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Byron Bailey, The Australian, MCAS
From Fridays paper, headlined "Boeing 737 MAX Most Tested Jet and Very Safe".
Indeed there have been several incidences of MCAS activation on US B737 MAX aircraft but experienced American pilots recognised the problem, which just required treating it as a pitch trim runaway, and turned the switches off. It raises a lot of questions. Why is he the only source? No official notices, from FAA or airlines or pilot unions, have mentioned this. What was the cause of MCAS activation? Did it activate for it's intended function, or because of some malfunction? Why have none of these pilots spoken out? Why has Boeing not said, "See, pilots can do this!"? Why hasn't someone else said, "See, it malfunctions all the time!"? I would say, generously, that this is very unlikely to be true. |
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta. I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do. Tootle pip!! |
Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10593079)
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta. I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do. Tootle pip!! With regards to the Lion Air 43 crew, the one with the extra crew in the jump seat, there's no evidence that they actually treated that as a runaway and ran the relevant NNC. They listed the NNCs that they had run (Airspeed Unreliable and ALT DISAGREE) and Runaway Stab wasn't mentioned. It would appear that Byron is back to his old trick of just making stuff up. |
Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10593079)
Megan,
Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta. I don't always agree with Byron Bailey, but, on this occasion, I do. Tootle pip!! "uncommended stab trim check list" = "Runaway Trim check list" correct? |
Conspiracy theorists??? If it was that simple the fleet would not be grounded and REMAIN GROUNDED!!!!! Believe what you will, have a look for the article on the Boeing gets pilots that took 8000’ to get the failure under control. These pilots knew what was coming and still............ Ah but let’s just blame sub standard pilots eh, the western world is so good! More to it than meets the eye! |
I don’t think anyone is blaming substandard pilots , just the substandard selection and training of pilots.
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I note that Byron also suggests that engaging the autopilot would have fixed the issue. I suspect that with the control force that was being applied such engagement would have been unlikely.
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Byron also said that on talkback radio - I nearly stopped talking on my phone while driving to call them up and say ‘what the...’. The point in the interview that he made was pilots can’t fly. He omitted to mention the AP will always be over ridden by force! |
Boeing will be full throttle on trying to discredit the crew of the MAX. The PIC of the Ethiopian had 8000 hours so was not a newbie. Of course they will have their willing accomplices to be their mouthpieces. Cash for comment is not limited to radio broadcasters. This aircraft is seriously flawed otherwise the FAA would have had it back in the air months ago.
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From the other thread mentioning Bailey's articles, it seems the alledged Aviation Week articles are nowhere to be found.
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So LS you are prepared to agree with Byron Bailey but are you prepared to disagree with this bloke:
Letter to the Editor Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger New York Times Magazine Published in print on October 13, 2019 In “What Really Brought Down the Boeing 737 MAX?” William Langewiesche draws the conclusion that the pilots are primarily to blame for the fatal crashes of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302. In resurrecting this age-old aviation canard, Langewiesche minimizes the fatal design flaws and certification failures that precipitated those tragedies, and still pose a threat to the flying public. I have long stated, as he does note, that pilots must be capable of absolute mastery of the aircraft and the situation at all times, a concept pilots call airmanship. Inadequate pilot training and insufficient pilot experience are problems worldwide, but they do not excuse the fatally flawed design of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that was a death trap. As one of the few pilots who have lived to tell about being in the left seat of an airliner when things went horribly wrong, with seconds to react, I know a thing or two about overcoming an unimagined crisis. I am also one of the few who have flown a Boeing 737 MAX Level D full motion simulator, replicating both accident flights multiple times. I know firsthand the challenges the pilots on the doomed accident flights faced, and how wrong it is to blame them for not being able to compensate for such a pernicious and deadly design. These emergencies did not present as a classic runaway stabilizer problem, but initially as ambiguous unreliable airspeed and altitude situations, masking MCAS. The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The National Transportation Safety Board has found that Boeing made faulty assumptions both about the capability of the aircraft design to withstand damage or failure, and the level of human performance possible once the failures began to cascade. Where Boeing failed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have stepped in to regulate but it failed to do so. Lessons from accidents are bought in blood and we must seek all the answers to prevent the next one. We need to fix all the flaws in the current system — corporate governance, regulatory oversight, aircraft maintenance, and yes, pilot training and experience. Only then can we ensure the safety of everyone who flies. |
This article comes along at the same time as Alan Joyce is in discussion with Boeing regarding future purchase, to soften up public reaction... |
Remember its Virgin that has an order for Max 8 jets, but I guess QF is a bigger target for some
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Sully is , dare I say it , only partly right.
