RAAF 707 Crash East Sale and Nomad Problems
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RAAF 707 Crash East Sale and Nomad Problems
1/ the australian airforce crashed a 707 while apparently experimenting with engines out at low level. its claimed the black box details were hushed up.
Is there anything on the net about what actually happened or does anyone know?
2/ Exactly what was wrong with the australian nomad STOL plane, I cant find much at all on the net. there were many crashes with claims of bad design, metal fatigue causing cracks, tail flutter etc
Is there anything on the net about what actually happened or does anyone know?
2/ Exactly what was wrong with the australian nomad STOL plane, I cant find much at all on the net. there were many crashes with claims of bad design, metal fatigue causing cracks, tail flutter etc
There was nothing 'hushed up' with the RAAF 707 accident and the cause of the accident is well known within the industry. The instructor turned off the rudder boost with two engines out on the same side. This placed the aircraft into a VMCA loss of control at too low an altitude to recover. There was some talk that a warning note in the manual was not transferred from the original Qantas manual when writing the RAAF one. One of the officers involved at the enquiry ended up as my co-pilot years ago, nice guy and a very sad accident.
The Nomad had some tail flutter problems during its delvelopment, killing one of the test pilots at Avalon. There was also some engine-ice related issues that were fixed by designing a new cowl. The RAAF accident with the tail failure was a direct result of extensive ground running/testing at prolonged high power, causing a fatigue failure. I flew Nomads for a little over 12 months and there is nothing wrong with them. It has some odd flying characteristics but that is all.
If you are a 'Jurno' seeking sensationalism, there is none to both your questions.
The Nomad had some tail flutter problems during its delvelopment, killing one of the test pilots at Avalon. There was also some engine-ice related issues that were fixed by designing a new cowl. The RAAF accident with the tail failure was a direct result of extensive ground running/testing at prolonged high power, causing a fatigue failure. I flew Nomads for a little over 12 months and there is nothing wrong with them. It has some odd flying characteristics but that is all.
If you are a 'Jurno' seeking sensationalism, there is none to both your questions.
By George
Not the first time either, a US airline had a similar training accident in the early '60s. B707 F/E was being trained, shut off the rudder boost, not realizing the pilots had two engines at idle. In the sim, I had an engineer do the same thing--quite surprising, airplane slowly rolled over despite my best efforts. In this case shut off power to the upper rudder in the Galaxy.
Not the first time either, a US airline had a similar training accident in the early '60s. B707 F/E was being trained, shut off the rudder boost, not realizing the pilots had two engines at idle. In the sim, I had an engineer do the same thing--quite surprising, airplane slowly rolled over despite my best efforts. In this case shut off power to the upper rudder in the Galaxy.
The name of the Test Pilot killed was Stuart Pearce and the date was the 6th of August 1976. The Test Engineer survived. You should be able to down-load the report from one of the Aviation Safety sites. If you are not a journalist, sorry for being blunt.
'Galaxy' thanks, interesting and sad that people kill themselves with the basics. Remember the 'Dutch Roll' demonstrations that knocked a few off before common sense prevailed.
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thanks, Im not a journalist, just someone who as a small boy sometimes lived under a flightpath and saw stratocruisers, connies, etc going overhead at low heights, so becoming interested in planes at an early age
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A couple of extra comments re the Nomad. (I never poled the beastie but spent two periods on the program as an engineer and manager).
The Nomad had some tail flutter problems during its delvelopment, killing one of the test pilots at Avalon.
All a long time ago now but the comment is, I suggest, not quite correct.
During the N24 prototype program, a possible fix pulled out of the literature for the long stab problem was being tested (possibly without sufficient work up ?). Three crew on board with two killed (chief pilot Stu Pearce and acting Chief Designer Dave Hooper). The FTE (we can leave his name out for privacy - it is easily found via Google if you are really interested) survived with very serious injuries which left him driving a wheelchair. Lovely bloke now in retirement.
There was also some engine-ice related issues that were fixed by designing a new cowl.
Again a prototype development problem where the original icing envelope was found to be a bit unconservative. Led to one hull being put down into a paddock (Stu Pearce the commander) with significant post landing damage.
