So what happens to them now? The rules used to be that if you had two shots and missed, you were sent to the sin bin for the duration. Is that still the case? I’d be curious to see if they were given another shot, but only on the 737. Good luck to those who try.

ruprecht
my thoughts about getting through training on the 737 as opposed to any long haul type is about the training system (it’s totally different to long haul, and everyone who comes is very impressed), the number of sectors available for the training, might be the relative simplicity of the 737 (dint be afraid of the overhead panel, seriously, it’s fine). Maybe they just try harder, I don’t know, but the results speak for themselves.

I think that old ‘different training systems’ between LH and SH is virtually dead. I’ve flown with a number of former 737 pilots converting to the A330 and virtually all of them indicate that there is now very little difference in training vibe between the two fleets.

Just to back home maggot’s comments. Sure a long time S/O is going to find a A330 promotional upgrade challenging. Many people find a promotional upgrade challenging for any number of specific and personal reasons (yours truly included when I did F/O training). So every one starts with a ‘standard’ course but there are multiple opportunities given to identify and rectify road blocks to learning along the way. The reality is though that trainees have difficulties at different places in the program (or no difficulties at all) so there is no one ‘silver bullet’ solution for a long time S/O. I do know though that a number of very good people are looking at this issue and seeing if there are ‘systemic’ things that can be addressed. At the end of the day, none of us wants to see a colleague’s career curtailed.

The major issue with long term SOs is that it different sitting in the front seat, despite all the work that you can see from the back. Many diligent and high quality people will still probably struggle a little because of the lack of exposure to ops below 20k in the front seat for x number of years. It used to be when you would get the SO out at 5000 that if they could get you to 20 miles 250kts at 5000 then job done. (Add a few miles for 330) If they could do that consistently then FO training became about 5k down as opposed to know where it is about TOD down. The 20k limit does absolutely nothing to help advance or keep any semblance of skill. The SOs also lack any familiarity with domestic ops which makes up most of their training (small stuff that takes away brain space like co-ordinatior in Sydney, COBT and the different requirements for it in each port) I’m not sure about sector numbers compared to the 737 anymore but it used to be significantly different along with fact that 330 trainers seem to sing from sdifferent song sheets from each other more so than the 737.(less consistency of message than the 737 which is what trainees need more of)

Couple that with a few idiosyracies of the 330. Such as the fact that 330 is one of the slicker jets out there and an FMS decent path that pretty much guarantees you are high on the ideal profile (ie the FMS path is crap without work arounds such as lower than planned speed at GS intercept) Or the tendency if your aimpoint is at the end of 1000’ markers as many teach the chance of landing short is dramatically increased which the sim doesn’t adequately prepare you for. (Landing short is a big no no in training) it is probably little wonder why some struggle. Laziness on removal of the golden handcuffs also possibly plays a part. It also must be remembered that people generally do not fail for one reason. A pattern generally develops.

When the increased heights came in I do recall discussing with a number of trainers whether we'd see a 'spike' in troubles with F/O trainees in the future due to lack of familiarity/ currency in getting the jet to 5000. It certainly places a lot more workload on the trainee if they've not had that exposure. Even with my own F/O training a couple of decades ago now, having previously had exposure to getting the aeroplane to 3,000' (as it was back then) on my previous aircraft type meant that I had a bit more spare brain space to concentrate on that last 3,000' on my new one- I certainly needed every bit of spare brain space I could get!

737 does 28 from Stage 2 including the check*. A330 does 22 including the check.

(*Presumes base training for both).

I find that 737 pilots are far more likely to land short than a former LH pilot upgrading from S/O. The S/O has at least been looking at the longer aim point from the back seat and doesn't have an old mental picture to fall back on.

Lol. :) That was truly amusing. Kudos. On a more serious note - perhaps if the aforementioned SOs spent a long, long time in the back of the 74, and were then improperly introduced to the magic of Airbus ?

I have serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the high failure rates. Any failure rate above ~ 10% is a systemic failure of the training department *

* that does not include dodgy cadet schemes, Euro MPL programs, and other scams to fill out pilot numbers.

Two comments, both purely speculative:

1. Demographics.

It’s conceivable that a pilot who sacrificies whatever salary and lifestyle for an earlier 737 promotion is more interested in the “real flying” that the job entails, and is thus more likely to pass from the outset, from an attitude and dedication point of view.