The sequence of events did start out as an Airspeed Disagree event ,caused by an angle of attack indicator failure, but the crew failed to complete the Non - Normal checklist correctly. The first items on the checklist are DISCONNECT autopilot and autothrottle. Fly the aircraft. The unintended consequence of the angle of attack failure led to the activation of the MCAS ,which led to to stab. trim motion ,which led to the loss of control. Completing the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal checklist would have resolved the issue. The failure of the angle of attack indicator ultimately led to TWO Non-normal checklists having to be completed correctly and promptly. Neither were. As a long time B737 Pilot I sympathise with the crew. The situation they found themselves in was extremely difficult. I’ve been there.Boeing checklists are difficult to run simultaneously with multiple failures. But the fact remains that completing both checklists correctly would have salvaged the situation. The B737MAX is not a fatally flawed design. That’s where Langewiesche’s article is closer to the whole truth. Training issues for new start airlines in third world countries will be an ongoing nightmare for Boeing AND Airbus for the foreseeable future, regardless of the outcome of the current investigation. |
Not quite correct George. If we want to go down that path, the crews, had to complete the 1) Approach To Stall Non-Normal Manoeuvre MEMORY items after wheels off the ground (first item do this immediately at the first indication of stick shaker), 2) Airspeed Unreliable NNC MEMORY items & QRH Performance inflight for pitch/thrust 3) IAS Disagree NNC, and 4) then in the middle it all, observe a Stabilizer partial runaway only when the Flap Leading Edge transit light extinguished after selecting flaps to UP.
I'm not the only one who thinks this is beyond the realm of us mere mortals. That is why the aircraft is still grounded. See also Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System Joint Authority Technical Review (JATR), October 11, 2019 report that does not cast Boeing or the FAA in a pleasing light. While contemplating this post, comprehend that each crew also had to deal with this background noise. |
George Glass,
Well put. Curtain Twitcher, Have you ever been confronted with multiple conflicting warnings at a critical stage of flight?? I have, and involving a failed AOA vane. In my opinion, various who have pointed to pilot (or lack thereof) training as a major issue (like FAA and now ICAO) as a major contributor are heading in the right direction. This is even recognised by Airbus in the A350 syllabus, which starts in the sim phase with just "flying the aeroplane". After all, the Lion Air aircraft was safely flown the evening before the loss, by a suitable experienced crew. Tootle pip!! PS: CT --- that was just a stick shaker ---- it gets far more distracting than that with a whole bunch going off at once. |
Curtaintwitcher, I have had an airspeed disagree event and can confirm that simultaneous over speed clacker and stickshaker is disconcerting to say the least. That’s why I have sympathy for the crew. But the fact remains that you can disconnect everything on a B737 and it will still fly. An instructor once demonstrated that in the simulator by taking us to 30,000 ft. and switching every switch on the overhead panel off. It still flew. I don’t think too many do that sort of stuff anymore. Just fly it like a C172. Personally I will never fly domestically in Indonesia. Ever. Seen too much scary stuff over there.
P.S. Don’t see the need for Approach to Stall recalls. Go straight for Airspeed Disagree. |
Leadsled, fortunately I haven't had multiple conflicting warnings, that is my point. The fact that a single point of failure can generate so many bells and whistles speaks to the poor engineering & design that took a 1960's airframes and allowed Boeing to bypass most of the the modern certification. Boeing essentially ignoring all the lessons & human factors discoveries about the fragility of human performance under unexpected duress.