The RAAF accident with the tail failure was a direct result of extensive ground running/testing at prolonged high power, causing a fatigue failure
The aircraft (A18-401) was on loan to the factory from the ADF and was used for a number of trials including some extensive ground running work. There were fatigue concerns with the tailplane carrythrough structure and this structure was subject to recurring inspections for that reason.
The aircraft's last inspection at the factory, prior to return to the RAAF, was done by a colleague (now long departed) who was very particular in his work. Actually I didn't know him at that stage but worked often with him in a subsequent life and held him in some regard.
Subsequently, the RAAF elected to defer an inspection as I recall. Now, whether my mate at GAF missed the start of a visible crack (I think unlikely) or whether the subsequent inspection deferral would have been the appropriate vehicle to pick up the developing crack will forever remain moot points.
Either way, a young military pilot (Glen Donovan) was killed during a circuit. Another TP colleague had just left the plane after the previous landing and watched the subsequent events - more than a touch sobering.
Exactly what was wrong with the australian nomad STOL plane
One could write a book of pros and cons of the Type. In fact, the injured FTE from the Avalon crash has done just that and is looking around for publishing options ...
My views are that the aircraft was hamstrung by the environment in which it was conceived and developed.
The program was a factory fill in exercise between military manufacturing projects. The aircraft started life as a single engined machine and, subsequently stretched into a small series of twin engined variants.
Probably the best aspects of the design were
(a) the payload/gross weight measure which, as far as I know, was head and shoulders above any other Type. DJPil probably can comment in more detail.
(b) (the Westgate Bridge collapse was instrumental in delaying the commencement of the flight test program and the extra time allowed) the design development of a much more capable roll control system - the aircraft is the closest most fixed wing pilots will ever come to flying a helicopter ...
With the ever stretching nature of the design, the small output engine became limiting and, for the N24A OEI WAT climb was quite limiting as a certification consideration.
The relatively lightweight structure gave its share of maintenance problems.
The aileron structure had a problem if the pilot pushed the airspeed limits. Some of the bent ailerons which were brought back to earth satisfactorily never ceased to amaze me. A certification review at great expense led to a revamp to make the pilot problem go away.
Those operators who were prepared to throw the required maintenance at the machine, and especially those who operated on longer flights generally were of the view that the only sensible replacement for a Nomad was another Nomad. Certainly, there were some operators who kept on at the factory to crank up the production line for more hulls.
It had some interesting quirks - what Type doesn't - but, overall, was a good little workhorse in an appropriate operation.
Certainly it had its detractors. One of the most vocal was the Australian Army toward the end of its military career. However, one might suggest that that was more a case of a changed operational requirement and the perception that a "widow maker" tag might be the avenue to fast track a replacement Type more suited to the revised operational requirement.
The Nomad had some tail flutter problems during its delvelopment, killing one of the test pilots at Avalon.
All a long time ago now but the comment is, I suggest, not quite correct.
During the N24 prototype program, a possible fix pulled out of the literature for the long stab problem was being tested (possibly without sufficient work up ?). Three crew on board with two killed (chief pilot Stu Pearce and acting Chief Designer Dave Hooper). The FTE (we can leave his name out for privacy - it is easily found via Google if you are really interested) survived with very serious injuries which left him driving a wheelchair. Lovely bloke now in retirement.
There was also some engine-ice related issues that were fixed by designing a new cowl.
Again a prototype development problem where the original icing envelope was found to be a bit unconservative. Led to one hull being put down into a paddock (Stu Pearce the commander) with significant post landing damage.
The RAAF accident with the tail failure was a direct result of extensive ground running/testing at prolonged high power, causing a fatigue failure
The aircraft (A18-401) was on loan to the factory from the ADF and was used for a number of trials including some extensive ground running work. There were fatigue concerns with the tailplane carrythrough structure and this structure was subject to recurring inspections for that reason.
The aircraft's last inspection at the factory, prior to return to the RAAF, was done by a colleague (now long departed) who was very particular in his work. Actually I didn't know him at that stage but worked often with him in a subsequent life and held him in some regard.
