I'm using as reference an ICAO document dated Dec 2012. It lists a total of 16 civilian & 9 Military ILS installations in Australia.
The new Wagga ILS is further away from Adelaide than Melbourne by about 100nm and about 40nm further from Mildura than Melbourne. So its irrelevant to the debate. In my experience in dealing with the airforce (for non aviation uses), they have become so restrictive, bureaucratic, insular and restrictive in the last 3 - 5 years, that I can imagine it would be easier to deal with CASA / ATSB following a landing on a highway than the airforce. It is easier for us to use military facilities in Singapore, Thailand and the US than Australia. The only way I get to 11 ILS enroute is to include Sydney, Melbourne, and the cluster near each. The reality is that most of these are not effective alternates in situations such as this. If you said you wanted an alternate within (say) 250nm with a different weather condition, then Adelaide's in trouble. My real point is just that we are more precious about ILS than most other countries. From the same ICAO document, I count 147 airports with ILS in China, 53 in Japan, 23 in Malaysia (with nearly the same population), 26 in Saudi Arabia, 26 in Thailand. If we were serious about aviation safety, we'd use the $6.4 million being spent on paint, carpet and partitions in the Mildura terminal upgrade and put ILS into 4 more airports. Or embrace WAAS. Our government is shortchanging us, and pilots end up taking the blame. |
Let's see if atsb can meet their self imposed deadlines!!! |
Old Akro although I agree with your premise on the ILS/WAAS installation lagging behind other developed/developing nations, which is also just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to aviation infrastructure (especially with airports) in this country. But in the YMIA incident would ILS or WAAS made a great deal of difference?? Maybe it would be better if YPAD had a CATIII ILS or the BOM had sufficient resources to be more predictive of localised wx phenomena or...and the list goes on..and on..
However I believe there to be far greater systemic issues related to the YMIA incident(s) (that in the wash-up industry stakeholders will ignore at their peril). It is extremely refreshing to see the ATSB placing some of their limited resources into (hopefully) carrying out a thorough, unbiased, apolitical inquiry into this incident....industry desperately needs our old bureau back!;) Ben's sentiments: Qantas 737 now included in Mildura fog incident inquiry Ben Sandilands | Jul 02, 2013 2:46PM | EMAIL | PRINT It isn’t surprising that the ATSB today officially broadened its inquiry into a very low fuel landing by a Virgin Australia 737 at fog bound Mildura airport on 18 June to include a Qantas 737 that made a similar reduced visibility low fuel landing minutes before that incident. This is shaping up to one of the most important inquiries yet made by the safety investigator, as it involved two mainline jets carrying significant numbers of passengers coming close to a state of fuel exhaustion. And by coincidence the announcement comes on a prolonged foggy day at Canberra Airport, indicative of what has been a very foggy (and soggy) winter for many Australian airports in the southern parts of the mainland. |
What now inc QF as part of the fiasco?........nah we can't have that, the Mods would never allow it:E
'bout time the authorities look at ALL the details not just to select whom they want to appease some with lots more clout! The 'Fog' that has the most impact on these events is the Fog that the bean counters create! I would like to think that this event will shake up the industry a little & make sure pilots get support not angst!. Wmk2 |
But in the YMIA incident would ILS or WAAS made a great deal of difference?? But I think we both agree that the focus should be on the failings in aviation infrastructure rather than pilot's decision making or fuel reserves. Cat III in Adelaide, WAAS or ILS at Mildura or better forecasts would have avoided the whole situation. And by the way, lets not forget that there is still no radar coverage at Mildura. |
How good is that Ben(sarcs) agrees that the atsb should investigate further.
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How good is that Ben(sarcs) agrees that the atsb should investigate further. |
better forecasts... Perhaps Sandilands needs to ask the question..:) |
Senate Inquiry
I reckon they should pencil in a Senate Inquiry into this investigation for about January 2016 :E
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Ansett Autoland at Adelaide 1999
It is interesting to compare the Mildura event with this incident that happened 14 years ago. It was a similar problem solved by an unauthorised procedure. Nothing has changed today except the BOM observations are done from a location closer to the runway.
