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QF near miss over Great Australian Bight
ABC News Radio reporting a 'near miss' with 'evasive action' being required between two QF flights SY-PH and PH-SY about midday (presumably AEST) today.
Flight aware shows what looks like TCAS climb from QF576 at about 10.41 but I can't immediately find anything which looks like it was conflicting? UTR |
I wonder if Scott was driving. Through no fault of his own he seems to attract a lot of "incomming"...or is that me :E
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QF near miss over Great Australian Bight
Perhaps a RR-powered non-ADSB B767 was the other... won't be seen on Flight Aware and other such sites
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Qantas planes in 'near-miss' over Great Australian Bight - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
"I sort of thought, I presumed, an airpocket - but it really wasn't bumpy like an airpocket, it was a smoother sort of drop.Apart from that, no, we had a beautiful landing and the crew were all fine and we certainly didn't think of anything else." mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm |
Afternoon news seems to suggest that it was an RA that was triggered after one aircraft was given a climb clearance. Crew took appropriate action. Pax being interviewed at airport said didn't really notice anything but saw other aircraft pass. No hysterics, no "I thought I was gonna die" stuff, lots of file footage of A380s' landing and taking off. Usual media guff. Lets move on to next story.
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I can't believe the continuing resistance from just about all quarters to mandatory offset tracking. It's not as though there haven't been well-publicised tragedies - (Saudia out of Delhi, Luftwaffe/USAF(?) pax flights off the west African coast, the Brazilian 'incident') - all of which would not have occurred if offsetting was encouraged or even better, mandated.
How many times a day do airline crew see opposite direction traffic pass EXACTLY over or under them? Before INS/GPS, we were all over the sky. (On the way back from Perth, I can remember one night seeing the TAA 727 supposedly on the same track as us approaching Mt Hope at almost 90 degrees to our track.) Today, everyone is EXACTLY on track. We rabbit on about "the Swiss cheese model" in CRM and everything else in aviation, but with navigation, we daily allow all the 'holes' to be super-accurately lined up and rely upon the very last 'piece of cheese' - TCAS (forget about the human eye - without movement, you probably won't see the other aircraft until it's too late). Standing by to be told (as I have been before when ranting about this topic) that I don't know what I'm talking about. |
so funny qantas put out a statement "passengers where not at risk" the planes crossed 200m apart at what point are they at risk? a tcas ra?
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so funny qantas put out a statement "passengers where not at risk" the planes crossed 200m apart at what point are they at risk? a tcas ra? Had to laugh at the news tonight, one pax knew something was wrong when the seat belt sign went on 30 minutes before landing in Perth. Must have been a fast flight. |
I just thank "All Mighty" that we still have Avionic guys at QF (all be it for the moment) looking after TCAS system that just saved 500 souls from oblivion over the Bite.
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Strange, the ABC have just reported that the TCAS in one was NOT operational or NOT working correctly.
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Investigation: AO-2013-161 - Loss of separation between Airbus A330 VH-EBO and Airbus A330 VH-EBS near Adelaide SA on 20 September 2013
The flight crew of EBS received a resolution advisory alert[3] from their aircraft’s traffic collision avoidance system. |
TCAS U/S? Surely not. Oh well, the aircraft with the allegedly busted hardware couldn't have been an A380, they are part of the new age "don't require maintenance and don't break aircraft" aren't they?
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Here here Andu!!!
Bzbzzzzzzz |
I guess Andu that if mandatory offset tracking were to be implemented, that airspace in Aus (and indeed the world) would have to be completely redesigned starting with the terminals. A lot of the airspace where I work is designed around aircraft being on track give or take 1/2 a mile, and the resulting off track scenario means that separation standards may not be provided.
Thats no reason not to implement it, but did anyone ask if either of these aircraft were track shortened any length? if they were then they may have not been on an air route and offset wouldnt matter at all. *generally* if things are kept on the rails, these types of things tend not to happen (having no idea the lead up to the incident). Were the aircraft within surveillance coverage or was this a procedural error? There is a lot to consider before people start getting their pitchforks out. |
Another thing about offset tracking is that it only helps on two way routes, which are pretty rare in my part of the world, and something to be avoided if possible.
Edited to add:10W of AD, I would imagine they were on radar. Re TCAS maybe EBS received a RA to climb, while EBO just got "continue descending"? Is it possible for one TCAS to generate a RA while the other gives a TA? |
TCAS U/S? Surely not. Oh well, the aircraft with the allegedly busted hardware couldn't have been an A380, they are part of the new age "don't require maintenance and don't break aircraft" aren't they? |
The "incident" was just after 02:10 UTC over the Gulf of St Vincent.