Subsequently, the RAAF elected to defer an inspection as I recall. Now, whether my mate at GAF missed the start of a visible crack (I think unlikely) or whether the subsequent inspection deferral would have been the appropriate vehicle to pick up the developing crack will forever remain moot points.
Either way, a young military pilot (Glen Donovan) was killed during a circuit. Another TP colleague had just left the plane after the previous landing and watched the subsequent events - more than a touch sobering.
Exactly what was wrong with the australian nomad STOL plane
One could write a book of pros and cons of the Type. In fact, the injured FTE from the Avalon crash has done just that and is looking around for publishing options ...
My views are that the aircraft was hamstrung by the environment in which it was conceived and developed.
The program was a factory fill in exercise between military manufacturing projects. The aircraft started life as a single engined machine and, subsequently stretched into a small series of twin engined variants.
Probably the best aspects of the design were
(a) the payload/gross weight measure which, as far as I know, was head and shoulders above any other Type. DJPil probably can comment in more detail.
(b) (the Westgate Bridge collapse was instrumental in delaying the commencement of the flight test program and the extra time allowed) the design development of a much more capable roll control system - the aircraft is the closest most fixed wing pilots will ever come to flying a helicopter ...
With the ever stretching nature of the design, the small output engine became limiting and, for the N24A OEI WAT climb was quite limiting as a certification consideration.
The relatively lightweight structure gave its share of maintenance problems.
The aileron structure had a problem if the pilot pushed the airspeed limits. Some of the bent ailerons which were brought back to earth satisfactorily never ceased to amaze me. A certification review at great expense led to a revamp to make the pilot problem go away.
Those operators who were prepared to throw the required maintenance at the machine, and especially those who operated on longer flights generally were of the view that the only sensible replacement for a Nomad was another Nomad. Certainly, there were some operators who kept on at the factory to crank up the production line for more hulls.
It had some interesting quirks - what Type doesn't - but, overall, was a good little workhorse in an appropriate operation.
Certainly it had its detractors. One of the most vocal was the Australian Army toward the end of its military career. However, one might suggest that that was more a case of a changed operational requirement and the perception that a "widow maker" tag might be the avenue to fast track a replacement Type more suited to the revised operational requirement.
As I recall, one of the initial design ideas was to have the entire empennage hinged on the side, so that the tail could be unlocked, and swung open as a full access rear door for freight loading. This idea was never developed, but drove the cruciform tail design (as the elevator had to be raised to clear the wing if the tail was opened) and the control cables were routed down the side of the aircraft, rather than the floor.
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thanks for that,
it was said that the nomad had a very high drag wing for cruising, due to its STOL ability, so more fuel had to be used when cruising was the nomads STOL ability ever actually needed?
it was said that the nomad had a very high drag wing for cruising, due to its STOL ability, so more fuel had to be used when cruising was the nomads STOL ability ever actually needed?
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one of the initial design ideas was to have the entire empennage hinged on the side
Had forgotten all about that - can vaguely recall seeing some drawing proposals in the early days.
it was said that the nomad had a very high drag wing for cruising
a supersonic fighter the Nomad wasn't ..
was the nomads STOL ability ever actually needed?
STOL has no relevance to civil certification or operation. The civil Type brought the original military STOL capability along, although it couldn't be used in civil certification practice.
The original military variant was just about as close to a helicopter as one might reasonably get and that was the original design brief .. a cheap fixed wing aircraft with something akin to a battlefield helicopter's basic observation capabilities. Obviously it was overtaken by the development of sophisticated battlefield rotary capability.
I can recall being flung into the back as ballast during some of the early takeoff and landing trials .. it got up and down just fine.
Had forgotten all about that - can vaguely recall seeing some drawing proposals in the early days.
it was said that the nomad had a very high drag wing for cruising
a supersonic fighter the Nomad wasn't ..
was the nomads STOL ability ever actually needed?
STOL has no relevance to civil certification or operation. The civil Type brought the original military STOL capability along, although it couldn't be used in civil certification practice.
The original military variant was just about as close to a helicopter as one might reasonably get and that was the original design brief .. a cheap fixed wing aircraft with something akin to a battlefield helicopter's basic observation capabilities. Obviously it was overtaken by the development of sophisticated battlefield rotary capability.
