ATSB rubbish single pilot IFR experience when it comes to being an airline pilot.
 

ATSB have just published its incident report on a B717 that approached high and tight towards Runway 30 Alice Springs during which the stick shaker operated on two occasions. Report No. AO-2008-064 Incident date September 2008. Two years and six months to get the report out. Same old - same old.

As usual, ATSB do a well researched piece of work. But one wonders at one of the comments made therein, when explaining why the captain stuffed up. Apparently the captain some time earlier, needed more command hours to meet the minimum command time to qualify as a captain on the 717 and so he took extended leave to pick up single pilot command time on light twins.

Now in Australia, single pilot IFR on light twins is the normal route for pilots hoping to be ahead of the mob trying to get into a big airline (well, big by Australian standards, that is). From that, we assume it is considered high value experience and airlines prefer to recruit from that pool (apart from the low hour cadet policy now in getting up and going).

But the ATSB report seemed to infer that single pilot IFR command experience brings with it its own problems when it states:

"The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft."

This flies into the face of every airline's recruiting policy in Australia for the past 50 years or more, where single pilot command flying on light twins was considered a highly favourable attribute to have when a pilot applies for an airline job. In other words decision making time in all weathers.

Bring on the MPL and the cadets. Seems they can be trained to operate optimally in large high performance transport jets as they have not been contaminated with useless command time on single pilot IFR ops. Well, just cast your mind back to some of the Asian, African and Middle East jet transport crashes where low hour first officers were involved, and think again.

What started off as a well written ATSB report on this 717 stick-shaker incident, is to my mind, shot to pieces by such an ill considered comment inferring the captain's single pilot (command) previous experience "had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi crew high performance aircraft."
Hello? Hadn't he already flown as F/O on a 717 and been trained to operate optimally in a multi-crew high performance aircraft? That must also have included significant training in a simulator as well as line training.

In other words, previous command experience flying single pilot IFR doesn't mean a thing to a scribe in ATSB.

Nothing in the ATSB report about the crew doing heads down programming of the FMC at low altitude when they should have been looking outside instead of staring at flight directors on a sunny day.

I think you might be misinterpreting.

A year of single pilot IFR in light twins would be great before jumping in the RHS seat of a jet (a few years would be better), but this guy did a year of single pilot IFR before jumping into the LHS. Big difference.

This is exacty what the senate inquiry is about isn't it?

Tell me how many stick shaker events haven been investigated on approach to the same airport (or any airport) by QF jets?

Can't wait for Clarries thoughts on this one....

Possibly 2 issues being blurred

1. Centaurus quite rightly believing single pilot time produces good decision makers
2. ATSB possibly infering that too much single pilot time possibly affects CRM skills.

Some airlines arent that struck on high time fighter jocks because some have demonstrated difficulty in adapting to working with others.

I could be wrong, but I would suggest that a lot of time on company turbo-props and preceding jet type, no single pilot IF time, no multi time pre employer(no IR pre employer) but a **** load of attitude suggesting it was everyone else's fault....

Surely (with specific reference to the written points) the ATSB is only making note of what is widely regarded as an industry norm elsewhere..with the possible exception of the US.
Yes single pilot IFR does produce good decision makers..but only if those pilots are taught too or taught how to reach a good decision.
How many of us can hand on heart from our GA days say that we were formally taught decision making skills? I certainly wasn't, what I did learn however was gleaned from the aeroclub bar, and from the odd sh1t-stained seat moments.
My opinion with the benefit of hindsight is that many of the skills that kept me alive in a SPIFR environment are of benefit flying mult-crew today...but plenty aren't..and have probably been trained out of me.
As for CRM, well that particular skill set requires an individual to want to be part of a team...something that single pilot stuff doesnt prepare you for, nor does it help with your management skills either IMHO.
No doubt though Mr Chuckles will jump on me now, and tell me I'm talking out of my arse:E

I'm going with Centaurus. Another cheap shot from the ATSB. Despite making such a claim/hypothesis/allegation, it provides no justification or reasons as evidence in the report.