If my memory serves me correctly the A320 crew were praised for their handling of the incident. They did not have much fuel left after landing (1500KG) Investigation: 199904029 - Airbus Industrie A320-211, VH-HYO, Adelaide, Aero. SA, 20 August 1999 |
Or this one
In the 1970s, an Ansett F28 operating at night, encountered unforecast sea fog. It diverted to another port only to again encounter unforecast sea fog. At this stage the aircraft became fuel critical and declared an emergency. As a result of local knowledge gained prior to joining that airline, the flight crew were able to make an emergency landing at Fitzroy Crossing, a remote un-lit dirt runway (ground personnel were setting portable flares as the aircraft landed). The aircraft ran out of fuel on the landing roll. |
casa, atsb and Mildura
Jungmeister, good catch.
It is interesting to look at the SR's from this: Local safety action As a result of this occurrence, the BoM's analysis and report of the meteorological aspects of the occurrence included the following recommendations:
On 19 July 2000, BoM reported:
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I was in Montreal at the time.
I was not in that job at the time. I didn’t join CASA until after that time. All CASA FOIs agree that pilots alone are responsible for anticipating and managing the consequences of un-forecast fog and third-world aviation infrastructure. Fixed. :ok: |
As a result of this occurrence, the BoM's analysis and report of the meteorological aspects of the occurrence included the following recommendations: What is even more alarming is that despite the issue seemingly listed as a 'Safety recommendation' there is no record listed as a SR or safety action or 'Safety advisory notice'. Which begs the question was it ever recorded? Or was it recorded then binned when the ATSB changed over the database? Either way it would appear that safety issues/actions related to this incident are lost forever unless you happen to read the incident report. Here is a link for all the SRs and 'Safety actions' addressed to the BoM, 'see here' .You should find that there is 1 page with 9 entries, one of which includes the 2000 Norfolk Island R20000040. Maybe (in defence of the ATSB) the Safety Actions highlighted, in this incident, were addressed to the local BoM office and that is why it has slipped through the gaps. Either way I agree Jungmeister, good catch!:ok: Priceless Creamy!:E Thanks for that CC..another perfect opportunity missed...darn!!:ugh: Kind of sounds like the current Beakerised methodology on safety actions..."err they fixed it so what are you worried about...nothing to see here!" :oh: |
"Not our part of ship"
They were internal BoM recommendations, not BASI/ATSB recommendations - therefore no need for BASI/ATSB to track them or make sure they happened. In the grand old naval tradition, it was someone else's problem - "not our part of ship"!!! :{ :O :=
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I think a big point is being missed here.
Pilots don't so much need an "accurate" forecast (where "accurate" may be defined as being correct most of the time) as they need an "accurate" worst case scenario (where "accurate" should be defined as never failing to indicate the possibility of the worst case scenario). If there is a 0.1% chance of a weather condition such as fog or TS occurring then I want a note to that effect on the forecast. |
Gosh.
If "0.1% chance" is the threshold, every forecast will include one or both of fog and TS! :eek: How does that help? |
Exactly CreamPuff . If that were the threshold most pilots would develop a type of 'Threat Fatigue' relative to TS and fog and it would be next to useless.
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so....
until all this gets fixed, why is no one questioning fuel policy? rpt jets getting airborne on a cold winter mornings with high pressure systems hanging about without a pre arranged plan b call me simple, but i struggle with that |
Look at the post on p15. The fog was unforecast less than 2 hours prior. The forecasts went from PROB30 FOG to real FOG in one go.
In my experience PROB30 might as well be 0.1%. Its the lowest PROB that is used. I think its reasonable to expect a better forecast that going from PROB30 to real fog in 2 hours with no intermediate steps. |
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