As time goes on we learn just how inadequate humans are in the chain for any degree of complex decision making with conflicting data. The research doesn't say we are getting better, we've never been good, and the engineering should reflect that, not fit the human in as primitive EICAS/ECAM. You mention the crew that experienced the MCAS activation and landed successfully, guess what, they had a third set of eyes. Nobody can say if there would have been a different outcome with just two crew. It is actually a true testament to skill and abilities of the global 737NG pilots that the accident rate is so remarkable low. Is this because globally 737NG pilots are inadequately trained? With 100+ million departures, I don't know how we can sustain that argument. Given the part number for the AoA vane is the same in both the NG and the MAX, there is likely no change in the rate of sensor failure rates. This Boeing data was produced in October 2018, covering the period to the end of 2017, so the MAX shows 0 fatalities. The chart below is stunning to me, the safety of the 737NG operation is remarkable. Boeing & the industry did something right to sustain that level of safety since 1997. What could possibly explain the difference between the NG and MAX? The pilots, Training or the aircraft itself? https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....fff6a9cb52.png Source: Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents Worldwide Operations | 1959 – 2017 |
But the fact remains that you can disconnect everything on a B737 and it will still fly. |
Max has been grounded for how long now? Max ain’t getting its wings back any time soon or they would not be being ferried to storage facilities. Max obviously has serious issues. Yes the previous Lion Air flight had issues, was it the same fault? What did engineers do to it overnight? Nothing is as simple as it seems. It does not matter how good you are, if an aircraft is uncontrollable it doesn’t matter how good you are. I have said it before, I have crashed a sim when over zealous instructor put an non flyable situation of failures into the box! It is not a nice feeling and that’s a sim where the whoops freeze button is hit and a erm sorry ensues......... I’ve read many articles on Max. The most interesting one was the Boeing test pilots that took 8000’ to correct the MCAS activation/failure whatever you call it. Now how high were Ethiopian and Lion? |
Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10593742)
After all, the Lion Air aircraft was safely flown the evening before the loss, by a suitable experienced crew. Thanks in advance. |
Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 10593753)
GG and LS you are talking about an analogue only aircraft. I have flown a 737 in full manual reversion and it was a non-event. What you are not considering is that MCAS is a digital system that applies a control input independent of the pilots. Pilots who were not told about the existence of the system or the full failure modes of it. To just dump it on the crew does not explain why the thing has been grounded and even then they have found other issues with MCAS. LS Airbus have included the" fly the aircraft" in their Golden Rules since they introduced FBW so the A350 is nothing special in that regard. Interestingly the A330 was not grounded after a legacy carrier crew put one into a stall and killed all on board and the A320 was not grounded after the Air Asia fatal accident off Surabaya. So there must be a lot more going on than you are willing to acknowledge. Boeing through their shortcuts and corporate greed have presented a product to market that has killed over 300 people. Therein lies the issue.
Just a couple of points: (1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital. (2) Go read what Airbus, themselves, had/has to say about the redesigned syllabus introduced with the A350, it aint't the same as "years ago" --- and all as a result of the demonstrated fall in manual flying standards --- for which Airbus has a major responsibility. Tootle pip!! PS: High hours does not equal high competence, any more than low hours means the reverse ---- as I have found out over a career. |
(1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital. This is even recognised by Airbus in the A350 syllabus, which starts in the sim phase with just "flying the aeroplane". High hours does not equal high competence, any more than low hours means the reverse ---- as I have found out over a career. BTW I am enjoying the shellacking your claims and statements are getting on the other thread, especially your doubts about Sulley's understanding of the 737 systems. |
My inexpert reading of all of the currently-available evidence leads me to conclude that systems design was a causally relevant factor in a couple of accidents that have resulted in Max 8 hull loss and consequential loss of life. But I’m a nobody amateur.
Given my amateur understanding, it saddens me that some would try to attribute blame to the pilots. So many accidents and their investigated outcomes tend not to support a ‘blame the pilot’ approach. This was a lesson that was supposed to have been learned a long time ago. |
(1) If you place the stab trim cutout switches to OFF, you have full manual control, leaving you without any complicating input ---- nothing to do with analogue v. digital. then you don't understand MCAS Do you know something that is not publically available? The official line is by moving the stab trim cut off to off will stop the trim wheel from moving electrically. |
Originally Posted by neville_nobody
(Post 10594060)
[left]
Do you know something that is not publically available? The official line is by moving the stab trim cut off to off will stop the trim wheel from moving electrically. That is public and well known - just not in the required documents or simulated correctly in the simulators!!! FACT It is critical to cut the stab trim cut offs - but more critical that it is in a correct part of available use of what is left to control the aircraft. |
Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 10593684)
:
Sully states what most reasonable thinking pilots know, the 737 Max is a fatally flawed aircraft. Clearly, I am not afraid to NOT go along with the majority opinion If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707. As a relevant example, the B707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, Murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. It was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the MCAS. Lightning reflexes, no, but don't muck around, either. The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft. By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11. Tootle pip!! PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft. |
PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft. I have flown a 737 in full manual reversion and it was a non-even |
Dora-9 it was a post maintenance flight and yes we were flying without the benefit of hydraulics to the controls. In no way am I claiming to be an ace but LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefore his knowledge of the 737 (and Airbus apparently) is absolute although he has never flown either and he still does not understand what MCAS does. He also doesn't seem to understand the difference between aerodynamic difficulties worked through on prototypes and pre-production aircraft that are subsequently certified and documented by the authorities and the MCAS system that was installed on an existing design with minimal oversight and deliberate obfuscation by Boeing. Boeing even went so far as to make a warning light that told the crew MCAS was operating an optional extra! I'm sure Sully is keen to chat to LS so that he can glean some crumbs of aviation knowledge that might fall from LS rather bloated table.
