LATAM upset SYD-AKL Mon 11 Mar
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A few articles are attributing the injuries to a “technical issue causing a strong movement” rather than turbulence. Will be interesting to see as some facts are released.
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Jokat said there was no turbulence after the incident and once the plane landed the pilot came to the back of the plane in “shock”. “I asked ‘what happened?’ and he said ‘my gauges just blanked out, I lost all of my ability to fly the plane’.” |
Not sure of any truth, but rumor going around in a South American pilot group, is that the entire aircraft electrical system (including primary instruments, flight computers, lights, pax IFE, etc) went out for about 45 seconds and when systems came back online, there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab.
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Faulty RPDU?
The FAA had a AD out around a decade ago from memory around generator failures. Be interested to see if the RAT was deployed Might be another one for the FAA to look at. They might need to hire some more staff soon due to workload. |
Just another crap Boeing product. Very similar to a MAS 777 off the West Australian coast in 2005. That one was due to faulty software in the FT-ADIRU.
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Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 11613095)
Just another crap Boeing product.
777X is the next problem child on the horizon. I don’t even need to check the crystal ball to tell me that is going to become a problem also. |
…there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab. |
Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 11613095)
Just another crap Boeing product. Very similar to a MAS 777 off the West Australian coast in 2005. That one was due to faulty software in the FT-ADIRU.
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Or they didn’t recognise, confirm and breathe.
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Just another crap Boeing product The cause of the LATAM incident remains unknown at this stage. |
Originally Posted by TWT
(Post 11613144)
QF72 was an A330. Fortunately, events like that are rare.
The cause of the LATAM incident remains unknown at this stage. |
I'm very much aware of that DirectAnywhere ;). The comment stated that it was just another crap Boeing product.
I merely pointed out that Airbus products are not immune to problems. mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmmmm |
Originally Posted by framer
(Post 11613072)
Stuff News
All I’m saying is there’s more than meets the eye here.. not blaming hardware, not blaming crew.. let’s see what the FDR and CVR say. |
I am amazed that despite all the requests, pax still don't leave seat belts loosely fastened. Would avoid all these unnecessary injuries.
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Originally Posted by logansi
(Post 11613078)
Not sure of any truth, but rumor going around in a South American pilot group, is that the entire aircraft electrical system (including primary instruments, flight computers, lights, pax IFE, etc) went out for about 45 seconds and when systems came back online, there was a 'large, rapid, uncommanded' movement of the vertical stab.
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Am I the only one old enough to be thinking about the Captain turning around and yelling: CHECK ESSENTIAL!. ?
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Originally Posted by ZFT
(Post 11613245)
I am amazed that despite all the requests, pax still don't leave seat belts loosely fastened. Would avoid all these unnecessary injuries.
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77X is the next problem child on the horizon. |
Tbh if it wasn't CAT it is certainly an interesting one
I guess CVR will be if no use ? |
Originally Posted by magyar_flyer
(Post 11613556)
Tbh if it wasn't CAT it is certainly an interesting one
I guess CVR will be if no use ? |
I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember?
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“The universe is hostile to computers” is a video floating around the web explaining how random cosmic particles can affect computers. It gives examples of it occurring and mentions the Qantas A330 over Western Australian as a possible.
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I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember? I merely pointed out that Airbus products are not immune to problems. |
Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 11613594)
True, but the Airbus NB fleet does not have any manufacturing and quality control issues on the scale of Boeings.
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Originally Posted by framer
(Post 11613072)
Jokat said there was no turbulence after the incident and once the plane landed the pilot came to the back of the plane in “shock”.
