Timely Go-Arounds
 

If I say go around and my captain doesn't, captain finds a new FO.

The phraseology is perhaps more interesting than the response.

"Lets" tends to be more a suggestion rather than a command e.g. "Lets have lunch" and the captain didn't actually say "go around" he said "Let's go".

I dug out the original report and it does touch on this:
"the captain’s statement of “let’s go” did not comply with any standard terminology and might have suggested to the first officer that the captain’s command was tentative"

There's probably a lesson there - if you want to give a command be definite, and use standard phraseology that is obviously a command.

Not according to the report??

The NTSB may well have an 'expectation' that either pilot can call for a go-around and it is automatically mandatory, but it may take some re-education to become accepted SOP.

Much like the stabilized approach criteria. Almost every operator now has that enshrined in their manuals, but often it is only paying lip service to recommendations or requirements. In certain cultures it would be a very courageous F/O who took over control from a Captain who was not within the parameters and refused to execute a go around.

"around" is bracketed because the captain didn't actually say it but it has been inserted for clarity. The command was "Lets go".

With a 2 word command, would you execute on the first or second word?
Gear......... up
Go....... [around]

Precisely.

Isn't the point of the statement is that the debate is over at the point either seat calls Go-around?
Who cares really who is the pilot is command?

Alitalia flight 404 is a classic case.

Get the words right for sure, but who cares who calls it, go-around!

The problem with that system is it overrides the authority of the PIC. Given the ever diminishing experience in the RHS you are creating a whole new can of worms by lowering the experience of the flight deck to the FO's experience and confidence levels.

In another era I was pilot in command flying a GCA into RAAF Base Richmond in rain and low cloud. The aircraft was a Vampire dual seat fighter. In those days Richmond had a long taxiway parallel to the runway.
We became semi-visual at 200 feet agl but the view through the windshield was poor because of rain and the Vampire didn't have wipers. I announced "Going Around." At that instant, the senior Air Force officer in the RH seat who out-ranked me by several stripes (nice bloke though) grabbed the control column on his side and whipped the Vampire into rapid turn saying "there's the runway.."

The only problem was he had seen the parallel taxiway. I was able to regain control from him and said firmly "We are going around, SIR." and told ATC we were diverting to Williamtown. The Vampire had very limited endurance even with drop tanks and we had flown to Richmond from Laverton an hour earlier. At top of decent into Richmond, ATC gave us the latest weather at Richmond which was awful - heavy rain and low cloud. I decided the chances of getting in to Richmond was low particularly because GCA being a radar talk-down aid could be seriously affected by rain attenuation. I informed the senior officer we were diverting to Williamtown RAAF base which was 30 minutes away where the forecast was fine.

The senior officer was anxious to get to Richmond for a high level meeting and suggested we at least have a go at getting in at Richmond as we had the fuel for a diversion if needed. Against my better judgement (after all he was a Group Captain) I reluctantly agreed and commenced descent in preparation for a radar controlled GCA (Ground Controlled Approach).

During the go-around and diversion to Williamtown the senior officer remained silent. After engine shut down at Williamtown I suggested to him we could refuel and have another go into getting into Richmond since we now had plenty of fuel to play with. Plenty of fuel including drop tanks in the Vampire gave us an endurance of 1.5 hours with no reserves!

The Group Captain knocked back my offer (much to my relief as I had enough drama for the day) saying "No thanks - I'll go back to Richmond by train."

The confidence of the Captain in Alitalia 404, pushed his command, training and experience over the FO. Yet the FO was right. The result was on profile, into the side of the mountain outside Zurich.
Mistakes are generated in either seat and the modern airliner is multi-crew.
Given a missed approach and another pattern is cheap isn't default to a low risk environment the better setting?

Ive read some total garbage on pprune over the years. This ranks highly.

If someone in the front says go around, you do it. Discussion can occur after. The number of accidents where the FO has called for the go around and the idiot captain thought he knew better, and didn't, are numerous.

I'm yet to find an incident where an FO called for a Go Around that wasn't required and people died. Have you?

I'm sure everybody's aware of the Garuda B737 GA200 accident in 2007. The Captain had 13,400 hours TT; the FO 1350 hours. The Captain ignored calls for a go-around by the FO and the rest is history. You don't need to have tens of thousands of hours to know what constitutes an undesirable aircraft state; all you need is a sense of survival.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garuda...sia_Flight_200

I actually can't tell if you're serious, or some elaborate troll.

