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Last week I wrote, as told to me several weeks ago by US pilots, about several instances of supposed MCAS events and recovery from the nose-down pitching by experienced US pilots. It now appears the events were not MCAS-related, ... |
Ahem...............
Sunfish: Mr Macintosh, This is a thread for transport jet pilots discussing transport jet issues. Please go away. j3 |
Well, it is now quite difficult to know exactly what you made clear or what you said as it appears that some of your relevant posts have strangely now been deleted. |
Originally Posted by The name is Porter
(Post 10597408)
Ahem...............
Sunfish: Can you please (and anybody else who is not a jet transport pilot) remove yourself from this thread. Show some respect for the jet transport pilots (j3 in particular) especially the right seat warmers from generation outrage. They are the one's saving the planet. Best they be banned - Pilots have MCAS sorted and always have - the proof is in the reports. |
I’m not qualified to discuss technical or operational issues, but I am qualified to deal with issues surrounding training of non western technical professionals like pilots. I’ll say it again. The “stupid third world pilot” explanation for these accidents is both evil and untrue. |
Yes Bend alot, but you are not a 'jet transport pilot'
Engineers, managers and human factors specialists have no place discussing flight safety, so get over yourself. |
And CRM is for weak minded individuals who can't make a decision. SOPs are for the slow of mind who dont know how to get the job done faster and better. Minimas are for the gutless who cant back themselves in a tight spot. Anyone who thinks differently needs to get onboard or get out of the way.
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Originally Posted by LeadSled
(Post 10594166)
Lookleft,
Clearly, I am not afraid to NOT go along with the majority opinion If your statement above is the case, every civil jet aircraft Boeing has ever built is fatally flawed; Why would I say that ---- because the MCAS system is a stability aid, these in one form or another, have been on every aircraft since the B707. Yaw dampers are another example of a stability aid --- in early days pilots in bulk did not trust yaw dampers --- unless they could disconnect them, like early B707. As a relevant example, the B707 had a auto mach trim to counter mach tuck, and it was a continuous source of niggles, and, Murphy's law being what it is, a mach trim runaway was almost always nose down.. It was distinguished from a main electric stab runaway by the speed of movement ---- quite slow, like the MCAS. Lightning reflexes, no, but don't muck around, either. The fact remains, as was demonstrated by Lion Air Bali to Djakarta, an MCAS malfunction in the hands of an adequately trained crew (actioning the un-commanded stab trim checklist --- whatever its current B737 QRH name) does not/should not result in the loss of the aircraft. By the Sullenberger yardstick, the Vickers VC-10 should never have been certified --- if you know something about its natural aerodynamic characteristics. Likewise probably the MD-11. Tootle pip!! PS: Lookleft, please let us know what experience/knowledge. you have on relevant aircraft. |
Originally Posted by hans brinker
(Post 10599547)
I would guess that if you tried to get any of those aircraft certified today, they wouldn't pass. B is wrong to try to re-certify a 60 year old design instead of starting from scratch. tootle your pip all you want, you could not be more wrong.
As they were 60 years ago, that is certainly true, but, in my opinion, updated designs that meet the certification criteria at the time is valid. The cost of a clean sheet design, versus a supplementary type certificate for an updated design, makes operational and commercial sense. After all, a high proportion of changed/upgraded certification criteria are as a result of hard won experience. In a comment specifically directed at the 737 MAX, in what has been said so far, and in interpretation of what happened, reading transcripts etc., I would suggest over-reach of current approaches to CRM and two pilot procedures, things have morphed to a stage where they can inhibit required rapid reaction where rapid reaction is required. This is not to suggest some reversion to some supposed "good old days", but a suggestion that too much talking and not enough action, when action is required, is at the very least, a contributor. Tootle pip!! |
updated designs that meet the certification criteria at the time is valid. The cost of a clean sheet design, versus a supplementary type certificate for an updated design, makes operational and commercial sense. T he first is how the organisational culture of Boeing had changed over the years since it acquired McDonnell Douglas, a failing aerospace contractor, in 1997. Boeing’s organisational culture is now radically different from its old engineering-led ethos. It’s now run by a board that seems driven more by marketers than by engineers – which may explain why it pressed for the Max not be be treated as a new aircraft (requiring thorough – and expensive – re-certification by the FAA) but merely as a modification. |
Folks,
In my opinion, the M in MD was the undoing of Douglas, the M in MD had had an inordinate and unsatisfactory engineering influence since the takeover of MD by Boeing --- that from old friends who are long time Boeing people ----- even allowing for their bias, I think they are correct. But, to be fair, long before the above, Boeing made some booboos, I won't try to list them, but just two examples ---- the horizontal stab deficiencies of the 320 series 707, versus the original -300s, and the rudder control package on many. B737. The ADs are a long read. Tootle pip!! |
The difference between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas engineering was like chalk and cheese, even to a young engineer in 1977. McD were always full of themselves, Boeing were the reverse - good listeners. |
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