I can recall being flung into the back as ballast during some of the early takeoff and landing trials .. it got up and down just fine.
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i was involved with the 707 that went in off East Sale
Nothing was hushed up but you may be refering to the fact that the voice transcript was fairly disturbing with an argument and some name calling and accusations of "youve killed us" at the end of it.
Nothing was hushed up but you may be refering to the fact that the voice transcript was fairly disturbing with an argument and some name calling and accusations of "youve killed us" at the end of it.
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Thanks anzacjack
I am a family member of the third pilot.
It has troubled me over the years that those last moments were as you described.
...but now I know how it was for him and it should not have been so.
I never got over what happened that day..it changed everything.
To this day I can barely say his name...............
I am a family member of the third pilot.
It has troubled me over the years that those last moments were as you described.
...but now I know how it was for him and it should not have been so.
I never got over what happened that day..it changed everything.
To this day I can barely say his name...............
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Dialogue on the Nomad is getting a bit ancient, but I could clarify on a couple of things.
As an ARDU test pilot, I did the first military test flying of the Nomad N2 in 1971. A Preview Assessment was undertaken, which is a complete evaluation of the aircraft in its intended role. On my team were ex-SqnLdr Chris Furse and LtCol Paul Lipscombe ARA. The idea of a Preview is to identify problems at the prototype stage so that rectifications can be incorporated in production aircraft.
Going back a year or so, the original Nomad cockpit design was basically that of a helicopter. Then it became a single-engine transport. Then a swing-tail twin. Then the final fixed tail version. Unusually the aircraft had an all-flying tailplane which - although quite common with power controls - I had not seen with manual controls. This I am sure contributed to many of its longitudinal control problems.
The cockpit design was a shambles and any relation to ergonomics was coincidental. Surprisingly for a firm designing and building a new aircraft type, GAF did not employ a test pilot until Stuart Pearce was hired just in time for the flight test programme. In 1970 ARDU offered to give GAF some gratis advice on the cockpit design and I and a couple of other ARDU tp's spent a few weeks putting together a cockpit mock-up at GAF which was more or less built into the first prototype (VH-SUP).
Probably the major and continuing problem was that to get funding GAF had to produce a prototype for military evaluation. But GAF was very firmly targeting the civilian market. Thus whenever we wanted a change, GAF would consider its effect on the civilian aircraft, ie whether to include the mod at extra cost, or to have two build standards - also at extra cost. Or to try and reject the mod. As a result many of our desired mods were not incorporated.
I am now based in India and don't have my test report here. But from memory basically I thought the aircraft had a lot of potential but had a large number of problems, all of which were fixable with time and effort. Unfortunately this was not applied.
STOL performance was very important to the Army and the Nomad was quite good. I described it as like landing into a bowl of soggy pudding mix - ground roll I recall at about 400-ft. Except that the early brake pedals were designed to blow the tyres on landing - which I did, both of 'em once.
The two crashes - Mansfield and Avalon - were not really aircraft faults, but human errors.
The one at Mansfield was caused by a twin engine failure as a result of intake icing. There was nothing wrong with the de-icing system - it just was not fitted and the aircraft was not cleared for flight in forecast icing conditions. Nevertheless the aircraft was being flown in icing conditions and guess what? Even then, the aircraft could have force-landed with just minor damage in a large open field straight ahead at cloud break. Instead, Stuart tried to land on a narrow road bordered by tress and overshot his touchdown and had to try and negotiate a dogleg through a railway level crossing. Score - level crossing 1, Nomad 0. Very luckily no one was injured although some patrons at a pub were somewhat surprised as he went past the front door. You could talk to Peter Reddel (ex-Cathay) who was RHS and had a full head of hair prior.
