Mt Erebus Disaster 40th Anniversary
 

I can highly recommend the NZ Herald 'Litany of Lies' Erebus podcast, it has been excellent so far:

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/a...ectid=12284801

Best close it now Mods, the subject only raises the ire of many, bit like talking about '89.

In loving memory Air New Zealand Flight 901, 28 November 1979
 

When I read this I thought that Milton Wylie was just defending his boss, and I'm still not sure.

However when I read this
"He also reveals his concerns about the fact First Officer Graham (Brick) Lucas, who had been an Air Force navigator, on TE-901 was not on the flight deck in the final moments. Wylie believes he could have made a difference to the fatal outcome.) "I knew him personally - a very experienced guy, very forthright. I'm sure if he'd been on the flight deck, he would have had something to say at an earlier stage. Why wasn't he on the flight deck? Another eye, another ear, another brain - and somebody who was certainly not going to sit still and be quiet. He was a very forceful character." I agreed entirely.

I met Brick Lucas at the WLG Aero Club when I was learning to fly (PPL only, sorry) and I found he certainly called a spade a bloody shovel. I flew with him a number of times when he was flying the newspaper run for Murray Turley's Capital Air Services and Air Albatross and found him to be most professional and a good friend

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/a...ectid=12286526

and it will go on, and on ad infinitude!

OK, so leave it open, I'm listening to the podcast and the more info the better.

I've had my say on this topic over the years on here and am loathe to contribute more to this topic, but interestingly a quick look at the previous posts reveals that two of the most vociferous and contemptuous posters have not been active on pprune recently.

Back around 1996 or '97, I was part of a small team that Boeing sent to ANZ due to an issue they were having with their CF6-80C2 powered 767s. I was aware of the Mt. Erebus disaster, but really hadn't thought too much about it - it wasn't due to an aircraft problem, wasn't a Boeing aircraft (this was pre-merger), and it was almost literally half a world away.
But dealing with the ANZ people the subject somehow came up, it quickly became apparent that - many years later - it remained an open wound. It had affected them - in much the same way the Lauda 767 crash had affected me (something that took me many years to get over)
Pretty sobering...

You don't need to have an opinion on the cause to be able to appreciate the scale and gravity of this tragedy. The previous thread prompted me to spend some time understanding all sides of the argument and learn a great deal. Possibly a case study to surmount all case studies.

There was a Stuff/Radio NZ 6 part podcast "White Silence"the week before that had a few interesting tidbits.

Not sure we need two govt entities (RNZ and NZ On Air) both funding their own podcasts on the topic

With this Herald/NZ On Air effort there was an error or two in the first few episodes, and I didn't think much of the interview of the US Navy Navigator who claimed to talk to the crew, don't recall seeing that conversation in the CVR transcript.

Learn!
 

This one was a bit before my time as a pilot , but I remember it.
I just read a few pages on it , and there is indeed a few basic things to learn from.
Also loosing one of my best friends down there in a Twin Otter crash in the 90s makes mull over old mistakes.

Live and learn folks.
Erik and the rest of You down there: We never forget You!
Rest in Peace.

Cpt B

Those two were behind my close the thread comment, having been on the receiving end of their bile. Folks might review previous threads on the subject to see the invective.

I found a copy of Justice Mahon's book at an op shop and I think that he was able to show where the true blame lied (pun intended). As for justice, I think all those who were involved have long since departed.

This was the accident that started my journey in aviation safety. It was a tragedy for so many people, those that died on the mountain and those that were left behind.
After thirty years and having investigated numerous accidents incidents, I truly believe that this accident led to greater understanding of Human factors, Chaotic complex systems and a far more enlightened form of investigation that goes beyond the initial "cause" to find the why's behind the what happened.
having said that whatever your opinions we should and must remember that everyone on TE901 went on the flight expecting to have a great experience of seeing Antarctica. Tragically they did not return.
RIP

If any post is contrary to the rules or the thread becomes unnecessarily vexatious it will be appropriately moderated or closed, like any other PPRuNe thread.

It is 40 years since the Erebus disaster, we all have 20/20 vision in retrospect, history can't be changed. Remember those who were lost or suffered but it is time to move on.

That's what I was alluding to, well said Taily:-)

Am I one of the two contemptuous posters that Megan refers to? If so, I take that as a compliment.

A question for the handwringers out there who babble on about air safety whenever this topic gets too difficult for them: Was Captain Collins blameless? Of course not, yet that is exactly what Mahon found. That does not advance the cause of air safety at all. It has the opposite effect. For example, how is air safety advanced by allowing a pilot to fly visually into an area that the pilot knows that he will not be able to see the terrain. (I could go on, and on, and on.)