This report in The Australian seems to be about as accurate as any I have heard or seen. Cookies must be enabled. | The Australian |
My suggestion is that it be used above FL200. I know it doesn't help with crossing traffic, but with crossing traffic, you have to be really unlucky - to have the fatal encounter at that exact moment the two aircraft cross tracks. With opposite direction traffic, you're both there on exactly the same track for hours on end.
Australian ATC have assured me that they would have to completely re-draw the airways to implement it, but elsewhere in the world, ATC aren't too bothered by it. Crossing the Atlantic using NATS tracking, possibly one of the busiest and most critical areas of airspace in the world, allows up to 2NM right of track without informing ATC (but rest assured, they can see you're doing it). It's just that so very few pilots use it. My last 20 years of flying was mostly outside Australia, and flights in Europe, Asia and North and South America quite frequently operate on the same route in both directions. It was my habit, particularly on climb and descent, to kick in a right offset the moment ATC informed me of opposite direction traffic (that I had to sight/pass before being allowed to continue the climb or descent). This not only gave an added safety factor, but assisted in seeing the opposite direction traffic because of the relative movement, which was minimal to zero if the traffic was coming right at you. The tracking tolerances of enroute airways are such that 1NM offset if used by any GPS-equipped aircraft would not put the aircraft off airways. I am not advocating the use of offset in terminal areas or if direct tracking. But as I say, there seems to be enormous resistance to it. Change of subject: someone can (will) correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that this particular incident was caused by one aircraft being cleared to climb to 2000' below the opposite direction traffic's cruising altitude. However,the PiC of the aircraft cleared to climb did so in VNAV or FLCH, resulting in such a high rate of closure with the other aircraft that the TCAS quite correctly saw the rate of closure as being inside its RA parameters and gave the correct warning to stop the climb. Offset tracking would, in most (but not all) cases prevent this, but an even better fix (and one that simply had to be used in Heathrow airspace) is to use VS mode with a lower rate of climb inserted to give the TCAS vertical mode a set of figures that would not result in an RA. The purists worry about the use of VS in case someone forgets they're in a degraded level of automation and leaves it in in a situation where the VS the pilot has inserted is greater than the RoC that VNAV or FLCH is demanding. My reply to that is that, while I understand that flight departments have to write SOPS to cover a worst case situation, if they don't allow a pilot the latitude to use his aircraft to best advantage, they're doing themselves and their pilots no favours. I have some sympathy for the poor buggers writing the SOPS, particularly since today we have lawyers lining up to find fault at every step, but the use of VS in these circumstances has a lot of advantages - advantages that I think override the "maximum level of automation at all times" argument. I think the use of VS in an all-engine overshoot/missed approach (after the initial climb is established) has similar advantages - it slows down to a manageable rate what for many pilots is a very busy (and all too often one they screw up) procedure. The recent Air France incident at JFK comes immediately to mind. |
Nautilus
Re TCAS maybe EBS received a RA to climb, while EBO just got "continue descending"? Is it possible for one TCAS to generate a RA while the other gives a TA? Yes. TCAS can generate different commands in different aircraft if the situation is line ball proximate/conflict. |
LiveATC archive has a couple of snippets from the pilots. Sounds like TCAS working on both at the time - 581 reported RA, 576 reported clear of conflict returning to FL390.
I was working 576 a couple of hours later on descent into PH and had been told TCAS US by that time... Perhaps they're a one use item?
Originally Posted by Andu
someone can (will) correct me if I'm wrong, but I understand that this particular incident was caused by one aircraft being cleared to climb to 2000' below the opposite direction traffic's cruising altitude
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Full Report on Senate Thread
Posted at 14:27 this afternoon give ABC early report and Ben Sandilands update
http://www.pprune.org/8057010-post1516.html Certainly would be of interest to the Honourable Senators. |
I always thought the term near miss is highly misleading because when you think about it if two planes nearly miss then they actually hit.... It would be more correct to call it a near-hit....
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SLOP in 'straya?
Holy smoke, No!
YBBB ATCers with the super duper ADS C **** will catch you red handed and send nasty letters to your CAA authorities and operator! You are deemed to have committed mass murder! |
No matter – problem solved; move along, nothing to see here.
Sandilands - However it has now been confirmed by CASA that an AirServices Australia controller has been stood down following the incident. |
When flying long haul I used to fly offset if I could, not always possible though. The late Rod Cane, (QF,SIA and Qatar) did an external degree whilst in Singapore and wrote his thesis on offset navigation, put a lot of work in too, be interested to know where that paper is now.