The N24 tailplane tests were pretty cavalier. Try one thing and if it doesn't work try another. I am not sure who was more to blame, the design or flight test depts. The fatal flight took off on the short cross runway at Avalon and encountered unmistakable flutter at about 800-ft. Some may not understand the significance of flutter. It is not just a vibration in a part of the airframe. Flutter is a structural instability that within seconds will likely cause a major airframe failure - e.g. loss of wing, empennage, fuselage break-up. Answer was to reduce speed and put the aircraft on the ground ASAP - any ground. Pat Larcey - the FTE and only survivor - immediately grabbed a parachute and was halfway to the door when Stuart said it was OK he'd got it. Pat had just enough height to jump out, but returned to his seat and strapped in. Stuart, instead of landing straight ahead in an open field, tried to complete a circuit back to the takeoff runway but only got halfway there before complete control was lost and he crashed beside the main runway. Stuart died instantly from a ruptured aorta but David Hooper (design) was ejected through the front windscreen still strapped in his seat and died sometime later. As I recall there was something wrong with the seat. Pat's station in the cabin was at the CG and, as they hit, he suffered a severe vertical deceleration causing paraplegia.
Sure the N24 had some stability problems but they did not cause the accident. Nor did flutter problems - which were introduced by the players. Once flutter occurred, the severity of the situation was exacerbated by poor handling by the pilot.
So, the main causal factor in both these accidents was human error rather than aircraft design deficiency.
In summary. my experience with the Nomad was that it was a potentially good aircraft, both for the military and civilian market, but development of which was screwed by a dysfunctional management system.
As an ARDU test pilot, I did the first military test flying of the Nomad N2 in 1971. A Preview Assessment was undertaken, which is a complete evaluation of the aircraft in its intended role. On my team were ex-SqnLdr Chris Furse and LtCol Paul Lipscombe ARA. The idea of a Preview is to identify problems at the prototype stage so that rectifications can be incorporated in production aircraft.
Going back a year or so, the original Nomad cockpit design was basically that of a helicopter. Then it became a single-engine transport. Then a swing-tail twin. Then the final fixed tail version. Unusually the aircraft had an all-flying tailplane which - although quite common with power controls - I had not seen with manual controls. This I am sure contributed to many of its longitudinal control problems.
The cockpit design was a shambles and any relation to ergonomics was coincidental. Surprisingly for a firm designing and building a new aircraft type, GAF did not employ a test pilot until Stuart Pearce was hired just in time for the flight test programme. In 1970 ARDU offered to give GAF some gratis advice on the cockpit design and I and a couple of other ARDU tp's spent a few weeks putting together a cockpit mock-up at GAF which was more or less built into the first prototype (VH-SUP).
Probably the major and continuing problem was that to get funding GAF had to produce a prototype for military evaluation. But GAF was very firmly targeting the civilian market. Thus whenever we wanted a change, GAF would consider its effect on the civilian aircraft, ie whether to include the mod at extra cost, or to have two build standards - also at extra cost. Or to try and reject the mod. As a result many of our desired mods were not incorporated.
I am now based in India and don't have my test report here. But from memory basically I thought the aircraft had a lot of potential but had a large number of problems, all of which were fixable with time and effort. Unfortunately this was not applied.
STOL performance was very important to the Army and the Nomad was quite good. I described it as like landing into a bowl of soggy pudding mix - ground roll I recall at about 400-ft. Except that the early brake pedals were designed to blow the tyres on landing - which I did, both of 'em once.
The two crashes - Mansfield and Avalon - were not really aircraft faults, but human errors.
The one at Mansfield was caused by a twin engine failure as a result of intake icing. There was nothing wrong with the de-icing system - it just was not fitted and the aircraft was not cleared for flight in forecast icing conditions. Nevertheless the aircraft was being flown in icing conditions and guess what? Even then, the aircraft could have force-landed with just minor damage in a large open field straight ahead at cloud break. Instead, Stuart tried to land on a narrow road bordered by tress and overshot his touchdown and had to try and negotiate a dogleg through a railway level crossing. Score - level crossing 1, Nomad 0. Very luckily no one was injured although some patrons at a pub were somewhat surprised as he went past the front door. You could talk to Peter Reddel (ex-Cathay) who was RHS and had a full head of hair prior.
