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Originally Posted by F.Nose
(Post 10210500)
Good grief.
The cold hard facts are; The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result of a disturbed 'German Wings' FO deliberately flying an aircraft into terrain. However....the 2 on the flight deck rule does not prevent either Pilot destroying the aircraft and its occupants at any time.....if they so desire! So the rule does not achieve its objective other than it may have an influence on where and how the job is done. Nobody would object if the few operators of aircraft 'without keypads' develop procedures, such as the 2 on the flight deck, to mitigate the risk of Pilot incapacitation at an inappropriate time......but that does not mean there needs to be a blanket rule for all operators on all aircraft with more than 50 seats, when in the majority of cases the risk is alleviated by other means......such as a key pad. |
The cold hard facts are; The 2 on the flight deck at all times rule was mandated by the regulator in Australia as a direct result... |
Originally Posted by F.Nose
(Post 10210500)
However....the 2 on the flight deck rule does not prevent either Pilot destroying the aircraft and its occupants at any time.....if they so desire! So the rule does not achieve its objective other than it may have an influence on where and how the job is done.
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Steve Creedy
Australian airlines will be able to decide for themselves whether they want to have two people in the cockpit at all times. The Australian government followed the lead of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and adopted the two-in-the cockpit rule for aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 50 passengers after the crash of Germanwings Flight 9252 crash in March, 2015. Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, who had been diagnosed with suicidal tendencies, deliberately flew the aircraft into the side of a French mountain, killing 144 passengers and six crew. The idea was to have another crew member enter the cockpit if one of the pilots left for any reason but the practice has raised a number of safety and security issues. EASA eased the two-person rule in August, 2017, and German airlines revealed they would abandon it April this year, arguing it increased security risks rather lowered them. Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority said a review of the practice in Australia found there were “unintended consequential risks, including the second person in the cockpit potentially distracting the pilot, making inadvertent contact with cockpit switches and taking cabin crew away from their safety role in the cabin”. “It was also found the practice complicated flight crew access to the cockpit and introduced an additional risk of flight deck incursion,’’ CASA said in a recent briefing note. “The recommendation is for air operators to evaluate their own safety requirements and make an operational decision on whether to maintain ‘two in the cockpit’ in their standard operating procedures. “CASA’s aviation medicine branch will continue to monitor pilot mental health and maintain a high level of awareness among pilots of mental health priorities and sources of assistance.” Australian pilot unions have welcomed the decision to ease the rules. It comes as the EU recently published strengthened mental health guidelines for pilots. The new rules mean all European airlines will need to perform a psychological assessment of pilots before they start employment, something many airlines already do. They also include a support program for all pilots working for European airlines to help them “recognize, cope with and overcome “problems which might negatively affect their ability to safely exercise the privileges of their license” Mandatory alcohol testing will be extended to pilots and cabin crew of all European and foreign airlines that fly into the EU. |
Good, the sooner this procedure is gone, the better. FD door open for far longer in total, the FA removed from their security role in the cabin, and not one FA given a single minute's training on what their actual responsibilities and required actions are when they're up there with one pilot.
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My concern with this has always been managing the flight attendant during a non-normal. At my airline, the cabin crew aren't exactly the brightest sparks, however they do have a very high opinion of themselves and have an long established attitude of being the true "managers" of the aircraft. I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain".
If I have a major failure (ie: depres) and need to start a rapid descent, I have no faith that the 19 year old sitting in the jump seat (who is already on "heightened alert" as they've been told I am sitting there plotting to kill them) won't grab the crash axe and take my head off. About the last amount of added stress one needs during such an event. |
Originally Posted by VHFRT
(Post 10213619)
I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain".
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We had the rule before all of this happened (because of how the door lock works) so I assume we will still have it. |
I believe the CC union once sent a memo stating that the lead flight attendant was "second in charge of the aircraft, behind the captain". |
I remember something about a senior manager being a bit too close to an FAAA rep and having the Policy manual changed to show the CM being number two on the chain of command. It didn't last long, the manager's position in the airline and the policy change. Through the mists of time the only thing I do know for certain is that it wasn't the 70's or 80's and it wasn't the boilers but one of the new breed of managers and FAAA ladder climbers.
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