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'top' I can kinda see where yr coming from with yr analogy of a 'near miss' but I believe the comment refers to the 'miss' part of the statement being 'near' meaning they missed each other with min distance hence the word 'near':-)....hmmm I think I just wrote a 'hit & miss' comment:)
These two A/C broke a criteria (Min dist separation by Std)hence the RA which is pretty liberal & for good reasons. Am sure this sort of thing goes on world wide quite a bit it's just that our airspace is almost M/T compared to the advanced world out there making it more 'terrifying' for the media/gen public:-) Wmk2 |
Plane talking vent
Ben's not holding back on ASA/CAsA/ATsB critique! :D
Adelaide fall-out: Airservices is dangerously incompetent One of the truly alarming memes thatcirculates in incidents like yesterday’s ‘near hit’ near Adelaide is that TCAS,the automated collision avoidance system would always save the day. It isdeeply troubling that such a notion should gain traction. A day after as many as 600 passenger lives could have been snuffed out by an AirServices Australia blunder involving two Qantas A332s near Adelaide, the unadorned unairbrushed truth about this persistently dangerous and incompetent organisation needs to be taken onboard by the new federal government. In recent years the ATSB has investigated numerous instances of loss of separation incidents in which air traffic controllers were found to have been incompletely checked or trained for the duties they were undertaking. It has even in some instances published summaries of field training notes in which the controller at the centre of an incident was deemed unsuitable for the tasks given to him by a management that has persistently failed to adequately resource the service. Incredibly, the findings in ATSB final reports are released after the final draft is read by all parties and discussed with Airservices, meaning that those reports can hardly be described as unfair or unbalanced. This is a very dangerous situation not just for Australian airlines and their travellers, but foreign nationals and carriers entrusting their lives and airliners to Australian controlled airspace. The take away line from this is that Australia is persistently failing to meet the civil aviation obligations that adhere to a supposed tier one state in terms of air safety standards. This is not a popular position to take.In general, media reporting of AirServices failures is stymied by PR messaging, and a lack of resources in the general media in terms of allowing reporters with a knowledge of aviation issues to take the time to read the actual reports, which often bear little relationship to the anodyne ATSB summaries which can get printed without the real story being picked up. This is not withstanding some very incisive individual reporting in the general media. An example of this was the use of FOI by the ABC to uncover CASA’s own damning assessment of the state of affairs in AirServices Australia earlier this year. As also reported here in relation to the FOI disclosures, and the lies told by AirServices Australiawhen it lost a Virgin Australia 737: For years Australia has tolerated a situation in which foreign airlines flying to Australian airports have been denied the safe and efficient air traffic control procedures expected under international safety rules. One of the truly alarming memes that circulates in incidents like yesterday’s ‘near hit’ near Adelaide is that TCAS, the automated collision avoidance system that is mandatory for airliners and some other aircraft relating to their size and capabilities, would always save the day. It is deeply troubling that such a notion should gain traction. When airliners infringe the required separation from other aircraft, including those that may not be TCAS equipped, everything depends on adherance to the resolution advisory that one or more aircraft may receive, subject to the split second judgement of the captains of the flights involved. There is also a concern, at least insome quarters, that the TCAS unit on one of the Qantas A330s may not have been working as intended at the time of the encounter, as reported yesterday. Qantas hasn’t clarified the situation, indeed it may not know what the truth of that suggestion is at this stage. But while a bit of a worry on the side, it doesn’t change the fact that an incorrect ATC approval was given for one Qantas A330 to climb through the flight level occupied by another Qantas A330 flying directly toward it. There is no excuse for this. AirServices will kill on a very large scale unless something is done to cut through to the causes of endemic unprofessionalism in its delivery of service and remedy it. Isolated incidents are one thing. Persistent stuff ups are another. At the top of this screen is an illustration of the Adelaide incident created by the Aviation Herald. Reading its report concerning this incident is strongly recommended. And avherald report link:ok:: Incident: Qantas A332 and Qantas A332 near Adelaide on Sep 20th 2013, loss of separation ps comments also worth a read! |
From the look of the Flightradar24 tracks, offset tracking would not apply because the most efficient route meant that they crossed tracks, in this case just west of Adelaide. So in reality the situation wasn't really any different from any other where aircraft cross tracks at different altitudes. These two just happened to be less of angle than other crossing points.