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....87c544d463.jpg
No Need; just reread previous posts

Visual Illusions: The Ground May Be Closer Than It Appears

Prevent controlled flight into terrain in flat light and whiteout conditions

The problem Flight operations in geographic areas that are susceptible to flat light and whiteout conditions can lead to accidents, as visual references are greatly reduced for pilots.

• Flat light occurs when the sky is overcast, especially over snow-covered terrain and large bodies of water. In flat light conditions, no shadows are cast and terrain features and other visual cues are masked, making it difficult for pilots operating under visual flight rules (VFR) to perceive depth, distance, or altitude. The photograph in this figure shows how these conditions combine to create an environment where it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the sky from the ground.

• Similarly, whiteout conditions can occur in areas with snow cover. Pilots can experience a loss of depth perception and become spatially disoriented, unable to maintain visual reference with the ground and unaware of their actual altitude. Related accidents The NTSB has investigated many general aviation (GA) accidents involving flat light or whiteout conditions. These accidents serve as important reminders about the critical need to ensure that pilots are aware of the challenges associated with these operating conditions and are adequately prepared for safe operations. The following accident summaries help to highlight the issues involved.

• An Airbus AS350B2 helicopter sustained substantial damage when it impacted terrain following a loss of control while landing. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, reported that the weather was deteriorating and he encountered an area with flat light conditions over snow-covered ground. As the visibility decreased, he Figure. Photograph of an accident site showing the visual effects of flat light and snow-covered terrain SA-052 slowed the helicopter and stayed low to the ground; he reported that blowing snow from the main rotor downwash reduced the visibility to whiteout conditions with no ground reference.

• A Bell 206L-1 helicopter sustained substantial damage following the commercial pilot’s attempted precautionary landing due to poor visibility conditions. The pilot reported that while flying over an area of flat and featureless, snow-covered terrain, deteriorating weather conditions with low ceilings, light snow, and flat light conditions reduced his visibility. He said that, while attempting to land, blowing snow from the main rotor downwash reduced his ability to discern topographical features on the snow-covered terrain. During touchdown, the helicopter drifted to the left, the left skid struck the snow-covered terrain, and the helicopter rolled onto its left side.

• A Cessna 182B airplane, being operated on a cross-country flight that included flying through a narrow mountain pass, sustained substantial damage when it collided with mountainous, snow-covered terrain. The commercial pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The typical route through the pass required making multiple turns, and the pass intersected with a box canyon. The airplane’s wreckage was located at the bottom of the box canyon a day after the airplane was reported overdue. A friend of the pilot, who attempted to cross the mountain pass the day of the accident, reported flat light conditions and difficulty discerning terrain features. Another pilot who flew through the mountain pass on the morning of the accident reported 4,400-foot ceilings, severe turbulence, and flat light conditions.

• An Aviat A1-A airplane, being operated on a cross-country flight under VFR, sustained substantial damage after colliding with snow-covered ice (a frozen drainage reservoir). The commercial pilot, the sole occupant of the airplane, was not injured. The pilot reported that he intended to overfly an airstrip without landing and that flat light conditions hampered his ability to judge his relative distance to the ground. He further stated that he did not realize he was descending over the snow-covered terrain until he impacted the snow.

What can pilots do?

• If possible, look for, use, and don’t lose sight of multiple visual reference points.

• Obtain an instrument rating and become proficient and comfortable with operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Trust the cockpit instruments and develop good cross-check practices.

• Understand that the ability to judge the height and determine the contour of terrain is difficult in conditions where the sky and ground (or water) are similar in colour. When landing on snow-covered terrain, conduct an overflight and consider using weighted flags or other markers that can be dropped from an aircraft and provide contrast. Shorelines may also provide needed contrast.

• If you regularly fly in snowy conditions, become proficient and comfortable with taxiing, taking off, landing, and conducting en route manoeuvres and go-arounds in areas with snow. If visibility drops, use your instruments and land at the nearest suitable airport.

In 1983 a British Airways S61 Helicopter on the regular scheduled flight from Penzance to St Marys (Isles of Scilly) crashed into the water on let down on a warm moist foggy/misty July Saturday morning.
23 were killed - 6 got out.
Haze limited their forward visibility so that they could not see the horizon, they were confident it was in excess of the VFR minimum of 200' ceiling.
Both pilots thought that the plane was still at 250 feet, though one of the passengers, a local, said that the cabin attendant had told her they were flying at around 100 feet shortly before the crash.

Erebus Flight 901 is a good listen, seems to point the finger all the way to the top (Piggy).

White Silence delves a whole lot deeper, some of the same people interviewed but more in depth.

