Aircraft, I'm afraid that it is you that doesn't grasp the incident.

Yes, the crew likely made an error. Yes, it was caught by the configuration warning horn. Yes, the crew corrected their error and continued.

My boy, the system worked as advertised. The QAR WILL have captured and flagged it, but I guarantee you that the crew WILL have self reported.

How do I know? I fly 737's. Whilst I haven't personally seen this one occur, I have seen plenty of other things which would probably have you sh1tting in your nappy.

So pullleeease don't get on here and lecture professional pilots about their moral responsibility. They are fully aware.

Sandy Freckle:
The "config warning" part worked, but that is the last resort catch. The part that a professional pilot would be extremely concerned about is that it required the config warning to prevent the takeoff continuing (that it happened at all, in other words). How well did the warning horn work in the case of the Helios 737 that failed to pressurise?

How can you guarantee that the crew self reported? I thought only used car salesmen handed out guarantees so freely.

Is it one of your guarantees that the incident will be detected by the person analysing the QAR data? Other posters to this thread have stated that what gets picked up is dependent on how sensitive the analyst chooses to run the analysis. Is the QAR data from every flight analysed? Does it require humans to do it? What if those humans call in sick or get snowed under?

Some are aware, but by no means all. There are powerful reasons not to self report at times - but surely you would be aware of that.

Aircraft Profile;
Age:
22
Licence Type (eg CPL. Pilots only):
ATPL
Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only):
PA28
Location:
Perth, Australia


With all due respect aircraft I think you are way out of your depth.

Via second hand information coming from someone who was not on the flight deck or in the loop about the decisions being made and basing their assumptions purely on an observation way back in row 16, you have neither relevant qualifications nor appropriate expertise to make intelligent comment.

:ugh:

Thanks for pointing out the "experts" qualifications Shapeshifter.
Don't ya just love the gawl of these 22 y.o. armchair experts that just know it all :hmm:
Thanks for the advice Aircraft, now get back to flight sim or the PA28 and leave us alone will ya.
The system is well able to take care of mistakes of this nature.
And don't even begin to compare the Greek accident with this.

Aircraft I can assure you that the experienced crew on that 737 would be very aware of their responsibilities.
They have more than just a basic CPL on their licence.

No sledging of crew here, because it can happen to any one of us...something that our mate Aircraft hasn't grasped!

Professionals do make mistakes Aircraft.....and you could make one of those mistakes one day. I'm sure the crew has learnt from it, but until you know the full facts, ie, were the crew rushed by ATC, was it a faulty flap guage, the crew may have thought they had done the before takeoff checklist etc etc, be very carefull about "dobbing" people in.

Another thing Aircraft, with good CRM, aircraft and systems knowledge, and a professional attitude etc etc we go to work in the aim of minimising mistakes. And if they do occur, we report them and learn from it. If you are an up and coming professional pilot, you may want to adopt a more humble attitude, thats no personal attack on you, just a bit of advice.

aircraft, you referred to the Helios accident warning horn.
Well it worked perfectly well, and remained on the whole time I believe. I dont think they even cancelled it.

Gday,

In a previous life, I have done 2 successive RTO's due to the TKOF Config warning. Each time we cleared the runway, ran through a scan of all trigger items, again ran all checklists to see if we had missed the bleedin obvious.

Very bemused we returned to the gate. Once investigated, it was found the warnings were generated by a micro switch, which measures condition lever angle, that had collapsed.(Damn Turboprops)

We have all missed things at times, that is why we have 2 pilot aeroplanes, checklists and Config Warning systems.

No foul in this case, as mentioned earlier, the system worked. And, the chaps at the pointy end would indeed be very self critical if an error was made in this area. No one would take an omission like that lightly, we have all seen the outcome of attempted Flapless takeoffs.

Cheers,

Con:ok:

Qantas Maintenance Memo
 

QF Maint Memo M06-0047 issued 27 Sept 06

"...Procedural change.......take off flap will be selected after Engine start and PRIOR TO the dispatching engineer being advised to disconnect."

