QantasLink Sydney 26 Dec 08- astonishingly unsafe approach?
Late yesterday the independent air safety investigator, the ATSB released a damning report into an astonishingly unsafe approach to Sydney Airport by a QantasLink turbo-prop at the end of a flight from Moree on Boxing Day 2008. Qantaslink cockpit failures exposed by ATSB report – Plane Talking AO-2009-001 I am not sure if this was "astonishingly unsafe" but there are some shades of recent accidents with unmonitored airspeed on final (Colgan at Buffalo). Does this incident have serious safety implications which are being kept from public scrutiny as Sandilands seems to suggest or is his article another beat up? :confused: |
Originally Posted by paulg
I am not sure if this was "astonishingly unsafe" but there are some shades of recent accidents with unmonitored airspeed on final (Colgan at Buffalo).
Also I am not sure why the ATSB is associating a FAF with an ILS. Precision approaches have FAPs, not FAFs. Their reference to non-compliance to the SOPs excerpts listed does not make sense to me. The FAF listed on the chart is for the non-precision approach (LOC 34), a pure ILS approach, like YMML ILS-X (the CAT II & CAT III) only has a FAP. http://www.airservices.gov.au/public...MLII04-123.pdf |
Did I read that right?
At the time the PNF PIC was writing down a "Landing Clearance".... Is that SOP peculiar to Qantaslink? If this is indeed an expectation - that the PNF (and PIC in this instance) have a pen in one hand and something to write on in the other - at such a busy point in an approach then the world has indeed gone mad. That is the layman's equivalent of writing, texting, GPS programming, while driving in traffic and the people that come up with these ridiculous 'ass covering' procedures should be held accountable. In fact we need a sea change - they need to be made to chew on the indecipherable 800 page Ops Manuals that they, and the authorities, come up with. |
people that come up with these ridiculous 'ass covering' procedures should be held accountable. |
ATSB is a little lacking on the detail here. Chatting with a Qlink mate about this a while ago I was told that with the landing clearance the tower also told them to exit at taxiway Foxtrot and it was this information that was written down.
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Also I am not sure why the ATSB is associating a FAF with an ILS. Precision approaches have FAPs, not FAFs. Their reference to non-compliance to the SOPs excerpts listed does not make sense to me. |
SWH
The FAP is co-incident with the FAF of a localizer-based non-precision approach in Australia. What are you trying to refer to with the ML16 chart? Where do you think the FAF/FAP is? G/S intercept at 4000' or 3000' or where? Clear as Mud. |
When I was at Eastern the technically correct procedure to comply with the FAM was to write down the landing clearance on the Landing Card.
So there you go.....Ass covering indeed. I think the captain involved was actually a checkie to boot !!! GUARD:ok: |
When I was at Eastern the technically correct procedure to comply with the FAM was to write down the landing clearance on the Landing Card.
So there you go.....Ass covering indeed. I think the captain involved was actually a checkie to boot !!! GUARD Was never the case when I was there, and I was a Checkie, and not that long ago either. |
So, was that the one with check Capt. Flan-diddly-anders and the cadet FO? Heard it was almost a loss of control event :E
From memory the taxi light was used for landing clearance. |
That is the layman's equivalent of writing, texting, GPS programming, while driving in busy shopping centre...
Originally Posted by ATSB report
As a result of this occurrence, the operator has proactively implemented changes to its DHC-8 training syllabus, highlighted to its crews the destabilising effects of changes to an aircraft's configuration during an approach and emphasised to crews the importance of good communication in a multi-crew environment.
Next they'll overshoot the turn onto final because of a crosswind. :rolleyes: |
Where does it say the FO was a cadet. Having 2100hrs total including 220hrs on type is more than enough to operate as an FO. I am afraid it was just a stuff up, luckily no sad outcome!
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Having 2200hrs total including 220hrs on type is more than enough to operate as an FO |
desmotronic
Very true, but you could ask, what was the Captain who was very experienced doing? How would an ATPL make a difference in this case? |
How would an ATPL make a difference in this case? you could ask, what was the Captain who was very experienced doing? |
From desmotronic
Obviously not in this case and why no ATPL. What difference does "no ATPL make? I never completed my ATPL exams until 6,000hrs plus. Am now a Q300 Captain with in excess of 11,000 hrs |
I never completed my ATPL exams until 6,000hrs plus. Am now a Q300 Captain with in excess of 11,000 hrs What difference does "no ATPL make? |
Immediate report
2 pilots a CVR,FDR and radar tapes. And it takes 18 months to issue this final report? And it doesn't even talk to much about the FOs training? |
Am now a Q300 Captain with in excess of 11,000 hrs Mind you, I was a 146 captain when I had around 3800 hours... yeah i don't think many people are going to be impressed with your progress at 11,000 hours! |
I sense a bit of dick waving going on here. Lets get real guys, we all do sims..
we are all human..know what I mean. |
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