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there have been several incidences of MCAS activation The pilots couldn't be expected to report on the activation of something that they didn't know was installed in the first place. Flight data monitoring may have picked it up similar to how it would record an unstable approach or a limit being exceeded. Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ? |
Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10594166)
Lookleft,If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707.
False equivalence. Did any of these preceding Boeing aircraft suffer a series of fatal accidents in a very short space of time due to the failure of these 'stability aids'? Stability aids is a broad term that does not make the various forms contained within that umbrella equitable. The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft. "Does not?" I know of 346 people who would probably disagree with that statement if they were able. Regulators worldwide also appear to share this view, which is why the max is currently located in the only safe operating environment that exists for it. By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11. So because aircraft with potentially fatal handling characteristics were certified 50 years ago or more, then we should simply accept this in the modern era and sign off on the same now? Do you not remember that after a series of identical accidents during landing that the software for the flight control system was modified by Boeing? I thought we were trying to improve air safety over time, not use the template of past failure to ensure we repeat it. These crew did not suffer a simple MCAS failure in isolation. They had to deal with all manner of unreliable speed indications, a non stop stick shaker and the fact MCAS is masked within these failures, and does not behave like a 'vanilla' stab trim runaway. Not to mention of course they were never told about MCAS, trained on its failure modes or had an opportunity to witness this failure, one that was clearly inevitable given the stupidity of Boeing's design to include a single data input. Further, given the speed at which it operates (with everything else going on), you can disconnect the trim switches and no longer have that spurious input, yet in a very short space of time it wont make a difference as the forces required to rectify the out of trim situation are too significant to overcome anyway, as the Ethiopian crew found out. Boeing needs to build a plane that can be safely operated by all crew, not just the Ace of the Base such as yourself. |
Originally Posted by Lookleft
(Post 10594468)
Dora-9 it was a post maintenance flight and yes we were flying without the benefit of hydraulics to the controls. In no way am I claiming to be an ace but LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefore his knowledge of the 737 (and Airbus apparently) is absolute although he has never flown either and he still does not understand what MCAS does. He also doesn't seem to understand the difference between aerodynamic difficulties worked through on prototypes and pre-production aircraft that are subsequently certified and documented by the authorities and the MCAS system that was installed on an existing design with minimal oversight and deliberate obfuscation by Boeing. Boeing even went so far as to make a warning light that told the crew MCAS was operating an optional extra! I'm sure Sully is keen to chat to LS so that he can glean some crumbs of aviation knowledge that might fall from LS rather bloated table.
With your superior knowledge of the B737 ( as opposed to other Boeing aircraft) could you please explain to me how the MCAS keeps the stab running, if the two stab trim cutout switches have cut all power to the stab motors --- you have me really intrigued. It is true I have never been endorsed on the B737, but I have a representative sample of Boeing products, and the basic design philosophy of the stab trim system has a family history dating back to the B-47.. I have also spent some years involved in technical development of Level D/D+ simulators, but that was all B737NG, not Max, so I am not unfamiliar with the B737 in general. As for Captain Sullenberger, he did a magnificent job in ditching in the Hudson, placed in a near impossible situation, but nobody is perfect, he and his mate missed the ditching switch (whatever Airbus call it) , but that great effort and outcome does not make him an instant expert on all things aviation. Although the demands of the speaker circuit push him that way. It certainly does not make him an expert on certification of Boeing aircraft. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but having had a bit of experience internally with Boeing airworthiness people, I am certain they thought the way the aerodynamic characteristic that MCAs was directed at solving was a reasonable engineering solution at the time. Tootle pip!! PS:1 "----- LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefor ------" You really are a twit --- are you suggesting that a normal response to a Non-Normal procedure is somehow to be criticised, because it hasn't happened to you. Given you aeronautical wisdom, suggest what we should have done, to avoid being classified as aces --- which traditionally means 5 or more combat victories. Perhaps you see dueling opinions on Pprune as some sort of moral (as opposed to mortal) combat. PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped. |
Originally Posted by krismiler
(Post 10594513)
The MCAS is supposed to activate and lower the nose if the pitch becomes excessive, it's hardly headline news when a system like this does what it's supposed to do. If the stall warning activates then it's notifiable and an investigation will be undertaken to determine how the aircraft got onto that situation in the first place.