The N24 tailplane tests were pretty cavalier. Try one thing and if it doesn't work try another. I am not sure who was more to blame, the design or flight test depts. The fatal flight took off on the short cross runway at Avalon and encountered unmistakable flutter at about 800-ft. Some may not understand the significance of flutter. It is not just a vibration in a part of the airframe. Flutter is a structural instability that within seconds will likely cause a major airframe failure - e.g. loss of wing, empennage, fuselage break-up. Answer was to reduce speed and put the aircraft on the ground ASAP - any ground. Pat Larcey - the FTE and only survivor - immediately grabbed a parachute and was halfway to the door when Stuart said it was OK he'd got it. Pat had just enough height to jump out, but returned to his seat and strapped in. Stuart, instead of landing straight ahead in an open field, tried to complete a circuit back to the takeoff runway but only got halfway there before complete control was lost and he crashed beside the main runway. Stuart died instantly from a ruptured aorta but David Hooper (design) was ejected through the front windscreen still strapped in his seat and died sometime later. As I recall there was something wrong with the seat. Pat's station in the cabin was at the CG and, as they hit, he suffered a severe vertical deceleration causing paraplegia.
Sure the N24 had some stability problems but they did not cause the accident. Nor did flutter problems - which were introduced by the players. Once flutter occurred, the severity of the situation was exacerbated by poor handling by the pilot.
So, the main causal factor in both these accidents was human error rather than aircraft design deficiency.
In summary. my experience with the Nomad was that it was a potentially good aircraft, both for the military and civilian market, but development of which was screwed by a dysfunctional management system.
Moderator
Don't recall that I knew Barry - although I see he is into boats so, obviously, he has to be a fine chap.
His tale is pretty much on the mark but, if I may, a few comments (noting that my own memory is being stretched). djpil may come in with more information as he spent a far longer period at the factory than I.
As an ARDU test pilot
I wasn't placed appropriately to have other than second hand information through the GAF FT and design folk. However, that there was a degree of antipathy between ARDU and the factory is not disputed by anyone who was involved in the project.
On my team were ex-SqnLdr Chris Furse
who is an occasional PPRuNer, as an aside ... top chap and also into boats.
The cockpit design was a shambles
Certainly there exists a number of views on the subject
Probably the major and continuing problem was that to get funding GAF had to produce a prototype for military evaluation.
The more significant problems were
(a) the project was a fill in between military projects
(b) funding was only ever provided in dribs and drabs with the inevitable consequences of that sort of approach
But GAF was very firmly targeting the civilian market.
A observation I hadn't heard before. I speculate that the original thrust was to the military requirement and the civilian development a subsequent consideration with delays to other programs ?
STOL performance ... like landing into a bowl of soggy pudding mix
My first exposure to the aircraft proper was with Stu and Pat (with me as ballast) during a sequence of takeoff and landing performance trials. I would have likenened the experience down the back as being closer to terrifying .. whatever one might have thought of Stuart, he could make the aircraft do its tricks. Indeed, some had the view that his skill evolved into an unfortunate level of overconfidence.
There was nothing wrong with the de-icing system
This doesn't sit entirely well with my recollection. I was working in the design section at that stage and well recall the aircraft's sorry return. My recollection is that the AFM icing envelope proved to be a bit optimistic and was revised as a result of the investigation.
Instead, Stuart tried to land .... You could talk to Peter Reddel ... had a full head of hair prior.
Red's recounting of the tale was similar, but, in his usual dry manner, guaranteed to bring a smile to the face. He, like me, was well on the way to baldness around the time - The first time I met him, he had taken me for a ride in the Macchi at ARDU some months earlier, as I recall.
The N24 tailplane tests were pretty cavalier. Try one thing and if it doesn't work try another.
The comment is a little unkind, I think. The long stab problem was the source of some bedevilment to the factory. One idea, which didn't have all that much research data available, as I recall, was to include a small mod to the TE of the tailplane. It was this mod which, very likely caused, and certainly received the bulk of blame for, the Avalon mishap.
As I recall there was something wrong with the seat.
In a later life I had a lot to do with aircraft seating, including that in the Nomad. The comment is correct in one respect but I don't propose to go into that here. That particular deficiency I detected during a much later unrelated structural test program and it was corrected as a consequence in conjunction with the factory. Mind you, the factory insisted on its rectification which was not the simple solution I had proposed .. the way of life, I guess.
