.
Chain Home Extra Low reported to Chain Home Low RDF stations which liased with CH RDF stations and both reported to Filter Room.
Filter room reported to Group Ops and in later years to the GCI stations.
Group Ops controlled the AA ops rooms.
Most of the setup was based on a location and roughly corresponded to the local fighter group boundaries.
There was quite a bit of combined directional telling between adjacent Group Ops Rooms and Observer Corps Centres from the associated Filter Room to enable track production of plots that may enter their control areas as the raid progressed.
As to the Ju88. It was planned by two of the crew who held a pistol on the third crewman. They faked a radio message of engine problems and dropped a dinghy to suggest a ditching.
The suggestion that they were expected depends on how much/how little research you put in and what theory you are predisposed to believe.
Regards
Ross
In essence it was three main phases :-
Day Ops 1939-40
Here the coast RDF was the main electrical detection means looking out from the coast with Observer Corps reporting tracks inland by sight and ear.
Jim Crow flights were used to shadow enemy formations and report track/ formation splits/confirmation of strengths of fighter and bomber component. So this could be considered escorting but more often than not it became a fighter dogfight.
Pip squeak used as d/f to aid position plotting and bring fighters into visual range of targets.
Night Ops 1940-42
Coast RDF main detection aid but with increased use and training of aural tracking by Observer Corps. Limited use of Gun Laying Radar (GLR) as trial.
Pip squeak not updated quickly enough to enable night visual range but experiments of priority use gave some success. Of note was that one Observer Post on coast of Scotland used their telephone and normal reporting system to control a fighter and bring it into visual range of target at night.
On the other side of the coin a post in Devon tracked and reported the movements of a farmer using a machine to plough a field several miles from the post in poor visibility.
Night Ops 1943 -45
Increased use of GCI sets to augment Observer Corps reporting.
In one case of exceptional weather an Observer Post in the north of England visually reported the inbound track of a supersonic V2. Later analysis proved the report correct.
In between there were numerous tweaks of operational use to address changing tactics.
The rank of the bods was interchangeable it was the post that gave the authority.
At the RAF Filter Rooms the duty bod in charge was the Filter Room Controller but in addition there were duty MLS staff, Identification Officer, ROC Liaison Officers etc all between F/O to S/L rank. Add to these the Plotters and Tellers etc.
OC posts reported in small location base clumps to Inland OC Centres and these reported to the Filter Rooms.
Chain Home Extra Low reported to Chain Home Low RDF stations which liased with CH RDF stations and both reported to Filter Room.
Filter room reported to Group Ops and in later years to the GCI stations.
Group Ops controlled the AA ops rooms.
Most of the setup was based on a location and roughly corresponded to the local fighter group boundaries.
There was quite a bit of combined directional telling between adjacent Group Ops Rooms and Observer Corps Centres from the associated Filter Room to enable track production of plots that may enter their control areas as the raid progressed.
As to the Ju88. It was planned by two of the crew who held a pistol on the third crewman. They faked a radio message of engine problems and dropped a dinghy to suggest a ditching.
The suggestion that they were expected depends on how much/how little research you put in and what theory you are predisposed to believe.
Regards
Ross
Last edited by XH175; 30th Oct 2013 at 19:30.
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That's what was so special about the visual report.
An Observer Post in the Pennines saw and reported bearing of the trail of a rocket in sub orbital trajectory in the last moments of it's descent to a London target.
Not bad for a Mk 1 eyeball with 1944 visual aids.
Regards
Ross
An Observer Post in the Pennines saw and reported bearing of the trail of a rocket in sub orbital trajectory in the last moments of it's descent to a London target.
Not bad for a Mk 1 eyeball with 1944 visual aids.
Regards
Ross
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Thanks again for acomprehensive post, XH. Just to make sure I have the picture, in summary, for such an arrangement to be successful, only the filter officer need be informed but a good many others above and below would be aware what was happening, but not necessarily that it was an enemy type. We're talking night time, '41?
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You are not giving me much to go on.
If an hostile aircraft was to be sanctioned for overflight then it would need one of two senarios.
1. It needed to have been issued with a MLS aircraft movement descriptor by Fighter Command Movement Liaison Section at least 12 hrs before the flight giving a timescale, take off point and landing point which corresponded to the flight track that would be used.
This meant that although detected and plotted the Filter Controllers would not know it was enemy and so not be designated as hostile.
However any deviation from typical and expected track/flying methods would cause anyone from the Filter Room Controllers to Group Ops to instigate an interception.
2. Filter Room Controllers and all controllers in the loop above to be ordered to class hostile as friendly.
An event such as this would be so strange as to cause talk and concern as to every one who could see the plot and the lack of interception attempt.
All the above would need to be mirrored in every Filter Room/Group Ops area that the overflight flew through.
Ross
If an hostile aircraft was to be sanctioned for overflight then it would need one of two senarios.
1. It needed to have been issued with a MLS aircraft movement descriptor by Fighter Command Movement Liaison Section at least 12 hrs before the flight giving a timescale, take off point and landing point which corresponded to the flight track that would be used.
This meant that although detected and plotted the Filter Controllers would not know it was enemy and so not be designated as hostile.
However any deviation from typical and expected track/flying methods would cause anyone from the Filter Room Controllers to Group Ops to instigate an interception.
2. Filter Room Controllers and all controllers in the loop above to be ordered to class hostile as friendly.
An event such as this would be so strange as to cause talk and concern as to every one who could see the plot and the lack of interception attempt.
All the above would need to be mirrored in every Filter Room/Group Ops area that the overflight flew through.
Ross
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The reason for that, xm, is I'm interested in the aviation aspect of Hess's journey to Scotland in 1941 and I didn't want the thread to be overtaken by the wider conspiracy theories surrounding the event.
One of these is that a safe passage was pre-arranged. From what you say, this seems unlikely as so many individuals would have to have known.
One of these is that a safe passage was pre-arranged. From what you say, this seems unlikely as so many individuals would have to have known.