Absolutely. A steep experience gradient makes it harder, not easier for a low hour pilot to speak up. If they are seeing something I'm not, then you better believe I'd initiate a go around if in the command seat if they called for it. We can discuss why he/she made that call when the aircraft is safely established above MSA. If it was an erroneous call, we can discuss why that is, then brief the next approach in light of this and try again.

As for the 'cadet' jibe. They are a licensed and endorsed pilot. Do you turn your nose at the 21 year olds with less than 1000 hours total time flying F18's around too?

What on earth are you on about. Ignoring the fact the Captain of EK521 had less hours than the FO, what decision 'outside the flight deck' affected the outcome here, and how on earth does it relate to your point that a Captain should be able to ignore an FO's call of Go Around?

There is no way you're a transport category pilot. Referring to FO's (even low hour ones) as 'the lowest common denominator' just shows how clueless you obviously are. Please go back and play in the GA forum.

At my airline, if I elevate my concerns and the Captain isn't responding appropriately, not only am I not to accept him/her pressing on, I'm required by OM to takeover and execute the go around myself. The reason is simple and blindingly obvious. To push on when in danger is to risk the lives of all on board. To Go Around when it wasn't required risks nothing more than a few polar bears.

It shouldn't even be a discussion.

Generally a walk through a debris field helps. Knowing the limits of one and the aircraft is admirable, however there is ample evidence to suggest that the 'limits of our ability' are not as high as we thought.

Captain Raffaele Liberti, 47, Alitalia, total flying time of more than 10,000 hours.
His junior FO spoke up, wanted to go around, knew something was wrong. It was.
The hills outside Zurich bought the whole aircraft to a grinding halt.

An arrogant and childish assertion. Similar to a recent difference of opinion that arose re use of autobrake for landing on a long into-wind dry runway. Company SOP left it to the captain re autobrake use. Basically if autobrake not needed operationally to meet runway length and conditions there was no requirement to use it.
Captain was PF and during approach briefing elected not to use autobrake. The F/O disagreed saying all the captains he flew with use autobrake for ALL landings regardless if operationally necessary or otherwise..
Captain thanked him for his advice and continued with briefing. F/O got twitchy. On short final F/O calls "Go Around" but gave no explanation for late call. The approach seemed normal so the captain queries the call. F/O states " The autobrake is off."
The landing which was stable is continued with F/O later de-briefed. Common sense prevailed

Neville_nobody,
I hope you are not involved in any airline because what you’re displaying is a complete lack of understanding of airline ops. Your assumptions of EK521 are completely out of whack. Your assertion that an FO doesn’t know anything is completely wrong.

If if you are indeed an airline captain, you need to be pulled off line as you sir are, to put bluntly, unsafe to operate.

Precisely.
The accident evidence suggests that in several cases this approach killed numerous people.
In Alitalia 404 a highly experienced Captain (and trainer) and a junior FO.
The FO was right, God Bless him.

If FO commands a Go Around and it is executed by him taking over the controls if he/she was not the Pilot Flying at that moment, the the FO is in fact the commander at least temporarily. My question - how long the FO keeps the command authority - until landing? What is the CPT legal position in that time - Also is there a requirement to write a report after landing in such a case?

Everyone here is missing the elephant in the room which is PIC authority. Just because the FO says go around does not mean you should. It is the captains decision not the FO's. My gripe with the FAA's suggestion is the arbitrary nature of the decision making and the surrendering the command of the aircraft to the FO.

Many of the objections raised in this thread are actually communication or CRM issues rather just than the FO wanted to go around and the Captain disagreed. And if the FO believes things are out of hand or the PIC has lost the plot for whatever reason they are well within their rights to take over.

So you believe that a arbitrary goaround is required with 3000M+ of runway remaining? What is the risk assessment of a very low level go around vs just landing normally? My point with that is the decision to Go Around was not made by the PIC but by company policy. In the cold light of day I am not so sure if the risk management was well thought out, given the functions of the aircraft and the apparent lack of awareness of what would happen with the aircraft automation.

My question to you is if we just blindly follow what the FO wants to do who is responsible if it all gets out hand and the crew get called in for a please explain?

The PIC doesn't have the authority to drive the plane into the ground.

Show me a single airline OM in the country that backs up this claim.

You've contradicted yourself. Above you state its not the FO's decision and the CPT is not bound by an FO's call to GA. Now you say the FO is within their right to take over? Which is it?