2. Training department.

I don’t know how it stands today, but for many years there was a general feeling that if a candidate fails a LH promotion, it is the candidate’s fault. But if a candidate fails a 737 promotion, it is the trainer’s (or the training department’s) fault.

Therefore the 737 trainers tended to take more personal interest in getting the trainees up to scratch prior to a check ride. The “system” had something to do with this too - on the 737 the line training generally had a dedicated trainer, who took responsibility, but in LH you could have a different trainer for every trip. It wasn’t that the aircraft is easier to fly (it isn’t), or that the required standard is lower (it isn’t), it was more the system and culture.

The reality is that the training in Shorthaul for Command or First Officer is vastly superior. The contract sadly is not.

Shorthaul has had a long culture of training as opposed to checking in long haul. That is in the process of changing in Longhaul however cultural change is slow, as are modifying training paths. Shorthaul didn’t previously have the advantage of training from S/O to F/O. TAA and Australian Airlines candidates came directly from GA or airforce directly into the RHS of a high performance jet, so the training had to be good and practical.

What really impressed me was the accountability of each individual training or senior check captain in Short haul.

The onus was equal on trainer and trainee. In fact I would go as far as saying it’s greater on the trainer provided the student has prepared and has the right attitude. A failure rate that high from SO to FO in Shorthaul would not be acceptable.
My personal take was that a higher percentage of training pilots got selected on their ability to train in Shorthaul. Long haul has some extremely gifted trainers too but Shorthaul IMHO has the higher average. The system is also designed with the ethos that if you put in the work you will get through. The statistics back this up. Failures are rare in Shorthaul and it isn’t a talking point.

In both First Officer and Command training, candidates are taught to be commanders or co pilots and given the skill sets as opposed to just having it or not. If students need extra they are given it. Everyone can reach equal standard at different rates of learning.

Suspect the S/Os who failed have been in the backseat for some time. Now growth is increasing, the pressure is immense on the training section, so it’s as much a failure due to pressures on resources and a system in Longhaul where SOs were traditionally never that long in rank. Now with lots of retirements and pilot shortages this pressure will only increase. The training section will look at how they can improve the training and pathways so the failure rate is not so high. It will have to get better as the pressure isn’t going to back off. Agree with a Keg that it is disappointing that the system has let so many people down.

In an ideal world every candidate would move through Short Haul for upgrades. Certainly the failure rates would be lower.

That so many Short Haul TRIs and TREs were selected for the 787 speaks volumes about the quality of trainers.

If only the Short Haul contract was as good as the training!

Good post FlightDeck. Just to pick up a couple of quick themes.

This is how it is in long haul.

Upgrade from S/O to F/O on the A330 is currently 17 years so your ‘some time’ comment is accurate.

I’m not sure there is any direct comparison possible with SH in terms of 17 year S/O upgrading to 737 F/O but certainly the stats I’ve seen across the fleets and and across the years indicate the longer the time spent as a S/O, the more difficult the upgrade pathway. Sometimes exponentially so.

Training dynamics, preparation, training methodologies, engaging with different learning styles, etc, has long been a hobby of mine with tertiary studies and external experiences geared towards that also. There’s great discussion to be had about all of those subjects (and more). Sadly though I won’t be engaging on those discussions on PPRUNE given my closeness to some of the individuals being discussed. I’d hate for my comments to be construed as a direct comment on any individual circumstances.

Anyway, with a few more F/O trainees still in the system we’ll see how the numbers pan out.

Ah. My apologies. We were talking before about initial F/O training on the 330 so my comments were in response to that specific context. Of course some would probably consider my assessment somewhat biased. I’ve no experience of the A380 since 2015 but all the line trainers I came across in my short time were excellent. Two were outstanding.

Seems it took at least the three of them (more likely entire departments) to come up with that though. I don’t think just $24.6m would get such insightful clarity from Qf management.

14 x 787-9 due by 2020 is the current order.

$24.6 million for the year.
Now that would be $67,397 a day , would it not ?
Money well spent , or avarice personified ?
Remunerated more in one day than most Aussies earn in a year .

Is this what the Irish Banker Wa@ker wannabe was inspired by when he birthed Jetstar ?
After 1 too many Bushmills , no doubt !

Geoff Dixon was the father of Jetstar when he bought Impulse and rebranded it Jetstar. Great move against the Pommie of the Caribbean