Pat's station in the cabin
I understand that Pat's seat caused much of his injury but that was more a consequence of the loads being very much in excess of the then seat design standards rather than any intrinsic deficiency in the seat. Subsequently I became intimately familiar with that family of seats as a designer and they were a good little unit for their time.
development of which was screwed by a dysfunctional management system.
I think it fair that both the factory and military systems take some proportion of the blame for the Type's problems, both real and publicity related.
Overall, I concur that the Type had some very good points but was let down, in particular, by its underlying corporate support structure.
Now, let's see if Mahindra can take it to a new level ?
His tale is pretty much on the mark but, if I may, a few comments (noting that my own memory is being stretched). djpil may come in with more information as he spent a far longer period at the factory than I.
As an ARDU test pilot
I wasn't placed appropriately to have other than second hand information through the GAF FT and design folk. However, that there was a degree of antipathy between ARDU and the factory is not disputed by anyone who was involved in the project.
On my team were ex-SqnLdr Chris Furse
who is an occasional PPRuNer, as an aside ... top chap and also into boats.
The cockpit design was a shambles
Certainly there exists a number of views on the subject
Probably the major and continuing problem was that to get funding GAF had to produce a prototype for military evaluation.
The more significant problems were
(a) the project was a fill in between military projects
(b) funding was only ever provided in dribs and drabs with the inevitable consequences of that sort of approach
But GAF was very firmly targeting the civilian market.
A observation I hadn't heard before. I speculate that the original thrust was to the military requirement and the civilian development a subsequent consideration with delays to other programs ?
STOL performance ... like landing into a bowl of soggy pudding mix
My first exposure to the aircraft proper was with Stu and Pat (with me as ballast) during a sequence of takeoff and landing performance trials. I would have likenened the experience down the back as being closer to terrifying .. whatever one might have thought of Stuart, he could make the aircraft do its tricks. Indeed, some had the view that his skill evolved into an unfortunate level of overconfidence.
There was nothing wrong with the de-icing system
This doesn't sit entirely well with my recollection. I was working in the design section at that stage and well recall the aircraft's sorry return. My recollection is that the AFM icing envelope proved to be a bit optimistic and was revised as a result of the investigation.
Instead, Stuart tried to land .... You could talk to Peter Reddel ... had a full head of hair prior.
Red's recounting of the tale was similar, but, in his usual dry manner, guaranteed to bring a smile to the face. He, like me, was well on the way to baldness around the time - The first time I met him, he had taken me for a ride in the Macchi at ARDU some months earlier, as I recall.
The N24 tailplane tests were pretty cavalier. Try one thing and if it doesn't work try another.
The comment is a little unkind, I think. The long stab problem was the source of some bedevilment to the factory. One idea, which didn't have all that much research data available, as I recall, was to include a small mod to the TE of the tailplane. It was this mod which, very likely caused, and certainly received the bulk of blame for, the Avalon mishap.
As I recall there was something wrong with the seat.
In a later life I had a lot to do with aircraft seating, including that in the Nomad. The comment is correct in one respect but I don't propose to go into that here. That particular deficiency I detected during a much later unrelated structural test program and it was corrected as a consequence in conjunction with the factory. Mind you, the factory insisted on its rectification which was not the simple solution I had proposed .. the way of life, I guess.
Pat's station in the cabin
I understand that Pat's seat caused much of his injury but that was more a consequence of the loads being very much in excess of the then seat design standards rather than any intrinsic deficiency in the seat. Subsequently I became intimately familiar with that family of seats as a designer and they were a good little unit for their time.
development of which was screwed by a dysfunctional management system.
I think it fair that both the factory and military systems take some proportion of the blame for the Type's problems, both real and publicity related.
Overall, I concur that the Type had some very good points but was let down, in particular, by its underlying corporate support structure.
Now, let's see if Mahindra can take it to a new level ?
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g.f.:
TWA training flight at Atlantic City, NJ.
Not the first time either, a US airline had a similar training accident in the early '60s. B707 F/E was being trained, shut off the rudder boost, not realizing the pilots had two engines at idle. In the sim, I had an engineer do the same thing--quite surprising, airplane slowly rolled over despite my best efforts. In this case shut off power to the upper rudder in the Galaxy.