From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties.

As for who I'd rather have in the right hand seat, give me a 1500hr GA troop over an MPL any day.

And as for the 717 stick shaker, it has been said, half tongue-in-cheek, that in the same situation, you'd have to pull 4g in a real Boeing to get the SS. The 717's SS is a sensitive beast.

Oh and another point; the ATSB obviously has no idea about flying jets in the circuit. One generally does not do square base legs. To claim that the crew didn't "conform" with the ATC clearance is pretty rich, especially given the track, as shown on the map, is near enough to a base join anyway.

I also don't see the point in mentioning the other stick-shake events, especially the three that were system failures. They have absolutely no relevance to this incident. If the ATSB was trying to make a point, they missed the mark.

Does such arrogance still exist???

A380,
Fitted to most real aircraft. Not found on Dugongs. :}

You're pulling too hard when the purple light's on and there's blue smoke in the cockpit. The only IFR I do is when I Follow Roads, Rivers and Railway lines! :E

For us blokes, that came off single ops twotters in PNG and Australia, straight onto DC9'S and B727's, I can but only contain the laughter. Who writes this crap.:rolleyes: Give me a GA pilot anyday, regardless what he/she flew.

????
 

Are our government aviation organiations investigating and regulating or manipulating? Are they really impartial?

How many of the people at ATSB who write this stuff actually have or had a CPL, have actually done significant single pilot IFR, and have done multi crew RPT ops?

I'll bet that whomever wrote it came from one of those aviation safety degrees with no piloting experience.

Having gone from single pilot to multi pilot operations and back several times I can kind of see their point. Jumping from one type of operations to another for a relatively low experience guy can be an issue. Going back to multi crew from a period of single pilot ops requires a bit of practice and simulator time, but is infinitely easier than transitioning to single pilot from multi pilot. If you need captaincy time it would be easier if you got it first then progress onto an airline job where it will be required for promotion. Or am I missing something?

Fundamentally, I would prefer to train a competent single pilot IFR guy on multi crew operations than try and teach captaincy skills to someone who has almost no solo time.

Having read the report, one of the first things that stood out was the fact the captain had the first officer programming the flight management computer to draw lines and position fixes on the moving map display to a three mile final - and before that more heads down programming was taking place despite the aircraft being high and fast and the runway in sight.

What mind-set is taught to airline pilots that so many rely heavily on heads down flying on flight directors and hanging on to autothrottles regardless if appropriate or not (amazing things though they may be),that they have apparently lost the basic flying skills needed to judge a visual approach path without having stick shakers going off.

The time is well overdue that ATSB make serious research on previous incidents of this nature (unstable approaches below 1000 ft for example, perhaps stick shaker incidents, and high and fast approaches), to see if quite unnecessary heads down programming of flight management systems at low altitudes has, in fact, led to greater workload than desirable with the inevitable result the crew are well behind the aircraft.

One is reminded of a true story in which a Boeing instructor pilot in a US simulator remarked to a pilot undergoing a 737 endorsement: "Barry - one thing is for sure and that is you will never be killed flying a 737 - and do you know why? Well, I'll tell you why. That mother-fu***r will be so far ahead of you when it crashes you'll never catch up"

Time and again, there has been evidence that loss of control crashes overseas have been caused by too much concentration on autopilot programming to the detriment of basic handling skills.

I think, and totally my opinion, that the ATSB is stating that the COMPANY itself is at fault, due to the fact that they made the PIC, previously, take some leave(WOP?) and obtain some command hours to meet their req for command(see previous post re how long this guy had beeen with the company). Obviously the guy didn't have the right connections to get the COMPANY 500 ICUS that previous command candidates received...

Why not look at the requirement to have 500 hours PIC in the first place. The experience gained by 500 hrs more in the RHS of the 717 would have been alot more valuable to this pilot than 500 hours single pilot IFR.