The pilots couldn't be expected to report on the activation of something that they didn't know was installed in the first place. Flight data monitoring may have picked it up similar to how it would record an unstable approach or a limit being exceeded. Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ? You have got it right. The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be possibly MCAS related in retrospect. They have come to light during the MAX investigation. Tootle pip!! |
Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10594166)
as a relevant example, the b707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. it was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the mcas.
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Ahhhh the Sully factor... Remember the experts recreating the scenario and making it to the airport... until what the fark factor introduced. No matter what anyone says on here, there but for the grace of god. I would hate to be in the position of the fatal Max crews. The airplane trying to kill you, screaming at you, shaking at you, no matter what you do it may fix for a second then all hell breaks loose again. I am now trying to find the actual piece on the Boeing test flight where the test pilots knowing what was to come took 8000’ to get out of Max ****e!!! Oh never flown a Boeing. Ps As I’ve stated many times, how many times has anyone here done ****e in the sim due to over zealous instructors putting in un flyable scenarios??? If it ain’t gunna fly it ain’t gunna fly! |
krismiler, You have got it right. The reports in AW&ST (in the bodies of technical articles, not headline news) were in the context of occurrences that were logged for maintenance to look at, but were only realised to be MCAS related in retrospect. They have come to light during the MAX investigation. Whilst I don'r have the quotes to hand, several articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, which have been exhaustively covering the issue, have mentioned same. They never received any publicity at the time, because the crews involved just ran the uncommended stab trim checklist, as did the lost Indonesian aeroplane's crew the night before, Bali to Djakarta. Did he mean to say that there had been previous incidents where the MCAS had malfunctioned in a similar way to the two disasters but the pilots had managed to prevent an accident ? 737 MAX - MCAS |
How is it that every single thread in the Australian forums ends up in a slanging match from the same usual suspects. :ugh:
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Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10594558)
Lookleft,
With your superior knowledge of the B737 ( as opposed to other Boeing aircraft) could you please explain to me how the MCAS keeps the stab running, if the two stab trim cutout switches have cut all power to the stab motors --- you have me really intrigued. It is true I have never been endorsed on the B737, but I have a representative sample of Boeing products, and the basic design philosophy of the stab trim system has a family history dating back to the B-47.. I have also spent some years involved in technical development of Level D/D+ simulators, but that was all B737NG, not Max, so I am not unfamiliar with the B737 in general. As for Captain Sullenberger, he did a magnificent job in ditching in the Hudson, placed in a near impossible situation, but nobody is perfect, he and his mate missed the ditching switch (whatever Airbus call it) , but that great effort and outcome does not make him an instant expert on all things aviation. Although the demands of the speaker circuit push him that way. It certainly does not make him an expert on certification of Boeing aircraft. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but having had a bit of experience internally with Boeing airworthiness people, I am certain they thought the way the aerodynamic characteristic that MCAs was directed at solving was a reasonable engineering solution at the time. Tootle pip!! PS:1 "----- LS certainly is as he has had to turn stab trim switches off therefor ------" You really are a twit --- are you suggesting that a normal response to a Non-Normal procedure is somehow to be criticised, because it hasn't happened to you. Given you aeronautical wisdom, suggest what we should have done, to avoid being classified as aces --- which traditionally means 5 or more combat victories. Perhaps you see dueling opinions on Pprune as some sort of moral (as opposed to mortal) combat. PS2: If the B707 was to be certified today, it would need something like the MCAS, to prevent the pitch UP in the stall on Flap 50. "Back in the day", we coped. Pardon my ignorance. What is a B737NG D+ simulator? Thanks |
How is it that every single thread in the Australian forums ends up in a slanging match from the same usual suspects. |
Lookleft, It would help if posters had at least some idea of what they were talking about. But that’s the internet isnt it?
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