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Rudder Boost
The Rudder is the only hydraulically assisted primary flight control surface on the B707 and my recollection is that without that assistance available rudder displacement from neutral was approximately halved. The exercise which led to the loss of the RAAF aircraft was not, as I remember, an approved one and was not covered in the Flight Manual.
When the RAAF first took the type into service in 1979 three complete cockpit crews were trained by Qantas using Qantas procedures and Qantas standards. These procedures and standards were used by the initial crews and early pilots and F/E's converted by those initial crews were trained to the same Qantas procedures and standards.
Unfortunately, the system in the RAAF which existed in relation to pilots saw personnel changes on a regular basis and so the experience levels on type as far as pilots were concerned was constantly diluted and the nominated OIC of Training Flight was in the onerous position of having to "get full bottle" in a relatively short time and take responsibility for crew training and maintenance of standards.
The loss of the aircraft and crew was a tragic event but one which was totally avoidable in my view.
When the RAAF first took the type into service in 1979 three complete cockpit crews were trained by Qantas using Qantas procedures and Qantas standards. These procedures and standards were used by the initial crews and early pilots and F/E's converted by those initial crews were trained to the same Qantas procedures and standards.
Unfortunately, the system in the RAAF which existed in relation to pilots saw personnel changes on a regular basis and so the experience levels on type as far as pilots were concerned was constantly diluted and the nominated OIC of Training Flight was in the onerous position of having to "get full bottle" in a relatively short time and take responsibility for crew training and maintenance of standards.
The loss of the aircraft and crew was a tragic event but one which was totally avoidable in my view.
Stuart Pearce.....the British test pilot killed in the Nomad crash at Avalon:
Also the father of famous and wonderful actor called Guy Pearce.
Also the father of famous and wonderful actor called Guy Pearce.
Last edited by ramble on; 26th Jun 2014 at 12:21.
As an aside, at some point in the 1970's Gulf Air evaluated the Nomad on paper, vs Skyvan and Twin Otter, and decided that if all its promises were fulfilled it would be a very useful aircraft and in some respects the best available.
But we also decided very early on that a launch customer (or near to being a launch customer) would need highly efficient, unstinted technical and operating support in the first year or two of operation, and that the manufacturers seemed not to understand what they would have to do to provide it.
So it was kicked into touch.
But we also decided very early on that a launch customer (or near to being a launch customer) would need highly efficient, unstinted technical and operating support in the first year or two of operation, and that the manufacturers seemed not to understand what they would have to do to provide it.
So it was kicked into touch.
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@john_tullamarine
You stated that STOL had no requirement in Civil Certification.
I am not a current pilot but some of the old New Guinea strips tested the limits.
Or did I misunderstand.
You stated that STOL had no requirement in Civil Certification.
I am not a current pilot but some of the old New Guinea strips tested the limits.
Or did I misunderstand.
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some of the old New Guinea strips tested the limits.
Civil certification didn't address STOL .. which was a specific MIL application.
In the olden days when Australia oversaw PNG's aviation, there were particular ANOs which addressed the reality of developmental aviation for PNG and these contained numerous deviations from mainstream rules.
I can't remember the details at this distance in years but I suggest that the bulk of deviations were addressed via operational concessions, either across the board or by operator.
Certainly the Nomad could get on and off the ground in a stylish fashion and Stu played it like a puppeteer - my first exposure (as ballast) was on some performance T/O and landing trials with Stu and Pat and, in the absence of any briefing to the subject, I had my young eyes opened as to its capability.
Civil certification didn't address STOL .. which was a specific MIL application.
In the olden days when Australia oversaw PNG's aviation, there were particular ANOs which addressed the reality of developmental aviation for PNG and these contained numerous deviations from mainstream rules.
I can't remember the details at this distance in years but I suggest that the bulk of deviations were addressed via operational concessions, either across the board or by operator.
Certainly the Nomad could get on and off the ground in a stylish fashion and Stu played it like a puppeteer - my first exposure (as ballast) was on some performance T/O and landing trials with Stu and Pat and, in the absence of any briefing to the subject, I had my young eyes opened as to its capability.