Australian GA single pilot IFR pilots are simply that. They tend to be one man band operators even after years of Airline flying. They never quite grasp the concept of true multi crew operations. Agricultural is a term that comes to mind.
I guess they dont know that they dont know.
Ignorance is bliss.

The wisest three words my instructor ever uttered unto me were "aviate, navigate, communicate." Surely this order of priorities continues to apply no matter whether you're in a PA28 or a B717?

Do BOTH crew routinely need to have their heads down to fiddle with the FMC? Surely PNF could have done that while PF continued to look out the window and scan instruments?

Another village idiot is loose again.

So where, Mr Big Boeing "boy" do all the best multi crew pilots come from?

Please don't tell me the RAAF. :8

My experience is that if pilots are subject to a robust check and training system, it doesn't much matter what their previous history was, they can and will adapt, if not the check and training department will resolve the issue one way or the other.

That generalisation is absolute rubbish, Mr MPL. Two-crew operation is not rocket science, despite what the scientists (you one of them?) might say. All that is needed if half-decent training.

Agree.

Systematic problems I believe lined up most of the holes in this piece of cheese.
This guy had been with the company for well over 12 years.
He had flown 4 different multi crew aircraft types within this company. 2 x jet types.
He joined the company understanding (i.e. he understood, I don't know) that the company would provide ICUS and all that was needed to progress him. They did provide a CIR for him on initial employment, from then on there was no assistance from above to progress, in fact the opposite even though most of his checks indicated he was satisfactory.
This was how the check and no training system worked in this company back then. (Thankfully all three at the top of that tree have either been removed or moved on by choice)
This guy ended up taking LWOP pay and ALV/LSL to obtain some fairly useless hours in the scheme of things
If there had been a robust check and training system in place, he should have either been trained to a satisfactory standard, OR if not satisfactory moved on!

He was/is a product of a Check Up No Training System that was full of holes.

He was along way from any buffet,

Bankrunner.

You are following the correct line. In a proper world both heads should never be down. If the FMS needs input, one should be programming the box while the other maintains the AVIATE function. Who does what can vary from company to company. However the fundamental rule is that only one should be box watching.

The question then arises as to whether or not the box fiddling is necessary. A lot of the time, close in, drawing pretty pictures will give you nothing more than is already available, but it looks nice. Gee aren't I clever, I can draw.
If it is an IMC arrival it should be programmed long before you arrive. If it is a VMC arrival or visual on the end of an IMC arrival, it should be done with the heads out of the office for the bulk of the time.

The problem arises because of the lack of skills and background in the planning and execution of the visual sectors. Many crew lack the confidence to properly conduct a visual approach.
Many is the time that I have watched, (from all seats front and back, left and right), crews trying to do things on the screen, that are clearly visible from a good look out the window.
Many times have I seen circuits done where the PF sees nothing till he/she looks up on short final. Is it any wonder that occasionally they get stuffed up.
The reason for this is the aforementioned lack of confidence and skills, coupled with a lack of proper training and enforcement of standard procedures, and is a systemic issue rather than an individual one.
Don’t blame the pilot for the procedure if has not been given the tools and training to do it properly, blame the training system, for it is that which is putting out an insufficiently skilled individual; blame the checking system for failing to ensure that proper standards are not being maintained; and blame the auditing system (internal and/or CASA) for not picking up that procedures are either deficient, non existant, or not adhered to. :ugh::ugh::ugh:

SS

I won't argue with that, Scam! :ok:

It's plain to me that the leaders of the industry are no longer leading. They are being lead by rampant technology invasion, unknowingly allowing basic skills to disappear. Either we take the bull by the horns and train hard in both autos AND manual, or we give in and do RNP approaches everywhere. That's fine, right up to the point where the autos mess up. Then jets start dropping out of the sky. The biggest current cause of prangs is no longer CFIT; it's loss of control. Pilots can no longer "fly", and it's only going to get worse.

Maybe we should have days of boxless approaches. That would be entertaining. Get that Dugong on the buffet, eh 380?