This has nothing to do with your original point, the one that has drawn everyones ire. Policy at my airline is that its CPTs discretion. Outside touchdown zone is allowed if CPT believes reasonable runway length remains. Guess what I'm going to do though if we land 3/4 the way down the strip at Ballina?

Ever heard of this brand new thing called the stabilized approach criteria? A crews decision to GA is governed by a litany of rules outside their control.

So in your scenario, an FO calls for a go around that wasn't required. What happens? A perfectly safe go around. Then, maybe, and I don't view it as likely, but maybe you get called down for tea and bickies. The FO states their reasoning. Perhaps he/she are retrained. Lessons are learned.

My question to you is if we just blindly follow what the CPT wants to do, who is going to be there when it all gets out of hand and the CPT tries to drive the plane into the ground?

Ill give you 3 guesses.

I will hazard a guess that all Ops Manuals have qualifying statements contained within them with certain tolerances. That is very different circumstance than an FO being out of his comfort zone which is what I was referring to.

No I haven't. They are two different scenarios. Have a look at CAR 224 and show me where anyone else other than the PIC is responsible for the continuation of flight. If the PIC becomes incapacitated or threatens the lives onboard the FO can take control. Most companies have a framework for this.

Firstly GoArounds are not done all that often, so the risk of people screwing them up, damaging the aircraft (ie flap overspeed) or having some other unintended consequence is a consideration. And there is a risk involved. Goround may mean missing out on landing all together at the airport in question due to weather, curfews, airport issues etc etc. It may mean being forced to divert to a less favourable airport, the options are endless. Maybe the FO gets retrained. But Captains gets demoted which can be career ending so there is a big difference in consequences.

No one is blindly following anybody. My point is that the PIC is the final authority. It is up to the FO to use CRM and whatever other skills/company procedures etc at hand to ensure a safe outcome. I am not suggesting that the FO's
say nothing, however just because the FO says go around does not mean that it should happen. However if the Captain says it then that's what happens. If you and read the FAA Circular the Captain said to go around and the FO didn't do it.

Extract from Boeing 737 FCTM under the heading Wheel Brakes;
Quote: "Use of the autobrake system is recommended whenever the runway is limited, when using higher than normal approach speeds, landing on slippery runways or landing in a crosswind."

The original post clearly stated: "Similar to a recent difference of opinion that arose re use of autobrake for landing on a long into-wind dry runway."
Clearly the runway concerned was not limiting. There was no justification for the F/O concerned for such a petulant action which was beyond comprehension.

I give up with this guy.

This thread has some great stuff in it. Truly cutting edge wisdom for that last 30 seconds from getting visual to the point where you pull in the reversers and are committed.Yep, that's after touchdown.

and it centers around this from Australopithecus and all the similar posts:

"A good general rule is that it should take two yes votes at all times. A single “no” should be enough to trigger a safer course of action. If the F/O calls for example, “not stable”, are you going to argue or go around? CRM does not allow for a single ego operation"

It's a two crew machine and the existence of doubt is just the same as excessive sink rate, glide slope deviation or the many other parameters which violate the concept of a safe stable approach . That's the 'EXISTENCE" of doubt not the fact of a reason for doubt. Doubt is itself a reason. A well flown missed approach or rejected landing would have saved countless lives over the years. Reliance on "The Captain is in command" rarely so. When you're cleared for approach you are also cleared for the missed approach or rejected landing. Even a junior Second Officer in the jump seat might have seen something you didn't. And even if you chalk up a missed approach which might cost you 10 minutes and a couple of grand in fuel, big deal.

If you think giving instructions is the key to your manhood get a job with IKEA. This isn't war. The best decisions a civil captain can make are NOT to do something or to delay while something else (de-ice, refuel, wait for a squall to pass, malfunction rectification etc) is done. Rarely, if ever, is the safest option the "I am the Captain" instruction to proceed when others are voicing doubts.

I'd be happy to start a thread listing accidents where, when crossing the fence, someone was unhappy but either didn't speak up or wasn't listened to. It'd be a bloody long thread. And as Davies said 50 years ago in "Handling the Big Jets" if you do crash, and survive, you'll spend the rest of your life wishing you had that 30 seconds to live over again.

And then you've got the screwed up startle effect go around. One of THE most poorly executed maneuvers in the industry.

Then you've got the pop up Cb on the MA track.

Bottom line is that there is no right or wrong answer. It's up to the PIC to make a snap decision then and there. And that is why you need experience to sit in that seat.