Applicability 737-300/400 737-700/800 :ouch:

IMHO, the selection of flap for take off is both critical and forgettable, thats why there is a this warning. This is particularly so, if for example, the flap selection has to be delayed until just prior to lining up, just post de-icing.
The operation I work for does autoland the 737 classic and NG. Flap 40 is the recommended setting as it gives a lower nose attitude and therefore a greater chance of seeing some lights, but flap 30 is certified.

Am dumbfounded that an aspiring "professional" aviator is suggesting that someone sitting in the back drinking beer and eating peanuts should report fellow professional flight crew to CASA. What has happened to the world.
I bet they would make a helpful and supportive F/O, NOT!
BB

No one would ignore a warning - Surely
 

"TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP"
"SHUT UP GRINGO"

testImagine a multi-sector four day trip?
Anyone else hoping the psych test works as advertised...

It has been revealing, how so many posters claim not to have a problem with self reporting but get all sqeamish at the idea of making a report that involves another pilot.

And throughout all this discussion, the word "professional" keeps coming up.

It seems the posters here regard making such a report as "dobbing". One poster (Pete Conrad) even used those exact words.

Well, maybe it takes somebody with my lack of humility to point out the following:

If you have a problem making a report that implicates another pilot, you are not as professional as you think you are.

No further questions your Honour.

geez i didn't expect the thread to turn out like this...'aircraft' is very passionate abot me telling someone other than u guys abut this event isnt he/she...

thanks again to the few posters who gave me the info on how the crew would have got the alarm from takeoff config warning... and also for the explanation re:QAR.

We all can agree that this shouldn't have happened, but it did, and the crew presumably did the right thing and carried on..

hey bundybear, it was rum, not beer..:ok:

QF peanuts...THE BEST!

Aircraft, I have some experience and advice I'd like to share with you.

As a very, very, very, junior engineer at AN, I was once asked to investigate rather unpleasant nosewheel vibration on a few aircraft (F27 Fokkeri) and proudly presented my typed report, complete with diagrams, graphs and some impressive statistics...............and my recommendation that the entire fleet be grounded forthwith pending the assembly of a task force to deal with the matter.

To his everlasting credit, my boss politely, tactfully and privately tore me to shreds in such a way that I didn't feel the complete git that I obviously was (and probably still am). My complete overreaction and jumping of miles to conclusions about the matter was never mentioned again, and I like to think they eventually beat some sense into me.

From memory the problem was fixed by tightening the balance specs on the nosewheel, a bit of re - rigging or giving someone a kick in the backside, or all three, can't remember which.

I would respectfully suggest that you learn to consider when it is appropriate to shut up or perhaps make further inquiries before opening mouth, otherwise I suggest that your aviation career is going to come to a very short and embarrassing end.

To put it another way, How do you think you are going to feel when you stuff up again, and one of your colleagues gleefully runs off to ATSB before you are out of the aircraft?

Aircraft...............grow up
ya plonker.

A configuration warning system is installed to serve a purpose. Obviously the system worked as advertised.
What's all the fuss about?
There is not a single pilot I know of that would not report this kind of incident.
"Boss, we stuffed up. Will do our best not to do it again", can't really be argued with.
Does anybody here really know the full story. Was this their 5th sector of the day, or maybe a 2nd sector after just completing a redeye?
I can only hope to be as professional as "aircraft" one day. :mad:

either flap 30 or 40 is ok, depending on field length and what you feel like doing.
the main reasons for using 30 instead of 40 are better approach climb gradient ie higher landing weight and/or lower minima and also better control in strong x-wind landings.
flap 40 is normal for autolands because of better slant vis in low vis conditions but there is no reason why 30 can't be used except for the above.
it's up to the individual.
in the 300's you mainly used 30 in hot weather because of approach climb limitations but apart from icing conditions it doesn't make much diff in a 700.