In addition, the aircraft would not have hit even if the altitudes had matched. Sure, they came inside the mandatory separation distances and IF they were actually on a collision course they were less than 20 seconds apart, but it's very clear from the radar tracks that were never going to collide. Sure, it's an incident and whatever tightening of procedures is required will be undertaken and we will all be safer as a result, but to suggest it was a near miss or that without evasive action the aircraft would have collided is baloney. Without evasive action the result would have been less separation, that's all. |
Im certainly not an apologist for Airservices. However, Ben is way out of line on this one. This incident is a mistake pure and simple. It has nothing to do with training, standards, procedures, recruiting, or any other corporate rubbish that you can normally attribute to an incident.
Im not downplaying the potential severity but dont over analyse what actually happened. Human systems will always have human errors. Im sure the ATC had a sleepless night but Im equally sure they wouldnt make that mistake again. |
Finally some perspective. Yes, this was a mistake. Yes, this was a breakdown of separation. Yes, it's a serious incident. But part of high-reliability industries like aviation is the awareness that the operators are human, and that human error is inevitable whenever humans are involved. So the systems have defences in place to catch those errors before they end in disaster. And those defences worked.
Mr Sandilands clearly has a bee in his bonnet about AsA and in many cases that's equally clearly warranted. But this one isn't one of those. A controller made a human error and the system defences stepped in, more or less as designed. It's unfortunate, but it happens. That's why those defences exist. |
A question: if, as it would appear, the lower aircraft requested a climb and that request was approved, surely to God (if the TCAS was serviceable) the lower aircraft's crew had a TCAS readout of the conflicting traffic on screen. If everything was serviceable, why did they accept a climb with the other aircraft visible on their nav display?
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Nojowood, that plot is not the radar tracks, it is from uncalibrated web based ADSB information. Don't base absolute judgement on that either way.
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Pavement, it's common knowledge on here that I'm an ATC. I know that there are several ATC's that post on Prune that are directly involved in training. I'm pretty good mates with an ATC directly involved with recruitment.
I have to be very careful about what I say here. But I can say that you are wrong in several of the factors you listed. I would suggest to you that Ben Sandilands is getting pretty accurate information from somewhere, I don't know where (no really, I don't). But it's accurate. I should add that I have no knowledge of what happened, I'm not making any judgement of the controller involved (there but for the grace of god go I) it's a bloody horrible spot to be in. If less time was spent on bull**** & spin, more on the actual systemic causes of these problems the better off we'd all be as an industry. |
Jack
The investigation (and I mean internal not the waste of time ATSB) will identify the factors. I have observed your 'bent' I guess for want of better words. Some times Ive agreed but this time I dont. We can investigate by hearsay if you want to but that would not serve any purpose. I stand by my previous post by the information I know. If I subsequently learn of new facts which contradict what Ive said I will gladly apologise to Mr Sandilands. |
MTOW: I cannot recall the number of times I've had requests from pilots that you would think they could see are unavailable (potential RA resulting) due very close proximity traffic. Makes me wonder how much TCAS is used enroute for situational awareness.
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P.S Totally agree with your last sentence.
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Show me the money
Xxxxxxxx
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Many of us take cheap shots at Asian ATC, in particular Indonesia. They have very poor infrastructure, including radio quality, poor radar coverage, limited ADSB etc etc. despite this, I am no less safe in their hands.
For this type of error to occur in primary Australian airspace with full benefit of radar coverage and ADSB is not acceptable and heads should roll; Be it because of reduced manning levels, poor training or whatever as middle managers chase the elusive KPI's. To quote that retiring American Pilot of years gone by: "Second best air traffic controllers in the world". Unfortunately, the net result will be less track shortening and commonsense as everyone covers their arse but continue taking home some of the most generous salary packages available. |
Originally Posted by wasbones
MTOW: I cannot recall the number of times I've had requests from pilots that you would think they could see are unavailable (potential RA resulting) due very close proximity traffic. Makes me wonder how much TCAS is used enroute for situational awareness.
What surprises me is the number of times I hear pilots cleared to non-standard levels. I thought that was to be for operational requirements only after the Darwin incident, yet recently I was offered a non-standard level by ATC after being told that the standard level I'd asked for was not available. |
I'm confused,
Can we assume both aircraft on the same frequency and monitoring traffic in their immediate surrounds. Airmanship? Both ADSB equipped. Conflict Resolution part of ATC equipment?? Haven't checked but crossing airways?? Both TCAS equipped and no doubt RVSM? 5 defences I count. Trouble in River City? |
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