Shotdown of a Libyan 727 over Sinai in 73
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Shotdown of a Libyan 727 over Sinai in 73
Hi,
just read a ICAO report about the shotdown of a Libyan Arab AL 727 in February 1973 over Sinai by israelean interceptors.
Reading this stuff, there are a few questions:
How could this grave navigation error happen to the french/libyan crew? According to the report, they were displaced from there course by a strong tailwind and they had no ground in sight, when they cross the Gulf of Suez. But the crew didnīt notice that they are more than 100 miles off course.
I know, it was in the pre GPS era and they have no INS navigation onboard, but more then 100 miles....is that possible? They tried to tune in every navigational aid, they can think of, but untill the last minute, they had no idea, that they were over the Sinai.
Is it possible, that professinal, experienced pilots (for instance, the french captian had 11.000 flighthours) confuse an egyptian Mig 21 with an IDF F4 Phantom? Esp., when the F/Aīs (lend from the lebanese carrier MEA) and most of the passengers back
in the cabin clearly reconized the IDF F4.
Why the IDF interceptors shot the LAA 727 down close to the border, when it start to climb and heading west, away from Israel main land and the military installations?
Did the flight crew of the IDF interceptors identified and report the 727 to the ATC as a civilian aircraft?
The Israelean Goverment admitted this shotdown as an "error", but was ever somebody in Israel (military or resp. politician) punished for this (indeed grave) mistake?
With regards,
Studenfliege
just read a ICAO report about the shotdown of a Libyan Arab AL 727 in February 1973 over Sinai by israelean interceptors.
Reading this stuff, there are a few questions:
How could this grave navigation error happen to the french/libyan crew? According to the report, they were displaced from there course by a strong tailwind and they had no ground in sight, when they cross the Gulf of Suez. But the crew didnīt notice that they are more than 100 miles off course.
I know, it was in the pre GPS era and they have no INS navigation onboard, but more then 100 miles....is that possible? They tried to tune in every navigational aid, they can think of, but untill the last minute, they had no idea, that they were over the Sinai.
Is it possible, that professinal, experienced pilots (for instance, the french captian had 11.000 flighthours) confuse an egyptian Mig 21 with an IDF F4 Phantom? Esp., when the F/Aīs (lend from the lebanese carrier MEA) and most of the passengers back
in the cabin clearly reconized the IDF F4.
Why the IDF interceptors shot the LAA 727 down close to the border, when it start to climb and heading west, away from Israel main land and the military installations?
Did the flight crew of the IDF interceptors identified and report the 727 to the ATC as a civilian aircraft?
The Israelean Goverment admitted this shotdown as an "error", but was ever somebody in Israel (military or resp. politician) punished for this (indeed grave) mistake?
With regards,
Studenfliege
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Join Date: Aug 2005
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Hi,
when the captain and the f/e (the f/o where at the controls) first time noticed, that they were not at the position they should be, they be at the begin of the descend at 29.000 ft.
While the f/o handle the controlls in the descend, the rest of the cockpitcrew start to tune in every radio navigation aid, they knew. Then they asked the ATC at Cairo for asistance, but no success.
When the israeli interceptors finaly open fire in 6.000 ft. , the LAA crew still thinks, they were near the airport in Cairo.
Strange.
A israeli newspaper wrote after the crash, that the french captain and the f/e had alcohol in their blood, but there was nothing official from the israeli side, nor in the ICAO report.
when the captain and the f/e (the f/o where at the controls) first time noticed, that they were not at the position they should be, they be at the begin of the descend at 29.000 ft.
While the f/o handle the controlls in the descend, the rest of the cockpitcrew start to tune in every radio navigation aid, they knew. Then they asked the ATC at Cairo for asistance, but no success.
When the israeli interceptors finaly open fire in 6.000 ft. , the LAA crew still thinks, they were near the airport in Cairo.
Strange.
A israeli newspaper wrote after the crash, that the french captain and the f/e had alcohol in their blood, but there was nothing official from the israeli side, nor in the ICAO report.