“I asked ‘what happened?’ and he said ‘my gauges just blanked out, I lost all of my ability to fly the plane’.”https://www.stuff.co.nz/nz-news/3502...d-crew-injured Stuff News It would appear from the pilot's comments that the aircraft had suffered an electrical failure that blanked out his gauges and which also prevented him from controlling the aircraft (ie, he was unable to use the flight controls to maintain cruise flight). Questions that need answering are: 1. Why the essential/emergency electrical backup for maintaining pilot control of the primary flight controls of the aircraft did not occur? 2. What is programmed to occur to the pitch flight control surface positions (primarily elevator and THS) when electrical power is lost...when electrical power is restored...or briefly interrupted? 3. Is this an electric/flight control program design defect that is a one off, or will it occur every time such a similar electrical fault occurs? It is of concern that whilst the B787 electrical power system re-configures in flight in this manner, that the flight control surfaces don't at least freeze, rather then putting the aircraft into a zero or negative g bunt which eventuated in injury to passengers hitting the roof. The FDR will be interesting to analyse when it becomes available. |
There was an AD in 2020 requiring all operators to power cycle B787s to "flush stale data" in the Common Core System every 51 days. Not sure if it could be connected if it did suffer an indication or control failure?????
Details here ....https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/US-2020-06-14 |
The investigation of the QF A330 looked at the possible effect of the Learmonth facility and found there was no link. There was no physical change to the flight path. We were enroute PER-DPS and upon arrival in DPS the engineers ran a series of checks that confirmed we had an electrical failure that lasted less than a second. On the return journey, once again over Onslow, we had a double FMC failure. Again there was no serious adverse reaction on the aircraft other than what you would expect with a dual FMC failure. It took about 5 minutes to get one FMC back up and running. The other would not come back online. These events were also considered during the QF72 investigation. |
Originally Posted by Sunnyjohn
(Post 11613581)
I have a feeling I've read of similar situations over this part of Australia and there was a suggestion that high magnetic fields produced by the iron mines were affecting the controls. Anyone remember?
Pro pilots scan PPrune in the 24 hrs after rumours of an event, to quickly determine whether something did in fact happen. A day or so afterwards the threads descend into nonsense and the pro pilots leave. It's taken less than 24 hours this time! |
I'll bet my hat there is a lot more to this story........
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Oeb48 might like a word. |
I see there was a Virgin Atlantic 787 return with the RAT out yesterday, LHR I think.
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Originally Posted by Global Aviator
(Post 11613720)
I see there was a Virgin Atlantic 787 return with the RAT out yesterday, LHR I think.
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Originally Posted by lucille
(Post 11613223)
So, no battery powered standby AHRS?
I don't think it was quite as you suggest, but with reported loss of primary displays and reported loss of control it is instructive to note that in the anticipated situation for which FAA-2015-0936 Interim Airworthiness Directive that at a predictable point in time the 4-off Generator Control Units could simultaneously go into Fail-safe mode and deprive the aircraft of AC electrical power, it "could result in loss of control of the airplane" and could occur regardless of flight phase That related to exceeding a 248 day powered period, so the AD instructed that power was removed at least every 120 days. Regarding the 120 day maintenance action interval, note that in 2020, FAA-2020-0205 (not an Interim AD) was raised due to counter/timers associated with the Common Core System, that could affect data integrity after 51 days, and a power-down repeat interval of 25 days was specified in B787–81205–SB420045–00, Issue 2. There may well be other mechanisms that have similar symptoms, so
Originally Posted by lucille
(Post 11613223)
...let’s see what the FDR and CVR say.
In this case, they should have a lot more info from the aircraft, although if the CCS was interrupted, the Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder might have some missing ARINC 664 data. The immediate take away is that whatever did occur, the point in the flight and the actions taken recovered the situation, which 787 pilots will hopefully learn more about soon. |
Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (seized they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B787. Does this mean the airframe can’t fly until replacements fitted (duh! -no) but where do they come from? ANZ spares, Boeing stock, LATAM bits flown in?
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Originally Posted by airspace alpha
(Post 11613748)
Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (seized they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B787. Does this mean the airframe can’t fly until replacements fitted (duh! -no) but where do they come from? ANZ spares, Boeing stock, LATAM bits flown in?
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a couple of more seconds (out of control) … we would’ve been straight down to the ocean, |
Originally Posted by airspace alpha
(Post 11613748)
Purely out of interest, the TAIC have taken (siezed, they say!) the CVR and FDR of the B78
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