What an absolute tragedy for a small nation, an airline that punches significantly above it's weight. I'll travel any day of the week with this mob, above a wanka airline that trades on 'safety' but is a hairs breath away from 'there but the grace of god go I'

It's extremely sad listening to the Captain's widow and oldest daughter.

Don't any of you toss bags spoil this thread. Whilst all of us 'know' about this tragedy, none of us 'know'

Because Mahon found that the Air NZ Navigation section changed the flight plan but didn't specifically tell the operating crew.

Captain Collins spent sometime plotting the previous tracks, which led past Erebus instead of right into it, so that he had a mental picture of where he would be.

To my mind Brick Lucas should not have been removed to the cabin to make room for Peter Mulgrew whose presence on the flight deck must have been a distraction.

Remember that Mahon's "orchestrated litany of lies" was directed at Air NZ management, not at anyone else.

Quite simply - the questions have not been answered.
 

I see the Black Caps are well on top of the Poms in the 1st Test match.

Thanks to this thread I've taken a renewed interest in this air disaster and started listening to the podcast. My wife joined me in my listen and raised the following concern: This crew flew all the way from NZ to Antarctica to find themselves at destination in clouds with a ceiling of 1500' and, onboard, 250+ fare paying passengers whose only purpose was the experience of seeing the ice. Throughout the crew training, passenger expectations beyond departing/arriving on time and a smooth landing are usually not the main concerns. This flight however was different as seeing Mt Erebus could admittedly be considered the crux of the whole flight, the reason passengers paid extra for their tickets, thus adding to the pressure of the crew. I want to tread carefully here as I've read that both pilots had extensive experience and were held in high regard by their peers. Without questioning their decision making skills, had the airline briefed them or given explicit instructions on the required course of actions to take should conditions at Ross Island be marginal? If not and therefore left at the captain's discretion, one could hypothesise that the PIC could have had a chain of thoughts along this: "The current conditions don't favour flying below LSALT, so my training and experience dictate that I should remain at 16,000' and head back home, as I would on any other flight. However I'm in a radar environment and the passengers' expectation is to see Mt Erebus, hence I'll make the call to descend below clouds. Otherwise I might face backlash from the airline if they all come home having paid this much for their tickets and seen nothing".

Therefore my question: Did Air New Zealand issue explicit directions to follow if conditions at destination precluded seeing the volcano?

There was an alternative route, to the South Magnetic Pole. The alternative route was available if the bad weather was known about before getting to Cape Hallett. After Cape Hallett, the captain had a free hand as to the track and could go to other areas. While heading towards McMurdo Station after passing Cape Hallett, Captain Collins was informed of the bad weather at McMurdo Station.. He was just about to go somewhere else when McMurdo Station offered him a radar- assisted descent. Collins gladly accepted the offer, announced the plan to the passengers, and waited for the radar operator to make contact. While waiting, Collins was told that the weather over the Dry Valleys was perfect. His response? "I prefer here first." So he kept on the track to McMurdo Station and he kept on trying to make contact with the radar operator. Then, he came to a large hole in the cloud layer, so without any discussion with his crew he started descending from 18000 feet in a figure-of-eight track. There had been no contact with the radar operator so there had been no confirmation of his position, but he got around this by pretending to be flying visually. The word "pretending" is accurate because Collins knew about white-out and knew that he would not have visual conditions below the cloud layer. What he was actually relying on was the aircraft's inertial navigation system - but the INS was not to be used to go below the height of a nearby mountain. Why? Because it might be wrong, and in this case, it was.

And on, and on, and on, and on; Again, and again, and again, and again...........ad infinitum......

Changing Nothing

That's a little bit better then a picture of rocks, but only a little bit. Why don't you try answering the question: Was the captain blameless?

@ampman: Thanks for clarifying this. You seem to know heaps more about the subject than many a ppruner here. When you say:
At that time of the year, what would you expect to see when looking straight down? Ice or water? Was there any chance that they could have distinguished the shoreline at Lewis Bay as they were approaching it or was it simply imperceptible?

Lewis Bay at that time of year was mostly sea-ice, but you would be able to see the black parts where there were gaps in the ice. They may have been able to see those black parts as they flew towards the mountain at 1500 feet, but they could not see the mountain itself. Vette postulated that what they saw was an open expanse, just like the middle of McMurdo Sound would look like. Vette, however, had a barrow to push. What the captain actually saw was nothing. No horizon. Like being inside a ping pong ball. He should have climbed back out immediately. Instead, he carried on for 120 seconds. Count off 120 seconds. It's a lifetime. That was the last of a series of bad errors.

Ad nauseum?

Was the captain blameless?