Point taken Cap't B. I was talking in a more general sense in response to Bankrunners post, rather than in response to the subject incident. I have not read the report.

SS

Any effective investigation is obliged to consider ALL factors.
Let’s have another look at the paragraph that seems to be causing all the fuss:

The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft. However, it was not possible to establish if that recent non-airline experience influenced the pilot’s actions on the day.

Note the words “had the potential”, and in particular the last sentence. In my opinion some here are drawing a fairly long bow if they consider that the above paragraph constitutes rubbishing single pilot IFR experience. Either that or some pretty thin skins. No further mention of the PIC’s extra-company flying is made anywhere in the report.
Now to the findings. NO MENTION is made of the PIC’s single-pilot operations in the findings. Had the paragraph quoted above been included as part of the findings, I would then consider that those who find this report so offensive perhaps had a case. In the meantime I reckon a Bex and lie down might be in order for a few here.

RENURPP

Does the said Captain (who I know) approve of you airing his dirty laundry on here mate??

It's clear to me that this incident has nothing to do previous experience type. There are hundreds of examples out ther of why SPIFR experience is the most valuabe thing an airline pilot can have, this hapoens to not be one of them.

If it was not possible to support the assumption with evidence - why include it in the report??

Their (ATSB) reports are usually pretty bloody good.... but this part.... - not so good.

Machiavelli and Renurpp
 

BV,

Perhaps Renurrp fully intended to continue with his apparent public support while giving full rein to his private aim of making the individual's life truly miserable?

Bloggs,

Well, really there was....

Centaurus,

There is GA experience that is invaluable and there is GA experience that has the potential to be a latent failure. In the context of the current Senate debate, here is a hypothetical for you: if you were a cadet thrown into GA after 12 years and you went flying unsupervised parachute school stuff for a year, how might that affect your future judgement back in your jet not long after when faced with a high energy marginal visual approach?

And generally,

The shaker was activated by a turbulence encounter in the base turn - the predictive algorithm can be quite vicious when you fall into a 1.4g "hole" - not specifically by the PF's handling.

The true value from an HF viewpoint of this whole incident (notwithstanding RENURRP's distortions) seems to have gone missing, unfortunately a hallmark of recent ATSB efforts.

An example of the stick shakers sensitivity can be gleaned from an activation on entering light mechanical turbulence on a straight in approach, some 15nm from the threshold, and descending at Vmin (not to be confused with Vs) plus 20ish knots.

No sign of the red zipper (stall warning foot), QAR recorded 1.4g, stick shaker activated for a nano-second.

Prince,
OK, don't keep us in suspense. How about sharing your thoughts? What were the significant CRM/Multi-crew issues/deficiencies that could be gleaned from the report, or are you making your claim based on inside info that the ATSB hasn't identified?

Is Abdul still with Coham?
I agree original post was making a mountain of a molehill.
I also agree and very happy that most of the tosser C+T department have been pissed off. They were a bunch of mongrels. They hated Abdul and I am glad he got a command eventually.
Never forget the Wagner Principal.

I dunno what the "Wagner Principal" is but sure know the "Wagner Principle". :E

And the answer is Yes.

Wagner Principal
Wild Ass Guesses Not Easily Refuted.
Used a lot these days.
I am glad he is doing OK

So are you the Principal supporter of the Wagner Principle? ;)

Yes. Beware the Wagner principal. Useful on some check flights though.

Inside Info
 

Bloggs,

only on what ex-Chairman Renurpp told me..... :( :uhoh: :eek:

It's funny, everytime one of these things happen, everyone forgets there was copilot in the right seat.

'Gee captain, your getting kinda slow, maybe I can push the throttle up a little, push the stick forward'

Or is it that in the real world of airline hiring practices that the copilot is a seat warmer and not expected to participate in the flight.

I can't get worked up over this, everyone is getting exactly what they deserve and the authorities are just throwing darts when they know the cause: They aren't hiring capable pilots.