Story is far from over
 

Overall the story missed despite great camera and editing.
Certainly again proves 4 Corners has lost the journalistic edge it had in the Chris Masters era. As one journo commented - it was as forensic as pathology without results!!

Re Milne's comments:
Milne hinted at the nexus between the two which in risk terms are not mutually exclusive. In other words there was an awkward mid sentence pause that I'm sure will later prove to be significant.

That said however the question of "who knew what" is unanswered.

Still find it hard to believe that Milne and Co did not know what was happening on the Airbus production line with RR replacing engines, the AD's and the test bed failure and not even thinking to ask the question about the engines on the QF 380 wings. Single contract responsibility does not negate the need for due diligence.

End of the day RR knew there was an issue and a resultant risk and did NOTHING hoping to lay low and change the rented engines over quietly during heavy.

Noted the absence of CASA in the 4 Corners story although CASA was very quick to issue letters of praise coincidently as QF talked up the market with resumption of 380 services. Dolan for the ATSB was ineffectual and highlighted why both Regulatory bodies need a shake up.

Also thankful for the noted absence of Olivia's Worth-less efforts.

Did however like the AIPA lanyard.

AT :E

Question:

If QF lease their engines on a per hour basis, is it incumbent on RR to keep Qantas appraised about 'non operational' issues with the engines since they are only buying a service?

Qantas seem effectively on a pay as you go deal and this in itself, if my question is valid reduces the layers of swiss cheese from what used to be two layers (manufacturer and owner both with a vested interest) to just one layer where RR are the only party interested in looking for issues.

The old addage two sets of eyes are better than one!!

More to Follow

The Kelpie

Kelpie,

the overlay to your question also involves the State Based OHS Acts particularly the Victorian Act which has clear obligations associated with Designers, Manufacturers and Operators of Plant (plant as in a/c & engines).

While Q belives Mascot is the centre of the universe, the placement of crew from Victoria on the 380 means that the Victorian OHS legislative provisions also apply.

Under such it is incumbent upon the Designer and Manufacturer (ie RR) and Operator (QF) to not only inform but more significantly 'ensure'!!

Not that State WorkCover/Safe Agencies have a passion for prosecution, it is none the less a clear underscore to RR's obligations to tell and QF's obligations to ask.

Moreover Airbus by its own admissions knew of RR's replacement of prod line engines - Still can't quite buy Joyce's line that Q knew nothing and certainly can't buy the line that Q did not have to ask the questions.

The Q action against RR would make the detail of those agreements to some degree, discoverable but reality is there is no way on earth that RR would risk the precident of an unfavourable judgement.

AT

And totally inappropriate. How many people watching this program would realise that because of seniority, only the most experienced of Qantas' pilots would occupy the front seats during the critical phases of flight?

Your point being Ken? Do you disagree with the SO's statement?

Sorry Ken but does the same apply to Jetstar?

Might at the moment but for how long?

I've made my point but I can't help you if you are either unable or unwilling to understand it! :ugh::ugh::ugh:

Ken
Actually I don't think the answer was inappropriate, because I believe the question asked by the interviewer (not shown/heard on tv) was: how do you think an inexperienced F/O would have handled the emergency?

Nice sidestep Ken, spoken like a true politician. I understood your statement clearly and think that the SO was simply trying to state that the FO was at his limits in a high workload situation.

Thread drift, but valid to my argument- do the passengers realise that their "most experienced" pilot up in the RHS on a Jetconnect or Jetstar service is actually far from it? :hmm:

Ken proves once again he has NFC

I think for not only handling the incident brilliantly, but for handling the media attention superbly Richard deserves a knighthood. :D

That man is the face of Qantas, not some actor. He and his crew (tech and cabin) replicated the Sully / Skiles crew. What more can you say. Brilliant.

As for the phorensic study....well.:rolleyes:

Nope. Just got promoted. Head of IOC.

Please qualify Chadzat why any of the current F/Os in JQ are not up to standards and why?

You must admit it was 10 times better than the 60 minutes PR show:rolleyes:

Just wondering what's the flying background of the F/O? Military, GA, Instructing etc?

It actually stated in the show that the FO came into QF via the cadet program.:ooh:

Training wheels, am pretty sure he is GA. Having been on the wrong end of a few rather alarming problems over the years, you really don't know how you will react until the **** happens. It is highly likely 99% of you, would react in the same way as this crew. You would not be in the job you are in, you most likely would not have slipped thru the net, if you were incompetent. I found after losing a donk, on rotate, out of CBR in a DC9, full pax, full fuel, on nightfall, and the ATC advising me of a "roman candle" coming out of the port side donk, was not the way to start a sector. The F/O and I had a quick chat, the training kicked in, no other thought patterns intruded, just calm, calculated reasoning to get out of the problem, which we obviously did, and got her back on the ground. It was not till a quiet time later over a beer with the F/O, we both said "What the :mad: happened? I thought about my reaction, the F/O's reaction, and realised how much our backgrounds, our experiences, our training over the years had paid such a part in a successful outcome. That was only one of three serious problems I had in my flying career, and I found each time I reacted the same way, as did the three separate F/O's. I took that into my check and training career for years to come, and did not hesitate to fail those who showed they were not coping for whatever reason. Obviously I am deadset against any pilot, who has not put in the hard yards to occupy a RH seat, communication is a huge thing when the **** hits the fan, and the reliance of a competent F/O is paramount, which showed up in the A380, and in all three of my own experiences, that were potentially disastrous.

I think one of the most telling statements in the whole story was that of the check captain at the end where he spoke of his son going in for shoulder surgery and the doctor telling him he'd get the "Rolls-Royce treatment", to which he replied 'No thanks!" :ooh:

Matt was NOT a Cadet. He came through the GA system, as did the two Check Captains. Richard and the S/O ex-Military.

I joined the same day as Matt. He was GA, not a cadet.

Well done mate.
G.

Just think if it had been a couple of well known GA operaters in Australia.
The following scenario would have taken place:

1. The aircraft would have have been operating VFR and been climbing
OCTA to avoid enroute charges,

2. Nothing put on the M/R for at least a week or two,

3. The aicraft would have been at least 10% overloaded,

4. The pilot in the LHS would be on an ICUS paying program,

5. The pilot in the RHS would be employed on a casual basis and only paid for the hours flown.

But back to the serious side, shows the value of a well trained crew, lets see the bean counters put a costing index on that!

The CSM comment was interseting about keeping the passengers calm and in the loop.

Training is expensive, but try putting a cost on an accident.

I reckon they would and if it's covered by insurance they wouldn't give a sh!t if people were killed and a hull lost. I was going to say that an Australian would care more about the company's reputation..........but then I remember Dixon :yuk:

I 'second' that assessment.
Ken Borough the armchair expert = tosspot...........